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4Abstract
This thesis comprises railway mnovation in the 19th century, railway regulation, recent
railway reforms across Europe and a theoretical analysis. The historical study is
complemented by an investigation of the rationale for extensive regulations and eventual
nationalisation of railway systems. The nationalisation schemes granted exclusive rights to
public undertakings to provide a public railway and sometimes more extensive transport
services. Notwithstanding subsidies and a protectionist railway policy, the railways could
not compete successfully with other modes of transport; the railway industry's market
share steadily declined across the European Community. As a result the European
Community passed legislation to reverse the deteriorating trend. This legislation and its
national interpretations are evaluated before proceeding to brief case studies of the railway
liberalisation undertaken in France, the Netherlands and Sweden; the German and British
approaches to railway reform are then analysed in greater detail. Arguing that liberalisation
was often a watered down version of privatisation schemes that had been compromised in
the political process, the thesis develops an alternative model of privatisation, centred on a
concept of market-based integration and a competitive railway market. It is proposed that
the current crisis on the British railways and the slow progress of railways in other
countries could be resolved by means of this concept.
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17Section 0
Introduction
18Today, British railways lie in shambles. This is despite the railway age starting its
journey in 9 century Britain and a radical railway reform under the Conservative
government of John Major at the end of the 2Øth century. Dreadful railway accidents in
the last decades of the 9 century and at the turn of the millennium alike prompted
government action and a reversal of deregulation and entrepreneurial policies so
fashionable in Britain prior to the accidents. There is a further parallel between the events
in the 9 and 20th centuries as it was alleged with regard to both that the accidents
followed a lack of investment and increased capacity to accommodate growing traffic
volumes. Also, it was claimed that railway directors put their customers' life at risk to
squeeze higher short-term profits Out of their railway business, whilst safety devices were
deemed to be inadequate.1
More moderate approaches to liberalising the railways in Germany and other
European countries such as France, the Netherlands and Sweden have not yet collapsed,
as has the British hybrid. Still, governments in these countries under closer investigation
have a variety of controlling stakes in the industry, which is also heavily dependent on
state subsidies. The railway reforms and the final collapse of Railtrack in 2001 clearly
illustrate that much scope is left to determine strategic reform proposals for the railway
markets that will achieve long-term stability in highly complex and competitive transport
markets.
In the past, politicians generally resorted to the rationale of central planning of
railway systems or entire transportation networks. However, the trends  in the railway
industry up to the I 990s were often alarming with regard to a declining market share and
debt accumulation, increases in congestion and pollution that governments were virtually
forced to re-think their policy prescriptions.2 Many railway systems proved unable to
provide a prospect of a high-quality public service to the entire populace, eradicating their
basic rationale for public funding. Despite subsidies and a protectionist railway policy, the
railways could not compete successfully with other modes of transport. The railway
industry's market share in the transport market was on a steady decline across the
European Community. Government budgets were challenged to provide ongoing and
Gourvish (1980), PP. 51-52 and Simmons (1978), p. 81 provide the arguments prevailing in the 1870s.
This is dealt with in section I, whereas the author's case study on the UK privatisation in section III draws
upon the 20th century disasters. While the London & North Western was at the focus of the disgraceful
record in the 19th century, the current debate mainly targeted Railtrack.
19increasing public support to the railways, funded by the taxpayers. However, higher
demands from the railways for funds meant either an increase in the tax burden or a cut in
other public services with an inevitable outcry from their corresponding interest groups
and the electorate.
By the I 990s railway systems across Europe had become a heavy burden to public
finance and politics, making comprehensive reforms inevitable. The search for new
solutions to deep-rooted problems was supported by a political climate favouring
deregulation and privatisation policies coming out of the Reagan and Thatcher years.
However, the privatisation of hallmarks of national protectionism, such as Rolls Royce,
Jaguar, British Airways and British Petroleum created few burdens compared to the
railway sector and other perceived public utilities that require networks of fixed
infrastructure to produce their final product. As duplication of railway tracks, water
supply mains and cables running right next to each other has generally been considered as a
waste of resources, competition in network utilities was usually ruled out due to the
alleged natural monopoly character in the infrastructure.
Evidently, railway privatisation is a very delicate issue, in particular in the land of
origin of the railways, where dosures of highly unprofitable lines with virtually no traffic
volume were strongly opposed by the entire public during the 1960s, the era of the
Beeching plans. Rather ironically, Hibbs suggested a preoccupation with childhood train
sets as a determinant in the British passion for railways. 'Politicians and the public alike
appear to possess certain fixed ideas abvxit railway that are by no means related to reality. A certain
sentimental attraction mqy be their association with childhood train-sets. Anjvone who experienced the
floods of quite irrational emotion that accompanied the resistance to close even the least-used lines during
the 1960s will be familiar with the problems we face... ' But this points exactly to the core of
the transport crisis. Since the early days of railroading, politicians and the public had
certain ideas how to run a railroad, which did not necessarily match the business
perspective of a profitable railway industry. Though regulation was at first extremely
limited, it already moved in by the 1 840s in the UK and Prussia, whilst gaining pace after
the 1 870s. Section 1 is dedicated to the early railway age in the UK and Prussia up to their
respective railway nationalisations.
2 European Commission (1996), paragraphs 10 15
I-Iibbs (2000), p. 47
20The nationalisation schemes granted exclusive rights to public undertakings to
provide public railway or even comprehensive transportation services, as in the case of the
British Transport Commission. Whereas politicians and the public proclaimed to be readily
aware of the dangers of private monopolies, they were either unaware of similar dangers
arising from public monopolies or were placing an enormous trust in the workings of
public undertakings. Though short-sighted, it was a common practice to judge monopolists
exclusively on their potential danger to exploit their dominant market position.
"Economists, government agents, journalists and politicians in this count?y obvious'y love the word
because it has come to be a term of opprobrium which is sure to rouse the public's hostility against anj
interest so labeled. In the Anglo-American worhi monopo/y has been cursed and associated with
functionkss exploitation ever since... " In 1939 Schumpeter highlighted the beneficial effects
of monopolies on innovation and stated that the monopolists would lose their market, if
they were unable to stay ahead in the innovative race.5
Indeed, the nationalisation of the railway industry created the only type of
monopoly that cannot be challenged by competitors, however outstanding their
innovations or quality of products might be.5 The governments created legally protected
national monopolies and eradicated both actual and potential competition. The 1947
Transport Act to nationalise the British railway system stated as the main objective of the
British Transport Commission "...toprovide, or secure or promote the provision of an efficient,
adequate, economical andproper/y integrated ystem ofpublic inland traniport and port facilities within
Great Britain forpassengers andgoods.. ." Though the UK government very much hoped for
the creation of an efficient transport system by central planning, Hayek had already, in
1944, issued his warnings about central instead of individual planning. Only the price
system inhibits the capability to oversee the co-ordination of an opaque system like the
operation of railways.5 In the aftermath of WWII, economists and politicians alike were
nonetheless in favour of centralised public railways due to the assumed  special characteristics
Schumpeter (1943), pp. 98-100
Schumpeter (1939 , p. 102
6 Greenspan (1967), pp.64 65 illustrates the danger of legal protection of markets with the example of the
American Railroads. However, it must be emphasised that the railway has never had a monopoly of the
market for movement, whether for passengers or goods. Thus, when using the term monopoly, great care
must be taken with regard to the relevant market. Defining a market in narrow terms, such as the  nz1zj
market between Aberj tnyth and Shenw bu,j dunng the Jesuit' season would designate a corresponding train
connection as monopohstic, whilst a wider definition, such as the market for movenient in Bataza dunng the
same penod leads to a different perspective with according implications for the regulation of the relevant
market This issue shall be dealt with further below.
7 Public General Acts 1947): Transport Act, S3
21of the railway mdustry.9 Mises was probably one of their most outspoken critics. While
nationalisations and the Middle lVaj or New Deal policies gained ground, he was a prime
advocate of the free market economy as opposed to a centrally planned economy.'0
Planning " . .is the antithesis offree enterprise, private initiative, private ownership of the means of
production, market econo,,y, and the price s,ystem. Planning and capitalism are utter/y incompatible.
Within a .cystem ofplanning production is conducted according to the government's orders, not according
to the plans of capitalists and entrepreneurs eager toJrofit l'j best filling the wants of the consumers.""
Section H investigates the rationale behind the nationalisations and their
corresponding justification. It is commonly argued that the case for state owned railways
must not be limited to pure economic arguments, but social and enrironmental considerations
have to be taken into account. However, the assumption that the government must run
railway systems as a public service to the benefit of the nation was increasingly eroded
with the system's growing dependence on state subsidies and the corresponding drainage
on the country's resources.12 While the provision of railway services as a social service
produced extremely poor results in terms of quality and value for money, the
environmental argument also vanished with highly subsidised and protected railways that
were constantly losing market shares in freight and passenger traffic. 13 Neither social nor
environmental challenges were met by the state-owned railway systems. Increasingly,
decision makers had to confront doubts about the railways' contribution to society's
welfare when the system required high subsidies, but offered a bad public service
'In his 1944 critique of central planning in The Road to Seifdom, Hayek proved the superiority of competition
and the free price mechanism over central planning with regard to the co-ordination of production activities
due to the complexity of the decisions. See Hayek (1946), pp. 35-37 and Hayek (1999), p. 17
Ewers and Meyer (1993), pp. 15-26 note that German transport economists invented the
Besondetheitentbeone to argue that conventional economics does not apply to the railway sector.
Mises (1952a), pp. 36-49. Similar to Hayek, he opposes a middle way between planning and laissez faire.
In a 'very strong statement, Mises concludes: "L sseJam means: let the iná&sdual czten, the much tahed about
commo,r man, choose and act and not force hem toyeld to a dictator. "Thus, he arrives at the same conclusion as
Hayek (1946) in The Road to Seifdom that central planning and interventionism lead directly into dictatorship
and serfdom. See also Mises 1952b), pp. 527-543 and Mises (1997), pp. 83-94 on his critique of
interventionism and its philosophy. Boettke (2000), pp. 19-22 sums up the main propositions of the
Austrian schooL
Mises (1952a), p. 1
12 Leaving the vast subsidies aside, the railway debt was mdeed alarming, European Commission (1996),
Annex 1/2. The figures are in billion ECU: Italian railways: 42,1 (1994, German railways: 33,8 (1993,
French railways: 28,7 (1994 , British railways: 10,7 (1994 , Spanish railways: 8,1 (1994).
13 Nash and Preston (1994), p. 19 note that "...the failure of rail compames even to perform well in those
sectors in which they have a comparative advantage, such as long distance international passenger and freight
traffic, and the perpetual complaints about the price, quality of service and inflexibility of rail transport leads
to doubts as to whether railways are currently running efficiently."
22compared to a more efficient private provision of other means of transportation. This
implies the question, whether society needs an extensive public railway system at all costs
and also whether railways are assumed to be superior to other modes of transport
according to some mystic principle. The European Commission's 1998 White Paper on
transport clearly stated that railways were better than all other modes of transport by some,
however, mystically unknown standard. Still, the Commission appeared to be startled by
the paradoxical downward trend of the railway industry's share of the transport market.
The White Paper notes ' . . that the railwqy is, onprincile, better than all other means  of traniport
and that it is paradoxical' that its market share is diminishing... '. The author rather considers
it as paradoxical that the railway industry, which is supposedly better than all other modes
of transport, requires both heavy subsidies and massive market distortions in its favour in
order to keep it from bankruptcy. Railway passengers and freight customers apparently
preferred other modes of transport in recent years.
The policy of state intervention to achieve social and environmental goals
produced exactly the crisis the railways were facing at the outset of the reforms in the
I 990s. The railway protectionism of the past led to an antiquated railway system in urgent
need of a general overhaul. The complex regulations and policies of the  20th and 1 9th
centuries pressed the railway system into a straitjacket, crippling its potential to reply to
intermodal challenges. In a competitive global market, national economies require efficient
transport systems as basic inputs into their production. An innovative and flexible railway
system is an integral part of an efficient transport system and may foster economic growth.
When initial attempts to reform European railway undertakings did not have the desired
outcomes, several countries resorted to more radical reforms, not least under the pressure
exercised by the European Commission. Section III investigates the impact of the European
Union on liberalisation of European transport markets with specific case studies. The
special focus rests on the reforms in Germany and the United Kingdom.
14 The general railway and underground strike in France in 1995 highlighted the doubts about the necessity
to uphold an extensive pubhc railway system with vast pubhc funding: Gerondeau (1996), p. 158 noted that
the strike '.. cIea'y reteakdpreacefr where the nnLwaj was still necessaiy and where it has ceased to be utaZ For the first
bme, contrarj to what m:ght bare been tbou,ght and what was often sa4 the pan4yth of the nxLwjs tbd not para/yse
France." An opinion poii revealed that 8000 of the French were unaffected by the strike action, while only
lou had been prevented from going to work. The strike caused some discomfort with  1900 of the
population, though the strike had its greatest impact on the Paris region. This was, however, only due to the
strike of the Paris metro and bus system and was independent from the national railway network.
European Commission (1998b). Gerondeau (1997) makes a strong argument to leave the deasion to the
marketplace whether or not society needs railways. In the 1970s 1-lall and Smith (1974,  pp. 17-19 came up
with an unconventional proposal to convert railways into roads with limited access. Their findings suggest
that lorries, cars and buses could be transferred from residential streets to the road ways which would
improve the environment in those areas
23This thesis aims to illustrate that the railway industry is a  business like ay other
business in theory and may be so in practice.'6 However, it will become obvious in sections
I, II and III that other objectives were prevailing from the government's, the public's and
lobbyists' standpoints, which rendered a corresponding operation impossible. Therefore,
section IV develops models to reform current railway systems. Meticulous planning of
privatisation would however contradict a thorough reform process, as the optimal
structure of a railway system is an unknown variable. If the optimal structure were
known, the British Transport Commission or similar planning boards would have
incorporated the knowledge long ago. Different models of horizontal and vertical
separation are proposed which are then discussed in the light of their likely potential and
outcome. The basic idea of a strict vertical separation into three instead of the more
commonly used two layers is based on Knieps' comparison of the railway industry to air
traffic.'7 When drafting railway reforms, special concern is taken to leave the privatised
railway system the freedom to adjust according to the entrepreneurial and innovative
potential without a tight government straitjacket. The railway market may best be
regulated by self-regulation of competitive market forces.'8 Thus, the models are based on
Hayek's insight that scientific predictions in market processes are impossible because
knowledge is dispersed across the individual members in society. Accordingly, individual
planning is superior to central planning.° The strength of the models developed in section
W is their capability to offer economic solutions to the railway problem, which may also
be adjusted to states with a moderate approach to railway reform, though certain
beneficial effects would be lost in a compromised reform.
Prior to any reform it is assumed that the property rights in the railway industry
are clearly distributed. As the government owns and operates the railway system, section 1V
suests that contractual arrangements between the government and the private sector
railway industry may be negotiated at the time of privatisation. Those arrangements may
include a non-discriminatory open access provision or obligations to run (un-)subsidised
trains to remote villages with virtually no traffic volume but high costs. As long as these or
16 The European Commission 1996 White Paper stated a similar goal in paragraph 21: "To overcome these
weaknesses and to exploit future opportunities, the Community needs a new kind of railway. It should be
first and foremost a business. It should have the independence and resources to compete."
17 Knieps (1996b)
Blundell and Robinson (2000), pp. 15-18 and Hibbs (1982), p. 77
19 This was the focus of Hayek's 1974 Nobel Prize Memorial Lecture on The Pretence of Knowlege, see Hayek
(1996), p. 14: The AnnvoJArng von IV,ssen. I-Tall also questioned the basic rationale of planning in Hall (1969):
Non Plan: An Epenment :n Freedon, and Hall (1977): Plan 'ung's ,,,useu f&sasterr.
24any other contractual arrangements are agreed upon Jnor to the actual privatisation at full
information to the bidders for the services, they are not infringing upon the railways'
property rights, as they are simply derived from the previous state ownership and in the
end from the ambiguous processes which led to nationalisation in the first place.
Nonetheless, it must be perfectly clear to decision makers that corresponding obligations
have an effect on the sale price of the industry and on the final success of the railway
reform. The governmental requirements might even be such that no private company
applies to run the infrastructure. Alternatively, applicants may ask the government for
subsidies to fulfil the demands or the government could opt to run the infrastructure as a
public company, while only the train companies would be sold off. A utopian task to
dream up a railway structure from a state of nature environment, where the railways
would be left to themselves might be easier, as logically no final predictions about the
outcome can be made. Still, the variables in the real world scenario were set by
government regulation and nationalisation. Therefore, the possibility to start from scratch
is ruled out. Now, it's the governments' responsibility to release the industry, so that the
railways may flourish, if the market so demands.
This thesis neither takes on apro-rai nor an anti-rail bias. However, a privatisation
in accordance with the structure suggested in section IV cuts back on regulation, promotes
the opening up of the railway market and encourages competitive and innovative
entrepreneurs to enter the industry. As a result, it is expected that the railways will exploit
their competitive advantages over other transport modes and adapt their structures
accordingly. Complementary to this, a full-scale reform of the entire transport and
communication markets is required to establish a level playing field between the diverse
actors in the markets. In addition to improving the situation for the railways, a
comprehensive railway reform could bestow reform-minded politicians with further
arguments to liberalise other markets by releasing them entirely to the private sector,
which could result in pricing schemes in road, water and air transport. Such reforms
offer a great potential to enhance the transport market's efficiency, the country's material
wealth and its competitiveness in the global economy. As the reforms induce a more
efficient use of scarce resources, they also benefit the natural environment.
20 A brief digression into the privatisation of roads is made below in appendix VI.C. Also, the author gave a
lecture on the private supply of roads in a paper presented to the 1999 Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers Conference in Cape Town, Knipping (1999 . Efficient pricing schemes are a prereqwslte to creating
a non distortive transport system across all modes.
25The last section 1/reconsiders the case studies investigated in the light of the model
developed in section IV to locate the flaws in past railway reforms and most urgent fields
for further action. Though none of the case studies under closer investigation came close
to a laissez faire model with government intervention being absent, the scope of the
reforms in the EU varies markedly, despite the influential EC Directive 91/440. The
synthesis then draws a conclusion with a brief outlook to future reforms and research in
transport economics. This thesis shows how interventionism hampered the development
of the railway industry throughout its history. Notwithstanding the privatisation efforts,
the government is still present at all stages in European transport markets, limiting their
potential. Though political reasons may support regulatory control of the transport
industry, a compromise between a free market and interventionism often leads to worse
outcomes. 'Both competition and central direction become poor and inefficient tools f they are
incomplete; thy are alternative principles used to solve the same problem, and a mixture f the to.
means that neither will real/y work and that the result will be worse than f either  .!ystem had been
consistentfy relied upon. '' The European Union and her member states have mounted the
first step towards a private supply of transportation services that already led to visible
improvements in railway markets. The EU must continue to liberalise the European
transport and communication markets. Social considerations should be dealt with in social
policy. The railway industry is a business like any other industry. Now, they must runfree.
The complexity of this thesis ranges from the early days of the first railways to
their regulation, nationalisation and partial liberalisation with a comprehensive theoretical
analysis of the railways' scope for reform. In the discipline of planning studies, the thesis is
centred at the interface of economic history, political science and economics.
Hayek (1946), p. 31
26Section I
The Ear/y Railwqy Age -
Innovation, Competition and Regulation
27MAP 1: Map .f the Eigksb Kai1p'iys ii 1848
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1. Opposition and the railway manias
The 1823 Railway Act on the Stockton and Darlington Railway announced the
advent of the era of steam-powered locomotives. The arrival of the 40 mile-stretch of an
iron rail road in 1825 constitutes an innovative leap, soon to be leaving the horse-drawn
carriage behind. The next decades experienced the rapid construction of a modem railway
network with an impact on the entire British economy. Britain pioneered the railway age,
with the entire globe to follow suit. The Stock.ton & Darlington's use of steam-powered
locomotives was, however, limited to the conveyance of freight. Nevertheless, it revealed
the diverse opportunities the innovation offered to the public, such as faster and cheaper
transport of goods and passengers, as well as increased means of communication and
commerce. Railway construction further stimulated demands in other industries. It created
the need for innovations in engineering, management, organisation, finance and a demand
for labour, building materials and coal. New institutions emerged, focussing on the
financial requirements of large private enterprises, as railway companies could not raise
enough funds. The railway industry considerably contributed to the growth of the London
Stock Exchange and to the emergence of local stock exchanges, when provincial demand
for railway shares took off.22 The railway innovation revolutionised transportation,
thereby promoting trade and economic growth, stimulating further innovations, whether
in communication, in transport and finance markets or in management theory due to new
organisational requirements.
The Litepoo/ & Manchester Railwqy was a further move forward in railway
promotion when the line was officially opened in 1830 to provide freight and the first
regular steam-powered passenger services. The motion for the construction of the railway
was decided upon at a convention of merchants in LiverpooL The merchants formally
inquired with the canal operators as to whether they would reduce charges for canal
transportation. As a consequence of a decline to their request, the merchants decided to
invest in the construction of a railway, connecting Liverpool and Manchester. The first
prospectus of the Liverpool & Manchester in 1824 presented the case for a mode of
transport that was cheaper and safer compared to the existing alternatives. The canal
system carried goods between Liverpool and Manchester on average in 36 hours, whereas
Reed (1969), pp.162-183 gives evidence on the railways' impact on capital markets.
29the railway would reduce the passage to four or five hours. In contrast to the canals, the
railway was independent from weather conditions, regardless of lack of water in the
summer or frozen canals in winter resulting in interruptions of commerce. Charges were
expected at least one-third below the prices of the competing canal companies, drawing a
line under the canal operator's dominant position in the transport market. 'The immediate
and prominent advantages to be anticzated from the proposed railroad are, increased facilities to the
general operations of commerce, arising out of that punctualify and dispatch which will attend the transit
of merchandise between liverpool and Manchester, as well as an immense pecuniary saving  to the
trading communify. But the inhabitants at late of these populous towns will reap their full share of
direct and immediate benefit. Coals will be brought to market in greater plenty, and at a reduced price;
andfarming produce. . . willfind its wayfrom greater distances, and at more reasonable rates."23
Facing strong opposition, the Liverpool & Manchester Company was fighting for
Parliament's authorisation, which was the only prerequisite for new railroad companies to
start operations. The competitive pressure threatened the incumbents  in the transport
industry, most obviously canal and turnpike operators, but also sea traffic. Landowners
facing expropriation might feel certain mischief with the innovation. Opposition was also
rational from complementary industries, which were dependent on the incumbents'
business and were forced to diversify. The campaigns against the innovation
accommodated the public's concerns and fears, to discredit the railways and prevent
parliament's approval. 'Next to the canal owner, the most important opposition was natural/y
expectedfrom the landholder, and by both interests every art was used to produce an effectual hindrance.
Every report which could promote aprejudice, evey rumour which could affect aprincible, was spread.
The cvunty gentleman was told that the smoke would kill the birds as thy passed or the locomotive.
The public were informed that the weight of the engine would prevent its moiüg and the manufacturer
was told that the sparks from its chimney would burn his goods. The passenger was fnghtened by the
assertion that lift and limb would be endangered. Elder'y gentlemen were tortured with the notion that
tby would be run over. Ladies were alarmed at the thought that their horses would take fright. Foxes
and pheasants were to cease in the neighbourhood of a railwqy. Farmers were possessed with the idea
that oats and hay would no more be marketable produce; cattle would start and throw their riders, cows
even, it was sai4 would cease to yield their milk in the nezghbourhood of one of these infernal
machines. "24 Arguably, the opponents were concerned about their own business and
n Douglas (1977), pp. 546-548. Francis 1851 , pp. 94-98 provides dethis about the convention of the
merchants in Liverpool, their resulting railway promotion and their prospectus.
24 Francis (1851), pp. 101-102. Clapham (1967), pp. 380-384 gives some account on the difficulties, the
early railways had to surmount. He sites that the promoters successes were remarkable in the face of
systematic opposition.
30engaged in protectionism of their incumbent industries by lobbying for legal, and therefore
insurmountable, mobility barriers to the transport market. Such was the environment
surrounding the arrival of one of the most influential innovations of the 9t1 century.
Notwithstanding the railway opposition's lobbying efforts, the British government took a
rather passive role, authorising the construction of rail roads by Acts of Parliament and
thus adopted a lighter regulatory touch.
The first decade after the opening of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway saw
several lines going into operation, with London becoming the centre of railway links. In
the decade from 1825 to 1835 parliament passed 54 Railway Acts, resulting in nearly 500
miles of railways in operation in 1838. The railway mania reached its peak in 1836 and
1837, when parliament sanctioned another 39 projects, followed by a massive slow-down
thereafter, culminating in a temporary halt in new railway promotions in 1840 and an
economic depression.25 'The press supported the mania; the government sanctioned it; the peopk
paidfor it. Railwys were at once afashion and afreny. England was mapped out for iron roads. The
profits and)ercentage of the Liverpool and Manchester were largefy quoted The prospects and power of
the London and Birmingham were as freefy prophes:ed"26 Though few direct long-distance
connections came into being, it was possible to travel as far north as Lancaster or York by
train in 1838. Still, the railways had to overcome a number of technical difficulties, as
engines were unreliable and regular breakdowns on the line placed a high risk of accidents
to the traveller. Braking power was by no means more reliable, with some trains having no
brakes at all. Railway operators had no information about a train's location if it was
delayed for some reason. Cooke's and Wheatstone's invention of the electric telegraph in
1837 was a welcome innovation and by 1848 nearly half of the railway lines equalling
1800 miles were equipped with the new tool of communication.27
The consequence of the first railway mania with the Acts of Incorporation passed
in the 1 830s was a rapid increase in total mileage with 1952 miles in operation by the end
of 1843. Soon, the second mania was at the doorstep. Parliament granted its approval to
the construction of 805 miles in 1844, 2700 miles in 1845 and 4538 in 1846. The figure
rapidly dropped in the following two years to 1354 and then to 330 miles of newly
approved lines, reaching a total of 6021 miles of track open for traffic in 1850 with a
steady increase thereafter (charts I and 2). Before entering a new depression, the second
is Ciapham 1967), pp. 387
Francis (1851), p. 290 as quoted in Clapham (1967), p. 387
312. Competition and concentration
One reason for the relative absence of state interference in the early days of the
railways was the strong conviction in British politics, that private enterprise and as a result
the public welfare were best served by the absence of regulations in an unhampered
market economy. Also, the railways gathered a strong lobby in parliament, totalling 215
railway directors as members of the Houses of Parliament in 1866.30 Britain was unique in
her political approach to the railways, leaving the development of the railway network to
private companies without government aid31. And private investors were willing to
commit their funds to the railways, as the country was densely populated between the
main metropolitan areas and promised profitable traffic. Johnson and van Metre suest
that parliamentary sanction to run a railway business was simply based on the assumption
that the country was already well supplied with dense transportation networks of canals
and turnpike roads. Therefore additional facilities had to be beneficial to the general
public. 'In the United Kingdom the creation of the earfy railwaj network, from the choice of routes and
the raising of capital to the operation of services, was left t private enterpnse. The sole restraint on the
free market was imposed bj the private act procedure of Parliament, which required each new project to
'ass the scrutinj of committees of both Houses before obtaining powers to purchase land, and raise
capitaL.. Competition, it was hoped, wouldprotect consumers from the threat of moncbo/y. British polig
was in sbatp contrast with thatfollowed in continenta/Europe, where the state's presence at all stages -
planning constr7lction, and operation - was readily apparent."32
Notwithstanding this relatively free market stance, fairly modest government
regulation of the railways arrived on the agenda in 1840 with more interference to follow
in the name of safeguarding competition between the railway companies and other means
of transport Due to a petition of the trading community, a Select Committee was
appointed in 1839 to investigate charges against the railways. Several of the petitioners
had approached the recently opened London & Birmingham Railway for the
transportation of their goods, which the company declined. The petitioners considered the
railway's denial as an unfair discrimination, which the company could exercise without
3° Gourvish (1980 , p. 55
31 Johnson and van Metre 1916), PP. 389-413 emphasize that the UK "...affords the best example among
European countries of private ownership and operation of railways, and is the only country m the world in
which the railways have been developed practically without pubhc aid." (p. 413). In a footnote (p. 389) they
explain that Ireland's railways received some pubhc funds and a city council in northern England supported a
rail connection.
32 Gourh (1980), p. 49
Gourvish (1999), pp. 118-119
33immediate punishment from the market only due to its regional monopoly in transport.
The monopoly power, however, was not derived from their superiority in the market of
transportation. Parliament's Acts of Incorporation granted the railways exclusive rights.'
The Select Committee found that it '..does not appear to have been the intention of Parliament to
give to a Railwqy Company the complete monopo ,y of the means of communication on their line of roa4
on the contray, proiision was made in all or most of the Acts of Incwporation to enable other persons to
place and run engines and carriages on the roa4 upon payment of certain tolls to the Company.'5
Theoretically, access rights were granted to other operators though the report foresaw
some burdens. Accordingly, it cannot be sufficient to allow other engines on the track.
Their successful operation furthermore depends on access to the railway owner's water
supplies as well as train stations. Additionally, the entrants were required to comply with
the rules and regulations set by the incumbent company in order to guarantee the
passenger's personal safety. Therefore, the management of the traffic would need to be
exercised by one company being in sole charge and control of its line, even if they would
thereby acquire a monopoly. In order to curb the monopoly power which parliament had
in effect granted in the acts of incorporation, the 1839 Select Committee concluded that
the companies must be checked in order to protect the public from any abuses. It is
interesting to note that access rights to competitors were envisaged  in the original Acts of
Incorporation, whilst they became the focus of debate in the late 1 830s. The situation in
Prussia was very similar, as the next chapter will reveal. Eventually, the arguments on
open access provision and competition on the track in the I 990s were drawing upon the
ideas of the very first railways.
In its early legislation incorporating the railway companies, Parliament naturally
assumed that the railways would function similar to the canals, with the companies
owning the way and allowing access to other carriers and locomotives in exchange for an
access price or toll. In their report in 1840 the Select Committee cited the London &
Birmingham Company as an example, which granted all carriers access to its infrastructure,
According to Hansard (1839), pp. 1220-1221, Lord Somerset presented a petition in Parliament,
"...connected with the conveyance of goods from London to Birmingham and other places...The petition
stated, that soon after the opening of the London and Birmingham Railway, applications had been made by
several of the petitioners to the company, for the purpose of having their goods conveyed by the railway, but
the answer which they received was, that the company had no means upon their line of conveying the
goods. The petition went on to state, that other parties, however, also carriers, had their goods carried by the
tiams, and complained of the great Inlustice which this unequal exercise of the monopoly possessed by the
company had produced....The petitioners hoped, therefore, that the house would take into consideration the
consequences which had arisen from the monopoly granted to the railway company..."
"Parliamentary Papers (1839), Vol. X, p. 132
34but subject to rigid conditions. The Directors of the London & Birmingham were still in
charge of deciding upon the arrival and departure times and they were providing both the
engines and carriages, leaving not actually much leeway for competition on its own line.
Though the Grand Junction Railway permitted locomotives of other operators, the latter
had to agree not to undercut the Grand Junction's prices. Even though competition on the
track was to some extent provided for in the incorporating acts, the arrangements of the
incumbents undermined any real competition on their lines. Competition on the track
could have eased the public's concerns of the abuses of market power, but the theoretical
possibility was replaced by competition between lines.36 The 1840 Select Committee
advised Parliament to set up a government agency to preserve competition. As a result a
regulatory body, the Railwaj Dpartment of the Board of Trade, was established but fell short
of Parliament's ambitious endeavour. The early railway regulator was hardly more than a
supervisory authority, leading a 1872 Joint Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation to
comment rather ironically, that the Railway Department had '..no  power but that of requiring
returns and enlightening the public as to the condition of the traffic and of the rates... The Acts passed in
consequence of these Reports contained nothing which had anj effect in checking or regulating
monopo/y.I7
William Gladstone's motion as President of the Board of Trade for further
regulation in 1844 was the first serious threat to the railway industry. However, the
following act was a more moderate version. Nonetheless, it allowed for price regulation
and state acquisitions of railway companies after 21 years, if their profits were exceeding
100 0 for three consecutive years. The 1844 Act also implemented the first social service
obligations, demanding parliamentary trains, i.e. low-tariff passenger trains. From now on,
3 'The Parhamentary Papers (1840), Vol XIII, p. 176 provide the examples of the London & Birmingham
and Grand Junction Railways, while the Parliamentary Papers 1872), Vol. XIII, p. 4 give evidence to
Parliament's early notion, that companies would act as owners of the way, granting access:  "It was also
supposed that nilwaj, like canal, companies would be mere!, the ownere of the ny, receiteng tolls for the use  of it, and
that amongst the nen and owners of locomotive power using their owe en,grnes and camages upon the kne there would
be ample room for competition. The companies were consequent!, bound bj theirActs to admit the caniages and engines  of
other persons on their bees at a ce#.avs rate of toll, whilst en manj cases tbçy were also bounel, acting as earners
themseb, to ce,.azn nvaamuin rates sJ.'eajied in their seteral Acts. But izr the nzLu'aji companies were  not bound to
furnish anj accommodation except the use of the s and as srngfr mana ement was necessay, the competition between
d/fferent earners on the ante line never took q7èet.."
'7 Parhamentary Papers (1872), Vol. XIII, p. 5. Clapham (1967), pp. 415 423 and Gourvish (1980, pp. 49-
50 confirm the 1872 Committee's statement.
Gladstone's rise to the President of the Board of Trade and the 1844 Railway Act are covered in Jenkins
(1995), pp. 66-69. N twithstanding the "moderacy" of the 1844 Act, nationalisanon of the track system
was on Gladstone's agenda in 1864 to avoid more "unco-ordinated biald.ng' Jenkins (1995), p. 249. Though
Gladstone's motion resulted in a Royal Commission, it came up with a negative report. Apparenfly,
Gladstone's design resembled the institutionally separate railway system in modern Sweden with a state-
owned track system and emerging private companies in the train operations.
35every new company was required to provide at least one train a day on each line at fares
not exceeding a penny per mile.39
The regulatory legislation commencing in the 1 840s originated from the well-
meant intention to protect and promote competition for the benefit of the public. The
same period was characterised by a closer co-operation within the railway industry,
culminating in a trend towards amalgamation and concentration within the railway sector
and between the railway and canal companies. An 1846 Select Committee on the
Amalgamation of Railways and Canals estimated that about 161 bills for England and
another 56 for Scotland contained clauses on amalgamation, whereas 32 of the bills were
related to amalgamations between railways and canals. 41 In their First Report in April
1846, the Select Committee considered the benefits of amalgamations. The committee
anticipated that the amalgamated companies could provide better quality services. They
were also expected to pass their cost reductions on to their customers. Operations under a
single system of management were assumed to be more efficient, thus resulting in
increased safety and faster travel, though the absence of proper regulation could also lead
to the exact opposite effects.42 The Second Report in the following month examined the
competition between canals and railways. Being a check on the abuse of powers of either
party, the "...competition material/y reduced the expense of convyance. Instances have been adduced
before Your Committee in which the charges for the conveyance of merchandie have been lowered bj
these means to one-seventh of theirformer amount; and there are nowfew parts of the countrJ which have
not derived material advantage from the competition between Railwqys and Canals. It is obrious/y of
importance that Parliament should not lightfy sanction ay arrangements which would tend to deprive the
Public of this advantage; ...Did Your Committee believe that the two ystems could be preserved in
entire independence one of the other, thçy might be disposed to recommend The House to adopt this
course." 3 The Select Committee recommended parliamentary sanction, if the individual
amalgamations do not place the public at a disadvantage.
39 The 1872 Report of the Joint Select Committee compares Gladstone's original Bill of 1844 and the cut-
down version of the later Act of Parliament in the Parhamentary Papers (1872), VoL XIII, p. 6. See also
Clapham (1967), pp. 419-420, Gourvish (1980), p. 50 and White 1982), p. 174.
4 °Preceding the legislation was an ongoing debate, started off in James Morrison's influential speech in 1836,
when he was arguing for more government regulation. As the Acts of Incorporation would award monopoly
rights to the train company in question, he advocated the right to interfere with railway rates in future acts.
An unabridged version of his speech is published in Hansard (1836 , pp. 977-988.
41 The First and Second Reports of the Select Committee on the Anialgamation of Railways and Canals, on
which the following data is based, are published in the Parliamentary Papers (1846), VoL XIII, pp. 85 97.
42 Parliamentary Papers (1846 , Vol. XIII, p. 88
Parliamentary Papers 1846), VoL XIII, p. 95
36The trend towards concentration led to fifteen companies controlling 75°  o of the
UK's gross traffic revenue in the aftermath of the investment mania of the late 1 840s. in
the next two decades the figure rose up to 83%, when the  No,th Eastern, the Mid/and, the
Great Western as well as the London &' P.'Ionb Western companies taken together
accumulated 4400 of the revenue. Two of those, the Great Western Railway and the
London & North Western Railway acquired 52 smaller enterprises in the years 1850-1875
to build their own railway systems. The amalgamations were the reaction of the market,
as the railway firms had to cut costs after the construction mania of the 1840s.
Complementing intra-industry mergers, the railway finns acquired about a third of the
canal network until the mid-sixties, thereby restricting the competitive threat. 'But coastal
shipping remained a powerful competitor, frequent'y up etting the most meticulous agreements to
.ctabilise or raise rates. Moreover, the competitive area was far from smalk in 1872 a Select
Committee stated that sea competition influenced some rates at no fewer than 60 per cent of all railwqys
stations.'5
While real competition within the railway market was limited to the potential
threat of constructing parallel lines, many new lines or alliances were beginning to
undermine the dominant market positions of incumbents from the I 850s. In 1857 the
Sheffield Railwqy went into an alliance with the Great Northern to get their share from the
London to Manchester traffic, which was formerly dominated by the London & South
Western Railway. The Midland Railway joined in with a third express route between
London and Manchester in 1867. Competition in Devon and Cornwall was taking place
between the Great Western and the London & North Western Railways from the late
I 850s and very strong competition arrived in the South East at the same time. The  South
Eastern Railwaj happily enjoyed a monopoly until the East Kent Railwajr received approval
in 1853, later being named the London Chatham & Dover Railwqy, after it had secured a link
to London. When the Chatham was still the small rural East Kent, the South Eastern
missed an offer to puithase the company. Soon both companies offered services to most
of Kent's towns. When the South Wales coal trade increased towards the end of the
185 Os, the London & North Western and the Great Western Railways did not want to
lose their potential share and competed to extend their systems by means of acquiring
Welsh lines.
Gourvish (1980), p. 10 and p. 50. Schumpeter (1939), pp. 342-344 states that the amalgamations were
unavoidable due to the consiruction boom.
Gourvish (1980), p. 30
4' For the following examples and a detailed story of the emerging competition see Simmons (1978), pp. 62-
76. White (1982) offers a comprehensive discussion of the devel pments in the English regions.
37In contrast, the period prior to the I 850s was dominated by intermodal
competition in the entire transport industry instead of fierce direct competition between
the railways. Intra-industry competition was largely due to the expanding railway network
and the construction boom. The railways' original zeal was to break the monopoly of canal
companies, and so they did not only on the Liverpool & Manchester. ' vetjvhere the canal
interest was in natural (Ipposition to railway projects; but down to about 1840 railwqy competition
developed so slow/y that the canals made no attempt to imp rove their own competitive capacity. Although
a few, speciallj open to railway attack...had sqffered heavi'y in pocket, some had improved their
financial position between 1825 and 1 840...As soon as a direct5, competitive railwqy was opened a
canal had to cut its rates; but nothing is heard  of rate cutting to forestall competition."7
The reaction of the canals is characteristic for dominant incumbents. Rather than
innovating, they often tend to take a break and enjoy their dominance until they realise
that their market dominance had been undermined or even lost to a direct competitor in
the market or that a new market had been created. When the canal operators realised the
challenge, they lobbyied parliament against the unwelcome entrants. Still, wherever the
canals had a competitive advantage over the railways and were not burdened with various
locks to pass, they were able to carry traffic and survive. But the story was rather bleak
for the turnpike operators. 'The blow wasfar deadlierfor the trusts than for the canals, because it
was precise/y from that passenger andparce/ traffic which t e railwqys took over at once that the trusts
had drawn most of their tolls. Farm carts used the roads free and kw.grade bul4y loads paid little or
nothing. The effect of a railway on the tolls was instantaneous.. .Between 1837 and 1850 the receipts of
the trusts fill off fry a tbirtL"49
Generally, the transport market was turned upside down by the newcomer and the
incumbents had no choice but to adapt to the challenge one way or the other. The railway
innovation changed the market structure in the transport industry. Instead of offering
long-distance travel by coach, horse-drawn traffic had to focus on shorter distances and
railway feeder services, whereas the canals had to concentrate on bulk freight. Though the
' 7 Clapham (1967), pp. 396-397
Regarding the competitive advantage of the canals, Barker and Gerhold (1995), p. 44 note that the bulky,
lower-value freight traffic "...and epeaahfy the steam-poid coat4 ssth, n better able to rthstand the new
competition."
Clapham (1967), pp.402-403
50 Clapham (1967), p. 398 underlined the mtermodal mergers between the railways and canal operators. In
1845-1847 the railways acquired 948 miles of canals, with 2750 miles left to independent canal operators.
38canal and turnpike operators suffered from the consequences of the railway innovation,
new opportunities arose with a potential benefit to society as a whole. Notwithstanding
the transport lessons from the 9 century, the railways were similarly unprepared to meet
the challenge of motorised road traffic or air travel in the 20th century.
Barker and Gerhold 1995), pp. 44-45 illustrate a similar trend in road transport with both mtra- and
intermodal mergers.
393. Changing times - from entrepreneurial freedom to regulation
The speculative investment boom in the early 1860s was boosted by the insurance
business and emerging finance companies investing in railway shares. Trade in unsound
shares, however, was a main factor behind the financial collapse in 1866, when important
railway companies were passing right into receivership. The period prior to the 1866 crisis
was marked by renewed amalgamations and working agreements in the railway industry,
bearing some resemblance to the mania evolving in the I 840s. However, the investment in
the 1860s went largely into the extension of already existing networks and the
construction of branch lines. In the aftermath of the crisis, the positive attitude of the
public and government towards free enterprise railways now rapidly changed into a more
hostile environment.5'
The trading community became increasingly concerned about foreign competition
and discovered the railways as an easy scapegoat for their own competitive struggle,
blaming them for keeping rates at a far too high leveL Therefore, of course, the
international competitiveness of British merchandise would suffer, as the carriage to the
ports was believed to be far too expensive. Claims alike were undedning the new role
that was attached to the railways. Instead of being regarded as any other private business,
train operators were considered to serve the public interest more effectively, if they
received special regulatory treatment. Dreadful railway accidents provided further food
for advocates of more government control, as the safety of passengers was in question.
The London & North Western led the disgraceful record, as nearly a third of all accidents
in 1870 occurred on their line. The accidents were supposed to be a consequence of a lack
of investments in new equipment, maintenance and increased capacity in order to
accommodate for growing traffic. Further focuses for complaints were inadequate safety
devices and excessively long working hours for signalmen and other railway labour.52
Thus, it was obvious for the public that the railway directors were putting the life of their
customers at risk for squeezing out higher short-term profits.
Rising costs prevailed in railway transport from the early 1870s. The growth of
third-class travel required investments in order to adjust the capacity to the larger number
Si Clevdand-Stevens (1915), pp. 227-231 and Simmons (1978), pp. 76-82 report on the origins and the
consequences of the 1866 crisis and the failure of the London Chatham & Dover, the Great Eastern and the
London Brighton & South Coast Railways, while Gourvish (1980), pp. 47-53 concentrates on the shift in
public opinion.
'2 Gourvish (1980), pp. 51-52 and Simmons (1978), p. 81
40of passengers. As a response to the rather unfriendly environment, the railways often
raised the quality of their services for third-class accommodation, which was in turn
reflected in an increase in labour costs. In addition, lavatories, heating and lighting were
usually installed to improve travelling conditions and special excursion tickets or other
deals were on offer that were not even dose to covering operating expenses.53 The
restrictive legislation passed in the decades after 1870 further imposed considerable costs
on the railways and rather checked than promoted the competition between the
companies. Paradoxically, Parliament's original intention was the protection of
competition in order to curb monopoly power, but by 1894 any further legislative
protection of price competition was made redundant by parliamentary action, as it rigidly
fixed rates without much hope of any variations. 'The Railwa, and Canal Traffic Act of
1873, the Cheap Trains Act of 1883, and the legislation of 1888-94 were all pan' of a sgn/icant
shfl in public opinion. Railwqys were seen more as public coeporations than as profit-making
businesses..., and the companies responded to this change all too readiy. It was in this environment that
railwqys experienced diminishing returns, while producing substantial benefits for society as a whole.'54
The events following the 1866 crisis mirror the situation after the 1847 crisis. The
depression was superseded by an upswing, tendencies for more concentration in the
industry, a resultant concern about market dominance of a few players in the railway
market and eventually, an inquiry by Parliament.55 The 1872 Joint Select Committee of
the Houses of Lords and Commons on Railway Companies Amalgamation scrutinised the
merger Bills before Parliament and highlighted their trade-off. They found that fare
reductions were a common result of amalgamations, with increases in ticket prices rather
being an exception. The Committee cited the example of the amalgamation of the North
Eastern in 1854, when rates were cut, while facilities of the railway were enhanced and
the company's dividends increased. However, the Committee was readily aware of the
dangers entailed. Because the role of actual or potential competition would be diminished,
n Gourvish (1980), p. 52 and Aldcroft (1968), pp. 6 & 16. Irving (1976), pp. 274-277 shares their view,
arguing that the companies reacted to the public opinion by improving their services and "4 our conclusions
are right, it is a/.'nost ceriasiv that labour costs on the nalwajs si rising throughout the 1870: and 1880:, part/y
because wages and hours niw stick3 fter 1873, and pan'fr because the trend in business a1ywa3 was toward.r the
prousiorv f an ;nsreasm,g sapp'y of senices in all areas qf bususess, which pushed the wage bill wpwanis irrespec#ie of rates
ofpaj and hours f wai'." His conclusion on rising costs in the last three decades is then given on the
following page: "Though statzsticallj the 1 890s w the jean in ,Ai:ch the rraLwajs' costs rrah5 went sour, aiy  of the
seeds were sown in the 1870: and u grusvng np4j in the 1880c."
Gourvish (1980), p. 48. According to HMSO (1907), pp. 10-16, the 1873 Act was ated as the Regulation
of RasLwaysAd, 1873 and amended the Rthy and Canal T* Act, 1854.
Cleveland-Stevens (191 5), pp. 232-235
41the mergers would discriminate in favour of the incumbent companies in the market.56
The condusions of the Joint Committee's report focussed on preserving the effective
competition between sea and rail traffic by means of preventing railway companies to gain
control over harbours. The report favoured to increase competition from river and canal
transportation by investments in the system of inland waterways. Though the Committee
was opposed to a state purchase of the railway network to date, the report already
considered a possible nationalisation at a future date. Accordingly, a state purchase of the
railways might arise as a necessity if the process of amalgamation led to a few powerful
companies.57 The report's immediate consequence was the 1873 Regulation of Railwqys Act,
which established the Board of Railwaj Commissioners. Though the Act conferred the
jurisdiction of the rather ineffective Railwaj and Canal Traffic Act of 1854 upon the
Commission, the approach to regulation was half-hearted. In order to become legally
binding, the Commission's orders had to be enforced by court action, and were therefore
not posing an immediate threat to violating companies. '4nj decision or anj order made bj the
Commissioners for the purpose of canying into effect anj oftheprothions  of this Act maj be made a
rule or order of anj superior coun and shall be enforced either in the manner directed bj section three of
the Railwqy and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, as to the writs and orders therein mentione4 or in like
manner as aiy rule or order of such ut." 8 The enforcement mentioned in section three of
the 1854 Railway and Canal Traffic Act states that parties who are complaining about
unreasonable facilities may apply by motion or summons to superior courts. So far, the
railway industry was not obliged to comply with the Commission's instructions until they
were confirmed by a court ruling.
However, more serious legislation was on the agenda. The Cheap Trains Act of 1883
granted both the Board of Trade and the Railway Commission the right to order railways
to provide for proper third-class accommodation and workmen's trains at fares, which
either the Board of Trade or the Commissioners considered to be reasonable.59 The 1888
Railwqy and Canal Traffic Act, which was to be construed as one with the Regulation of
Railways Act of 1873, replaced the Railway Commission with the  Railway and Canal
Commission, which was equipped with considerably extended powers to interfere with a
railway company's business decisions. The Act also required all railway companies in the
' Parliamentary Papers (1872), VoL XIII, p.31 and Douglas (1977), VoL Xfl(1), p. 319. Cleveland-Stevens
(1915), pp.317-318 supports the argument that amalgamations generally led to reduced charges.
Parliamentary Papers (1872), VoL XIII, p.31
HMSO (1907), pp. 10-16: R4gwlatson of Rti1pizjs Act, 1873. Cleveland-Stevens (1915), PP. 268-272
comments on the limited powers of the Railway Commissioners.
HMSO (1907), pp. 19-24: Cbe TraisjAct, 1883
42United Kingdom to submit to the Board of Trade revised  classification of merchandise
tables and suggested maximum rates for the merchandise. The outcomes were uniform
classifications and laws in the following years to introduce maximum rates. 60 'Many of the
new rates put into effect by the laws of 189 1-1892 were substantial reductions under the rates
previous5 charged, and to offiet the losses occasioned by the reductions, the railway companies raised to
the authorized maximum virtual/y all rates previous?, in force which bad been below the new maxima.
A storm of complaint immediate/y arose from sh:pers, and to meet the situation the Railway and
Canal Traffic Act of 1894 was passed... The law of 1894 virtual/y constituted as standards of
reasonableness all rates in effect on December 31, 1892, except such rates as were reduced by the rate
laws of 1891 and 1892, and gave to the Railway Commission broader discretionary powers with
respect to rates than it badpretiousfypossesseL'1
Section two of the 1894 Act obliged any railway company concerned to prove the
reasonableness of an increase of rates, further stating that it shall not be sufficient to show
that the increase was within the boundaries prescribed by law. Following the  1893 Railway
Rigulation Act, which attempted to limit the excessive working hours in the industry, the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894 put a halt on companies' independence in pricing
decisions, while costs were simultaneously rising due to the legislation passed.
Notwithstanding the costly arrangements that had been imposed upon the railways in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, the government further curtailed the railways'
flexibility, dictating preposterous restrictions in the Act of 1894. Had the previous acts
regulating the railway still acknowledged competition as an effective force to curb
potential monopolistic abuses arising from consolidation in the market, the principle was
now turned upside down and competition was throttled.  '!ncidental/y, this removed whatever
danger there might have been of rates being raised on amalgamation, but the noticeable point is that the
Act was more destructive of competition than any number of amalgamations. The possibility of raising a
rate became a remote haara contingent upon sati[ying the Railway Commissioners on points which in
many cases were incapable ofproof The most enteiprising competitor will hesitate to cut his prices when
be knows that be may not be able to raise them again should his experiment faiL The English railway
managers appreciated this. Tby bad voluntari/y refrained from active competition in rates for years
before this, but there bad been no compulsion, and bad thy wished to experiment thy were free to do so.
60 HMSO (1907), pp. 25-55: Radiy and Canal TrqjicAct, 1888 and Johnson and van Metre (1916), pp. 403-
408
"Johnson and van Metre (1916), pp. 408-409 and HMSO (1907), pp. 59-60: Rzly and Canal Tr€7ic Act,
1894
62 Gourvish (1999), pp. 121-122
43automatically result in an increase in net revenues.65 Due to the absence of proper railway
statistics, British railway managers were often unaware that they were investing into lines
with a negligible or even no return, instead of focussing on their core business. In stark
contrast, American railroads were making extensive use of railway statistics and
accounting principles from mid-century in order to co-ordinate traffic flows?
The British situation was further aggravated by an inefficient and distorting pricing
policy in freight haulage that was not based on the actual costs imposed upon the railway,
but on the value of the products carried. The imbalance between charges and operating
costs made cross-subsidies from profitable to less or even unprofitable services necessary,
thereby disguising their poor record and preventing the management from closing lines.
Yet it is admittedly doubtful whether closures could have been a viable option in times
when public opinion was moving towards the Conviction that the railways had a social
obligation and were to serve the benefit of the public, rather than their shareholders. Not
surprisingly, the proportion of the railways' total expenditure to gross revenue, excluding
miscellaneous receipts from tolls, canals, steamboats, hotels etc, rose from 45.6 to 63.2%
in the period from 1854 to 1913 which is reflected in the operating ratio's steady
deterioration (chart 4). After 1908 the pressure on the railroads temporarily eased due to
the counteracting growth of both passenger and freight traffic until 1912 (chart 5).
However, the volume of traffic was not retained after WWI, with disastrous
consequences for the railways.
' 4 Aldcroft (1968), pp. 8-26 and Irving (1976), pp. 278-279
'5 Aldcmft(1968), p.13
The statistical information on traffic costs did not improve markedly before the estabhshment of the
British Transport Costing Service.
'7 For the American railroads see the study in the appendix, section VLA. Chandler (1997) gives a detailed
account of innovations in oianisation, management and accounting prinaples. The main points are
summarised in the appendix.
45increase prices or cut costs, if they were to retain the existing network and the quality of
services. Public perception and regulation blocked both ways of easing the pressure on the
railways.
Though rate increases were ruled out due to the restrictive legislation, reductions
were extremely unlikely, even if they made sense from an economic point of view. Every
company would better consider possible reductions more than once, as a later increase
might be unattainable due to regulatory constraints. It is rather startling, that Johnson and
van Metre praise the admirable .ystem of rate control in B,itain, before acknowledging the
long-term defects the system produces.68 They argue that the control of rates due to the
established standards of reasonableness would protect the public from exorbitant rates,
but also prevent the companies' engagement in destructive competition. The resultant
inflexibility of rates, however, is then agreed upon as the chief defect of the regulatory
regime. Apparently, you can't have the cake and eat it, too. The companies themselves
were naturally reluctant in reducing rates voluntarily, as they were likely to encounter
opposition in raising them to their former leveL Indeed, if there was a real need for rate
increases, an act of parliament was required to agree upon new upper limits.
Accordingly, the companies' leeway in cutting costs was limited. The railway
managers' capabilities, however, added to the situation. Instead of concentrating on
profitable business, their egomaniac or misjudged notion of building railway empires by
length of track led them to invest in unviable extensions. Thus, they made it even more
difficult to eliminate the prime reason for the exorbitant costs by scrapping unprofitable
branches. Consequently, the railway's escape route led right to increases in productivity.
Those could have easily been accomplished, were the companies prepared to alter the
nature of their competition. In order to satisfy trader's demands, they were collecting
small consignments that were delivered immediately to their location with many wagons
carrying half their capacity. In the course of events the competitive advantage the railways
naturally had in delivering heavy wagon loads over long distances  in through trains was
sacrificed to small trader's requirements.69
The government interventions in the last decades of the nineteenth century were
alleged to protect competition and the consumer from abuses of monopoly power. In the
' Johnson and Van Metre (1916), pp.410-411
69 Aldcmft (1968), p. 15. Irving (1976), pp. 278-279 comments on the consequences of Victorian society's
expectations towards the railways, which helped to prevent rationalizations.
47short term, the government's goal was partly achieved. Notwithstanding, whether or not
competition might have offered a superior protection than government regulation, the
consumer did not have to worry about monopolislic rates. However, he could neither
expect rate reductions due to price competition, productivity gains or innovations. The
long-term side effects of the regulations arrived rather by surprise to the contemporary
observer, preparing the ground for the future difficulties and the railroads' inability to
challenge the competition from road traffic and airways. Had the railway industry been
free from politicians' wisdoms and desires, some obvious malpractices were almost certain
not to have occurred.
Nonetheless, the figures were pointing upwards after the turn of the century with
a slight but only temporary recovery in the return on capital and the operating ratio, as has
already been demonstrated (charts 3 & 4). The relevant data were published by Parliament
in 1913 and are enclosed in the appendix, chapterB.1. for the years 1850-1912. Far more
startling, however, is the massive upturn in freight earnings per mile as shown in the chart
below. The passenger train receipts could by no account match the figures achieved by the
freight operations, instead they were almost a mirror image of the results from freight
traffic in the early years of the twentieth century, showing a decreasing trend since a peak
in the 1 870s with a short-lived minor revival around 1910 (charts 5-8).
The trend in passenger receipts per mile partly reflects the train companies'
commitment to satisfying the public's expectations, when they extended their network of
partly uneconomic branch lines and offered a growing number of third-class trains that
were not as profitable as other services. The significant increase in freight receipts per mile
in the early twentieth century suests that the railways must have realised some sort of
efficiency gains, which mainly affected the freight business. Most likely, the improvements
were based on reductions in mileage, increases in labour productivity, a more effective use
of the freight capacities and loading facilities, respectively freight depots following inter-
industry mergers and further alliances.70 Notwithstanding the extraordinary recovery in
freight, the railways' weaknesses remained the near absence of proper statistics and the
organisational (non)-development, lagging behind the innovations in the US railroad
industry. Though the exogenous factors such as the hostile public opinion and regulatory
70 Irving (1976), pp. 280-284 points out that the precise origin of the efficiency gains was not absolutely
dear, though cuts in the network were hkely to be most significant More could have been achieved with a
full-scale rekirni of otanisational structures and the lntro&Iction of at least basic statistical data collection
and evaluation.
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World War I naturally affected the railways. During the war, the government took
control of the railway companies' operations according to the Regulation of the Forces
Act of 1871 that allowed Her Majesty's government to take possession of the railroads in
an emergency.7' Thus, the Railwj Executie Committee was established and was in charge of
the actual operation. The Committee was made up of the general managers of the principal
companies. The Act acknowledged the necessity to provide full compensation to the
private railway companies. Consequently, it was agreed upon that the railways would
receive their net revenue of 1913, amounting to £44.1 million.
Initially, the more uniform operation of the railways as a single network created
considerable benefits for the system due to a reduction of duplicate services and facilities.
However, the period of war time control produced severe long-term drawbacks. The
railways suffered from a growing discrepancy between costs and revenues with heavy
under-investment at the end of the war. Aldcroft points out that the annual average gioss
investment amounted to £16.1 million in the first decade of the twentieth century, and to
about £9 million in 1910 to 1913. Therefore, the wartime annual average  in the years
1915 to 1919 of4.5 million in 1900 prices added up to a mere half of the pre-war level,
falling just short of a quarter of the investment carried out in the first ten years of the
century.72 Taking the figure immediately prior to the war as a basis for an extremely
conservative estimate of the shortage of investment in the railways, at least another £22.5
million in 1900 prices were required to secure the railways' operation. However, the
figure is likely to be a low estimate, as the pre-war figures are hardly representative for
wartime maintenance efforts and future challenges. Intermodal competition slowly
appeared on stage, indicating a massive need in investment to successfully match the
challenge imposed upon the railways by motor traffic, trains and to a very limited amount
early air travel, announcing the advent of a further competitor. Furthermore, the intensive
use of the network during WWI contributed to a more than normal depreciation, in turn
requiring for more than usual investments in repair, maintenance and replacements.
The necessary investments were, however, obstructed on account of different
reasons. The high volume of traffic during the war left only a few time slots to carry out
71 Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 86. Aldcroft (1968) and Aldcmft (1970) present a
detailed account of the railway history beginning With WWI on which the following discussion is based.
72 Aldcroft (1968), p. 35. The figures were supplied by Dr C.R Feinstein.
52repairs without interfering with railway traffic. Undoubtedly, the demand for labour in
military industries and in the forces itself left the railways with a shortage of labour, with
30% of their former workforce joining the army. The same applied to industry production.
Instead of producing new rolling stock, the priorities were naturally in military rather than
railway equipment. Thus, repairs of the infrastructure were often postponed and became
more pressing towards the end of the war. In 1918 the system had to operate with 80,000
fewer wagons than prior to the war.73
The divergence between charges and operating costs in combination with the
inflexibility of the rate structure in the late nineteenth century had already been discussed
above. While there had been no major changes since the I 890s, the gap widened
considerably during the era of wartime controL 'Ac with investment it is possible that costs and
prices were falling out of line in the ear?y twentieth century, but it was on/y real/y during the war that the
problem was raised in an acute form... Under government controlfares and cbai'ges were  frozen at the
pre-war level, the on!, concession being an increase of about 50 per cent in passenger fares in 1917.
Wages and prices were much less rigid/y controlled, and lij the end  of the war they were more than
double the pre-war levels. During the course of the war, however, the railwqys were sheltered from the
full effects of the cost increases bji the fact that most of the wage awards were shouldered bji the
Government, whilst coal was sold to the railway at an art:ficial/y low price. Moreover with the beay
increase in traffic and government guarantee the companies had little cause to worrj about their revenue.
The partial removal of some of these measures ofprotection soon after the Armistice and the further
subsequent rise in wages andprices left the railwajs in a verj dflhcult position."74 Chart 9 illustrates
the increases over the pre-war levels in the railways' input costs and in their income from
rates and fares for the immediate post-war period 1919-1921 when the companies were
still under government controL Whereas input costs in 1920 often exceeded pre-war levels
by 20000, a revision of charges allowed for an adaptation to 75, respectively  10000 above
the basis of 1913 in the same year. The pressure eased in 1921 when input costs dropped
slightly. However, the discrepancy between costs and prices resulted in the deterioration
of the railways' net revenue from £13.6 million in 1919 and £6.9 million in 1920 to a loss
of £9.0 million in 1921, as demonstrated in chart 10. Correspondingly, the operating ratio
rose to 104.100 in 1921 before it turned around in 1922 (chart 11). Accordingly, the
railways' receipts from passenger and freight traffic excluding miscellaneous receipts were
not even covering short-term working expenditures in 1921, leaving long-term fixed costs
' Aldcroft (1968), p. 34
74 Aldcroft (1968), p.37
53agreed that the pre-war level of competition between the railway companies should be
substituted with a more co-ordinated operation, there was no consensus concerning the
actual implementation of reorganisation. The Railways Act of 1921 subsequently created
four groups of companies according to the First Schedule of the Act, merging 120
companies.76 The companies were divided into constituent and subsidiary companies,
thereby drawing a dividing line between the larger and smaller ones. The larger constituent
companies were required by the Railways Act to amalgamate, while the others were to be
absorbed as provided by the Act. In effect, the Act created the Southern Group, consisting
of 19 constituent and subsidiary railways and the W'estern Group with 33 companies, which
then adopted the titles of The Southern Railwqy and The Great Western Railwqy. The Nonh
Western, Midland and IVest Scottish Group embraced another 35 railway companies and was
titled The London, Midland and Scottish Railwqy. Finally, the London and Non'h Eastern Railwqy,
which came into being as the Notih Eastern, Eastern and East Scottish Group comprised the
remning 33 railroads. The main driving force for the Act was the belief that the grouping
would lead to economies of scale and replace competition with co-operation between the
railways, thereby reducing duplicate lines and other fathuities.
The Act prohibited any further amalgamations or agreements between the four
new companies without the government's consent and established the Railwqy Rates
Tribunal. The Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide upon the reasonableness of charges,
alterations of freight classifications as well as variations of tolls and rates. The constituent
companies of the four groups were ordered to submit schedules of proposed standard
charges for the amalgamated companies to the Rates Tribunal. The Railways Act required
the settlement of any objections towards the schedule before they would subsequently
come into operation on 1t January 1928. According to section 32, the amalgamated
companies were obliged to charge the standard rates as fixed in the authorised schedule,
76 The Railways Act, 1921, 10, 11 & 12 Geo. 5, ch. 55, pp. 417-506 contains the First Schedule (pp. 485-
487), which allocates the railway companies to the four groups as displayed in appendix B.2. Fenelon (1932),
pp. 101-117 discusses the 1921 Act, citing the titles the companies assumed. Though a total of 214 separate
companies existed in 1921, the 94 companies which were excluded were either jointly owned or light and
narrow gauge railways. Of the 120 companies, many had long been merged with other railways, but retained
their legal independence. Cleveland-Stevens (1915), pp. 315-316 further noted that the amalgamations of the
preceding sIxty years led to a comprehensive railway system, which was dominated by eleven great
companies prior to WWI, while 933 companies had been merged since 1849.
Notwithstandmg the anticipated savings, potential inefficiencies and costs  of the amalgamations, such as
different corporate cultures, organisational and management challenges, were rather neglected. Crompton
(1995), p. 117 notes that it ".iw less deartj aJ'preaated that kforefinaflaal adwivtages ouW be securea there
.wqor otanisationalproblems to be overcome first"
56ruling both upward and downward variations out, except by way of exceptional charges.tm
However, either the amalgamated companies or traders were '..  entitled at anj time to app'y
to the rates tribunal to mod[y the standard charges...and, fay such compan) or boil3  of traders or
person...prove to the sati.faction of the rates tribunal that the standard cha,es or conditions or anj of
them ought to be modified, the tribunal shall make such modjfications as thy think fit..."79
The train operators' only option to influence their own charges was by means of
exceptional rates and fares that were provided for in sections 37 to 41. The exceptional
charges that were still in operation on January 1 were cancelled unless they were in the
region of 5% below the new standard rate. The new exceptional charges had to be
reported to the Minister of Transport and exceptional freight rates which deviated more
than 40 or less than 5% from the standard rate required the Rates Tribunal's consent.
When the Minister objected to exceptional rates because they were prejudiced towards
users, the Rates Tribunal might modify or cancel the exceptional rates or revise the
standard charges. In contrast to freight charges there were no restrictions on the passenger
side to charge exceptional faxes, as long as they were lower than the standard passenger
fares and reported to the Minister of Transport, who again may refer the case to the Rates
Tribunal if customers might be discriminated against in his opinion.
The legislation produced four railway combinations that had to face strong and
steadily increasing intermodal competition from road traffic for passengers and freight
The government's intention was to reorganise the railways to achieve a more  efficient and
economical working, as stated in section one.80 Indeed the government established heavily
regulated railway companies, stripped of their essential right to determine the most basic
business policies, such as price and quality of the product they intended to sell. The
entrepreneurial enthusiasm that created innovative and profitable enterprises had been left
somewhere in the last century and was now substituted with dominant territorial
enterprises. Notwithstanding the market power of the amalgamated railway firms, ". . . no
one of the amalgamated companies can claim a complete monopo/y of the railwqy traffic in its area.
B ranches from one amalgamated cornpanj extend into the area of another, and more impotlant, the
78 The amalgamated companies were loaded with burdens that coniradict the allocation function of pnte
markets. One of the most preposterous provisions of the 1921 Act was the provision that income should
match 1913 figures.
Railways Act, 1921, 11 & 12 Geo. 5, ch. 55, sec. 35. Fenelon (1932), pp. 105-110 provides an overview
over the railway rates and the Tnbunals' power to determine.
The potential paradox of achieving both an effiaent and economical working has also been acknowledged
by Crompton (1995), p. 119. Crompton (1985) devoted an entire article to the efficient and economical
57territorial boundaries of the companies are the routes of heaviest traffic. "81 Also restrained by legal
requirements, the dominant railway operators were expected to serve the perceived public
interest. Even though it was envisaged to achieve more efficient operation of the system,
economic considerations were absent in the creation of the four groups. While the
government suested in their 1920 White Paper to establish seven amalgamated
companies, opposition led to the compromise of the 1921 Railways Act. 82 If the
government were convinced of the supposed gains of economies of scale or scope to be
overwhelmingly beneficial, it would have been a consistent line in their policy to take the
merger a step further towards outright nationalisation or public control of a single instead
of four private monopolies. And if the government's anticipated economies in the
production of transportation were indeed based on proper economic arguments, they need
not have worried. They could have delegated the actual amalgamations to the companies'
self-interest of profit maximisation. The Act's provisions of imposed mergers, fixed
standard rates and the Rate Tribunal's authority to modify charges as they thought fit left
the regulations in the last decades of the nineteenth century appear rather harmless.
Instead of enabling the railways to charge and amalgamate as tb!y think fit to successfully
meet the challenges arising through intermodal competition, they had to swallow the
government's and Railway Tribunal's prescriptions. The same were ineffective in a
dynamic, innovative and highly complex transport market. The railways were forced to
administer their operations according to the government's plan with a maximum of
inflexibility. In contrast to the chosen path of bureaucratisation, the 120 companies
should have been forced by the emerging competitors to quickly respond to the innovative
challenges in the transport market. Aldcroft briefly summarised the Act's defects: 'First, it
drew too much from past experience and second, those responsible for its contents gave too little attention
to economic considerations. The maa'n innovation  was the grouping of the companies, but even this was
not done n4th anj clear economic criteria in mindL Essential'y the Act was a tidjing-up  measure which,
since it drew so beavi/y on past experience, was unsuited to the npidy changing conditions of the
twentieth centuy.'83
Most importantly, the challenge of road competition and the reorganisation's aim
to provide for a more efficient and economical working required for a reform in pricing of
freight and passenger services towards a pricing policy based on operating costs and on the
working of the railways in the inter-war years, whilst he emphasises on pp. 228-229 that effective
competition was also secured by coastal shipping with very cheap rates due to post-war over-capacity.
Walker (1942), p. 19
Aldcroft (1968), pp.4146
Aldcroft (1968), p. 47
58price elasticity of demand, charging more for non-competitive traffic and less where
competition curtailed the companies' pricing freedom. Adding to the legislative
restrictions on pricing, cross-subsidies posed an immense burden to any reform towards
more scientific charging principles. The problem of the construction of unprofitable
branch lines through thinly populated areas aggravated with the 1921 mergers. The
amalgamated companies incorporated lines which were dependent upon cross-
subsidisation from profitable services. Instead of freeing the four groups from the
responsibility to finance unsustainable services and provide for a sound basis to commence
operations under the new group, the architects of the act were fooling themselves that the
new creations would cope with these supposedly marginal difficulties - if they were
realising the problem at all. In order to keep the uneconomic lines of the network up and
running, the profitable railway services had to charge a mark-up from their customers,
thereby reducing their competitiveness and putting the profitable lines at risk in the long-
term. The railway operations were even more endangered, when the rapidly increasing
competition of road traffic in freight and passenger transport skimmed the cream by
focussing on the profitable transport operations of the railways, leaving the latter to serve
the thinly populated areas and making it even harder to obtain the additional profit to
redistribute it to the ailing parts of the network.
The necessary changes to pricing principles were not on the agenda of the inter-
war period. Even worse, the situation turned out to be more confusing and arbitrary,
lacking a sound strategy in charging for freight and passenger traffic. The railroads reacted
to the challenge of road traffic by offering large numbers of exceptional charges, as
variations in standard rates had to be approved by the Rates Tribunal before taking effect.
The exceptional rates and fares were, however, not correlated to highly competitive
connections but were available throughout the entire network, i.e. on both remunerative
and unviable routes. Instead, the rate reductions should have been concentrated on
pro fitable lines which were exposed to road competition. In the event, the proportion of
revenue from special fares rose from 34.4 to 85° o between 1924 and 1938 in passenger
travel, whereas 700 o of freight traffic receipts were derived from exceptional rates in
1935. The diversity of exceptional charges caused irritation and dissatisfaction among the
customers with the result that passengers on a single train between the same locations
were often travelling at various different fares.M Fenelon argues that the multiplicity of
tickets available might have led customers on standard fares to believe they were victims
' Aldcroft (1968), p. 60 and Parliamentary Papers (1931), VoL XVII, Cind. 3751, paragraphs 123-125
59of extortion, as virtually everyone around them travelled on another fare. He illustrates
the great diversity in cheap tickets in the late I 920s, though the list was admittedly not
exhaustive: ' . . season tickets; trader's tickets; toupist tickets; period and specwl excursion tickets;
weeken4 dqy, afternoon, and market-dqy tickets; cheap tickets for ramblers, go(fers, anglers,
fishworkers, sh:jwrecked mariners, and members of sports clubs; 10,000 miles first-class tickets...;
zone tickets...; and reducedfaresforparties of eight. There are even cheap daj and week-end tickets for
dogs. '
The 1921 Railways Act sanctioned the traditional charging system by requiring for
value classifications of merchandise and goods instead of addressing the long overdue
issues of cross-subsidies and pricing reform properly. Statically, it had been assumed that
the volume of traffic would continue to grow as it did during WWI. Thus, the railways
could keep their poor lines running for the public benefit. Reality was not quite as
pleasant While the total number of passenger journeys declined from a peak of almost 2.2
billion in 1920 to just over 1.2 billion in 1938 (chart 12), the trend in the freight business
was also downwards, from 318 million tons in 1920 to 266 million tons carried in the year
before the outbreak of WWII (chart 13). The decline of neither freight nor passenger traffic
could be compensated by higher earnings, as higher charges were impeded by both the
regulatory constraints and intermodal competition from road haulage or coach companies.
They were more cost-conscious than the railways and were not carrying the burden of
cross-subsidisations and high fixed costs. After railway revenues reached a peak in 1920
with receipts of £1 09.4 million in passenger and £129.9 million in freight traffic, they lost
more than a quarter until 1938 with receipts of (75.3 million and £87.8 million
respectively. Relating the railways' earnings to the total mileage of goods and passenger
trains confirms the continuous downward trend (chart 14), with a brief respite in 1926 and
again in the mid-thirties (chart 15). In general, the data highlights an 2hrimng decline of the
railways between the wars, which was aggravated by the discrepancy between charges and
costs. 'Though prices genera4v were falling in this period labour costs, which formed a large part of
total running expenses, remained fairfy stable at more than double the pre-war leve4 while other costs
did not fall pari passu vith the fall in charges. Thus by 1938, the cost of many railway inputs was
a,vund double that ofpre-war, whereas the average level of charges (freght and passenger) was on!,
about 50 per cent greater.'7
Fenelon (1932), p. 149
S6 Mitchell (1994), p. 548
60game in the market of transportation. But it is likely that the companies were
underestimating the role of their competitor, as less than 350,000 vehicles were running
on Britain's roads at the end of WWI.89 Still, they cannot have been entirely unaware of
the forthcoming threat. It was fairly visible for everyone who ventured to look on the
streets. By recalling their own experience with the canal operators in the nineteenth
century, the railroads might have discovered that immediate investments in innovation
and the removal of structural defects were urgently needed. During the course of the war,
investments in maintenance, repairs and renewals were far lower than in peacetime,
accelerating their decline. The restrictive regulation of charges meant that it was difficult
to meet the rise in input prices after WWI, which is likely to have hampered any over-
enthusiasm for new investment projects, whether in physical equipments or innovations.
And the cross-subsidisation equalled an invitation to intermodal competitors to skim the
cream off the profitable lines. The train operators were forced to charge a high mark-up
on marginal costs, so long as they were committed to finance unprofitable services. Still,
the defects were tackled neither in the 1921 Railways Act nor in the 1947 Transport Act.
In fact, the problems of cross-subsidies aggravated with the railways under public
ownership, as the new ownership approach tightly implied that benefits had to be
generated for their collective owners and not a selected group of individuals, whether the
public was living in an conurbation or a remote village.
The success of cars, buses and trucks was considerably pushed by manufacturing
costs dropping a third between 1923 and 1929, accompanied by simultaneous reductions
in operating costs. While the number of vehicles on the roads had increased to more than
three million in 1939, they did not miss out on the unspoken invitation of the railways.
Road haulage freight companies geared their charges to operating costs and were not
required to make heavy capital investments in a fixed infrastructure network. Accordingly,
market barriers to entry were low in road haulage business. The small element of fixed
costs of road services provided for more flexibility compared to the railways, as
unprofitable routes could be abandoned immediately. This also reduced the capital risk
entailed. They could offer convenient door-to-door transport services as required by their
customers, service distant villages if there was sufficient demand and carry small
consignments. Though they partly complemented the railways and stimulated new
demands for transportation, they often targeted profitable routes of the rail operators and
did not commit themselves to the task of cross-subsidising uneconomic traffic.
' The data concerning the motor transport is taken from Aldcroft (1968), pp. 55-58
63Nevertheless, road transport was mainly confined to short and medium distance
merchandise and passenger travel until the late thirties. Aldcroft argues that the bulk of
the journeys was non-competitive with rail travel.90 Apparently, the railroads had their
competitive advantage in long-distance passenger and freight business, as road transport
was not geared to carry bulky and heavy loads, such as coals and minerals. Considering the
arguments made on charging reforms, it was in those operations, where rail transport
possessed a competitive advantage over road and had to raise prices according to the price
elasticity of demand.
Therefore, the intermodal competition from road transport was indeed
challenging, but not entirely devastating.0' Ideally, it should have released the railways'
entrepreneurial potentiaL But there was another influential determinant in the railways'
misfortune. After WWI, the railway companies still had a dominant position in the market
for long-distance and heavy goods transportation. Quite unfortunately, it was exactly this
highly profitable market, where the railways still possessed a competitive advantage over
road haulage that experienced a decline in the volume of traffic in the inter-war years
(chart 16). Thus, the assumption of further growth in rail traffic, implicitly underlying the
1921 Act, had been undermined, thereby further eroding the shaky vindication for
supporting the unprofitable lines. The 1923 peak of 222.2 million tons of coal carried on
the railways was never again reached with an annual average of 180 million tons conveyed
in the period 1920-1938. This situation was mainly caused by an accompanying depression
in heavy industries and coal exports being halved from 73.4 million tons  in 1913 to 35.8
million tons in 1938. The fall in coal transport had a serious impact on the railways'
earnings. The receipts from highly profitable coal freight amounted to 20% of revenues.
To make it even worse, the railway network had been built to serve the demand of the
same industries which were now on the decline, highlighting that adaptations and
withdrawals from certain routes were inevitable.92
9 °Aldcroft (1968), p. 58
Crompton (1999b), p. 137
92 Aldcroft (1968), p. 53
64remaining groups particularly hard, as they were serving the industrial areas of south
Wales, north-east England and south-west Scotland. Though the Southern was not that
much affected by the industrial descent, the company had to face harsh intermodal
competition in its passenger division in the metropolitan area of London. In addition to
the threat the Southern had to face from bus and coach operators, its high volume of
merchandise traffic was a potential victim of road-haulage companies. The Southern's
operations must have been close to immediate withdrawal, if road competition was the
prime challenge to the railways. However, the Southern Railway Company was indeed one
of the most successful railway enterprises of post-war Britain. Therefore, road competition
is clearly not accountable for the railroads' fate on its own, but the depression in heavy
industry and the discrepancy between costs and prices are also partly responsible.
Moreover, it remains to be emphasised that the structure of the railway network was by
no means uniform over the entire system, but differed quite substantially between the
Southern's focus on passenger and merchandise as against the other companies that had a
more balanced mix.
When investigating the railways' reactions to the challenges posed by intermodal
competition, deteriorating heavy industries and the discrepancy between prices and costs,
the Southern leaps to mind again. Surely, one could assume, that the railroads would not
wait until doomsday without taking action. As early as 1909 the London Brighton and South
Coast Railwqy Company, one of the constituent predecessors of the Southern Railway, chose
electrification as the only option to save its South London line between London Bridge
and Victoria stations from closure. They were soon relieved of their disastrous records of
falling passenger levels, which subsequently rose from three and a half million passengers
during their crisis to 12 million travellers by 1920. Despite the high initial capital
investments in the fixed infrastructure, electrification produced considerable advantages
over steam-powered engines. Electric trains accelerate quicker than steam locomotives.
Accordingly, electrification extended the network's capacity, allowing for a greater
number of trains with an increased frequency and reduced costs of operation. Thus,
especially over short-distance suburban routes with a large number of stops, the electric
trains were faster than steam engines and were able to regain a position in passenger traffic
with more efficient operations. '7t was onv electrification and the reduced opera/ins costs which
allowed better services at cbeper fares. By those means rail transport was once more in a competitive
93 Whte (1982) gives the most comprehensive account about the Southern Railway Company in his study
on the regional history of railways. The data on the Southern's electrification draws upon his discussion in
White (1982), pp. 179-187 and Aldcroft (1968), pp. 54 & 71-77
66position and new traffic was White then quotes the example of the competition
between London and Brighton, a distance too short for the railway to rely on their
competitive advantage in speed over motorised vehicles. In the run-up to the
electrification of the line, an increase in traffic of 6° o was assumed to be sufficient to
cover the costs resulting from the installation of the electric infrastructure. Eventually, the
initial estimate was by far outnumbered with the traffic volume increasing by 29% in
1933, the first year of the new service to Brighton.
Surprisingly, only a marginal 5°o of the UK's railways had installed electric
traction by WWII, whilst the Southern Railway alone owned roughly 80% of the total,
equalling 800 miles of electrified track. The main reasoning for the popularity of
electrification on the Southern is based on its structure, as its traffic pattern was
particularly suited to electric trains due to its routes through densely populated areas. In
contrast to steam trains, the electric trains did not have to sacrifice their main advantage
of speed over road traffic, due to rapid acceleration on electric traction. Though diesel
trains had proved to be a viable alternative at that time, the option was widely neglected
until after the war, presumably because of the British abundance of coaL "Whatever the
reasonsfor the deiqy in adopting new forms of traction, it is clear that the railwqys stood to lose in the
long run. Extensive application of diesel or electric traction would have made them more competitive
uth road tranport, particular/y on the passenger side, though it would not have eliminated competition.
As it was, railway travel became relatively less attractive, especial'y over thon distances where road
tranport showed to its best advantage, whilst the run-down in investment darzng the inter-waryears left
the railwqys in a particwlarty weak position to face the stringent conditwns of the Second World War
and its aftermatb." 6 Aldcroft estimated that the actual net investment, i.e. the annual gross
investments reduced by the rate of depreciation in the railways' capital assets between the
wars was indeed negative for each year and amounted to a total of at least £125 million in
1930 prices. While he agrees that figures alike are naturally rough estimations as they are
94 Whtte (1982), p. 186
95 The Southern was committed to electrification in stark contrast to the general reluctance prevailing among
the other railway companies in Britain. Crompton (1995), pp. 125-131 investigates the impact of the 1931
Weir report and other studies that were based on rather shaky assumptions. Increases in demand,
advantages of accelerated services and the potential for reduang the number of locomotives due to
electrification were mostly negected. Also, the studies were often assuming a conversion of the entire railway
network, although much "...( this .'ndeage would have been morr propiiate for do urr than corn'err:on to eIeYnc
traction' Crompton (1995), p. 127. In addition, concerns about further damaging effects upon the coal
industry contributed to the reluctance in adopting innovations in locomotion technology, such as conversion
to diesel units or electric traction.
Aldcroft (1968), pp. 76-77
67based on hypothetical assumptions about the assets' life cycles, they indicate the massive
disinvestment in the railway business, which led to a deterioration of their capital stock.97
Though innovations of diesel and electric trains were mainly confined to the
Southern Railways, some efficiency gains were realised in the freight sector. The waste of
resources in the inter-war years was curbed due to a more effective use of depot facilities
and an improved utilisation of the capacity of wagons as well as the attempt to introduce
larger carriers. Although the average capacity of 11.3 tons per wagon in 1930 against 10.4
tons in 1922 was an improvement, the capacity of freight wagons in Britain fell far short
of the average size of wagons in Germany with 16 and the United States with 42.3 tons,
indicating that there was massive room for savings. While the standard wagon size had a
capacity of 12 tons, 20-ton trucks could have realised considerable gains in efficiency,
when shunting and hauling the loads. An obstacle, however, was that nearly half of the
wagon rolling-stock was privately owned and costly alterations in facilities to cater for the
larger stock were often opposed. The legacy of the past had furthet established an
insuperable burden to reform, as the traders took the conveyance of any size of
consignments to a variety of locations for granted. 98 When employment figures dropped
20% from a total of 735,870 in 1921 to 588,517 employees in 1939 the railways were
afforded another respite. Due to a decrease in earnings and the large proportion of labour
costs to total receipts rising from 33.25% in 1913 to 55.42% in 1930, reductions in the
workforce became a pure necessity for the survival of the railroads.99
Nonetheless, the slight relief might have contributed to the railways' reluctance in
pushing through more reforms and considerable investments  in research and development
in order to produce innovations to counter the competitive challenge. Their difficulties
were fairly obvious and solutions were at hand, induding the use of electric or diesel
engines, larger wagons and consignments, improvements in doser intra- and intermodal
co-operation to provide better and wider services, the withdrawal from unprofitable lines
to cut costs and cross-subsidies, thereby enabling the development of a cost- rather than a
Aldcroft (1968), p. 71
' Fenelon (1932), p. 170-173 reports on the under-utilization of freight wagons and the trader's
expectations.
Aldcroft (1968), p. 78-83. Crompton (1989), however, notes that railway workers were not faring so well
in the 1930s as m the 1920s. Whereas they enjoyed ..reaty mi'pnnred hung standanir and wrng coiuktwns Fy
cvmpaiisoa nth the d'mtted'j unsatz/actorj pre-war situation" throughout the 1920s, the serious decline in freight
receipts in 1928 resulted in a 200 pay cut with cuts of nearly 500 to follow in mid-1931, Crompton (1989),
pp. 68-71.
°° Butterfidd (1986), p. 32 noted that the "...genenilarntude seems to have been fatalistic" and competition from
road services was gwen too little attention.
68value-based pricing scheme. Instead of improving their competitive position by their own
efforts, they resorted to lobbying the government for regulation of road transport.
According to Aldcroft, the main outcome of the  1930 Road Traffic Ac and the 1933 Road
and Rail Traffic Act was a regulation of entry and conditions of service in the road
transport industry, in effect checking their growth and competition. Though Aldcroft does
not quite agree with the argument that the regulation made the railways less enterprising,
as competition was still severe in the I 930s, he emphasises that the railroads' situation
might have been much worse had it been left uncontrolled. However, he later admits that
an increase of road competition might have forced the railways to withdraw from
uneconomic operations, as the road transport companies would have concentrated on the
dense traffic links.101
Therefore, the pressure on the railways would have been even bigger to abandon
unprofitable lines, if the road operators were skimming off the cream of their competitors'
main source of income. In order to stay in business at all, the four amalgamated railway
companies would have been well advised to take immediate and radical steps to counter
the competition on their profitable line of business, rather than leaning back and carry on
in the way they did before, trusting that they were successful in the past and believe their
past experience will help them overcome the challenges of the future. Instead of wasting
resources on their unprofitable branches, the railways would have been forced to abandon
them and concentrate their investments on improving their competitive position in their
endangered core business. The legislative protection made the railways less enterprising.
The same applies to former well-meant regulations aiming to protect rail transport.
Though it helped to cushion against the immediate consequences of competition, it could
not prevent them in the long term.' Whereas the railroads should have grabbed the
chance and make up for their delays in investments and innovations, they slowed down.
Eventually they switched their strategy, either entering into alliances with bus or road
freight operators or setting up their own road-based businesses after they secured the
necessary parliamentary approval in 1928. In 1931 they were already associated with
nearly half the bus companies, whilst it was far more difficult to settle in the road haulage
industry. In 1929 the railroads obtained powers to diversify into air travel, but it was not
101 Aldcroft (1968 , p. 84-8 (esp. footnote, p. 85) and Aldcroft (1970), p. 221. The Road Traffic Act, 1930,
ch. 43 regulated the traffic of motor vehides and the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, ch. 53 was focussed
on "...?gnhzfr1!g the czage ofgoodi on road, niotor ttehcles oc ce#n roadr.J'.
Accordingly,J y (1973), p.138 underlines the absurdity and the adverse effects of the Road Traffic Act
"After 35years of econoniic regwkton of road baidage, it was &ffiadt to iden any beaanes of the ystew, with the
key exception of sonic tctabbsbed baithers. It bad cerainEy not protected the nl.uy."
69until the mid-thirties, that they were actively involved, either establishing new companies
or acquiring stakes in existing enterprises.'03
The check on road transport is remarkable when observed in the light of the
findings of the Royal Commission on Transport, published in their final report in 1931.
The Commission discovered that the depression in heavy industries was more important
than road competition in causing the difficulties of the railways. Still, the report
acknowledged that the railways were naturally affected by the emerging competition, as
road transport was highly advantageous to both commerce and the general public. Still,
the railways were supposed to be partly responsible for their debacle. '7t has been suggested
to us that when road competition first began to be serious from a railwqy point of uew - that is,
immediate5 after the War - the railwqys were caught napping and failed to take sufficient steps  to
meet the new situation.. . . it cannot be denied that in the ds of their monopo5 the railwqys bad in some
wqys insufficient?y studied the needs of the public, and that their polig had become undu±5'
conservatit'e."104 The report then states the railways' efforts to convince the Commission to
regulate road transport. Whereas the railway companies were right to highlight the
government's damaging discrimination in favour of the road hauliers, regulation was only
one option. The railway users had to bear the full costs of rail transport, while the
corresponding bill in road transport was shared between the users by means of licenses and
the taxpayers.105 Instead of the regulation of the 1933 Road and Rail Traffic Act,
legislation might have pursued the path suggested by the railway companies themselves in
the same report, namely an equal treatment of road and rail transport concerning
maintenance costs and new investments in order to put an end to legislative
discrimination.'°6
103 Bonavia (1981), pp. 94-117 briefly examines the railroads' involvement in road and air transportation,
serving as a comprehensive literature study.
104 Parhamentary Papers (1931), VoL XVII, Cmd. 3751, paragraphs 128-139
103 Parliarnentary Papers (1931), VoL XVII, Cmd. 3751, paragraph 97: "As regards what may be described
as economic disabilities, the railway companies took the view that although the economic costs of rail
transport are entirely borne by rail users, in the case of road transport the user bear a part only of the
corresponding costs. The grounds on which this contention was based were that (i) railway revenue must
remunerate the capital approximately £900,000,000) expended m purchasing lands for and constructing the
permanent way, stations, etc., and must also meet the annual cost (approximately £23,000,000) required for
the maintenance of permanent way, signalling, equipment and the wages of signalmen; and (ii) the total
annual expenditure on highways is approximately £60,000,000, of which only about £20,000,000 is
provided by the Road Fund (i.e., licence duties) and £40,000,000 is provided by the ratepayer. The railways
asserted that no account is taken of this £40,000,000 in the charges made by road hauhers for conveyance."
1°'Parhamentary Papers (1931), VoL XVII, Cmd. 3751, paragraphs 99-102. The discrimination in favour of
road transport remained.
70The events during the Second World War very much resembled the WWI period.
From I 't September 1939 the government regained control over the railways and left the
responsibility for the daily operaiions to the Railways Executive Committee of the railway
managers. As before, the companies experienced a decrease in investments and frozen
charges after the initial financial arrangements had been revised in September 1941. The
initial wartime agreements between the railway owners and the government established a
pool for the entire receipts and expenses of the railways. Government guaranteed
payments of £39.44 million, the guaranteed net revenues. They were then paid to the five
controlled undertakings out of the pool Whereas any remaining balance in the pool up to
a further £3.5 million was distributed between the four amalgamated railway companies
and the London Passenger Transport Board in proportion to their respective guaranteed
net revenues, any earnings exceeding the sum payable up to a limit of £56 million were
split half between the Exchequer and the five companies in proportion to their guaranteed
net revenues with the remainder going directly into the government's account.107
Following strong opposition to the financial arrangements due to the belief that
they were favouring the railways at the cost of the transport consumers, alterations were
undertaken in 1941. The outcome was guaranteed net revenue of  £43 million payable to
the railway companies, while any surpluses in net revenue over the agreed guarantee
would contribute to the government's purse.108 In the short term, the revision turned out
to be a welcome blessing for the government, which received a total of £195.1 million
between 1941 and 1945.109 In the long term it added to the costly railway bill for
neglected and overdue investments. Also, the controlled undertakings had no incentive to
provide efficient transport services and to invest in maintenance and innovations, as they
would not get a share of any profits exceeding the guaranteed net revenue. Though the
railroads successfully managed the wartime demands, they were worn out in its aftermath.
"One of the biggest problems was the poor phjsical condition of railwqy assets. This can be attributed
marn5i to the effects of war damage, the ng lea of investment and maintenance, and the intensive use of
rolling stock which accelerated the rate of depreciation. Moreover these adverse factors affected the
railwqys when thg were least able to stand the strain, since prior to 1939 investment and renewals had
been neglected, and on balance the railwqy companies had been disinvesting since 1914. The war served
'°7 Parliamentary Papers (1940), VoL X, Cmd. 6168. The proportions of the guaranteed net revenues are
given in the Command Paper as follows: London Midland & Scottish Railway. 34°c London & North
Eastern Railway: 230 o; Great Western Railway: 16°e; Southern Railway: 16'o; London Passenger Transport
Boar& 11°.. Also see Gourvish (1986), p. 12
'°Parliamentary Papers (1941), VoL VIII, Cmd. 6314
109 Aldcroft (1968), pp. 89-94
71to accentuate the problem considerab ji."1° In 1947, l6.6% of the total stock or roughly
203,000 railway wagons were in line for repair with many more being obsolete, reflecting
the neglect of investments during the wartime years. Mirroring the post-WWI period input
costs of the railways rose in the aftermath of WWII, whilst there was no corresponding
adjustment in charges. Despite an increase in 1947, charges reached only 55% of the pre-
war level. Wages and other input prices had more than doubled by 1948.111
After the Labour Party's sweeping victory in the 1945 election, the railways were
set on the final path to nationalisation. Labour assumed that public ownership was
necessary to undertake a general overhaul of the railway network and that a government
controlled unified transport system was the most efficient organisation to run the
service.112 However, the nationalisation received cross-party political support, though the
Tories' standpoint was rather ambiguous, drawn between the party's inter-war étatiste
tradition and economic liberalism, ending up in a compromise. 113 Eventually, the 1947
Tranport Act established the British Transport Commission (BTC), which was granted the
powers to run passenger and freight transport by rail, road and inland waterway. As the
government awarded a legislative monopoly in transport to the Commission, the BTC was
supposed to break even, neither making any profits, nor losses. 'The Commission shall charge
to revenue in eveyyear all charges which are proper to be made to revenue, including in particular,
proper allocations to general reserve, prop er provision for depreciation or renewal  of assets and proper
pro vision for redemption of capita4 and allpqyments (including the pajments which are 4'y the relevant
provisions of this Act, orbj anj other relevant statutory provision, to be deemed to be capital pqyments)
which fall to be made, in Lieu of ay other form of compensation, to anjF local authori!, in thatyear in
respect of any undertaking transferred  to the Commission, and references in this Act to charges prop er/y
chargeable to revenue shall be construed accordingy."4 Finally, the regulation of private
enterprise reached its climax in the Transport Act, following a century of government
interference in railway transport The British Transport Commissioners now had to prove
110 Aldcroft (1968), p. 100. Savage (1957), p. 638 portrays a similar picture of the railways after the war.
Aldcroft (1968), p. 104
112 Alternatively, Bonavia (1946), p.6 suested an early version of mstitutional separation in a memorandum
of the London and North Eastern Railway as the government should purchase "..the fixed assets required for
the operatio f ffic"There is some resemblance to the Swedish approach to deregulation, as outlined
further below.
113 Crompton (1999a), pp. 146-147. The Conservatives quickly adopted the advocacy of decentrahsation, but
it "...was unclear, how much autonomy the railways would enjoy, whether they would compete with each
other or where managerial control would be Located. In its comprehensive vagueness, advocacy of
decentralisation among post-war critics of nationalisation rouajily paralleled the earlier vogue for co-ordination
among the enthusiasts.", Crompton (1999a), p. 147.
114 Transport Act, 1947, section 93
72that they would run the transport system to the public benefit, maxiinising the welfare of
the public.
73Image removed due to third party copyrightB. The Kingdom of Prussia and the German Reich
1. The early railway promotion and the 1820 National Debt Law
In the early years of railway construction, Germany still resembled a patchwork
rather than a unified nation state. What became known as the German Reich were 39
sovereign states, finally tied together in 1871 as a direct result of the Franco-Prussian war.
Thus it is no big surprise that there was no unified German railway policy before the
empire's foundation. The other German states were worried that Prussia would take on a
dominant role in railway transport, meaning in turn that Prussia could influence the
individual states' economic and trade policy to an extent The states, being aware of a
potential threat to their sovereignty, were reluctant in promoting a German railway
network. German particularism and its inherent complexity was one of the biest
burdens the railway advocates had to face. The construction of a line from Berlin to
Hamburg required successful negotiations with four different states, one of them being
subject to the Danish government Having managed the initial construction phase of
railway lines across several borders, new burdens were waiting, as the states often had
differing local or regional time zones, currencies and units of measurement, resulting in
several calculations. However, at least the gauges were of a standard width, as the German
states were importing their locomotives mainly from England in the early stages of railway
development. 115
It is characteristic for Germany that the entire range between the extremes of a
private enterprise railway network and one operated and built by the state can be found.
While the systems in Bavaria and Saxony were partly state-owned, the states of Baden,
Braunschweig, Oldenburg and WUrttemberg were following the public ownership
approach.116 Prussia left most of the construction and operation of the network to private
entrepreneurs, offering only limited financial assistance to projects being in the national
interest The following discussion is limited to the Prussian case.
115 Accordmg to Fremdhng (1983), p. 126, 48 locomotives out of a total of 51 purchased for Prussian
railway companies between 1838 and 1841 were made in Great Britain, two in Belgium and a single one in
Germany. Seidenfus 1983), pp. 233-234 explains the consequences of the German state's particularism on
railway promotion in greater detaiL
116 Fremdhng (1983, p. 122, Klee (1982), pp. 165-166 and Stolper (1967), p. 40. Von Mayer (1891)
presents a detailed railway history of every single German state.
75The new mode of transport already had its promoters in the I 820s, with both
entrepreneurs and some of Prussia's civil servants favouring the construction of a railway
network. Their main line of thought was simply a logical consequence of taking Prussia's
economic geography and its central European location into account.117
Even though Prussia had its natural resources hidden away in the most remote
corners of the country, it still lacked an efficient transport system, such as the canal
networks that were prevailing for bulky and heavy goods traffic in Britain and the
Netherlands. Coal being the most essential ingredient for the country's industrialisation,
the major coal mines were disadvantageously located at its borders, in the Ruhr and Saar
regions in the west and in Silesia in the east. In order to exploit its natural resources and
distribute them to the cities and factories of industrialising Prussia, railways could provide
an efficient and time saving link between the centres of commerce and inland waterways,
thus being beneficial to the economy on a large scale. As if to support Prussia's early
railway promoters, the Dutch were placing a heavy burden on German commerce in
levying duties on all goods carried from the Rhine to the North Sea, although the 1815
Treaty of Vienna provided for free shipping on the Rhine. In order to circumvent the
levies and exercise pressure on the Dutch, a rail project between the Rhine and the river
Weser was suggested, promoting trade between the southern parts of Germany up to the
North Sea via the port of the Free Hanseatic Town of Breinen. This plan was first rejected
by the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm III in 1828 and again by the government in 1832.
The Prussian state invested in a road network in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars
and thus, the government was concerned about the role of competing railways, diverting
traffic from toll roads without providing compensation for its loss in revenue.
In 1833 the German economist Friedrich List gave the railway promoters strong
backing with his visionary publication on the advantages of a German railway network,
which would contribute substantially to the welfare of the German states. Still, the
Prussian government failed to recognise the potential benefits for the entire economy. In
July 1835 it commissioned its minister Christian von Rother to analyse the alternative
options for the government's railway policy. In his final report he advised King Friedrich
Wilhelm III against any government commitment to the railways, whether it be financial
assistance or even outright construction of lines. He believed that the promoters of the
railways were exaggerating the gains when contrasted with both the high initial capital
117 For the early efforts of Prussian railway advocates see Henderson (1958), pp. 155-160, Klee (1982), pp.
76investment of putting the infrastructure into place and the associated commercial risk of
the innovation. The Prussian roads would be sufficient for existing transportation needs.
The government failed to envisage that the railways might create new demands for
communication, stimulating economic growth and the demand for transportation
facilities. 8 Finally the military gained interest and the government had to acknowledge
the railway's advantages, reconsidering its options.
Adding to the economic arguments, the railway advocates further highlighted
strategic defence issues. Prussia's central European location left it in the position of an
island. In contrast to Britain, however, it was not surrounded with water, but with more
or less friendly nations, posing a potential threat to the country. Thus, from a military
point of view the railways could provide immediate supplies for endangered posts along
the frontier. If Prussia should decide to opt Out or postpone the development of a railway
network, it would have a strategic disadvantage, when attacked by countries that invested
in this modern means of transport.
But even though their lobbying of the government went back to the early 1820s,
the Prussian railway advocates did not succeed with their plans until November 1838,
when the first Prussian railway service had finally been introduced, connecting the cities
of Berlin and Potsdam. The very first locomotive-drawn German railway went into
service three years earlier, on 7th December 1835 in Bavaria, linking the neighbouring
towns of Nurnberg and FUrth, followed by the 1837 opening of the first section between
Dresden and Leipzig in Saxony.
The promoters had to circumvent a number of problems and vested interests. They
met strong opposition by the Prussian elite, the Junkers. Those aristocrats owned huge
estates in the East Elbian provinces and were strongly involved in Prussian governmental
and military bureaucracy. Further opposition against the advanced methods of
transportation came from competitors, such as road and water transport companies, but as
well from the head of the Prussian postal service, von Nagler. The latter anticipated falling
revenues due to the competition of railway companies, as the railways would skim the
cream by choosing profitable lines and leaving the remainder to the post The common
cross-subsidies from profitable passenger services could no longer subsidise the
97-101 and Seidenfus (1983), pp. 236-237
" Fremdling (1983, pp. 123-140 discusses the railways' significance for the economy as well as both
forward and backward linkage effects with oth& industries.
77unremunerative lines of the post's passenger coach traffic in order to maintain the
universal service even to the most remote village, lie demanded appropriate compensation
for the post's loss in revenues and secured his interests in the Prussian Railway Law of
1838. Incumbent competitors in the transport market and other interest groups lobbying
the government in order to set up strategic market barriers slowed the progress of Prussian
railway innovation.'19
Legal requirements were a further check on the railway promoters' progress,
adding to the market barriers. The 1820 National Debt Law considerably limited the
leeway of the Prussian government. The law "...fixed a 'legal' ceiling on the debt, the Crown
promising neither to add to it nor to introduce anj new direct taxes without consulting that quasi-
parliamentay bodj, the United Diet...It did not promise to be a very radical political instrument, but
the Prussian monarc/rJ flit that steps in its direction were concessions toward 'democracy' to be atided
at all costs. This stand, one should remember, was strongiy influenced and supported bji Prussia's
conservative Austrian and Russian allies (the flo?, A liiance ) . . . Thus, general antipathj on the pw1 of
Prussia's ruling class to industrial development was reinforced in the area offiscalpolify y politico-
legal arrangements which made public spendng patterns dependent ipon change in revenue sources.
The National Debt Law left the government hardly a choice, as borrowing was ruled out
and the Crown would have to divert resources from other uses. Withdrawing resources
from other public institutions would have provoked strong opposition of civil servants
and other beneficiaries affected.
The National Debt Law was the prevailing force which prevented the realisation
of a state-owned railway from a legal point of view. Though Friedrich Wilhelm III's
successor Friedrich Wilhelm N decided to call the Verein:gten stdndischen Ausschüsse der
preuJ?ischen Prorin/allandtage in 1842 and the Verein4gter Landtag in 1847 that were both in
favour of the government's involvement in railway construction, they declined the
Prussian government's proposal of approving a loan for the construction of the Eastern
Railway between Berlin and Konigsberg as they did not regard their assembly as a
parliament in accordance with the requirements of the 1820 National Debt Law. Whereas
the Verein:gten stdndischen AusschIsse were made up of representatives of the provincial
assemblies, the Vereinigter Lan dtag was the sum of the representatives of the eight
provincial assemblies. The 1820 National Debt Law, however, required a national
119 KIee (1982), pp. 98-102 and Seidenfus (1983), p. 237 on the opposition of the government and Tilly
(1966), pp.486-487 for the powerful position of the Junker aristocracy in Prussian government.
° Tilly (1966), p. 488
78representation, the United Diet. The Diet was envisaged to be a genuine national
parliament, representatives being directly chosen by the electorate in national elections.
The king's admittance of a national parliament would have been equivalent to a
self-restriction of his power and the introduction of a constitutional monarchy. Regardless
of whether Friednch Wilhelm IV was in favour of giving way to more democratic control,
he had to consider further vested interests. His Austrian and Russian allies as well as the
crown prince were unanimously opposed to modern democratic tendencies. Although the
Prussian railway policy had been the focus of the assemblies in 1842 and 1847, the debate
on public versus private ownership of the railways was only superficial, hiding the highly
delicate issue of constitutional reform based on the king's promise in the 1820 National
Debt Law. The majority of the advocates of either assembly arguing for state railways
were likely to be by far more concerned about the establishment of a constitution and a
genuine national parliament.
The 1847 Vereingter Landtag ended up as an embarrassing catastrophe for the
government and the King of Prussia, leaving them stranded without the requested bond
for the Eastern Railway. During the debate, August von der Heydt and David
Hanseniann, both prominent champions of a state-run railway system and later ministers
in the Prussian cabinet, were openly arguing that they could not approve of any state
bond, as long as the use of the taxpayers' money was entirely taken out of their control.
Hansemann went even further and attacked the failed railway policy of the last decade.
Following the assembly's refusal, the government dismissed 8,000 workers who were
already occupied in the construction of the Eastern Railway, thus increasing the massive
unemployment in pre-revolutionary Prussia. Eventually, the revolution of 1848 made
further considerations of the National Debt Law pointless, as the national parliament
became reality, in turn agreeing upon the required bonds, resulting in the government's
active involvement in the construction and management of the railways.'21
Whether or not the successive Prussian governments preceding the 1848
revolution had been convinced by the arguments of the promoters of a state-nm system,
they did have less choice than someone being trapped in a cul-de-sac. There was no way of
return to the era without railways - the only path led forward with the creation of a
121 Henderson (1958), p. 163 and Blankart (1987), pp. 79-80. Blankart highlights the role of the National
Debt Law as the single most prominent issue determining the Prussian government's railway policy. I(lee
792. Government interference and the 1838 Prussian Railway Law
In his classic economics book on business cycles, Schumpeter analysed the early
development of the railways in Prussia. He stressed the role of private enterprise and the
revolutionary impact upon the economy as a whole. The Prussian government '..acted zpon
what later became the fashion to call - aith some derogatoy implication - Smitbian princples. The
creation of the German railroad ystens was, hence, substantia4'y the work of private
entrepreneurs... Schumpeter's assumption of a Prussian free-market trend might appear
remarkable in a country which would soon take the lead as the forerunner of increasing
state control of the economy. But the Smithian principles can be explained by exogenous
factors, being beyond government's controL Notwithstanding the Prussian government's
stance concerning the above principles, the restraints on borrowing limited its possible
involvement in the railways and were responsible for the relatively unhampered
entrepreneurial freedom. Still, the Prussian system was far away from becoming a network
being created and operated by unrestrained entrepreneurship. The Smithian principles
were put in a straitjacket from the very beginning with the 1838 Railway Law. 'The
Prussian government bad to face the fact that most of the capita/for railwqy construction would have to
be raised /yprivaJe companies. But the State was determined to exercise as much influence as possible
over the building and operation of railways. The Prussian Railway Law  of 1838 gave the State u'de
powers over railway companies. Moreover every railway company bad to obtain a concession from the
government and this gave the authorities an ippomniy to acquire the nght of purchasing the line at
some future date. "a
The lack of public funds and the government's determination to exercise its
regulatory power in railway construction and operation resulted  in the 1838 Prussian
Railway Law and its predecessor, the Al/gemeinen Bedingungen of 1836. The latter defined the
general rules to obtain concessions from the Ministry of Commerce for the construction
and operation of private railway companies. The act of 1838 provided for the
combination of private enterprise with public supervision, exclusively directed towards
private railway companies.'25 26 of the Railway Law dealt with the urgent need to
attract private investment by granting every railway company monopoly power on its own
line for three years from start of service. During these years, the company was free to set
122 Schumpeter (1939), p. 346
'The Royal Prussian Railway Law is attached m the appendix section VLB3.
124 Henderson (1958), p. 163
Seidenfüs (1983), p. 237 takes the viewpoint that the law was a prdiminary deasion whether the system
should be run by pubhc or private companies, as it was restricted to private enterprises.
81prices according to their discretion. In addition, §44 of the law was concerned with the
high risk of the initial investment, as the government was not allowed to give any
concessions for parallel lines within the 30 years.
But the monopoly of the incumbent railway company was potentially restricted.
Competition on the track was permitted after the initial period of three years had passed,
thereby lowering the entry barriers of the railway market. According to §27 of the Railway
Law potential entrants had to pay an access charge, the Bahngeld, to the track owner.
Additionally, they had to obtain a licence from the Ministry of Commerce. Already in
1838, the law specified the formula for calculating the access prices to the incumbent's
infrastructure and limited the profits a company was allowed to receive to a maximum of
10% of the investment capital (29-30).
Due to the Prussian postal services' complaints and demands for appropriate
compensation, the law included certain privileges, such as the transportation of all postal
goods free of charge (36, 2). In addition, every railway company was obliged by law to
bring its transport service into line with the postal administration's requirements (S36, 1).
If the regular service should be interrupted due to the railway company's responsibility,
thus temporarily forcing the post to find other means of transportation, the private
business would have to compensate the postal administration. Though the law allowed for
a general railway tax (S38), its revenues were limited to compensating the government's
budget for lost revenues due to the railway's competition ( S 9)• Most importantly, the law
codified the state's right to acquire the property of the railway companies 30 years after
opening the line for traffic (S 42, 1), even including the basic rules for calculating the
purchasing price (542, 4). The state's discretionary powers were considerably widened
with the final paragraph of the law (549), providing leeway for future amendments or
alterations of the legal requirements of the 1838 Railway Law and railway concessions.
The law immediately provoked strong opposition from contemporary
entrepreneurs and shareholders of railway companies who were opposed to granting the
government both omnipotent and arbitrary powers, as they were expressed  in §49 of the
law. Even one of the prime advocates of state owned railways, David Hansemann,
strongly criticised the law on entrepreneurial grounds. Ironically, he admitted his lack of
' 1(1cc (1982), pp. 103-104 and Seidenfus (1983), p. 238. 1(1cc argued that the government designed the
Railway Law to make the capitalists pay for the railways, while it left the power of disposal with the
government
82comprehension of the rules on calculating the access prices laid down in §30. The
requirements were complicated, ambiguous and allowed different interpretations.
Notwithstanding the Prussian civil servants' astuteness and knowledge, the criticised rules
would prove their incapability of judging decision making in business. Hansemann
condemned the profit ceiling of 1000 as being unreasonable and unfair. The law, he
daimed, would scare off foreign capitalists, hamper innovation in railway transport and
curb any possible reduction in tariffs due to an increase in frequency of services.127
Already in 1837 he argued against the government's intention to place a commcsioner in
every railway company in order to exercise the government's supervisory powers, as was
envisaged for the law and actually implemented in §46. Hansemann deemed the constant
supervision of individual business decisions harmful. The private companies would lose
their essential advantage compared to state-run enterprises, if their entrepreneurial
freedom was restricted. He concluded that the government would have to choose either a
purely private or state-run system of railways, as the advantages of both systems were
incompatible.128
Hansemann was convinced that state-run railways were the first-best option for
Prussia, as only the government would build lines into areas with a low population
density. Though beneficial to the economy as a whole, the lines would not attract private
enterprises. However, he realised the impossibility of a public railway network due to the
government's financial restraints and resorted to a system of unrestrained entrepreneurial
freedom as the next best choice. Instead of regulation he demanded promotion and the
removal of all barriers for the construction and operation of railways. The law, he argued,
was an adequate means to wreck a railway company. 129 Indeed, the railway market had
suffered from the interference and did not recover in the following years. The demand for
railway shares and consequently their share prices went down, as the law ruined any
expectations for a high return on investment. The railway companies were left with the
vague hope that the government would refrain from applying the extensive regulatory
potential of the Railway Law.°
Recognising the imperceptible progress of railway building the Prussian
government created the Railway Fund in 1843 in an effort to provide limited support for
127 Hansemann (1841 , pp. 80-81
'2 1{ansemann (1837), pp. 102-103
Hansemann (1837), pp. 26-27 and Klee (1982), p. 103
Klee (1982), pp. 103-106 reports on the protests of the railway companies, the economic downturn and
the intention of the government, not to make full use of the law.
83railway projects. The combination of privatdly owned railways and companies built with
the fund's assistance resulted in Prussia's mixed approach to railway policy. The fund's
resources were available whenever the construction of a line was considered to be
essential for Prussia's economic welfare or for military reasons, but the risk associated
with the investment kept private entrepreneurs away from the project. In order to attract
investors, the state accepted part of the risk of some railway projects to make them
commercially viable. Though the Railway Fund served to promote railway construction, it
was in its essence a device for cross-subsidisation from profitable to less profitable lines
were considered to be iii the national interest.131
The Railway Fund's revenues were drawn from diverse sources. In the years
following the introduction of the fund, it was financed through government money and
superdividends of private railway companies, as the government creamed off one-third of
the profits which were exceeding 500 of the entire capital held in shares. In addition, a
progressive tax between 2.5 and 10 cent of net profits on railway companies was levied
following the 1853 Railwaj Law, activating the tax already provided for in §S38-39 of the
1838 Railway Law.
Financial assistance through the Railway Fund was given by two means. Either the
government acquired some shares of a private railway company or by guaranteeing interest
on shares through the fund. If the government agreed to support the construction of a
new line, it bought one in seven of the company's shares and guaranteed 3.5°o interest on
the other six-seventh owned by the public.' 32 Although it might already benefit by owning
one-seventh of the shares and in political terms by an increase in the nation's welfare with
the new transport facilities, it demanded the right for taking over the administration of
the company in question if certain circumstances would require so in exchange for its
financial commitment. If assistance through the fund were granted, the government would
impose its terms upon the company in the concession agreement, therefore considerably
restricting the company's leeway.'33
131 Fremdling and Knieps (1993, p. 132 discuss the problem of the cross-subsidies. The policy of cross-
subsidisation within a company was all too common in British Rail and Deutsche Bundesbahn in the 20th
century, which was partly responsible for the decline of the entire networks.
"2 Hendon (1958), pp. 165-166 and Seidenfus (1983), PP. 239-243
t33 Seidenfus (1983 , p. 240 for an excerpt of a concession agreement.
843. National verses private railways
The 1848 revolution presented a turning point in Prussias railway history with the
new government now openly favouring public railways. The strule for political
participation was over and the way for public borrowing open to the government David
Hansemann was appointed Minister of Finance in spring and carried on to promote his
vision of state-run railways. In consequence, the Prussian government planned to
nation alise its entire railway network for the sum of fifty million Thalers. The plan did not
materialise for another three decades, because that very government had to leave office in
the same year. Nevertheless, the natioiialisation efforts were stimulated in December
1848, when one of the most prominent advocates of a network of state railways, August
von der Heydt, was appointed Minister of Commerce. In contrast to Hansemann's
unsuccessful attempt, he adopted a piecemeal approach to nationalisation and exercised a
greater influence wherever possible, either by constructing new state lines or buying
private railway businesses. Heydt interfered with their internal business decisions, as he
was convinced the trains should be run in the national instead of the shareholder's
interest. During the 1848 depression many railway companies were facing financial
difficulties due to a dedine in freight transport as a direct result of the economic
depression. When they turned to the government to request assistance, Heydt was only
too ready to bail them out. But the government's support was conditional upon the
Prussian state taking over the administration of the company in question.
His policy of partial nationalisation and extension of influence was so far quite
successful. It was furthermore highlighted in December 1849, when the Prussian Landtag
authonsed a loan that was required for the state railway projects Heydt was advocating.
Still, the opposition towards the politics of nationalisation grew. He met fierce resistance
from the directors of the Lower Silesian Railwqy, when he suested that its poor
performance in the late I 840s would justify the government's take-over of the company's
administration. The company's directors did not quite share his view. They argued that the
minister himself was responsible to some degree, because he had imposed upon the
company an expensive night train service.1
Even though the 1838 Railway Law did not authorise Heydt to order private
railway companies to run night trains, he made use of the law in accordance with his idea
134 Henderson (1958), pp. 174-178 and Kice (198Z), pp. 121-122
85of maximising the country's welfare and meeting the natLonal interest. The mnster
referred to §36 of the law, stating that the companies were obliged to adjust their
timetables to the postal service. When confronted with the Lower Silesian's demand for
compensation due to the expected increase in costs, he replied that it would be odd for
the government to pay anyone to comply with the law. Thus, he forced the Lower Silesian
Railway Company to run a night train on the route between Berlin and Breslau in 1849.
Complying with the government's regulations, the company's directors were offering the
service and supplemented it with a surprise: '.4t a meeting of the shareholders it was decided to
defy the Minister of Commerce lij hamng the n{ght trains drawn by horses instead of /,j locomotives.
Von der Hy& threatened the directors with legal penalties f the locomotives were withdrawn from the
n:ght trains and the compan) gave wqy. '
The board of directors of the Lower Silesian Railway Company was hardly entirely
responsible for their railway's poor performance. Neither did they decide to run expensive
night trains, nor was the economic depression and the consequent reduction in commerce
their fault. The debate went on and included Karl von Bodelschwingh, the then Minister
of Finance. He rejected Heydt's plans of nationalising the Lower Silesian Railway
Company. However, Friedrich Wilhelm IV overruled Bodelschwingh, pointing to the
economic and military importance of the line. The railway was transferred into public
ownership in 1852.1k
Subsequently, the railway tax of 1853 as well as the dividends on the government
owned shares were used to increase the total amount of railway shares held by the state.
Apparently, the government's path between 1848 and the late I 850s was essentially a
policy aiming at a nationalised rail network, reversing the former market led development.
Though the government's policy of letting the railway companies pay for their own
nationalisation was remarkably ingenious, it is more than doubtful, whether the mixed
system between the poles of private and state railway companies maximised the welfare of
Prussia after all. The Prussian influence over railways grew at such a rate, that by the year
1857 about half of the Prussian railway network was either controlled or owned by the
state.137
'"Henderson 1958), p. 181
136 Blankart (1987), p.80 argues that excessive regulations led to deficits, resulting in the governmenfs legal
justification to take control See also Henderson (1958), p. 178 and Klee (1982), p. 122. The nationalisation
order for the Lower Siles,an Railway is attached in appendix 4.
137 Henderson (1958), p. 183 and Seidenfus (1983), pp. 242-243 concerning von der Heydt's nationalisation
efforts.
86The trend towards steadily growing government involvement caine to a temporary
halt with the election of a Prussian Landtag in 1858. Liberal politicians dominated the
newly elected parliament The favoured a notion of entrepreneurial freedom and put an
end to I-Ieydt's nationalisation concept financed by the private railway companies. The
proceeds from the dividends of the shares the government held in railway companies were
now no longer used for acquiring new shares, but were to contribute to the entire public
budget Despite the change in politics Heydt remained in the Prussian government until
1862, when he resigned due to Bismarck taking the post of Minister President He
returned to the cabinet as Minister for Finance in 1866 for three years. Ironically, Heydt
was forced to sell shares, which the state held in some of the private railway companies, in
order to raise money for the Austrian-Prussian war in 1866. However, the Prussian
annexation of German territories immediately after the war with Austria enlarged the
Prussian State Railway's lines by 1069 kilometres in total length, thus creating something
close to a true railway network for the first time.138
In December 1862 Heinrich von Itzenplitz was appointed Minister of Commerce
and was henceforth responsible for the government's policy towards the railways until
1873. 'Von der Hydt's railwqypolig was now reversed Public opinion followed the lead given bj the
influential Congress of Economists infairouring private rather than public railwqys. Itrenpb declared
that it did not matter who built railwqys so long as someone built them."39 Again, the lack of public
funds available for railways was a further driving force behind the support for private
railways. The government's priority was rather military spending than investments in the
railways. The Minister of Commerce's source of public money, the Railway Fund, was
discontinued in 1863, leaving even less leeway for public construction of railway
infrastructure. As a result of the shortage of both public and private funds in Prussia,
English capital was increasingly attracted in the I 860s, an era dominated by a trend
towards laissez faire in Prussia. The massive increase in privately built and operated tracks
culminated in a railway mania in the early I 870s after the Franco-German war, with 25
new railway companies emerging between 1871 and 1873, leading to a boost in network
expansion (chart 18). This period is characterised by increasing competition in the railway
industry, with companies building parallel lines, e.g. along the Rhine river and on other
routes in the Rhein-Ruhr industrial region. Though the competitive pressure was
13 Blankart (1987), p. 81 and Klee (1982), p. 134 report on the take-over of the railways of the states of
Hanover, Kurhessen, Nassau and Frankfurt/Main as well as Schleswig H Istein by the Prussian State
Railways.
87efforts for the nationalisation of the entire German network failed due to the opposition
of individual states of the Reich, he decided to pursue his course in Prussia. After the
Landtag elections a majority of representatives approved of his nationalisation programme
commencing in December 1879. By 1884, the Prussian government had acquired the
major share of about 8,500 kilometres of lines. "Construction was thenceforth done bj the state,
which un/led rates, rationalised administration, and achieved what was in the whole world looked upon
as the standard example of succes.fulpublic enterprise. The compliment, while ve,j well deserved, must
not be overdone. The main work was accomplished  4y 1875.. .prwate industry continued to offir to, in
fact almost to force upon the state-managed railroads a stream of improvements - particular/y
improved pes of locomotives, cars, brakes, safefy devices - so that the merit...is reduced to not
resisting and to displqying an intelltgent demand; and conditions, both technological and commercial,
were quite exceptional/y favourable in a thickypopulatea predominantlyflat county."43
At last, Bismarck got his way to pursue the path of nationalisation of the railways.
While nearly 60% of the Prussian railway network of 16,142 kilometres was still in
private ownership in 1875, it was only a marginal 6°  o of the 37,973 kilometres on the eve
of the first world war, as shown below (chart 19).1 Nevertheless, the chancellor's vision
of having the railways nationalised under ownership of the Reich was partly wrecked by
the several differing interests of the individual states within the Reich. It was not until
1920 that the operation of the railway network was transferred to the Deutsche Reichsbahn.
In the meantime, eight state railways were co-existing next to each other and the
'.. relationship among the e:ght public railroad .ystems was about what it would have been among
private ystems under loose state supervision. "4
'43 Schumpeter (1939), pp. 346-347
Stolper (1967), p.41 presents the corresponding figures for the Reich. The entire German railway system
in 1875 was consisting of 27956 kilometres, of which 12641 kilometres were prIvate, 12062 were state
railways and the remaining 3253 were operated by the state, though owned by private companies. The year
1912 presents a somewhat different picture, with a total network 0160521 kilometres, of which a marginal
3631 kilometres were owned and operated by private companies with the remainder being under control of
the German states.
'45 Stolper (1967), p. 42
894. The motivations for nationalisation
The development of the Prussian railways may be separated into three broad
stages. In the first stage of railway construction until the 1848 revolution, relatively
unrestrained entrepreneurial activities emerged as a bare necessity due to the scarcity of
funds in the government's purse. Though the 1838 Railway Law provided the government
with a powerful regulatory apparatus, it refrained from its use. Active government
involvement characterises the second stage. In 1858 it came to an end with the liberals
winning the absolute majority in the election to the Prussian Landtag. During the I 850s
August von der Heydt's policy of gradual nationalisacion led to a system in which public
and private railroads were increasingly co-existing and competing with each other. The
state had purchased private railways, taken over their administration and operation or
built own lines. In spite of the government's successful efforts to get more involved in the
decade from 1848, the laissez-faire doctrine captured ever more ground and came close to
being accepted as mainstream politics in the 1860s. Again, the government was confronted
with a shortage of funds for railway projects. The budget was focussed on military
spending due to the wars with Austria and France. However, there was an essential
difference compared with the I 84Os, as the political climate was now strongly favouring a
market economy. Thus, a kind of golden age for the private railway companies marks the
third stage before the nationalisation process gained full pace in 1879.
Though the cartelisation of the railways in the aftermath of the Franco-German
war created growing demands for reform, it is rather doubtful whether the nationalisation
was the appropriate reply. Even in the unlikely case that the government had suddenly lost
its entire confidence in a liberal economy, it could have applied the powerful measures of
the 1838 Railway Law."6 The promotion of competition on the track according to §27 of
the law was a considered option, allowing other operators than the owner of the track
access to the railway infrastructure, provided that the operator had obtained a concession
from the Minister of Commerce and paid the Bahngeld to the owner. The competition
between lines, which produced the overcapacity in the early I 870s, would have been
eased, thus avoiding future waste of resources by duplicate lines. Nevertheless, the
instrument had only been applied on a single occasion as a potential threat against the
Upjer Silesian Railwqy Compaiy, when Berlin's growing demand for coal was to a large
extent supplied by England. In order to promote the higher priced Silesian coal, Heydt
Fremdlmg and Kmeps (1993), pp. 144-154 study possible options prior to nationalisation.
91required both the Lower and Upper Silesian Railways to introduce the special
Einpfenn:gtarif The companies soon abolished the low tariff on account of anticipated
losses. In the course of events, the minister took over the Lower Silesian's administration
and announced that he would grant the Lower Silesian Railway a licence according to §27
of the Prussian Railway Law to run their coal trains for the  Einpfennigtarif on the Upper
Silesian's tracks. Unsurprisingly, the law assisted the Upper Silesian Railway's directors to
change their mind in I 852.147 In retrospect, the new tariff was a profitable business for
both the Silesian mining industry and the railways, as the coal carried to Berlin rose from
5,300 tons in 1850 to 191,700 tons in 1860."
Though market failures are a common justification for public ownership of
industries, the Prussian government could have remedied assumed failures with a
regulatory approach, e.g. applying §27 of the 1838 Railway Law. Heydt's arguments for
public ownership or control were often based on mismanagement or losses. Comparable
arguments were not viable in supporting the case of nationalising several profitable
railways in 1879. Also the argument of providing cheaper transportation facilities after
riationalisation was unjustified to support a state purchase. Contrasting the reductions of
the private companies, average rates nearly remained on the same level after
nationalisation, as illustrated in chart 20. Accordingly, the government's motivation for
nationalisation had different origins.
First, a single centralised state-run railway was preferable from a military point of
view, as it was subject to military control and easier to administer than a diversity of
relatively small, independent companies. Second, the railways were not at all at the margin
of bankruptcy, but in an excellent condition. Therefore, they were a welcome source of
hidden taxation. Fremdling and Knieps highlight that the '..major reason for nationalisation
was that railwqy revenues served as a substitute for )roper taxes in order to finance Prussia's
budget."'49 Third, the nationalisation was a logical reflection of Prussia's trend towards
protectionism. Bismarck claimed that protective duties would only be effective if the
railway companies could not undermine the duties by means of their pricing policy, as it
147 Fremdhng (1999), p. 79
141 Fremdhng and Knieps (1993), p. 145, Henderson (1958, pp. 182 183 and KIee (1982), pp. 126-129
discuss the E:tfenngtanf which meant that the freight tariff for 100 kilogramme of coal was fixed at one
Pfennig per German mile. Appendix B.4. contains the King's nationalisation order of the Lower Silesian
Railway Company as published in KIee (1982), pp. 123-124.
Fremdhng and Knieps (1993), p. 153
92earlier andproceeded more rapid/y than it actually did under a regime of bureaucratic inteiference and
deky. "-fl
151 Fremdling (1983), p. 122. KIee (1982), p. 113 and Seidenfus (1983), p. 238 share Fremdlings view, that
the Prussian railway policy rather hampered than promoted its further progress.
94C. Conclusion
Studies of railway history of the United Kingdom and Prussia illustrate that the
early railway systems had some parallels. Both the United Kingdom and Prussia were
densely populated and relatively small countries. They were benefiting from an improved
transportation service, whereas the railways in the United States were opening up large
undeveloped lands to the settlers. 1 Prior to the railways' advent, the countries were
largely depending on a transport system of inland waterways, turnpikes and other roads
with the system of canals being most elaborate in the United Kingdom. Road and canal
operators, as well as landowners were often naturally opposed to the railway innovation
threatening their market or country estates, respectively.
Following a period of relative government absence from railway affairs for the
different reasons described above, state involvement steadily increased across the UK and
Prussia. The advocates of a public railway network were most vigorous in Prussia. In the
aftermath of the depression of the late I 840s, the Prussian state became actively involved
in rail traffic, running a widely praised public railway in competition with private railway
companies. Prussia's piecemeal approach to nationalising the railways was quite successful
and by 1857 roughly half of its entire railway network was owned or controlled by the
government. While the action towards regulation and nationalisation in Prussia was largely
due to politicians' initiatives, shifts in public opinion were responsible for the trend
towards increasing government involvement in transport in the United Kingdom and also
in the United States.
After a speculative investment boom in the early 1 860s, the 1866 crisis marks a
turning point for Great Britain. During the ensuing depression, the railways were
discovered as a welcome scapegoat in the competitive struggle of tradesmen against
foreign products. Dreadful accidents led to public concerns about the railways' neglect of
safety and it was suggested that the passengers' personal safety was sacrificed for higher
profits, ironically resembling the claims in today's Britain. Amalgamations in the industry
were supporting the advocates' arguments for more regulation, as the railway companies
appeared to accumulate ever more market power.
152 The railway development in the United States is discussed in section VLA.
95In consequence, the last quarter of the 19th century was dominated by
government legislation in order to control the power of the railways in the United
Kingdom and United States, while Prussia had already nationalised the railways in 1879.
Prussia's and Germany's politicians were pushing towards nationalisation, above all the
chancellor of the German Reich, Bismarck. But the railways were in an excellent
condition and more importantly very profitable. Thus, the nationalisation served as a
substitute for proper taxes and furthermore supported Bismarck's protectionist economic
policy. The railways in the United Kingdom were suffering from severe underinvestment
both before and during WWII and had failed to meet the challenge of intermodal
competition, when the newly elected Labour government nationalised the railways with
the 1947 Transport Act in order to get the ailing railways back on track. The industry's
problems were, however, largely caused by e government's legislative discrimination
against the railways. The railways' flexibility in pricing and other business decisions was
constantly curtailed, making it more difficult to react to the challenges imposed upon the
railways from other modes of transport.
Although the early railway development in the UK and Prussia has often been
cited as an example of entrepreneurial freedom, considerable state interference prevailed.
The argument was even highlighted by outright supporters of a state-run railway system
like David Hansemann in Prussia, when he attacked the regulations of the 1838 Railway
Law, because he deemed them adequate to wreck a railway company. It has been shown
that the existing laws already contained a solution concerning the major problem of a
potential waste of resources in railway networks due to duplication of infrastructure. Both
the British Acts of Incorporation and Prussia's 1838 Railway Law provided for
competition on the track, which came back into public debate in the course of
privatisations in the 1990s in Britain and in Germany. The next section investigates the
common justifications for nationalisation of railway transport.
96Section II
Regulation and Nationalisation
97Throughout Europe, rail bat genera4y been seen as a natural monopo/y, requiring both regulation and
subsidy. Monopoly power was deemed to require regulation ofprices cbared for rail seruces, and 'common
carrier' obligations to carry whatever tr€J1c was qffernd at that pnce. IV:thdrawd of passenger senices
required government approttzI which wasfrequentiy Mtbheg requinng cross-subsidy of loss making reneces
bypivjitable ones. Competition was also regulatea with protection oj'niil tnic being a mqor factor in the
regulation of the bus and road haulage industries. Nevertheless, naiways throughout the Commun:y fell
into defiat dunng the courre of the 1960's and 1970's.
Nash and Preston, 1997152
A. The market imperfections doctrine and interventionism
Nash and Preston illustrate the environment in which the railways were operating
under private and public ownership. The extremes of relatively unhampered railway
competition and excessive government regulation were prevailing in the United Kingdom
and the German Reich until the train companies were nationalised. The reasoning behind
the governments' interference may be separated into economic and political motives.
However, politically motivated regulations are often claimed to arise due to economic
imperfections, though they are indeed politically motivated. This chapter focusses on the
economic considerations for regulation of the railway market due to perceived market
imperfections, before considering the remaining scope for public policy in chapter  A.4.153
Chapter B concludes section II with a statement and definitions on deregulation and
privatisation.
The political motives for regulation and nationalisation are extensive. The motives
in Britain and Prussia mainly comprised the pursuit of:
• integrationist transport policies;
• social policy considerations;
• redistribution of income;
• centralised political control and guidance;
• protection of other modes from railway competition;
• protection of the railways from intermodal competition;
152 Nash and Preston 1997), p. 20
Ewers and Rodi (1995), pp. 21-23 and Stackelberg (1990 , pp. 176-189. Blankart (1994), PP. 54-76 for a
comprehensive analysis of market imperfecnons and the potentially resultant role for the state.
98• protectionist government policies;
• militaristic advantages;
• substitutes for proper taxes;
• increases in overall welfare.
Most of the political motives, however, are centred at a dissatisfaction of
politicians or the public with the outcomes of the market. Thus, it shall be assumed with
Kirzner '. . that gove7tment regulation of the market economy is generated bj dissatisfaction with
market outcomes. Legislators or other government officials (perhaps in response to public outcry, or in
anticipation thereof) are disturbed either by the hzgh price that certain would-be purchasers are asked to
pqy in the market or by the low price (for example, the wages of labor) received by certain sellers in the
market; or they are disturbed by the quality ofgoods or services being offered for sale (for example,
because of the absence of safqy devices) or by the unavailability in the market ofgoods or services that
they believe to be important. Thy are disturbed by the conditions under which workers are expected to
work, or they are disturbed by the pattern of income distribution generated by the market, by
unemployment, or Ity trofiteering', or by the side effects (such as environmental polbition...) generated
by uncontrolled market activity. '"p' Though Kirzner did not focus on railway policy, the reader
will recognise the similarities to the periods of railway regulation in section I.
Dissatisfaction with market outcomes may then induce the government to
intervene and correct the perceived market imperfections by means of state ownership or
public regulation. Accordingly, it was suggested that an unhampered free market leads to
inefficient outcomes. First, public regulation of the railways was assumed to be essential
to curb their monopolistic market power. Second, the marketplace may be the wrong
place to co-ordinate transactions between producers and consumers of railway transport.
Thus, it may be a public instead of a private good, and should consequently be paid for by
the taxpayers. Third, market imperfections are supposed to arise due to external effects in
railway transport. In the following, the main arguments for market failures shall be
validated. If the discussion shows that there are none of the above assumed market
imperfections present in railway transportation, there is no reason to impede the
Klrzner (1985), p.134. Baum (1983), p.14 follows arelatedlmeofthought,arguingthat regulations were
"...constdered necessat because - or so the poliiy-makers bekete - these :nèuduas sectoral and general economic goafr
would not be aehui4 or not to the dern'ed extent, through free comprntwn." He then concludes that regulation of
the market economy was being justified on account of structural market failure, external effects and public
interest
155 See also the appendix m section VI.A on American railway developments and regulation.
99unhampered working of a free railway market.'5' Also, the past railway regulations and
nationalisations would be called into question from an economic point of view. Political
considerations must then hold the sole responsibility for regulation of railway services.
156 Ewers and Roth 1995), p. 23 and Brenck (1993), p. 101
1001. Monopoly
The charge that railways were exercising dominant or even monopolistic market
power raises questions about the term monopoly. Varian noted that the word monopoly
originally implied the right of exclusive sale, but the term ' . . has come to be used to describe
any situation in which some firm or small group offirms has the exclusive control of aproduct in a given
market. The dzfficuly nth this dfinition comes in defining what one means a given market There
are manj firms in the soft-drink market, but on5 a few firms in the cola market."57 While the
state-owned railways generally enjoyed exclusive rights of selling the product passenger rail
services on their railway networks, they faced competition in the wider transport market.
Accordingly, competition theory uses the concept of the relevant market to delineate the
market under investigation.'
The relevant market describes a market that is clearly distinguishable from a
material, spatial and temporal point of view. Thus, competitive conditions in the relevant
market are not or only marginally affected by outside supply and demand variations.
Disregarding a railway company's position in the railway market, it could be subject to
intermodal competition in the transport or communication markets, disciplining its
behaviour in the correlated railway market. Furthermore, it is important to define the
scope of the market, whether it is regional, international or strictly confined to national
borders. Also, markets are dynamic and change over time, requiring for flexible
adjustments. While European countries were highly protectionist in the 1870, the
borderless European Union extending from the Atlantic Ocean to Russia or even further
is at the doorstep. National frontiers will not for long be safeguards protecting national
economies against global competition. Thus, even when a monopolistic charge was
applicable a century or decade ago to an industry, an innovative leap may have replaced
the industry or created a wider market. While canal traffic had a prominent role  in the
transport market in the early 9" century, the railway innovation left the canals behind.
Though the telephone, video conferences and the Internet are not direct competitors in
the transport market, the wider communication market may exercise a long-term influence
Varian 1992), p. 233
Schmidt 1993), pp. 44-49
101on the transport market and could eventually replace some activities in the transport
market.159
The railways face substantial intermodal competition in the transport market. They
have lost market shares in passenger and freight services during recent decades, mostly to
road transport.16° Though many state railway operators enjoyed exclusive rights on their
national rail networks, it did not assist them very much to protect their business. The
railways' power to exploit consumers had been eroded to such an extent that one
proclaimed reason for nationalisation was the protection of railways. 161 Notwithstanding
rail protectionism, public subsidies, regulation of competitors and legally granted national
railway monopolies, the situation on European railways steadily deteriorated.
Schumpeter noted the essential role of monopoly rents as rewards for innovative
entrepreneurs. Though genuine long-run monopoly positions are difficult to defend in a
competitive, dynamic market, he asserted that short-term monopoly situations are much
more common. Indeed, they are necessary as incentives for innovation in the process of
creative destruction.162 Firms that succeeded in innovating ". . . are upsetting existing industrial
structure and, as it sometimes seems, heading toward monopo/y, are in general preciseiy those which
have set 4 new production functions and which are struggling to conquer their market." According
to Schumpeter, firms that are unable to keep up with the pace in innovating die a natural
death. 'Nofirri which is mereiy run on established lines, however conscientious the management  of its
routine business mqy be, remains in capitalist society a source ofprofit, and the daji comes for each
when it ceases to paj interest and even depreciation. " State-owned undertakings are exempt
from these essential characteristics of the market economy. Rather than being disciplined
by market forces, state railways were subject to political wisdom, interest group politics
and governments' budgetary constraints.165 They were not compelled to innovate and
In their game theoretical approach to business stiateaj', Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) emphasise
the complexity of the marketplace and recommend looking beyond current borders for both competitive
threats and opportunities.
160 See charts 21-24 and 39-42 in section III for Europe, Germany and the UK. Section IV.B.3 discusses
intermodal and other forms of competition.
161 Schmitz (1997), p. 38 claims that the British railways were nationalised due to road competition. Though
this was one important suestion, it was certainly not exclusive.
162 Schumpeter 1943 , pp. 102 105
163 Schumpeter 1939 , p. 91
164 Schumpeter (1939), p. 95. Porter (1997) and Kim and Mauborgne (1997) support Schumpeter's
arguments, emphasising the necessity to build a consistent stitegy and to leap-frog competitor's innovations.
165 Crompton (1999a), p. 145 suested that fear of politiasation of the railways existed in the inter-war
years and was ". - . applieabk to wy e ofpub/ie ownersbp. It iar supposed that all manNer of impmvperplrs mrs —for
102operate profitably in the transport market, as the national governments protected and
backed the railway undertakings.
In 1942, Walker highlighted the benefits of competition over imposed co-
ordination and sketched the further political and economic developments.  "Competition
between road and rail has been more successful in two decades than control by public authorities over a
century in winning the solicitude of transport undertakings for the wants of traders. .. .A 'co-ordinated'
transport service can be established by an ind.rsty which remains competztzve just as readiiy as by
monopofy. In the one case, co-ordination is brought about by the competition  of individuals in pursuit of
their own gain, the method described and recommended by most economists, and most notab/y by Adam
Smith; in the other, byfiat of those who control the monopoly. The latter.. . is more in keeping with the
plans and planning currently fashionable as the method of economic statesmansh'p. " Though the
four British rail companies were intended as territorial monopolies in railway transport,
they neither had an exclusive control, nor an exclusive right to undertake passenger and
freight traffic in the national transport market.167 In stark contrast, the British Transport
Commission was legally awarded exclusive rights in the transport industry. While the
British transport market was essentially closed down to newcomers, the previous private
railway system did not possess similar powerful mechanisms to deter entrants and stifle
competition. Schumpeter highlighted the public perception with private monopolies or
dominant firms. 'Economists, government agents, journalists and politicians in this country obviously
love the word because it has come to be a term of opprobrium which is iwre to rouse the public's hostility
against aiy interest so labelled. In the Anglo-American world monopoly has been cursed and associated
with functionless exploitation ever since... "168 This only applied to private monopolies. Five
years after Schumpeter's statement the British Transport Commission was established,
enjoying incontestable privileges in transportation, whilst the market forces had been
disabled in favour of centralized co-ordination of inland transport.
more jobs, higher pqy, lowerfares, better senrces - from se e king givsps might be impossible to contain. Pacular
anJaey was aused bj the railwaj unions, which were sfrv	 osganise4 qijibated to the Labour Parij and actu
suppolters of nattontthsation
166 Walker 1942), pp. 180-181
167 Butterfield (1986), pp. 22-23 points out that the grouping actually preserved competition on major cross-
country routes and lines to London between the railway companies. Walker 1942) has already been quoted
earlier, noting that "...no one of the amalgamated companies can claim a complete monopojy of the  nzlwaj fraffic in its
ama Branch from one ansa(gamaled companj extend into the area  of another, and more zmporan4 the temional
boundanes of the companies are the routes of beateest mnJ"
16S Schumpeter (1943), p. 100
103In the following it is assumed that a railway firm possesses monopoly power if it
temporarily obtained exclusive control of a product in the  market of transj'ortation services.'69
Though superior competitors might replace such private monopolies, the advocates of the
market imperfections doctrine suest that natural monopolies are exempt from according
rules of the market.
169 Brenck (1993), p. 102 also defines the relevant market as the market for tzansport, not solely the railway
market.
1041.1 Natural Monopoly
According to the market imperfections doctrine, the existence of natural
monopoly characteristics hampers the efficient working of the market economy. Natural
monopoly exists if it is less costly for a single firm than for multiple firms to produce the
output to serve the market demand. In essence a natural monopoly is a one-firm industry
by nature of the industry's cost structure. In this case, a firm's cost function is subadditive
due to economies of scale, scope or density) 7° Thus, oniy a single firm can achieve
productive efficiency under subadditivity. Also, the monopolist is believed to deviate from
the social optimum of allocative efficiency.'71 The monopolist may determine price and
output at monopoly level, pursuing the maximisation of profits instead of the provision of
the welfare maxiruising price-output combination. Traditionally, regulating or
nationalising the natural monopolist was expected to solve the dilemma between
allocative and productive efficiency in markets that were deemed to exhibit natural
monopolistic tendencies.172 The regulator may then lower the pro flt-maximising monopoly
price to the welfare-optimal marginal cost price-output combination. It was assumed that
state ownership or regulation would result in productive and allocative efficiency.
Though theoretically feasible, the regulator or planner's aim is very ambitious.
Neither a regulator nor the central planners in a state-run natural monopoly can obtain the
massive amount of information to determine the welfare-optimal price-output
combination. Regulations might eliminate the cost advantages of a natural monopoly,
while the incentive structure inherent to proflt-maximising companies is eradicated. Also,
political aims other than the maximisation of the public welfare and interest group politics
may obstruct their supposedly welfare enhancing operations.
170 Bauniol, Panzar and WlThg (1982), pp. 169-186, Berg and Tschirhart (1988), pp. 22 24, Stackelberg
(1990), p. 177-182 and Schmalensee (1979 ,pp. 3-7. Economies of scale, scope and density are defined and
discussed in section W.0 with special regard to railway systems.
171 The terms are used according to Ellig 2001), pp. 3-4, who reflected on the US. regulations:  'Rizbvad
regulation hampered both allocatzat and itjnamc ffldeiuj. Allocat.un fflaeny occurs when prices reflect mainal costs, and
these price signaic lead to t'timd use of resourre ,gtmn cost and demand condit.ons. Lynamic çfficxencj occurs when finns
find wajs to lawer their costs (hift the production function), tmprore qual4y (shift the demand curz), or offer new
prvducts or senices (create a new demand cunte). The concept of ynannc fficzeng thus captures a Lund) of ikijesse
phenomena that scholars baz desinbed..." such as productive efficiency, creative destruction and
entrepreneurship.
172 Geddes (2000), p. 1165 notes that state ownership was more frequently used than regulation of utilities
in Europe
105Demsetz challenged the conventional view on natural monopoly. 1-le maintained
that the theory is exclusively founded on the belief that the price-output combination is at
monopoly levels if a single firm produces a good due to scale economies.  'The natural
monopo/y theory provides no logical basis for monopo/y prices. The tbeorj is illogical. . . To the extent that
utilify regulation is based on the fear of monop 0y price, mere!y because onefi,wz will serve each market,
it is not based on an deducible economic theorem.' 73 Demsetz has reservations about the
assumption inherent to natural monopoly theory that market concentration and monopoly
price bear any necessary relationship. Rather, he claims that the natural monopolist's
pricing power to charge consumers a monopolistic mark-up over marginal cost prices
depends upon the presence of high sunk costs as market barriers. Sunk costs are
irreversible investment costs and serve as credible barriers to market entry and exit. Sunk
costs exist when the factors of production are tailored to suit the production of a specific
product and cannot be used for any other means of production. Once these industry-
specific investments have been committed, they are sunk as a specific input and cannot be
recovered from their current usage, not even by total cessation of production. If there are
no significant sunk costs in production, the market of the natural monopolist is
contestable and potential entry undermines monopoly pricing, assuming absence of other
market bathers.174 Though only a single firm will actively serve an efficient natural
monopoly market, many inactive firms exist. Currently, those potential competitors may
produce complementary, related or different goods, but they would be able to enter the
natural monopoly market without notice if the natural monopolist should neglect
efficiency savings or preferences of consumers.175
Sunk costs constitute an entry and exit barrier against potential competitors.
Imagine the case of potential competitors in railway transport. Because a locomotive and
the carriages may be used on many different railway tracks in Europe and elsewhere,
investments in rolling stock are not sunk, but fixed. Investing in the construction of an
entirely new railway track, however, is a market-specific investment that cannot be
recovered by simply ripping the infrastructure off the ground and shipping it to another
market.
' Demsetz (1968), p. 59 (without original emphasis)
174 Moorhouse 1995), p. 422
175 Sharkey (1982), p. 145
106Investments in the infrastructure and the operation of railways are of a different
nature. Due to the sunk cost element in the infrastructure, competition between the
incumbent infrastructure operator and competitors may seem impossible, whereas the
market for transportation services on the track network does not exhibit characteristics of
sunk costs or a natural monopoly.17' The different nature of infrastructure and train
operations requires that both layers of a railway system be investigated in separation from
each other. Distinguishing the layers reveals that sunk costs are solely involved in the
construction of an infrastructure network, while the fixed costs in train operations are not
sunk. Therefore, potential entrants to the railway market are confronted with a very
substantial entry barrier if they enter train and infrastructure operation  in conjunction.
The construction of a competing network is not only time, but also capital intensive. And
the infrastructure investment will not be recoverable in case of failure, notwithstanding
the waste of economic resources due to the duplication of the network.
The market power of a natural monopolist is tied to the contestability of his
market. Entry and exit barriers being absent, the market of the natural monopolist is
contestable and leaves no leeway for monopolistic behaviour. Monopolistic mark-up's on
prices attract potential competitors that may skim off the cream and force prices down to
the competitive leveL The contestability of natural monopoly markets is an important
determinant in whether or not and to what extent an industry must be regulated.
176 See section IV.0 regarding the potential of competition and the need for regulation in the honzontal layers
of railway systems.
1071.2 Contestability
Contestability theory looks at formal outsiders of a natural monopoly industry as
de facto incumbentsY The definitions on entry barriers hardly reflect consensus. Bain
started the debate on market entry and defined the conditions of entry as '..the advantages
of established sellers in an industry overpotential entrant sellers, these advantages being reflected in the
extent to which established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without
attracting new firms to enter the industy.vTs Stigler defines barriers in a cost-based approach
'.. as a cost ofproducing (at some or evey rate of output) which must be borne bj a firm which seeks to
enter an industry but is not borne 1.y firms alreadj in the industry."  Whereas Bain considers
economies of scale in production and product differentiation as barriers to entry, Stigler's
terminology contradicts with Bain's barriers, as long as there are no cost differentials
between the established finns and newcomers.
Market bathers are an impediment to the mobility of firms as they impose an extra
cost burden on the firms that wish to enter a market, whereas the costs are not borne by
the incumbent firms. Baumol, Panzar and Willig defined a perfectly contestable market  as
a market that is open to potential entrants, '..as one that is accessible to potential entrants and
has the following two properties: First, the potential entrants can, without restriction, serve the same
market demands and use the same productive techniques as those available to incumbent firms. Thus,
there are no entry barriers in the sense of the term used b) St:gkr. Second, the potential entrants
evaluate their profitability of enty at the incumbent firms' pre-enty prices. That is, although the
potential entrants recognize that an expansion of industrj outputs leads to lower prices.., the entrants
nevertheless assume that fthy undercut incumbents'prices tby can sell as much of the corresponding
good as the quantity demanded li j the market at their own prices.'" In essence a contestable
market shall be defined as a market that potential entrants irrespective of scale or scope
Demsetz (1989), p. 87. The contestabihty theory was developed by Baumol, Parizar and Willig (1982).
i78	 (1956), p. 3
Stigler (1968), p. 67
Sligler (1968), pp. 67-70. Schwalbach (1986) and Schmidt 1993,  pp. 62-65 amend Bain's structural
entry barriers with strategic barriers to entry, such as hmit-pnce and over-capacIty strategies. They explicitly
acknowledge the role of exit barriers as entry barners. If potential competitors anticipate high exit barriers
(like sunk costs in railway infrastructure) prior to entering  the market, the anticipated exit barrier may deter
them from actually competing with the incumbent.
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (198Z), p. 5
108economies may enter and exit freely, without being obstructed by entry and exit
barriers.'82
'The kej requirement of contestabiliy in markets in which the set of techniques dictates that
the size of incumbentfirms be large relative to market demand is that the enty process be entire/y, or
almost entirety, reversible without cost. With reversible entry - that is, with costless exit - unsustainable
prices will afford incentives for rational entrepreneurs to enter in fact. Such entrants need not fear
changes in prices /,j the incumbentfirmsfor, f and when such reactions do occur, even thy preclude
all further profit to the entrant, that firm need onty exit. "i Looking at natural monopolistic
industry structures due to subadditivity from the angle of costless reversibility of entry,
sunk costs are back in focus. If a potential competitor has virtually nothing to lose from
challenging a natural monopolist there is nothing that could possibly keep him from
accepting the challenge. Naturally, the incumbent will not give way without defending his
position by threatening the potential newcomer. However, market bathers, such as sunk
costs or new legal requirements that the incumbent does not have to comply with being
absent, the threat of the incumbent is not credible. Entry is likely to take place only if the
anticipated profits of successful entry are greater than the unrecoverable costs in case of
failure.184
If, indeed, the potential newcomer would meet high sunk investment costs before
entering the market, the incumbent has a major advantage. The entrant faces higher
decision-making costs than the incumbent who has already committed large sunk
investments. Once the sunk costs are committed to their specific use, they cannot, by
definition, be recovered - in contrast to fixed costs, which can be eliminated by total
cessation of production. The difference between sunk and fixed costs leads Baumol,
Panzar and Willig to the conclusion, '.. that sunk costs, unlike fixed costs, can constitute a
barrier to entry. In particular, we argue now that fixed costs need not have aiy detrimental we!fare
consequences, unless thej also happen to be sunk. In an industj whose firms use  on!, capital
on wheels (or wings), some or all of that capital mqy be fixed, but it is not sunk. This means that in the
absence of other enty barriers, natural or artficia an incumbent, even f he can threaten retaliation
after entry, dare not offerprofit-making opportunities to potential entrants because an entering firm can
bit and run, gathering in the available profits and departing when the going gets rough. Such a situation
182 Geddes (2000 , p. 1167, also Train (1991), p. 303
182 BaumoI,PanzarandWillig 1982), p.6
184 Baumol, Panzar and Wilhg (1982), pp. 290-291
109fits our definition of a contestable market, that is, a market vulnerable to cost/es (y reversible entry,
even when it is currenify occupied bj an okgçpofy or a monopo/y. The contestable market is a
generalization of the case ofpure competition, and it offers manj of the same benefits... The atailabiliy
of sustainable prices does permit the incumbent to preclude entry. But he can do so .n?y b jy offiring the
public the very same benefits that actual competition would otheiwise have brought with it. With entry
barriers, supernormaiprofits, inefficiencies, cross subsidies, and nonoptimaiprices all become possible.
But in a contestable market, which is perfect(y consistent with the presence offixed costs that are not
sunk, matters change drastical(y, and government intervention can contribute far less, anj'thing to
general we ffare.ma
Apparently, the common argument that the railway market is a typical candidate
for a natural monopoly and must be regulated is slightly over-enthusiastic.  S6 Observing the
product train operations, sunk costs are absent. However, the supply of the product
obviously depends upon the supply of the product infrastructure access that is characterised
by the existence of sunk costs. Sunk costs may indeed deter potential entrants. Section IV
will account for the special characteristics of the railway industry, offering a subtly
differentiated and flexible approach to the layers of railway systems.
185 Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), pp. 292-293 (emphasis in ongina
186 Rahmeyer (1996 , p. 5
1102. Public goods
The market imperfections doctrine also comprises the theory of public goods. 187 If
railway transportation is indeed a public and not a private good, market provision of the
good leads to misallocations and inefficiencies. The economic meaning of public goods
must not be confused with public services, representing an ideological conviction that
certain goods and services should be provided by state production. Services that were
labelled as public services represent a service in the same way as car manufacturing and
baking cakes. Eventually, these services have in common that they are provided for
private consumption.'88 Private goods are both excludable and rival. Considering the
consumption of a sandwich, it is fairly obvious that one person eating the sandwich
excludes everyone else from the joy of consuming it. More generally, the owner of the
sandwich shop excludes would-be consumers from consuming the sandwich, if they are
unwilling to transfer ownership of the sandwich for the payment demanded. If someone
has purchased the last sandwich, it is apparent that it is a rival good, because his
consumption rivals the one of others who were queuing up behind him for the last
delicious sandwich.
Public goods are defined by the absence of the two characteristics of private
goods. Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable goods regardless of the individual
contribution to the production of the public good. A tall monument on the town square is
visible for everyone who passes by, whether other visitors like it or not. Furthermore, the
consumption of the monument is non-rival, i.e. the consumption of the good by one
person does not diminish the utility that someone else might obtain from the
consumption. The monument remains the same even after many people have looked at it.
'Exchange cannot occur without property rzghts, and property rights require exclusion. Given
such exclusion, the market can function as an auction .ystem. The consumer must bid for the product,
tbere/?y revealing preferences to the producer, and the producer, under the pressures of competition, is
guided /y such s:gnals to produce what consumers want. At least, such is the outcome with a well-
functioning market. " While property rights are enforceable in railway services, the
Blankart (1994), pp. 55-64 and Si2ckelberg (1990), pp. 184-186
Seldon (1998), p. 17 notes that goods are misleadingly labelled public wuces and embrace public utthtus
from transport and power production to prison administration.
189 Musgrave and Musgrave 1989), p.42
111externalities below highlight the issues connected with non-defined property rights in the
environment. Now, comparing the sandwich-monument phenomenon to railway transport
results in a clear assignment of rail travel into the sandwich category. Obviously, train
passengers are excludable from the journey, as a valid ticket will prove to be an essential
prerequisite for rail travel. Railway transportation is also a rival good. The seats on the
train limit the tickets the rail company may sell, assuming that customers are unlikely to sit
on each other's lap. Both conditions of private goods are evidently met by railways,
resulting in the conclusion that railway transport is a private good that can be allocated by
means of market exchange instead of public planning. Though market imperfections might
be present in railway transport, the public goods argument does not offer support towards
the creation of a public railway undertaking.
1123. External effects
Though not qualifying for public good characteristics, railway traffic may expose
considerable public benefits, such as a reduction in environmental pollution and relieving
congestion on the roads, waterways and in the air. Accordingly, the production of railway
transportation produces external effects. Externalities are harmful or beneficial effects on
a third party resulting from production or consumption activities by other individuals,
who ignored the externality when deciding upon their action.9° External effects are based
on deficient property rights, as the property rights of externalities are not defined. Owing
to the lack of property rights, markets cannot internalise externalities.191 Ewers notes that
rational utility maximisers are induced to produce too many negative and too few positive
externalities.192
The most commonly known external effect is environmental pollution. The smoke
of a factory or a steam locomotive polluting the environment constitutes a negative
external effect upon the environment and the consumers of the good clean air. The
neighbour who plants flowers in his garden produces a positive external effect insofar as
every passer-by can enjoy the colourful variety of flowers and their fragrances. The issue is
slightly more complex, if the neighbour plants a big tree instead of flowers. If his
neighbours value the shadow they gain during the hot summer sun and the view of the
green tree which is blocking the view of decaying blocks of flats, the externality is of a
positive kind. However, if the tree blocks the view of the sea and prevents the inhabitants
of the neighbouring gardens, who usually indulge in sunbathing, from their summer habits,
the planting of the tree produces a negative effect on the neighbciurs.'9' To obtain
confirmation on the validity of the negative externalities between neighbours disregarding
costs imposed on each other, a quick check through German court registers could be
revealing.'94
'° Blankart (1994), pp. 22-23, Siackelberg (1990), p 184, Varian (1995), pp. 531-551
191 Demsetz (1988), pp. 104-115 on the role of property rights in solving problems caused by externalities.
'Ewers (1995 ,pp. 118-121 exemplifies his example with environmental damage and basic research. See
also Ewers and Rod, (1995), p. 22
193 Coase (1960), p. 8 reports on such incidents in Honda where a building cast a shadow on a neighbouring
hotel pool, and a building in England that ruined a windmill's production, as it obstnicted currents of air.
A recent dispute between neighbours about a wire-netting fence in Saxony made it through the German
TV channels and ended up as a famous pop song.
113Even though the era of steam engines has long passed, railway transport produces
negative external effects. Both diesel and electric locomotives pollute the environment
without bearing the full costs, while the land use for new routes cutting through farmland,
villages and towns also creates externalities.' 95 The population in areas that are affected by
the route, but not served by a station will have to bear negative externalities, the
inhabitants of connected town centres may benefit from positive externalities in the form
of network benefits.19' However, in general positive externalities in railway transport are
assumed due to network benefits, regional development effects and a reduction of road
congestion with increasing train traffic.'97
Every production involves positive or negative externalities of some kind. None of
the cases, though, necessarily requires government regulation other than a definition of
property rights. 'It is clear that the government has powers which m:ght enable it to get some things
done at a lower cost than could aprivate otanisation... But the governmental administrative machine is
not itself costless. It can, in fact, on occasion be extremefy cost/y. Furthermore, there is no reason to
suppose that the. . . regulations, made Iij a fallible administration subject to political pressures and
operating without an competitive check, will necessarily alwqys be those which increase the efficieng
with which the economic ystem operate.l " Coase draws the conclusion that the market might
find results superior to government regulation, while state involvement could be beneficial
if large numbers are involved." With regard to transport, Ewers suggested internalising
external costs via imposing the cost on producers of negative externalities and subsidising
the construction of lines, if the affected region would benefit over-proportionately.
Harmful regulation would then be redundant.° The market approach to internalising
externalities is based on Coase's findings and involves the government to establish and
195 Ewers (1995), PP. 118-121
196 Consider the construction of high-speed routes as well as the proposal and local opposition to build a
magnetic high-speed line between Hamburg and Berlin.
197 The impact of the railroads on regional progress may be observed in the settlement and industrialisation
of the American Midwest. See Appendix, section V1.A.
196 Coase (1960), p. 18
199 Though the main results of Coase' 1960 article are generally referred to as the Coase theorem, the
repeated criticism that Coase neglected transaction costs is wrong. Instead, he dedicated a whole chapter of
his article to transaction costs in Coase 1960, Pp. 15-19. Exphcitly, the theoretical argument of the Coase
theorem is made under the theoretical assumption of transaction costs being absent Mueller 1989 , p. 28
formulated the theorem: "In the absence of transactions and baiaimng costs, qffectedpames to an externaby ssll
agree on an allocation of resources that is both Pareto optrnial and independent of anj piior out nment of propeet)
nghtc"
°° Ewers and Meyer (1993 , pp.6-7 and Ewers (1995), p. 121
114enforce property rights. In environmental pollution this approach suggests an institution of
emission trading to determine prices for scarce natural resources.201
Regarding public regulation or nationalisation of railway transport, the market
imperfections doctrine finds no justification in externalities. Problems of environmental
pollution, regional development and social policies must be dealt with in the responsible
government departments and may not be passed on to the railways, even though the
passing of the buck was very convenient to politicians in the past. When reforming the
railways in Europe, governments chose approaches similar to Ewers' suggestion with
regard to non-commercial regional infrastructure investment and train operations.
Nonetheless, a comprehensive environmental policy that establishes a level playing field in
transport is still absent.202
Anderson and Leal (2001), pp. 167-169 analyse the potential of the market to solve environmental
problems. "Free market enuronmentalisrn accepts that i'ndwsduais are unbke4i to set afide se-:ntere t and asks bow
in t:tut:on can harness this sunewl tiwt to solve ptvblems. It recogmes that information  about the enuronment is so
diffuse that agywp of e4erz's cannot ,,sanae the planet as an ecoystem. "The literature on external effects and their
solution in environmental affairs is extensive. The following selection offers detailed comparisons of
mechanisms, such as emission trading, Pigouvian taxes and non-market mstruments used in environmental
policy with special emphasis on the uncertainty involved in planning ecosystems: Endres (1994), pp. 102-
117, Kemper (1989), pp. 121-141, Roberts & Spence (1976), pp. 193-208, Stavins (1996, pp. 218-232 and
Weitzman (1974 , pp. 477-491.
202 However, the German government implemented a highly re-distributive and discrimmating environmental
policy. The environmental tax that had been levied on fuels smce January 2000 granted exemptions to
notorious polluters like concrete producers, while the tax revenue subsidises the crumbling German state
pension system and investments m Eastern Germany to obscure the true costs of reforms in the areas
affected
1154. Public policy
The market imperfections doctrine proved to be invalid as a credible justification
for extensive government regulation, let alone past nationalisation of railways. 203 The
actions taken across European nations did not relieve the railways of their deteriorating
situation, but may have conserved it. Section III focuses more closely on European railway
reforms and the trend after WWII in Germany and Britain.
Recapitulating Kirzner's assumption that dissatisfaction with market outcomes
stimulated government regulation, political considerations must hold the sole
responsibility for railway regu1ation. This is not to say that there is no remaining scope
for public policy with regard to the railways. But whatever demands politics impose
upon the railway industry, government must be prepared to bear the full costs of the
actions. Most likely areas for governments are regional development policies, as well as
social and environmental considerations. However, government interference imposes
considerable distortions and resultant externalities on third parties that are affected by the
government's actions. As Braeutigam noted, ". . .perhaps the most s:gnficantfeature of regulation
is that it redistributes income, creating winners and losers, thereby shaping interest groups and
coalitions. "°' While the government creates positive externalities for the winners, the
external costs have to be borne by the losers. Public choice theory shows that some
interest groups are highly effective in working to become winners, whilst taxpayers are
often losing out in the game of rent seeking.207 Tullock defined rent seeking as "i. . the use of
resources for the purpose of obtaining rentsforpeople where the rents themselves come from some activify
which has negatitt! social value. "°'
203 Stackelberg (1990), pp. 186-187
These are essentially the political motivations listed at the beginning of this chapter  which are similar to
the nebulous concept of the so-called public interest in Baum (1983), p. 17. Rightly, Baum claims that the
pursuit of this essentially arbitrary concept results in a substantial deviation from the optimal allocation
process through competition. 'Pnoiy is gun to incomes dutnbutwn polty ,goals, igional and land-use policy,
promotion of small and me&umfnins, protection of rtaLwys, mip1vsment of road s'èçy,jiscal ithef of the national bu4get,
marntenance of jobs and sectored actio a&aznst inflation."
205 However, Beesley (1997), p. 32 insisted that procedures for non-commercial obligations be clearly
specified in the privatisatlon acts to prevent governments from eventually subsidising profitable operations.
°' Braeutigam (1989), p. 1299
Public choice applies economic theory to political processes. The founding fathers of public choice theory
present an overview in their classic analysis, Buchanan and Tullock (1999). See also Mueller (1989). In his
short criticism of public choice economics, Grantharn 1998), pp. 30-31 outlines the objectives and
advantages of the theory of political economy.
Tullock (2000 , p. 45. Though Tullock was one of the developers of the concept, he emphasises that he
personally does not like the term, as every investor would logically be seeking a rent
116This concept clearly applies to regulatory issues, if resources are empioyed to
influence the outcome and direction of the regulation. Thus, if incumbents in the market
for passenger rail services lobby for the restriction of competition, they will gain at the
cost of potential entrants and their customers, as they could expect lower prices or better
quality of services. Rent seeking is about obtaining special privileges. Indeed, Tullock
maintains that private monopolies and direct income redistributions by the government
are the results of rent seeking activities. 209 Socially wasteful rent seeking expenditure may
arise from three main categories, namely the lobbying establishment itself, distortions
imposed upon a third-party as a consequence of the rent seeking efforts and finally, the
costs incurred by the bureaucrats and politicians involved.210 Regarding the bureaucrats,
Tullock reminds that "...there is also the steadj growth of the total scpe of bureaucratic controL
This benefits the bureaucrats and not ayone else. That the bureaucrats do not become  vastly wealt/r j is
no doubt an indication of their probiçy, but the costs to the communiçy or rent seeking maj still be
gigantic."21'
Public policy must have a limited role with regard to the railways. The government
may provide a rule-based framework for the industry as for every other industry,
respecting and protecting the property rights of each firm, but economic theory does not
provide any justification for a more extensive role of public policy concerning the
railways.212 Section III analyses the European reforms before section W develops an
alternative model for the railway sector with minimal guidance.
-- Tullock (2000), p.45
° Mueller 1989), pp. 230, 247. Foster (199Z), pp. 92-93 finds the attack of public choice economists on
the incentive structure in pubhc enterprises as the fundamental determinant in the inefficiency of state-owned
undertakings.
211 Tullock (2000), p. 53
212 The author emphasised the necessity of a rule-based, constitutional approach to government in Knipping
(1997), drawing upon findings in Mueller 1996). Lal 1984) pictured the state as a predator possessing a
natural monopoly over the use of violence within its territory. Thus, he saw constitutionahsm as the most
effective force to restrain the dangers of the state. Vanberg (1998) highlighted the ongoing debate upon the
extent of the state in hberal theory.
117B. Conclusion: Deregulation and privatisation
Railway regulation, nationalisation and protectionism dominated the 20th century.
Realising the deteriorating situation of the railways, politicians proclaimed they would
resort to deregulation and privatisation policies in the last decade. Whether they adhered
to their goals shall be revealed in the next section. Now, for the remaining discussion it is
useful to define the terms associated with liberalisation of the railway industry:
• Liberalisation embodies all policies that help to extend the scope of individual
freedom and reduce coercive arrangements.
• Interventionism characterises policies that aim to actively shape processes and impose
external costs to be borne by third parties. The central planning wisdom dominates
interventionist policies.2"
. Laissez-faire leaves the railway industry to its own fate. Laissez-faire is incompatible
with well-intentioned subsidies, railway promotions or protectionism. While there is
no scope for central planning, the state may provide a basic framework for the
economy, applying the same rules to all actors. The power to shape the railway market
remains exclusively with the individual actors in the industry.
Deregulation implies the ' . . withdrawal of the state's legal powers to direct the economic
conduct of non-gornmental bodies. While this can occur in a variety of wqys, most picaly in
utilaies a refers to the relaxation ofptice, enty and br exit controls."214
Privatisation involves the transfer of property rights to the private sector. The capital
market acquires the control previously exercised by the government over a specific
economic activity. The transfer of controlling powers excludes the general framework
and checks that are applied to the entire economy.2"
Economic aims of privatisation and deregulation policies focus on an increase in
economic efficiency. This results from a reduction of the internal inefficiency of public
companies and distortions, such as subsidised prices and inflated costs due to the absence
of competitive pressures. Government objectives typically comprise revenue from the sale
and a reduction of subsidies and deficits.2 " Also, government objectives with regard to
2 " Mises 1977), pp. 35 37, 57 60
Geddes (2000), p. 1168, based on Sngler and Winston. See also Ewers and Meyer (1993), p. 4
215 Ewers 1995), pp. 114-115, Ewers and Meyer 1993), p.4 and Rahmeyer (1996), p. 16
' Ewers and Meyer (1993 , p. 5 and Kirzner (1985), p. 142
118liberahsatioii policies may embrace the creation of an  efficient transport system and
resultant environmental improvements.
This policy change emerged after decades of government guidance due to personal
motives of politicians and dissatisfaction with market outcomes, while market
imperfections were unjustly blamed for these often well intentioned, but harmful policies.
The consequence was a monopolised transport industry subject to rent seekers, as noted by
Demsetz. "The ky to monpoty power is the ability of an industry to restrict or retard the expansion
and utiIiation ofproductive capacity. Government can offer to industry much greater powers of coercion
to accomplish this end than can be supplied liji the industr ji itse4Y'27 Such rent seeking
opportunities may be curbed with privatisation and deregulation policies in open
markets.218 The liberalisation efforts must target the opening up of railway markets.
The opening up of markets with consequent deregulation and privatisation policies
promotes actual and potential competition in railway markets. The market is the
alternative to the conventional rationale of central planning and the entailed
protectionism, policies that are fashionable until the present day. The main advantage of
the dynamic market mechanism over central planning is the innovative potential involved,
the process of creative destruction.219 Regulation blocks spontaneous discovery and search
for new solutions as well as the replacement of inefficient organisational structures or
firms.22° In the framework of the conventional rationale, the planner or regulator allocates
the resources to the production and allocation processes. The criticism of the rationale was
one of Hayek's major achievements, as he asserted that knowledge is disseminated across
the individuals and no high-ranking expert panel could outperform the functioning of the
market when search is involved. The spontaneous discovery of information previously
unknown to the spontaneous learners is not based on deliberate search, but evolves from
an unplanned discovery process.222
217 Demsetz (1989), p. 108. Friedman (1962), p. 28 and Greenspan (196), PP. 64-65 strongly support the
view that governments are the main creators of non-contestable monopolies. Even worse, these monopolies
are legally granted and protected.
218 Vel;anovski 1989), p. 36 observed that privatisatlon takes politics out of daily operations, though pohtics
is not removed from the process of prlvatisaiion and from regulated mdustnes.
Schumpeter 1943), p. 83
220 Kirzner 1985), pp. 141-143
221 Hayek (1996, p. 14. Burrows (1977), p. 91 for a more optimistic view of government decisions and
government's access to expert evaluations.
119These insights were ignored in the past and led to the deterioration of the railway
industry and the supposedly social market economy.223 The railway liberalisations in
Europe need to account for the dangers entailed with occasionally even well-intended
state guidance as "..it is quite plausible to believe that government intervention constitutes the main
threat to a competitive econoy. It is important that this threat be recognized, because our belief on this
score governs how we dtØy resources to ensure that competition willflourish. What is called for is a
redirection of our effirts. Government intervention that has created and sustained monopo'y should be
ourpnmay taPRet.
Kirzner(1979 ,p.lSl
Litfiechild 1978) and Hayek (1946) for a critique of the mixed economy.
Dernsetz (1989 , p. 109
120Section III
Case Studies
121A. Railway reforms across Europe
L The liberating impact of the European Union
The market share of rail transport has been in constant decline since the end of
WWIL The railways' share of both passenger and freight transport markets went down
steadily across the 15 member states of the European Union, whilst private road and atr
travel gained a considerable share of the transport market as displayed in the charts below.
The European Commission claims that thc decline "i. . ic due to sevenilfactors both inherent and
external to the sector, as well as to the administered regime where niht'zj actizaties hate taken  phia.224
Governments were usually reluctant in liberalising the railway market, whereas they granted
exclusive rights or at least dominant market power to national railway undertakings. In
addition, governments were neither prepared to leave the public undertakings alone nor
guarantee their managerial independence from national politics. Instead, railways were
burdcncd with public service obligations as an instrument of social policy, while they were
often - though notably differing between countries - not receiving full compensation for
the substantial costs imposed on them. Rather, the undertakings were expected to continue
running several loss-making lines by cross-subsidies from profitable operations.
The Commiieion also claimed that the railway industry suffered from unfair
competition in freight transport, as road freight did not pay for its true costs, whilst the
railways ". . . have been confronted with the full costs of their actieities. ' The only appropriate
wording is indeed, that the railways have been  confronted with the full costs - naturally they
did not bear the full costs as they were heavily subsidised, state owned national
monopolies, though their dependency on public funding varied substantially across the 15
EU member states. In contrast, road haulage operators were generally not directly
subsidised, though the state is in charge of infrastructure investments. Road users
contribute to the total costs of road use via differing instruments across the EU, ranging
from fuel duties and vehicle taxes to tolls, whereas congestion charging and road pricing
224 European Commission (1998a , paragraph 1. See also European Commission (1996), paragraph 10
" Nash and Preston (1994), p.20
European Commission (1998a), paragraph 2. See also European Commission (1996), paragraphs 16-20
and Gerondeau (1997), p.140
227 According to the European Commission (1996), Annex 1/2, railway debt as a share of GD? varied from
0.2°. m Finland to 4.9°. m Italy in 1994, after the first railway reforms had been undertaken or were under
way. The annual slate subsidies to the railways also varied considerably across the 15 member countries.
122would result in political hara-kiri of the national politicians involved.232 Therefore, the
Commission dropped earlier proposals based on a compliance approach in favour of a
liberalization tactic strongly relying on its non-compulsory nature and the subsidiarity
principle, thereby allowing diversity in the implementation of the directive. 233 Thus, the
directive was limited to modest requirements and did not cover urban and suburban
railway networks, while encouraging member states to go ahead with more drastic
reforms?
The Directive 91/440/EEC states the promotion of the single market of the
European Economic Community and an increased efficiency of Europe's railways as prime
objectives. The means to achieve those aims are first, a mante,ial independence of railway
undertakings from the state and second, a coipuLcorj separation of accounts with an optional
institutional separation of railway infrastructure from transport operations. The accounting
separation was the most demanding condition the directive was enforcing upon the
member states. Additional measures were suggested to improve the railways' financial
structure and to grant access ñgbts to the infrastructure networks of other member states for
international railway groupings. Explicitly, the legislation does not discriminate between
public or private ownership of railway undertakings.235 The directive recognizes the
subsidiarity principle of the Community, emphasising in Article 8 that the individual
member states are responsible for the specific rules for determining the access charges. As
mentioned above, the directive remains vague, not to jeopardize individual states, but
suggesting voluntary compliance with its demands.
The Commission realised that the access rights had to be specified and went ahead
with two further steps in June 1995 with the Directives 95/1 8/EC and 95/19/EC,
complementing Directive 91/440/EEC. Their prime objective was to ensure an effective
232 Hibbs (2000), p. 47 highlighted the political sensitivity of railway policy, as cited in the introduction:
'7'olilaans and the public abke	 topossecs t-e,tarn fixed ideas about nrdw€ys that by no means rehited ' rrab(y. A
rasn senfrmental a#nution nra] be their arioaatzon mth thilithood nn-s&" Again, the tragic railway accidents at
Ladbroke Grove and Hathdd in 1999 and 2000 underline the sensitivity of railway policy. In its wake,
politicians were acting hysterical rather than providing a calm lead for the public, guided by reason. The
accidents and their consequences are disaissed in the UK Case Study below.
The subsidiarity principle demands that the decision-making competence must reside with authorities,
resp. individuals at the lowest possible level. Relating to transport market liberalisation, it suggests that the
Commission provides a general framework to promote the single market in transportation, while the detailed
rules for implementing a system of, e.g. licenses, are to be left with the member states. See Knipping (1997).
1 The directive 91/440 EEC was indeed an erception in the European regulatory framework. Webb (1989),
pp.18-19 pointed out that European laws and regulations dominate over natiomil legislation.
235 European Economic Community (1991): Directive 91/440/EEC, Artides 1-3 for the general objectives,
while sections II toV deal with the four means mentioned. See also European Commission (1998a) for an
overview.
125enforcement of access rights to the railway infrastructure. Thus, they generated conditions
with regard to the licensing of railway undertakings and the allocation of railway
infrastructure capacity, including access prices. The prices should be related to the nature
and time of service, the market situation as well as the wear and tear of the infrastructure.'
Due to the subsidiarity principie, the licenses are issued by the individual member states,
though they are valid Throughout the entire territory of the Community. The member states
have some leeway regarding the four main requirements for issuing licenses, which are
broadly good rcputc of thc railway undcrtaking, financial fitness, profcssional compctcncc
and cover for public liability. The requirements are further defined  in the Directive
95/1 8/EC.
Supplementing the directives, the European Commission issued a White Paper in
1996, outlining a stratcgy to rcvitalisc Europe's railways, which was generally in line with
the Directive 91 /440/EEC, but did not present 'y radically new insights or changes?7
Again, the White Paper acknowledged that railways have been insulated from the effects of
market forces, while governments did not fully compensate the national railway
undertakings for public obligations imposed. Thus, the Commission's approach was
predominantly twofold. First, the Commission suggested government support to relieve
the railways of their debts. Second, open access provision to thc railway infrastructure must
be extended to benefit from the expertise of market entrants and their positive effects on
railway services. The Commission identified a network of Trans-European Rail Freeways
for Freight as priority action and envisaged a single European railway market and a new
kind of railway to overcome the weaknesses of the past and to exploit the future
opportunities. According to the Commission, the future railway " . .  should be first andforemost
a business. It should haze the indendence and prsounes to compete. It should be free of the bumms of the
past. Market fors should be further introduad IN N appnØiak way. The düisioi'r if reponsibilities
between the State and the mi/ways should be chmfied, pa,liczdart,forpublic seriices. '
Eventually, the much more detailed Directive 2001/14/EC superseded and
repealed Directive 95/19/EC on infrastructure access, also recognising the subsidiarity
principle. Accordingly, the member states are expected to establish charging rules, subject
to the management independence laid down in Directive 91/440/EEC, while the
236 Holder (1999), p.112 and European Community (1995a): Directive 95/18IEC and European Community
(1995b): 95/19/EC, both directives issued on 19 June 1995
7 European Commission (1996)
2 European Comnussion (1996), pacgraph 21
126" . . detennination of the charge for the use of infrastructure and the collection of this charge shall be
peformed 4y the infrastructure manager.. . Infrastructure managers shall ensure that the application of the
charging scheme re.iidts in equivalent and ron-dlscviminatorj chargesfir &ffirent ?ihIiJ underiakings that
perfirwi services of equivalent nature in a similar part of the market... The directive further
requires at least a balance of infrastructure expenditure on the one hand and revenues from
access prices, surpluses from other commercial activities and state funding on the other
hand. While the new directive very much resembled the replaced directive of 1995, Articles
7 and 8 of Dircctivc 2001/14/EC inject essential new principles of charging.
Though the access charges shall reflect the costs directly incurred as a result of the
train operations, the ". . . infrastructure charge mqy include a charge which reflects the scarcity of cap acily
of the identylable segment of the infizstructure during periods of congestion. '° And the following
paragraph makes provision for environmental charges to take external effects caused by
train operations into account. Thus, the new directive realises the potential for price
discrimination to allocate scarce infrastructure capacity more efficiently, while the charges
are still non-discriminatory between different railway companies. The maximum duration
of individual train slots or paths granted to applicant railway firms must not exceed one
working timetable period, in order to promote constant competition for the slots.
Apparently, the latest directive was strongly inspired by the 1998 White Paper of
the European Commission on infrastructurc access pricing. The White Paper's goal was "to
improve the overall q7ideng of the proãton and use .f European tranport i,fizstructure, promote fair
competition, safeguard the single market and enhance the ctainabiliy of the fran.port Due to
the non-transparent variety of national charging regimes, the Commission suested a
harmonised Community approach to transport charging in order to establish a level playing
field, to be applied to all commercial modes of transport.242 In order to achieve the
Commission's goal, the infrastructure charges "i. . should be &reav relaled to the costs that users
impose on the infrastructure and on other including the ent,tn,nmental and other external  impacts caused
y the useri Charges should oni 4ffer when there are real d?f f erences in costs and service quality and
should not discriminate between users... '°'
European Community (2001): Directive 2001/14/EC, Artide 4, paragraphs 1 and 5
240 Euro ean Community (2001): Directive 2001/14 EC, Article 7, paragraph 4
European Commission (1998b), p. 5
242 Eopii Conmiission (1998h), p.6
213 European Commission (1998b), p. 6
127Eventually, the Commission's 1998 White Paper recommended the implementation
of a policy of marginal social cost charging at the EU level, estimating that it would lead to
welfare benefits of 30 to 80 billion ECU per year. The Paper explicitly identified a
number of cost components which may be induded in the marginal cost calculation,
namcly operating costs, such as cncrgy, labour and somc maintcnancc costs, infrastndreture
tr,me costs, such as maintenance and wear and tear of the infrastructure system,  congernon
and scan*j costs, including delays to other users as well as env#vnmental costs and accident costs5
As marginal costs reflect only the costs of an additional transport unit using the
infrastructure network, there is no rdaiion to fixed capital costs of the system, as they are
independent of the intensity of transport usage. Though the cost recovery would vary
across the European networks, the Commission estimated that a charging principle based
on marginal costs ". . . wouhi gerienrte suffidert revenues to fund the ilworr .yste,w's infrastrwcture
capital costs and pay for fiher investments. '' Aberle argues that a marginal cost pricing
approach leaves a massive gap between infrastructure revenues and charges, which would
require a large amount of public subsidies, establishing a renewed dependence from
political decision making, contradicting the initial goal of Directive 91/44O/EEC. 7 Price
discrimination in line with scarcity on the network, however, offers potential for full cost
recovery without falling back into state dependency. The Directive 2001/14/EC
established the basic conditions for such a pricing regime, while the British and German
pricing systems also offcr two ways to fully rccovcr thc costs of thc infrastructure,
contrasting the three examples below. Whereas the British approach involves negotiations
between the infrastructure operator Railtrack, the public Rail Regulator and the individual
train companies with different charges for francbiscd and open access operators, the
German method favoured a non-discriminatory access pricing regime every single train
operator has to face.2
The competition policy section of the Treaty of Amsterdam had an overriding
impact with regard to the transport market liberalisation and the relevant directives
mentioned. The enforcement of the corresponding articles of the treaty is vital in  the initial
phase of liberalisation. Article 81 EC declares as void ". . .practts which may affict bade
" European Commission (1998b), pp. 8-12
European Commission (1998b , p.8
246 European Commission (1998b), p. 9
Aberie (1998), pp- 474-475
Schwalbach (1998), pp. 476-479. The German pricing regime was altered in 1998 and again in 2001, as
small vain operators were complaining that the regime was discriminating in favour of the former state
monopolist Deutsche Bahn AG. The German access pricing system is discussed extensively below.
249 European Union (1997), most importantly Articles 81, 82, 86,87 and 295
128between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distonion of
covpetition within the common market... "whereas Article 82 EC prohibits any ' . . abuse l'j one or
more under(akins if a déminant position uiør the mmon market or in a swbstantzilpart  of it... "if
the abuse affects trade between member states. The Commission recognised that national
railway undertakings were still enjoying monopoly power for the provision of traction,
either statutorily or de facto. Thus, " . . thej enjoy a déminanIptiuion wthin the meaning ofArticle
82 EC and must therefore bepretentedfrompntting into phice abusive practices such as &sciimination or
refusal to .supplj traction ' In conscqucncc thc Commission acknowlcdgcd thc cxistcncc of
an obvious conflict of interest in a railway undertaking operating its own transport services,
whilst being expected to allow fair and non-discriminatory access to its infrastructure for all
transport operators: "An undertaking cannot be at the same time both a competitor and a judge
detetiwining access to an ji reletwrt ,warket."1
Clearly, one of the outstanding principles of the European Union is the promotion
of frcc tradc and competition bctwccn thc individual mcmbcr statcs. 252 But Articics 86 and
87 set limits to the Treaty in governing public companies. Article 86 EC is explicitly
concerned with public undertakings and undertakings with exdusive rights granted by the
member states. Those undertakings may not uphold any measures contrary with the Treaty,
also with special regard to the above articles. Though the interpretation of the articles
leaves a loophole for interpretation, Article 86 EC explicitly emphasises that the
development of trade " . . must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrarj to the interests of
the Conmurniy." Similar scope of interpretation remains with other articles, such as Article
87 EC, which declares state aid incompatible with the common market if it affects trade
bctwccn member states and ' . . distorts or threatens to di:ctort competition bj faturing certain
undertakings or the pivduction of certain goods... ' However, should the aid have a " . . soaal
character, granted to indisidsial consumers... "or "i. .pi'vmote the economic develapment of areas where the
stanhml of hung is abnorma4'y low..." it may bc compatible with the common market
Notwithstandin& the Treaty's rules regarding competition, the Treaty is indifferent towards
public or private ownership, according to Article 295 EC: 'This Treatj shall in no wqy prejudice
the niks in Member States governing the ystem ofpropertj ownerchp." Thus, the Treaty makes a
strong case against practices restricting trade or competition between the member states,
250 European Commission (1998a), section on Article 86 EC the author replaced the original "Amdè 86 EC"
with 'Am& 82 EC", as the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam also resulted in some changes in
numbering of artides.
251 ELamp Commission (1998a), section on Article 86 EC
252 Thus, similar legislation was passed in electricity and telecommunication industries with directives
90/388 EEC and 90/377/EEC of 28th, respectively 29' June 1990. The hberahsation of the latter markets
was finaffy established with two directives issued in 1996 that is directives 96/19/EC respectively 96 92/EC.
129notwithstanding whether private or public undertakings are concerned. Nonetheless, it
limits its applicability to interfere with national policies and public undertakings.
However, a variety of approaches towards railway liberalisation had been applied
across the European Union from member states such as Britain or Germany going far
beyond the measures imposed by the legislation to countries strictly keeping in line with the
minimum requirements or even strongly opposing a more open rail network, such as
Francc. Thus, thc reforms differ in various ways, such as public or private ownership,
managerial independence from the government, regulatory oversight, open access to the
railway track infrastructure, and also the extent of vertical separation between the
infrastructure and operation of train services. The main goal behind the separation issue is
the guarantee of non-discriminatory access to the tracks for every train operator,  in order
to promote competition in the railway market. The objective of non-discriminatory access
rights, however, depends upon the impartiality of the infrastructure operator. Whilst
Sweden and Britain organised the infrastructure provider as an institutionally separate
entity, most countries complied with the Directive 91/440 by placing the infrastructure in a
separate division of the national railway company. Notwithstanding the great diversity of
reform models, they share at least one common characteristic in their liaison between the
railway firms and the national or regional authorities. In general, their bonds are dominated
by contractual arrangements in the form of competitive tenders, franchises or negotiations.
The different approaches to railway reforms are investigated below.
Considering the liberalisation of the European passenger rail network, the
European Union's transport commissioner ". . . h:gh4gbted the political sensitiy of the £csue,
sr j ng that it was hard mough to get wew,ber states to agree to open op the inteniatienal rtilfrdght
' Whereas the liberalisation in freight rail markets will take effect from 2003, the
passenger rail market gained a respite until 2008. In the following, the approaches towards
liberalisalion shall be dwelled upon briefly in France, the Netherlands and Sweden before
analysing the complexity of the reforms pursued in Germany and the UK.
Financial Times (2000z). p.12 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2001e), p.17
254 Nash (1998), p. 2
255 Financial Times (2000g), p.12. However, the first result of freight hberahsation was registered on 29 June
2001 with IKEA Rail AB, the newly founded subsidaaq of the furniture company IKEA, www.bahu4e
2001) And www.lranverket.se 2001), press notices. IKEA Rail signed track access agreements with the
German, Danish and Swedish track operators to run daily freight trains each weekday between Sweden and
Germany.
1302. France
The French attitude towards liberalisation and the Directive 91/440 EEC may at
bcst be dcscribcd as rathcr unresponsive to the Europcan move. France liniitcd her
compliance efforts to the minimum requirements of the direciw and was "i. the
most reluctant country to imfiement the 1996 EC White Piper and the pwposal for fieways it
contained." Ncvcrthcicss, thc situation for thc French state monopoly Saciité Nationale des
Chemins de Fer (SNCF) was as bleak as for other railway companies across the continent in
the early 1990s. The debt of SNCF was close to 200 billion francs in 1993 and could only
be accumulated due to state guarantees. While revenues from passenger and freight traffic
amounted to 40 billion francs, expenditure was exceeding the revenues by nearly 50 billion
francs in the same year. Accordingly, the state had to grant further guarantees to extend
SNCF's dcbt, whilst it covered the remaining sum out of the budgct.7
In 1997 SNCF was split into the small Réseau Fer'I ü France (RFF), the owner of the
infrastructure with about 250 cmployccs and the large residual SNCF for all train
operations. Thus, there is no competition in the operation of train services, as the trains are
either run by SNCF, joint ventures or under agreements between SNCF and foreign
railway undcrtakings. In thcory, France has complied with the requirements of the 1995
directives and provides access rights to the railway infrastructure, but the access conditions
are rather restrictive. Currently, track access is granted to SNCF and international
groupings, though exclusively for international operations.
As the owner of the infrastructure, RFF is responsible for its construction,
maintenance and for the allocation of train paths after consultation by SNCF.
Paradoxically, RFF was separated from SNCF when it was established to manage the
infrastructure, though SNCF is undertaking the actual maintenance work and operates the
infrastructurc on behalf of RFF under the new arrangements. Thus, the wholc structure
looks just like an artificial construct to please the legislators of the Directive 91 /440/EEC
and the complementary legislation. While RFF receives track access revenue from SNCF,
RFF commissions SNCF to undertake maintenance and repairs.
'enry and Quinet (1999), p. 120, see also Domergue and Qnnet (2001), p 5, Schwa]bach (1998), p. 478
Gerondeau (1997), p.I56
258 Henry and Quinet (1999), p. 120, see also Knill and Lehmkuhl (1998), p. 11
9 Monami (200th), p.98
131Regulation of passenger railway services is shared by the state with six regional
authorities.° As before this most minuscule reform, both SNCF and RFF are property of
the state. Regardless of the ownership question RFF is dependent on state financial aid, as
its revenues from access charges amounted to 6 billion francs in 1998, while its expenses
on infrastructurc invcstmcnt addcd up to 30 billion francs, leaving thc lion's sharc of 24
billion francs to the taxpayers. The state is responsible for the charging framework after
advice given by RFF. This is hardly managerial independence as envisaged in the European
directives. Notwithstanding the creation of RFF, vertical integration is very strong in the
French railway system, as SNCF is still responsible for timetabling controls and the actual
operations of the railways.
France's reluctance to reform and change may be based on the strong concept of
public scrvicc that is dccply rooted in French socicty and attitudcs. 1 Tradc unions arc
especially powerful in the control and management of public firms and would lose
considerable influence in a highly competitive sector or in a privatised SNCF and RFF.2
In addition, the high speed services on the French network account for almost 60 per cent
of the entire passenger traffic and represent a distinction of French quality of railway
services, marketable abroad as French high-tech engineering.
°Monami (2000b), p. 179
' Henry and Qumet (1999), p. 121. Gerondeau (1997), pp. 153-159 also attributes the French aversion to
reform to historical expenences in WWI and WWII.
In December 1995, France experienced a month long strike, after the governxsenx a*ince4 a bill to
reduce SNCF's debt and public service pensions, as well as to re-examine the special retirement status of
railway employees, which allowed train crews to retire at the age of 50 and at 55 for others in the sector. As a
resuiç the government agreed that SNCF would remain a unified company and a public service. Six years
later, the industrial relations climate had not changed. A suested pay raise of 2.41 per cent in the rail sector
led to two day long national strikes in spring 2001. The strike however also reflected the French railway
workers' rejection of further restructuring of SNCF as a consequence of freight and passenger rail
liberalisation in the European Union.
1323. The Netherlands
Contrasting the French attitude towards railway reform, the Dutch approach went
bcyond thc rcquircmcnts of the Directive 91/440/EEC, though it did not take the radical
path of break-up pursued in the UK as outlined below. Prior to the reform of the railways
initiated in 1995, the state-owned Nederlandse Spoonvegen (NS) operated train services, which
.were .wiet to a h:gh degree ofgovernment intervention at every leveL '°" Whcrcas thc passenger
division relied heavily on public subsidies, freight transport was run as a by-product on a
commercial basis. However, the structure was challenged in the 1980s, when it emerged
that NS would need steadily increasing subsidies to improve passenger rail services or even
to maintain the status quo of rail operations. A1o, it had been observed that road freight
faced worsening problems of congestion and bottlenecks while freight volumes were
growing, thus creating a far-reaching problem for the competitiveness of the Dutch
economy. A report in 1989 "i. .madi agloosrj forecast concerning the competitive position of the Port
of Rotteniam and the development of the railways in thefuture The lack of a b:gh quality railway ystem to
prozide an alternative to road tranport would be 'disastrous' and a 'ceñois handicap for the Netherlands
as agatewqy to Europe ya65
The Wijffels select committee submitted a report in 1992 and recommended a
horizontal and vertical separation of the railway industry, incorporating the European
legislation of 1991. The report advocated '. . ssibstaitial deregulation, gizing NS the freedosv to
determine its investment, finance, ser,ice supp5i, fares, and J,ersonnelpolicies. The refirm was implemented
by a transitional contract for 1996-2000. 'i" Consequently, the Netherlands Railways were re-
structured into a ,wanet sector and three task orani3atie9ts. The market sector embraces NS
Riierc, operating passenger services, NS Stations, in charge of train stations and NS
Vastgoed to manage the holding's property and real estate. While these three businesses are
at the core of the market sector, which is supposed to act along commercial lines, NS is
also associated with Teort, a joint venture with British Telecom and Railion, a joint product
of its predecessor NS Cargo, the Deutsche Balm Cargo and other European rail freight
operators. The non-commercial task organisations of NS are NS Verkeersleiding, the traffic
control agency, NS Railinfraheheer, overseeing construction, maintenance and the
management of the infrastructure, and RailneiL Railncd's functions embrace traffic safety,
Nash and Toner (1998), section on Dutch railways
Knll and Lthznkuhl (1998), p.6'
Knill and Lehmkuhl (1998), p.7
van de Velde (2000), p. 10, see also Nash and Toner (1998)
133capacity management for freight and passenger operators, licensing of train operators and
advice to the Department of Transport related to capacity constraints, investments and
innovation. Though the task organisations are subsidiaries of Nededandse Spoorwegen,
they are accountable to the Department, which also covers their costs.267
At the outset of the reform, access prices to the Dutch railway network were set to
zero up to thc year 2000. Since then operators facc total charges of up to 400 million
Dutch Guilders, about 250 million to be returned from the main line, 100 million from
local networks and 50 million from freight services, in line with the European directives
requiring access charges. Reflecting the zero access prices, subsidies for train services were
also reduced down to zero by 2000. Passenger operations are now required to cover their
expenses, excluding infrastructure costs. Socially desirable though commercially unviable
services arc contracted by thc Department of Transport, totalling around 180 million
Dutch Guilders a year, roughly half of the subsidy required prior to the reform. The new
organisation of NS provided more transparent data on the viability of services, also
allowing NS to focus on profitable railway lines. As a result, government support may be
directed right to infrastructure investments and the contracted services.
Even though the Dutch liberalisation provided open access to the railway network
at zero prices, competition on the track was limited in passenger traffic, whereas Railion
has to face competition from a few private freight companies, operating on a national and
international scale. The government granted complete commercial freedom to NS Cargo
and its successor Railion, also including the discretion to set freight rates as it pleases,
thereby ending the pricing regime which discriminated in favour of road haulage However,
a politically motivated temporary zero pricing policy for infrastructure access turns the
discrimination issue upside down and introduces new distortions between rail and road
freight. On the passenger side, the first private passenger rail company in the Netherlands,
Lotr R1ii originating from the Amsterdam sightseeing boat business was granted
permission by the Department of Transport to run passenger trains on the Amsterdam -
Haadem - Ijmuiden line in 1996. Competitors to NS Reizigers had to surmount the burden
to obtain rolling stock equipped to the standards of the Dutch network, while drivers had
to be authoriscd to drive engines on a specific section of the rail network. Lovers Rail
7 Schaafsma (1997), p. 59 and van de Velde (2000), p. 10
van de Velde (2000), pp. 10 and 14
134solved that problem by hiring locomotives from NS Cargo, spare coaches from the Belgian
railways and former NS drivers, who had retired early.269
In 1997 Lovers Rail was acquired by a French subsidiary of the Vivendi Group and
refurbished Belgian coaches were operating the trains from Amsterdam to the North Sea
without subsidies. 'Y2oipared to NS Rtiers, Loterc Rail prodded a number of interesting and
surpming innotitions for such sbon-&stance senices. The ttunspded resenrd seats and rental biycks
for seasonal pass holders as well as a number of unusual on-board sences, inc/siding local TV news, b4ycle
nicks, shoeshine machines, beer and cofee bars Ath standing area rather than the usual jd and 2" class,
penalfie onboani ticket saks and thniugb ticketing with the Amsterdam municipal tninpor
compaiy. '° However, NS Reizigers was not prepared to co-operate with Lovers Rail in
ticketing. Thus, passengers had to choose between two Lovers trains and six NS trains per
hour and many passengers between Haarlem and Amsterdam were holders of NS discount
cards, benefiting the NS Reizigers service to Lovers' disadvantage. Finally, Lovers withdrew
its operations in 1999 and the new incoming coalition government banned competition on
the tracks? 1 Complementing competition on the track, the Dutch model of liberalisation
also allowed for competitionfor the tracks. While competing operators such as ConneXXion,
thc Ncthcrland's main state owned bus operator, were successful in tendering for local
railway lines, NS Rei2igers entered a variety of joint ventures with the British  Aniw, a
French SNCF subsidiary and ConneXXion to tender for regional integrated rail-bus
networks, such as NoordNed and Syntus.
The former liberal government envisaged franchises for the operations of the
national rail network as in the UK and the final privatisation of NS. However, those plans
are on hold as the new Labour Minister of Transport favoured a ten-year contract granting
NS Reizigers the right to operate the national main line network until 2010. The contract
specifies performance regimes, minimum service requirements, fare increases and other
conditions. Relating to the regional train lines, the new government is implementing a
policy of ' . .gradual transition from negotiated contracts to tetitii tendeiing y pivundal
gournments, with subsidies based on the same piincles as applied to local bus services.' 7' Van dc
Velde further ecnphasises the importance of clever and competent transport authorities. He
has some praise for the British Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, in sharp contrast to
thc rather discouraging cxaniplc of thc provincial call for tender in Groningcn, as the
9 Schaafsma (1997), p.64
van de Velde (2000 , p.11
van de Velde (2000 , p. 11
van de Velde (2000), p. 14
135relevant authority specified almost eveiything, induding the timetable. Thus, he realises
' . . the nsk of apara/ysing ffea through over-specification of contracts bj risk-arse authoities.'7'
van de Vdde (2000), p.16
1364. Sweden
The original purpose of the state owned Swedish railway company StatensJdmtgar
(SJ) was the provision of a link between private railway networks in the regions. In
addition, SJ acquired failing private operators and gradually built an extensive national and
regional network, pushing private operators below five per cent of the route kilometres by
1965.274 Sincc cvcr increasing car ownership was eating into the market sharc of thc
passenger traffic, railway finances deteriorated. The situation in passenger and freight
traffic was further aravated due to intermodal competition from air traffic and road
haulage resulting in Statens Järnvagar diving into deficit in 1976. As the population density
between the more industrial South and Sweden's northern counties differed markedly,
several unviable lines in the North were either facing closure or lasting dependency upon
statc subsidics. This uninspiring choicc lcd to the passing of the Transport Policy Act in
1979. The legislation divided the Swedish railway system into a commercial network, the
Stomjarnvagar, and a subsidised non-commercial network. Services in the Stomjarnvagar
werc required to cover their costs.VS
The act established Counfy Public Tran.pon! Authorities (CPTAs) in Sweden's 24
counties, in charge of overall planning for public bus or rail services in the corresponding
county. The decentralisation of responsibility to the CPTAs circumvented the politically
disaster-prone issue of centrally executed line dosures and undermined local opposition.
Now, it was the responsibility and choice of the regional C111'A to discontinue non-
commercial SJ services in favour of bus links, in which case the new authorities would be
eligible for national subsidies for five years. In the event, most of the non-commercial
county lines were replaced with bus services and where railway links remained in service,
the CPTA negotiated with SJ to run the lines at the agreed level of subsidy.V
Still, the steady decline in market share and investment as well as rising deficits were
not halted, leading to the 1985 Railway Act as a rcnewcd effort to turn the situation
around. While the legislation demanded the implementation of separate accounting for
infrastructure and operation of trains, the passenger and freight divisions of SJ were
obliged to pay internal access prices to the infrastructure division. The national
government, however, would cover all infrastructure investments and accepted a greater
214 Nash and Toner (199ff), section on Swedish railways
Allemeyer (1991), pp. 147-149 and Schmitz (1997), p. 74
216 /Jandon (2000), p.4
137commercial freedom of SJ from the state relating to personnel policies and its internal
organisation. The further deterioration of Statens Jarnvagar's finances and the need for
more subsidies amounting to one billion Swedish Kronor led to the  1988 Transport Policy
Act with the aim ". . . to ptvvde the dtirens and the jItms in all pam of the vunty with satt.facton
saj and enzdronmentalfiien4 trtrnboti serilces at the lowest possibk cost to so*y as a whole. A stiit
for making th jirewndrnons fir the nnys more smiihir tntb the onefor road ftqottafion was of
major imporlance for the design of the refi?iw. '
The Act created the basic conditions to liberalise the Swedish railway market. It
ended Statens Jarnvagar's monopoly position in passenger and freight rail services by
institutionally separating the railway operations of Statens Jamvãgar from the
infrastructure. Banttrket (BY) was established, essentially a government authority
rcsponsiblc for infrastructure maintcnancc and invcstmcnt, except terminals which would
remain the property of SJ. Banverket is funded through large state subsidies and access
prices, equalling the pricing regime employed by the road authority. Accordingly, the
1988 Act was a deliberate attempt to create the same competitive positions for road and
rail traffic and abolish intermodal distortions. The charge is composed of a fixed element
relating to vehicle axles and a variable element that is set to cover social marginal costs,
reflecting the amount of wear and tear caused by the train plus a contribution to the
external costs.
Though SJ would retain its legal monopoly for the entire freight network and
passenger connections on the trunk routes, the CPTAs might choose contractors other
than SJ for county lines. For a transitional period of ten years, the CPTAs were granted
state subsidies to commission train or bus operators to run public transport services  in the
affected regions at specified service levels. The rolling stock formerly used by SJ on the
county lines was transferred to the CPTAs to contract the public railway  services by means
of negotiating with interested parties or competitive tendering. Alexandersson points
towards the risc of BK Buss, a small bus company in the county ofJOnkoping. '4t a meeting
with the CPTA in 1989, one ,.j7idalswested that BK Buss shaddpksa a bid in the sepwuing tenderflr
the regional ftun serowes. The idea ,nate,ia/ised into an actual bid dvting the following months from what
came to be called BK Ta resulting in BK Tag's sensational tictorj against SJ and one other kddei In
mdn 2000), p.S
VS Rothengatter 1991), p.188 and Nash and Toner (1998), section on Swedish  tadyL Schwalbach (1998),
p. 477 estinutes that the access charges in Scandinavia reflect roughly ten per cent of the totsi costs of the
infrastructure.
138May 1990, BK Tag entered the Swedish ?uthva)1 market, breaking SJ's monopo/y and becoming the first
new prnute train operatorfor 40years. Ofgreat i#rpon!ance was the fact that BK Tag 'c bid implied a hrge
reduction (25°o) of the CPTA's costs fir iØohiing the senvces. '' Despite the advantages of
incumbents, such as learning economies, reputation, marketing and supply channels, BK
Tag combated thosc entry barricrs by challenging the formcr inflcxiblc practices, reducing
costs and integrating their road and rail businesses. Thus, BK Tag operated their service
with a crew of 43 instead of SJ's crew of 250 for the same service. Notwithstanding BK
Tag's success in the initial tender, SJ won the second tender in 1 993, though an
investigation by the Swedish Competition Authority found that Si had abused its dominant
position and placed its bid lower than its actual costs to drive BK Tag out of the market
Eventually, Statens Jarnvagar was sentenced to an 8 million Swedish Kronc fine in I 998.1
Nevertheless, the competitive pressures introduced with the railway liberalisation led to a
radical exchange of SJ's executive directors with experienced private sector managers, while
the SJ's staff nearly halved between 1988 and 1994 from 29,000 to 15,000. The reduction in
the workforce was due to structural changes, such as the establishment ci BV with 6000
employees, the sale of SJ's own chain of travel agencies and efforts to slim the railway
operator.
In 1991 a Conservative government came to power, aiming to induce further
competitive elements to thc railways. Resisting SJ's prcssurc, the govcrnmcnt backed
Banverket's decision to allow the mining firm LKAB to run own freight trains, implying
immediate cost reductions to the mining business. The government pushed a massive
infrastructure programme ahead to upgrade the network for tilting trains, amounting to 32
billion Kronor. In order to introduce competition into interregional traffic, the state
implemented the use of competitive tenders instead of negotiations with SJ to allocate
unprofitable interregional services from 1992. Notwithstanding fierce opposition from the
Social Democrats, a left wing party and the railway unions, the Conservative government
passed the 1994 Deregulation Act, opening up the entire railway market to newcomers.
Thc Act would have endcd the CPTAs and SJ's dominance in rail traffic, also establishing a
rail regulator in charge of traffic control and capacity management Open access would be
provided to any entrant with sound finances, whilst the entrants could draw upon
Alexandersson (2000), p.7
280 Nash and Toner (1998), section on Swedish railways
281 Alexandersson (2000), p. 9
Gerondeau (1997), pp. 150-151
139redundant rolling stock of SJ on a lease or purchase basis. However, the deregulation effort
was immediately postponed after the Social Democrats regained power in the same year.
The new Social Democratic government decided to allow the CPTAs to run their
services also on the main lines within their county's b rders, with the potential to reach out
into other counties. Despite expressed concerns of SJ against open access  in freight
transport, the government went ahead liberalising rail freight from July 1996, though
paying tribute to SJ's cfforts by introducing a grandfather's clausc favouring incumbent
operators in the allocation of slots. In the run up to the 1998 Transport Policy Bill, a report
supported by the Competition Authority proposed to drop SJ's monopoly by subjecting
both profitable and non-profitabic intcrrcgional scrviccs to compctitivc tcndcring. Not
surprisingly, Statens Jiirnvägar was strongly opposed to those plans and succeeded to
secure exclusive rights for profitable interregional lines, while Riksfraflken was established in
1999, an authority to oversee the tendering of unprofitable interregional traffic.
Still, further intermodal competition was on the doorstep, as the Social Democratic
government deregulated the long distance bus markct In effect, the growing competition
from coaches was assumed to affect the already loss-making passenger train connection
between Malmö and Goteborg. However, in spite of the continued losses of the line,
Statcns Jãrnvagar did not file the Malmö - Götcborg line for competitive tendering, as it
used to do with unprofitable businesses. Due to the potential danger of growing losses as a
consequence of the intermodal competition by coaches, parliament decided to tender the
line for one year from January 2000. 'For the zyfirst time, another operator than SJ badplaced the
best hidfir this f',pe of traffic. Moreotier, the winning ,nsortiuw, S jidvdsten, a joint enture betneen BK
Tag and the French companj Via Gil and British Go Ahead Grv14, did  isot demand aiy subsidies
whatsoewr from the state to carry out the trqffie, claiming that the retenues from ticket fares wouhi be
enough. Shon/y after the result if the tender was ma pubic, Sf withdrew a repon demanding tendering of
another two lines that had turned unprofitable. ' However, three days after Sjidvdsten had
commenced operation, the government announced that Statens Järnvägar would take the
line over after the contract expired in January 2001. Though the contract was limited to a
year from the very beginning, the joint venture expected an extension or a renewed tender
procedure after termination. '7n rwid4pril4ydsten declared open' that it was losing mong on its
operations and that it was meaningless to try to break this negatue detdopment when it wouhi nezeriheless
3 AIexandersson (2000), p.8-9
1 A1exandersson (2000), p. 1!
140lose its contract in Januarj 2001... On April20, Sjdvdsten released a statement that the compa,y had
cancelled allpqyments to its debtors and that all trains would stop within one neek. The action was sad to
be a consequern of the Got'enrnvent's viateiing position on whether the line should be open  fir kmk?ii?g or
not On April28, Sjdtisten filed bankneptg, qfter hating reached a deal with Rik.stnfiken, imp/,wng
that Sf would take otr operations on Mqy 11. 'i"
Alexandersson (2000), p. 13
1415. Conclusion: A market based integration of Europe's railway network
In 1994, Nijkamp suested ' . . that the network that is missing most in the rail tranipon'
domain until this moment is a reorganised stiicture of the railwqy market nith companies which are
indep.dtht fim national states and r .pemting wnpetitiw/y on a Emean network (vmmon
wrñ4ge).'' He emphasised the rather nationalistic character of transport policy making up
to the early 1990s, as governments were implementing policies in a segmented way,
disregarding mutual benefits of cross-border co-operation. This was also one of Knieps'
main concerns. He already envisaged track and traffic control agencies, separate from train
services and track maintenance, somehow similar to Railned in the Dutch model or to air
traffic control agencies, such as EurocontroL While he expected corresponding agencies to
arise on a national or interregional level, they might end up as a single European agency.
Thus, they would offcr massivc nctwork bcncflts and thc nationalistic notion of the
traditional state-owned railway undertakings would simply vanish. The issues regarding a
strict vertical separation will be dealt with in great detail in section N below. According to
Nijkamp, the railways' problems and loss of market share originated in their specific
structure as large organisations, exempt from competitive pressures. 'Planning and mnnrng
railway in Eumpe has alwqys been a task of national gotP7wsentL This explains the large, bureaucratic,
non-market opiented railwqy organisations in most countries. It alco explains to a  large extent the lack of
jmiate sector ink,went in the financing, management and peration milny The picture f mad
tranJponation is ty dèfferent. This explains the dominant use of mad tehicks in both freight and
passenger fransponation.&9
However, ten years after the liberalisation on the European level took off the
ground following the Directive 91/440 EEC, the situation of previous decades was altered
to a greater or lesser extent across the European Union. Already, the above examples
represent three different interpretations behind the term of railway market liberalisation.
They furthermore underline the scope of self-determination the European legislation
offered to the member states. Whereas the French way certainly stands at one end of the
range of options, the British pole characterises a highly debated opposing example. The
N kamp (1994), p. 54
257 N kamp (1994), pp. 26. Later, Nijkamp exemplifies his claims that transport policies show vanous signs of
nationalism with the high-speed rail network in Europe (pp. 89-9?).
Knieps (1996b), pp. 11-13, 26-27. Monami OOa), p. 101 raises a similar, though more limited idea. lie
sues ted a "...Eu,	 arbetraiwn or track aoatzoi boe y, sth anehi be bared oa the modelprouded by Eutvvnvl en
r aIspolt " Though Monami's proposal contains a European dimension, Knieps' idea of an agency goes
beyond, as it should also be in control of traffic safety.
Nqkamp (1994), pp.89
142following chapter shall turn to the German model and the most radical approach towards
liberalisation in the European Union, namely the British reform. Still, what was the impact
of the European legislation on the three approaches described above, what triggered their
national models?
Turning to the French model, Knill and Lehmkuhl suggest that the European
legislation may have supplied some support to the limited liberalisation in France, as it
provided the government with legitimisation and conceptual back up.29° Nevertheless, they
indicate that the notion of a strong French state is weakened by voluntarily complying with
European efforts, which may finally result in increased competitive pressures on the
French railways, potentially even from abroad, therefore jeopardising French jobs. The
moderate, mostly non-compulsory nature of the Directive 91/440/EEC permitted a
particular Frcnch approach to thc French railways, whilc stimulating othcr countrics to run
ahead their own way. Quite likely, a more draconian directive would have created more
opposition against an imposed liberalisation from Brussels, putting the whole legislative
effort at risk.
As in France the directive provided legitimacy to the Dutch government to endorse
railway market libcralisation, while it scrvcd as a valuable conccpt to solve domestic
problems the government would have to tackle anyhow. Thus, the government could draw
strength from the European legislation. It allowed policy makers to deal with specific
problems sequentially as . . the protisions enshrined in the  legis/ation kft swffident room for the
eenrment to inc6l?perate itc e poliy e*ws whilit Iniicjèiirii the frvøes into nati&wal
kgislation.''1 The reform of Nederlandse Spoorwegen was quite unique in Europe with
regard to the creation of Railned as a task organisation in charge of traffic safety and
capacity management in distinction from NS Railinfrabeheer's management of the
infrastructure. Commonly, those functions are combined in organisations such as Railtrack
in the UK or Banverket in Sweden. However, a further distinction  in railway systems as
pursued in the Netherlands to a certain extent is a main feature of a traffic safety and
control agency as suggested in section W and could lead to a previously unparalleled
market integration of European railway enterprises, similar to the hopes cxpresscd by
Nijkamp and Knieps.
30 KnlllandLehmkuhl l998,p.11
291 Knill and Lehrnlcuhi (1998 , p. 7. Van de Velde (2000), p. 10 supports the view that the Directive 91/440
EEC triered the Dutch ref rms.
I 4Though the Netherlands have been a playground for more radical measures than
simply competition for the track and have seen innovative transportation services, the
moderate experiments have been put on hoki for the tune being, due to a new government
moving in. While this illustrates the political power and interdepence between governments
and railways, the Lovers Rail cxperiincnt bctwccn Haarlcm and Amsterdam indicatcs that
competition on the track could work, if the government provides a basic straitjacket for the
state-owned dominant railway operator so that competition may flourish. Van de Velde
sucsts the reform of NS would have bcncfitcd from adopting some of the British ideas,
though he admits that it would have required legislative changes  in the Netherlands, which
were impossible at the time. "A number of irgukdo'y measures, such as costpuithty integrated
ticketing and some form of integrated information, would hafad/itated competition. In this re.pec4 the
Ministji f Tranpon uhi hm enfltedfrm adopting the B,itis/i reguh yframes whe, ticket and
i'yormation integration o intrinsic pants of both connecting franchises and competing franchises using the
same orJarallel routes.''2
While the European legislation was certainly helpful  in getting the French and
Dutch reforms off the ground, it was rather the other way around in Swcdcn. First, Sweden
was not yet a member of the European Community and second, Sweden implemented her
reforms two years before the Directive 91/440/EEC and was looked upon from all over
Europe. Today, Statcns Jarnvagar still keeps its grip on its legal monopoly relating to
profitable interrcgional train services Iy its own assessment, as long as SJ does not decide to
file a line for competitive tendering to Rikstrafiken. Freight transport is open to competing
operators, limited by a grandfather's clause duc to SJ's intervention with the government,
while competitive tendering procedures are employed for county lines and unprofitable
interregional services, reminding of the Dutch example of competition for the track or the
British franchising modeL Over the years, market-led reforms have been injected into
Sweden's railway system in a step-by-step approach.
The French and Dutch examples have already highlighted the strong relationship
between railway transport and the government. Whereas the French were reluctant to let
'Europe' have too much of a say in national affairs, such as railway policy, the Dutch were
far more progressive and open to quite comprehensive changes, though a change  in
government put a question mark bchind thc policy previously cxccutcd. Sweden's
experience parallels the Dutch in this respect Substantial deregulation was envisaged,
292 van de Velde (2000), p. 13
144legislation subsequently passed parliament and was postponed right after a new
government took office in 1994. Nevertheless, the market liberalisation was well under way
and generally embraced by the new Swedish government, in the late 1990s Statens
Järnvagar was taken by total surprise with the zero-subsidy bid of Sydvästen, which
• turned out to be the most senous threat so far against what is left of SJ's legal monopo/y. Howeier, SJ
managed to Set ild of this threat, ki seeking new aA&znas (NSB) and 1obbn5 the Gott,wmeni The
Government was able to meet SJ's iemandcjuct y sticking to thefirmal 1-year-ony-conIract...''3
Simihr experiences of compromised or watered-down reforms including continued
political interference were made in Germany and the UK The German reform was
restricted to a far-reaching overhaul of the railway system, including non-discriminatory
access rights for newcomers without actually selling the railway undertaking to the private
sector. The Conservative govcrnmcnt in Britain sold the infrastructure operator and thc
rolling stock of British Rail completely, while franchising passenger services by competitive
tender. But the process was substantially flawed. The franchisees barely owned any assets,
though they carried a substantial risk due to leasing contracts with rolling stock operators
and static access arrangements with the track owner. Open access was severely constrained
until 2002 and the envisaged sale of the franchises was postponed to some unknown day  in
the future. The reforms arc still far from a full privatisation. The next two chapters look at
the German and British reforms up to the current day.
Alexandersson (2000). p.15. The NSB are the Norwegian State Railways Nop Statsbaser.
145B. Railway reform in Germany
1. The nationalised German railway system on the path to reform
Whereas Bisrnarck's plan of a single German national railway was not
accomplished until 1920 with the creation of the  Deutsche Reichsbahn, he nevertheless
succeeded in setting up a Prussian state railway company by nationalising the lion's share
of the Prussian railway network in 1879. In WWII and in the years preceding the war, the
Nazis used the Deutsche Reichsbahn to serve their political demands and the war
machine. When Germany was divided after WWII, the German constitution for the
western sectors of the allied forces from Britain, the United States and France
subordinated the administration of the railway system to the federal government as the
Deutsche Bundesbahn. In the years to come the Bundesbahn was exploited as an instrument
of social, regional and structural policy, instead of dealing with these issues adequately in
the corresponding state departments of social affairs and economic policy. Though the
German government had originally been concerned about the dominance of the railway
system in the market for transport services, these concerns were soon turned upside down.
In the early 1 950s it were no longer other modes of transportation that required
protection from the dominant Deutsche Bundesbahn, but rather the railway. The DB had
to react to strong intermodal competition, especially from road hauliers.294
The Deutsche Bundesbahn went into deficit as early as 1952. By 1965 the
situation of the Bundesbahn had deteriorated immensely. The annual deficit exceeded DM
1 billion, while federal subsidies in the following decades rose to a peak of DM 13 billion
after the reunification in 1990, not accounting for the deficit of the Reichsbahn of the
ceased German Democratic Republic. Since the I 950s the market share of the railway in
the market for transportation of both goods and passengers was on a steady decline,
notwithstanding the German government's protectionist railway policy.295 This
aggravating trend is illustrated in charts 23 and 24. Chart 23 underlines the decline of
public road and rail traffic compared to private transport
1 Lenke, p.35 on the sudden shift from a protection against the dominant railway to a protectionist railway
pohcy.
Schröder (1994), p. 3
14669.9° o in 1999, thereby more than halving the market shares of railway and waterway
freight traffic. The transport market is characterised by a structural change with the
beneficiary of the railways' reduction in demand proportionate to total demand for
transportation services being road transport.296
Having addressed the statistical data of the structural change and the steady
deterioration of railways in German transport, the contemporary observer might wonder
about the reasons for the structural change. And if the crisis of railway traffic was that
apparent, it is startling that substantial structural reforms were carried out with a time lag
of several decades.
Stackelberg (1993), pp. 247-250
1481.1 Reasons for the structural change in the transport market
Whereas it has often been claimed that the railway system's assumed inefficiency
was to a large extent a consequence of its organisation as a government-protected public
monopoly, both the demands of travellers and of freight customers changed over the years
and contributed to the railway's plight. 297 The German Wirtschafiswunder, the period of
high economic growth in the aftermath of WWII, laid the foundations for more individual
wealth, which was then partly spent on automobiles, whether as a status symbol or  in
order to become more flexible and independent. Growing car ownership, however,
increased private transport to the loss of public transport and created the demand for
more roads, which in turn provided a better road infrastructure and created network
benefits for car owners. Turning from passenger to freight transportation, the demand for
the freight the railways were typically carrying, such as coal, steel, raw materials and alike
was on a steady decline, whereas the road hauliers were concentrating on high-value
products? 8 Also, cables and pipelines could easily carry substitutes to coal, e.g. electricity,
gas or oil, further cutting into the freight market of the railways. With the energy market
switching from coal to substitutes in individual households, an extensive network of coal
stocks in cities became unnecessary. Now, it was sufficient to deliver the coal to a few
energy-producing plants around the country.
True, economic growth and individual wealth might well induce customers to
substitute public by private transport in either passenger or freight traffic. But an
inefficient railway service considerably supports customers' decisions to switch from
public to private transport, especially when the latter is more flexible with regard to the
preferences of customers. Whereas other modes of transport offered logistic packages and
complementary services, the railways did not match their services. This is not to say that
the railways were unable to meet those demands. The challenge of losing market share
requires immediate rethinking of the Deutsche Bundesbahn's strategy if it did not want to
miss the boat. However, according to the figures discussed earlier, the Deutsche
Bundesbahn lost out to other transport modes to a massive degree. Chart 25 reflects the
railway system's lack of competitiveness with other modes. The chart illustrates the
overall growth in the transport market between 1960 and 1990, divided in passenger and
freight transportation. While the passenger market went up by 185°  o, the corresponding
Ewers and Meyer (1993
" Ewers and Meyer (1993), pp.2-4 and Rahmeyer (1996), pp. 2-3 discuss the impact of the structural
change on the market for transportation.
149bathers due to government regu1ation.2 It is startling that the Bundesbahn, which
already had a government guarantee on monopolised railway transportation and subsidies,
needed further protection from road hauliers by licence arrangements. 3oo Apparently, the
DB was so inefficient that it required even more protection via regulation of the
remaining competitors - despite its monopoly position in the market  for railway transport
and a dominant position in the transport market, with 36.4° o in passenger and 62.3° o in
freight traffic in 1950. Considering that politicians resorted to massive regulation plus
financial transfers in order to cover the railway's deficit, the Deutsche Bundesbahn's value
to the German economy and society must have been overwhehning. Still, it is hard to
believe that the Bundesbahn could not have done better than it actually did under the
protective shelter.
And if the DB was indeed essential to the German society and economy, why did
nobody acknowledge that very fact, why did customers switch to other modes of
transport? Obviously, other services were somehow superior, whether in price, quality or
both.301 Though a fundamental reform of the Bundesbahn might have averted the crisis of
the system and established the railway system as the superior product it could well have
been, the government cemented the status quo and resorted to plain protectionism.302
It is not the intention of this analysis to accept the often-proclaimed perception
that the railway system as a whole was doomed to be a failure if it was not protected from
various competitive threats. Indeed, the DB could have done far better than it was
condemned to do under regulation, which limited the entrepreneurial potential inherent to
a competitive and innovative railway system. Before turning to the delay in reforming the
system, the endogenous characteristics of the Deutsche Bundesbahn that led to its decline
will be discussed.
The Bundesbahn held a monopoly on public railway transport, guaranteed by
federal legislation and the German constitution.303 The only competition it had to face
stemmed from other modes of transport that were, however, heavily constrained in freight
and passenger transport in order to protect the railway's business. As a public company,
2"Lenke, p.35
°° Haxnm (1988), pp.4-S
°' It must be clarified that the quality of a service includes a variety of parameters  such as flexibility,
punctuality, kindness, speed, convenience, safety, complementary services etc.
302 This situation was familiar on the British Isles.
151the Bundesbahn was subject to political decisions; it had to face state intervention in order
to fulfil politicians' and pressure groups' demands. As a legally protected public service,
the Bundesbahn was obliged to serve the public by working towards social goals, though it
was supposed to operate profitably at the same time. Major management decisions of the
Bundesbahn, such as investment or fares had to gain approval from the civil servants and
the politicians of the federal transport ministry, or in the Vetwaltungsrat, an administrative
council consisting of representatives from trade, industry, agricultural, manufacturing, and
transport associations, the unions and the Bundesrat, Germany's upper house of
parliament.3°4 Now, briefly recalling the often-opposing interests of trade unions and
industry associations, throwing in local concerns about infrastructure improvements in
their own Lander, potential conflicts are eye-catching. The decisions of either the
Verwaltungsrat or the federal ministry necessarily neglect the objective of profitable
operations in order to reach a compromise that offered benefits to each interest group.
Thus, management decisions in the Deutsche Bundesbahn were indifferent to economic
rationale but were subject to political compromise. One may wonder whether the DB's
decisions served interest groups, a blurred social goal, business interests of a healthy
railway company in a regulated marketplace or none of them. As it seems, the German
government had simply resorted to a railway policy of  muddling through, which did not
follow any consistent strategy for the railway system and transport policy as a whole.
The variety of contradicting claims towards the Bundesbahn was a major burden
for the train system. Social service obligations forced the railway to maintain unprofitable
traffic to remote areas, charging passengers and products equally across the country, even
on unprofitable lines. In turn, social service obligations had considerable consequences for
the Bundesbahn as the DB's competitors were free of similar obligations. Other transport
modes had obtained an invaluable competitive advantage due to the Bundesbahn's
obligation to charge universal prices across the railway system. The Bundesbahn had to
cross-subsidise the unprofitable lines via transfers from profitable traffic, further
undermining the competitive position of profitable lines towards other modes. In
addition, the government discriminated against and in favour of the road haulage industry
via licences - limiting their traffic volume and protecting their limited market against
potential entrants into the road haulage industry at the same time.
This is excluding local tram or underground railways. They were generally run by the municipality,
whereas the Bundesbahn operated the S-Bahnen, a kind of urban commuter trains.
152Due to the public service obligations and its costly operation, the federal
government had to accept responsibility for the survival of the railway system.
Accordingly, deficits of the Deutsche Bundesbahn were covered by the federal budget,
taking any risk away from the railways. As a result, the Bundesbahn was not subject to the
constraints of the marketplace when running into deficits, because the government was in
charge of the railway company. This practice further discriminated against other modes
and distorted the working of the market The Bundesbahn obtained around DM 14 billion
annually as compensation payments for the public service provision. Nonetheless, Ewers
asserted that the Deutsche Bundesbahn would have had to be liquidated immediately due
to excessive debts, if judged on normal business criteria.305
The railway system had to cope with another absurdity, as the leeway of its
management was further limited. The employees of the Bundesbahn were either civil
servants or even Bundesbeamte, te. privileged civil servants who were appointed for
sovereign jobs on a permanent basis by the federal state. But it is hard to see why
empioyees of the railways had to be granted special privileges supposedly reserved for
sovereign affairs of the government In effect, civil service regulations caused the already
inconsistent set of social and business goals to be supplemented with administrators and
bureaucrats rather than professional railway executives. By law, civil servants were rather
concerned about the legitimacy of their actions than the successful operation of a
profitable railway industry. The law regulating their privileged status made it nearly
impossible to dismiss them and offered no performance-related incentives to get
promotions or a raise in salary.306
In summary, competition from other modes of transport gradually grew fierce,
notwithstanding the fact that the market was heavily regulated in order to protect the
Deutsche Bundesbahn. In addition, the risk of liquidation was simply non-existent
Deficits were generally transferred from the DB to the federal budget, eliminating a major
driving force of entrepreneurial activity. The Bundesbahn lacked not only external, but
similarly internal incentives due to its bureaucratic organisation as a civil service
administration.307 Eventually, the chosen policy of railway protectionism resulted in the
1 The Bundesrat is the representation of the Lander governments. Ewers and Meyer (1993), p. 3 briefly
describe the dependence of the Deutsche Bundesbahn from pohtical decision-making.
Ewers and Meyer (1993), p.2 and Regierungskommission Bundesbahn (1991), p.10
306 Ewers and Meyer (1993), p. 3
°? The fotmer chairman of the Bundesbahn, Dürr (1993), pp. 4-5, 9, selected the DB's bureaucratic
corporate culture as the main challenge to the railways: 'Thu status ofapubkc autboiiy, demedfron, its dinrnou
153absence of a permanent pressure to innovate and exceed competitors in the market for
transportation. Laaser condudes that the regulation of the entire German transport system
was nearly perfect. Market entry and exit as well as pricing decisions were subject to strict
government regulation. Due to a comprehensive net of regulation, suppliers in the
transport markets were united as a single cartel with competitive elements being the rare
exception.308
as a state-ow,ved nth'qy which is subject top sentce hw and budget h is an :nsm,nountabk barrier to fieabie
companj lopmenL Th is a ktzrne fferrnce, and one of its greatest & athiantages awspared to its conetito17 which
a, oi'awsed o apiwate enteiprise basu."
30S Laaser (1991), p. 19 and Rahmeyer (1996), p. 15
1541.2 Railway reforms postponed
Accordingly, the Deutsche Bundesbahn was in a straitjacket of internal and
external disincentives and constraints, hampering its successful operation as an innovative
and competitive transport business. The growing criticism of the rising deficits and falling
market shares as well as the over-regulation of the railway system led to the Brand-
Gutachten in 1960, the first systematic analysis of the weaknesses of the Deutsche
Bundesbahn.309 In effect, the report was partly considered in the transport legislation of
the following year, the Verkehrsanderungsgesete, designed to promote intermodal
competition as an important mechanism to co-ordinate the modes of transportation.
However, Ewers condudes that the minor reform of the Verkehrsanderungsgesetze did
not initiate a U-turn in German transport policy. The legislation failed to meet the main
aim of the reform, to improve the Bundesbahn's economic position, and neither curtailed
the Ministry of Transport's intensive regulatory instruments, nor the social objectives of
the Bundesbahn.
Notwithstanding the attempt to reform in 1961, it did not take the government
long to contradict the former legislation with the  Leber-PIan in 1967, the official
government guideline in transport policy for the 1968 to 1972 parliamentary session. The
Leber-Plan aimed at putting the Bundesbahn back on track by dirigiste measures against its
intermodal competitors. Road haulage contractors were prohibited from carrying specific
freight on the roads, whilst the quantity of road haulage licenses was limited and special
taxes levied. The opposition of industry associations, however, left the Leber-Plan
stripped of the quantity requirements and further regulations, thereby reducing its
defective consequences.31°
The late I 970s saw two main reform proposals to save and reinvigorate the
German railway system. In 1976, the board of the Deutsche Bundesbahn suested the
betriebswin'schafihich optima/es Net. The concept envisaged a concentration upon an optimal
network from a business perspective of 14,500 kilometres in total length, compared to the
existing network of 29,000 kilometres. The Bundesbahn's optimal network would then be
complemented with a socially optimal network. Whereas the government had to decide
309 Laaser (1988), pp. 8-9. The f lowing remarks are laxge1y based on the work of Laaser (1988), pp. 8-19,
Ewers and Meyer (1993), pp. 11-15 and Schräder (1994), pp. 4-13.
° Ewers and Meyer (1993), p. 12 note that the Deutither I,idust,ie- usd Haadthta (DIRT) and the
Bundesuerband der Deutsche,, mdi me (BDI), two lobbying otEanisations which are biased in favour of more
competition in the German economy were at the forefront of the opposing industry associations.
155upon the scope of the socially optimal network, it was furthermore required to pay for the
social service the Bundesbahn was obliged to deliver. Thus, for the first time it was
proposed to tackle one of the main structural misconceptions of the railways, the
perception that train companies would have to deliver a social service to the nation, while
operating profitably at the same time. Still, the reform did not succeed on account of
opposing Lander and community authorities as many regions benefited from the non-
profitable train traffic and were afraid of losing their heavily subsidised transport
infrastructure. In addition, the federal government was not in favour of the proposaL The
massive annual re-distributions of taxpayers' money to certain regions from the federal
budget as explicit railway transfers would have been exposed to criticism from well-off
regions that were already financing states with less revenue.311 Nonetheless, the board's
proposal was a landmark on the way to a fully-fledged reform.
The 1978 proposal, however, focussed on another main pillar of reforming the
railways, the vertical separation of train and infrastructure operations. 312 The government
analysed four different models of vertical separation with regard to their structural,
economic and social consequences. Whereas three of the four models simply implied a
direct transfer of the infrastructure costs from the Bundesbahn to the federal minister of
transport, one proposal suggested an actual separation of the track management and the
operation of train services. Accordingly, the track network was supposed to remain in
government ownership with the operation of one or more independent private train
operators on the network. Eventually, constitutional constraints of article 87e  Grun4geset
(GG) prevented the reform's realisation.
The publication of social balances in the DB's 1978 annual report was short-lived
and discontinued in the following year. While the social balances were soon forgotten, the
company published three separate accounts in their annual reports after 1980 in order to
produce clear responsibilities. According to the division, the government was in charge of
the track network and the social service obligations relating to the local and regional
traffic. The Deutsche Bundesbahn assumed responsibility of the freight and long-distance
311 The federal organisation of Germany consists of three administrative layers: the federal government
(Bund, the regional state governments Làsdei) and the communities (Geme#tden). Due to the
1nnaaug1ach, an arrangement of the federal organisatlon of the repubhç, the tax income of the
different layers is redistributed in order to support àsadvaritaged regions. For a comprehensive critical analysis
of the Länderfinanzausgleich see Blankart (1994 , pp. 522-545
312 This pohcy proposal was, indeed, not new to the railway industry. Already in 1864 Gladstone suested a
vertically separate organisation of railway operations and the track management, when he advocated
nationalisation of tracks to avoid more "unco-othnated bsahi1n' Jenkins (1995), p. 249.
156passenger traffic. Though the division of responsibilities between the state and the railway
created more transparency, it had not much in common with an actual separation of
infrastructure and train services. Overwhelmingly, the accounting division rather served
the Bundesbahn well in justifying its rising deficits, as did the social balance in 1978.
However, the development of the deficits and of the Bundesbahn's debts was
alarming to the federal government and the financially struling state-owned undertaking.
This led the recently appointed board to the implementation of the strategy DB'90 in
1983, to counter the aravating trend. Complementing ambitious internal targets to boost
efficiency by means of reducing staff expenses by 30%, increasing productivity by 40°
and lowering total expenses by 25° o until 1990, the board expected external support from
the government, more exactly debt relief and investments in new track infrastructure.
Regarding the set of targets, the strategy was successful. But though the transfer of debts
from the Bundesbahn to the federal budget in 1991 reduced the debt of the Bundesbahn
to DM 34 billion, they were roughly comparable to the 1983 leveL This sum still exceeded
the annual revenues of the Bundesbahn of DM 20.2 billion in 1990, not offering a real
prospect of economic viability to the railway system. In case of failure to reform the
railways thoroughly, massive debts were anticipated until the end of the millennium.
The previous considerations have shown that the post-war railway system was
steadily running downhill. The DB gained a brief respite with the debt transfer from the
Bundesbahn to taxpayers and the efficiency gains of the late I 980s. If the problems were
apparent from the outset, one may wonder why the various reforms were half-hearted
approaches until the more comprehensive report of the government commission on
railways in December 1991, the Rigierungskommission Bundesbahn. In a public choice
analysis, Ewers and Meyer reveal that massive lobby interests were responsible for the
postponed or watered-down reforms.313 Transport economists and policy advisers after
WWII were mostly in favour of social service provisions. They cut off transport policy
from the economics discipline and discredited economists' criticism of regulated transport
markets by inventing the so-called Besonderheitentheorie, i.e. instruments of economic theory
would not apply to transport economics.
Road hauliers were rather satisfied with the status quo. Neither did they consider
the inflexible and heavily regulated Deutsche Bundesbahn as a dangerous competitor, nor
157did they welcome a reduction in the bathers to entry of the road freight market, as
inventive and challengng entrants might intrude upon their market. Suppliers and
complementors to road hauliers, such as oil companies and truck as well as car
manufacturers, were naturally tied to road transport. They were unlikely to challenge the
regulated railway system. The regulations of the road haulage industry protected bith the
Bundesbahn and the road freight operators from new competition.
Advocates of railway reform had to face further opposition from the railway
unions. Naturally, they were defending their members - public empioyees and civil
servants of the Bundesbahn who were afraid of losing their jobs in a privatised railway
undertaking. The same applied to executives of the Bundesbahn, as the management did
not expect to be an exception to the rule. They would have been equally affected by job
losses, potentially even with a higher proportion, assuming that the course of the
Bundesbahn and the management style had to be turned in the opposite direction. The
prime concern of environmental groups is generally a reduction of road transport. They
were afraid that a privatisation of the railways would result in more road and less railway
traffic. Environmental groups were mostly opposed to a deregulated DB, disregarding the
benefits of an efficient and competitive railway system.
The electorate is often subject to ideological influences, such as the commonly held
view that the railway system needs protection and subsidies to exist due to its ecological
and social benefits to society. Though the short-term advantages of regulation, such as
social service obligations, are apparent to the electorate, long-term costs of public services
like the Bundesbahn debt on the general tax bill and an inefficient service were hidden and
more difficult to understand. Though politicians and the government are subject to a re-
election constraint, railway policy in Germany does not have more than a partial influence
on actual voting behaviour, as railway policy is one issue of a political election agenda.
However, railway policy often served as a comfortable substitute for direct social or
regional policy, such as the promotion of disadvantaged regions by infrastructure
investments or the support of disadvantaged groups in society by special tariffs with the
costs not being covered by the government budget, but by cross-subsidies or the annual
railway deficit. For the same reasons, regional and local governments and communities
were generally in favour of a public railway system. Otherwise, regional public transport
provision and finance could place a burden to the Lander.
313 Ewers and Meyer (1993), pp. 15-26 and Ewers (1995), pp. 115-118 discuss the following issues in
1582. The report of the Regierungskommission Bundesbahn
The partly successful strategy DB'90 highlighted the necessity for full-scale reform
of the Deutsche Bundesbahn. The rather unattractive alternative to the German
government was the railways' continued dependence from public funds. Though budgetary
pressures forced the government to counter the worsening railway situation, the German
conservative-liberal coalition government was in favour of a comprehensive railway
reform which is reflected in the government's selection of commission members. The
Rtgierungskommission Bundesbabn, a government panel on the Deutsche Bundesbahn's future
prospects, was commissioned in 1989 and submitted its report in December 1991.314
Though the commission was initially expected to publish a report on the reform of the
Deutsche Bundesbahn, it was overtaken by German reunification. Eventually, the
Regierungskommission decided to take both the Deutsche Bundesbahn and the Deutsche
Reichbahn in the former German Democratic Republic into account
Two reports immediately preceded the report of the Regierungskommission,
mapping out further developments. The reports of the monopoly and deregulation
commissions in 1989 and 1990 unanimously agreed that restrictions on competition were
detrimental to transport services and redundant. Though protectionism originally intended
to favour the Bundesbahn, it contributed to the railway system's decline. The reports
recommended curbing the regulations to prevent a further deterioration. The criticism
focussed on the entrepreneurial environment surrounding the Bundesbahn. The
undertaking did not face any entrepreneurial risks and was allowed to transfer its deficits
to the government budget. It was subject to civil service regulations and exploited to ease
labour market constraints in periods of high unemployment This was on top of social
policy objectives that were imposed on the Deutsche Bundesbahn. Also, the commissions
rejected to consider regulation on grounds of perceived ecological benefits. Lenke
concludes that protectionism promoted the shift of market share in the transport market
from the railway to road traffic. Both reports recommended a vertical separation of the
railway system and open access to the track infrastructure.315
The Regierungskommission Bundesbahn published their report in December 1991
in line with the monopoly and deregulations commissions. The report advocated a fully-
greater detaiL
314 Rerungskommission Bundesbahn (1991)
315 Lenke, p. 36
159fledged structural reform of the German railway network. The Deutsche Bundesbahn and
the Deutsche Reichsbahn should merge into the holding company  Deutsche Eisenbabn AG
(DEAG) and the federal government would remain the sole owner of the new company.
The commission proposed a vertically separated structure between the track network and
the operations as well as a horizontal separation of train services into passenger and freight
traffic divisions in profit centres.316 After a transitional stage of 5 to 8 years, the passenger
and freight traffic divisions should move to full privatisation.
The commission proposed to transfer the debt to an external institution, as the
massive liabilities would strangle the new DEAG and its three subsidiaries. Another
burden to the new holding company was the massive number of civil servants and
Bundesbeamte, amounting to a total workforce of 390,000. Again, the commission
suested an external institution to embrace the staff from the Bundesbahn. This
arrangement allowed the DEAG to renegotiate the job contracts with the employees
individually, as their former contracts would officially run with the external institution.
The staff was to be hired by the DEAG from the institution in exchange for the payment
of market wages at market conditions instead of civil servants' salaries and privileges.317
Privatisation of the Bundes- and Reichsbahn did not mean that unprofitable lines
must cease to exist, if they are socially beneficiaL The Regierungskommission
recommended that the regional Lander governments might order services from the
Deutsche Eisenbahn AG if the services could not cover costs. The Lander would have to
pay for the services, the alternative being cross-subsidies from profitable traffic, leading
into a vicious circle of intermodal incompetitiveness. Payments to cover unprofitable
services had so far been undertaken by the federal German government First, the funds
would be transferred to the Lander. Second, the Lander could then auction their public
transport operations to the Deutsche Eisenbahn AG or a competitive train operator.318
This policy of regionalisation of social service responsibilities from the federal to the Lander
governments was one of the most important steps in the process of structural reforms.
Eventually, it ended the railway's social obligation to cross-subsidise unremunerative and
expensive lines from the revenue of profitable services. Prior to the railway reform, the
profitable traffic had been condemned to charge customers a mark-up on the competitive
price, simultaneously undermining the Bundesbahn's intermodal competitiveness.
' Regerungskominission Bundesbahn (1991), p. 30
Regierungskommission Bundesbahn (1991), pp.20-21
Regerungskommission Bundesbahn (1991), pp. 22-23
160However, the regionalisation from 1996 guaranteed the continuation of socially beneficial
services.319
The Regierungskommission urged the government in the report to undertake a
general overhaul of the transport system, emphasising the necessity to provide equal
opportunities for all modes of transport, especially with regard to public infrastructure
investments. Though the DEAG would oversee the construction and maintenance of the
entire track network in its own responsibility, the federal government should finance the
investments in the infrastructure, receiving in exchange the annual depreciation from the
DEAG.32° The sole financial responsibility for investments in passenger and freight traffic
would be in the authority of the Deutsche Eisenbahn AG. Non-discnminatory open access
for third parties must be granted to the track network by the DEAG to promote
competition on the track. The Regierungskommission strongly advised against a public
authority in charge of the infrastructure, as an authority lacks the incentives to market
train slots and is highly sensitive to political interventions.321
319 The regionalisation was based upon the 1993 regionalisation law, article 4 E.NeuOG.
° Wittenbnnk (1993), p.224
Regierungskommission (1991), pp. 24-27
1613. The Deutsche Bahn AG
3.1 The first stage of the reform
Parliament passed the necessary legislation to restructure and privatise the German
railway system in December 1993, based upon the Regierungskommission's findings in the
Geset rrurNeuordnung des Eisenbabnwesens (ENeUOG). 322 The first stage of the long awaited
structural reform commenced on January 1 , 1994. Accordingly, the Bundesbahn and
Reichsbahn were merged into the special federal railway assets, the Sonderirmogen
Bundeseisenbahnen (chan! 26, large blue box). The Sondervermogen comprised commercial and
public functions, which were allocated to the bodies as shown in chart  26.323 The new
joint stock company Deutsche Bahn AG (DRAG) was established for the commercial side
of the Sondervermogen, with the federal government as the sole owner of 100°  o shares of
the DBAG.324 The DBAG was restructured as an integrated company with the separate
subsidiaries Personenferiwer/eebr and Personennahverkehr, the long- and short-distance
passenger traffic, Giiterverkebr, the freight traffic division, Personenbahnhofi, the subsidiary
for the railway stations and the Fabiweg, comprising the entire track network (chart 26,
upper green box).325 Non-discriminatory open access to the track system was provided,
whilst cross-subsidies between infrastructure and train operations were prohibited.326
Thus, Germany's reform of the railway system encompassed the European Community's
directive 91/441)/EEC and restructured the DBAG into the above subsidiaries.327
3 Bundesgesetzblatt 11993, No. 73. The ENeuOG comprises the following five articles:
Amde 1: Gesetz air Zusarnmenfiihrung und Neughederung der Bundeseisenbahnen - law to merge and
restructure the federal railways
Artid 2: Gesetz uber die Grundung einer Deutsche Bahn Aktiengesellschaft - law on the creation of a joint
stock company Deutsche Balm
AmcIe 3: Gesetz über die Eisenbahnverkehrsverwaltung des Bundes - law on the federal state's railway
administration
Amds 4: Gesetz zur Regionalisierung des öffenthchen Pezsonennahverkehra - law on the regionalisation of
short-distance traffic
Attic/i 5: Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz - general railway law
323 Article 1, 1-3 ENeuOG
3 'Artide 2, 1 ENeuOG
uS The separation was laid down in article 2, S25 ENeuOG. The law envisaged at least four separate
divisions, namdy the above, except Personenbahnhöfe, the station operations.
'' Artide 5, 9,14
Articles 2,5 ENeuOG converted the EC directive into national law.
162investments into the infrastructure.328 In addition, new train finns have to obtain
operating licences from the EBA. Generally, licences are granted  if the applicant is reliable,
financially sound and competent with regard to the operation of a railway company.329
The German government pushed to upgrade the EBA's functions to create a proper
railway regulator during 2001. Accordingly, the EBA would obtain powers to ban
discriminatory action itself, a power that is explicitly in the domain of the German
competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt.33° Due to strong opposition to a special
railway regulator from the competition watchdog's president and opposition politicians,
the passing of the law is not anymore expected for 2001. The Kartellamt's president
advocated a strict separation of infrastructure from train operations rather than an
overlapping industry regulator that would obscure competencies.331
The BEV incorporated the main burdens to privatisation. The massive debt of DM
67 billion, accumulated by the Bundesbahn and Reichsbahn, the staff of the former
companies and the property of the state railways that was not directly required for railway
operations were transferred to the BEV. 332 Thus, the 1994 Bahn reform removed the
DBAG's long-term debt and to some extent relieved the railway system of the burdens of
the past This was a considerable privilege to the DBAG as other modes of transport had
no way to get rid of their accumulated long-term debt. The debt transfer to the public
purse discriminates against other modes of transportation and distorts competition.
Though extremely beneficial to the railway system, the Bahnreform did not produce a
level playing field in the transport market. Aberle and Brenner emphasise that thl8 positive
railway discrimination highlighted the continuation of the past's railway protectionism.333
The Deutsche Balm AG hired Bundesbeamte for an initial period of three years.
Following the transitional stage, the DBAG exclusively hired the Bundesbeamte who were
required in the company from the BEV. The BEV served as a  job )ool to the DBAG
according to its demand for personneL The privileged civil servants were then hired at the
same rates and conditions, which were agreed upon with new employees or former civil
3i s Amdc 3, 3 ENcuOG
3 Article 5, S6 ENeuOG
°The setrt,geen JVettbewerbsbe chninkune* (GIVB) offers extensive scope for the Kartellarnt to intervene
with companies that are exploiting their market power or discriminate against competitors (19,2O GWB),
e.g. see Bechthold (1999) or Wolf (1996) with regard to the competition watchdog's role in hberalised
transport markets.
331 Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung (2001c) and Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung (2001d)
332 Kwasniewki (1993), p.610 and Article 1, 16 ENeuOG: Expenditure of the BEV that is not covered
by revenues shall be borne by the federal budget
' Aberle and Brenner (1996), pp. 15-16
164servants who signed individual contracts with the new company, thus terminating their
privileges within the new company.3M The BEV expected railway staff related expenses of
DM 87 billion in the period from 1995 to 1999, whereas anticipated revenues totalled
DM 29 billion from the Deutsche Balm AG. Therefore, the accumulated net burden to the
BEV job pool would amount to DM 58 billion. Even though the BEV expected revenue
from property sales, they would not exceed DM 5.7 billion until 1999. The federal budget
accepted responsibility for the BEV's expenses, which are not covered from revenue
according to Article 1, 16 ENeuOG. Thus, the high deficits of the BEV led to severe
strains in the federal budget.
In 1993 about 110,000 job losses had been anticipated up to the year 2000. The
workforce of the infrastructure division amounted to 119,655 and was cut to around
100,000 by 1995. Assuming an average gross income of DM 70,000 per staff, total staff
expenses would reach DM 7 billion in the infrastructure division alone. In relation to the
total network size of about 40,000 kilometres, an average 2.5 workers looked after each
kilometre in 1995. Comparing the number to an average one or two staff per kilometre on
small private railway networks, Aberle and Brenner suggested that the infrastructure
division had a considerable potential to increase productivity, especially when taking more
automated networks into account 335 Necessarily, antiquated production methods would
have to be replaced with innovative production technology to increase productivity and
reduce the high costs of the track management The large workforce and the lack of
investment in technological progress inflated the costs of the Deutsche Bundesbahn and
Reichsbahn. Over the next years, considerable gains were achieved. At the end of the year
2000, the workforce of the infrastructure division was down to 53,554 for a total
network size of 36,588 kilometres, amounting to an average 1.5 staff per kilometre. Since
privatisation in 1994, the total workforce of the DBAG holding was reduced by more
than 125,000 staff, as illustrated below.3
"4 Artide 2, 12,21 ENeuOG
Aberie and Brenner (1996), pp. 32-37
' Deutsche B-ahn AG (2000a) and Deutsche Bahn AG (2000b)
1653.2 The second stage of the reform
Following a transitional period of three to five years, the subsidiary divisions  (chart
26, upper green box) were to become joint stock companies in the second stage of the
Bahnreform. In an envisaged third stage, the Deutsche Bahn AG holding was to be
resolved into entirely separate joint stock companies at some future date (chart 26, lower
green boxes). The purpose of the DBAG holding in stage two was the strategic co-
ordination between its subsidiaries. Obviously, this arrangement could result in collisions
of interest, if third parties apply for traffic slots of the holding's infrastructure subsidiary
in competition with the transport operations of the Balm AG.337 Similarly to Britain, the
initial proposals of the reform were watered down in the further political process and an
actual privatisation drifted away into the distant future.
The DBAG entered the second stage in 1999 in accordance with article 2, §2(1)
ENeuOG. However, it is currently at least unlikely that the DBAG holding will ever
resolve into its subsidiaries in a third stage. Whereas the original bill in parliament fixed
stage two for 1997 and stage three for 1999, the latter date was dropped due to
opposition from the German Lander. As a consequence of the complicated prli2mentary
negotiations in the Bundesrat, the chamber representing the German Lander, the date for
stage two was scheduled to start between 1997 and 1999. An outright sale of the share
capital of all independent companies of the then resolved holding DBAG was only
visualised for the final stage. This would, however, exclude the infrastructure provider,
the DB Net AG that was to remain federal property with a majority of shares. Today,
1000 0 of the DBAG's share capital is still owned by the federal government Apparently,
the reform stopped halfway through. The Bahnreform was merely a formal instead of a
fully-fledged material privatisation. As a result of the difficult negotiations between the
federal and Lander governments, the introduction of the final stage of the reform with a
break-up of the holding requires federal legislation and consent of the Bundesrat.338
The second stage commenced in 1999 and saw the foundation of five quasi-
independent joint stock companies under the umbrella of the holding Deutsche Balm AG.
The DB Reise & Touristik AG is now responsible for the long-distance market,
corresponding to the short-distance operator DB Regio AG. The DB Station & Service AG
was created to maintain the station and service facilities, while the DB Cargo AG operates
Aberle (1998), pp.472-473
167freight services and the DB Net AG provides the railway infrastructure (chart 26, green
boxes). The DB Netz' functions comprise the construction and maintenance of railway
tracks, the traffic management and the operation of safety control systems.339
The federal government assumed final responsibility for infrastructure investments
other than commercially viable ventures of the DBAG. However, the government also
supports infrastructure investments that are of commercial interest to DB Neta AG by
means of interestfree loans. This major shift of final responsibility to the federal government
substantially decreased the DBAG's burden of the former social service obligations. The
move was essentially justified to correct past distortions in financing basic transportation
infrastructure, though it created new distortions of competitive conditions between all
modes of transportation. Again, the government discriminates in favour of the railway
industry, while the tax burden of road transport is rising, not least due to the new
environmental tax from which the Deutsche Bahn is currently exempt.  340 The
government's generosity is indeed startling for a supposedly profit-making private
company operating in a wider transport market. As a result, government policy distorts
market prices, induces investments that are considered beneficial to the general public and
revives the old times of railway protectionism and positive discrimination, when train
services were predominantly expected to be socially beneficial instead of profitable.Ml
Also, the interest-free loans distort investment decisions of the DB Nets AG by
encouraging investments and construction of lines that would not have been considered
under undistorted conditions.
Under the current arrangements, the DBAG is expected to maximise the profits of
the entire holding, whilst being required to allow competitors non-discriminatory access to
its railway network.3'2 Notwithstanding the legal prohibition of cross-subsidies,
compliance with non-discriminatory rules cannot be guaranteed, if the five subsidiaries are
subordinated to a single management holding. Only a full institutional separation between
the track management and the transport operations can assure a non-discriminatory open
access to the network for various train operators.3
"' Aberle and Brenner (1996), p. 6, Ewers (1995), p. 122-126 and Rahrneyer (1996 , p. 17
S2 AEG
° Böhmer and Delhaes (2000), p.92
341 Ewers (1995), p. 123 and Aberie (1998), p. 472
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1683.3 The access price system of the DBAG and DB Netz
During the first stage of the Bahnreform access to the railway network was
theoretically possible by paying an access charge to the predecessor of the DB Netz AG,
the Fahrweg division of the DBAG. However, the initial access prices were exposed to
constant criticism from transport economists. Sunimarising the critics' viewpoints, Knieps
suested the Deutsche Bahn charged internal, partly arbitrary prices between the DBAG's
different divisions and signalled that the entry of other parties would not quite be
welcomed.3" Indeed, as one would expect the Deutsche Bahn's charging mechanism
rather discouraged than encouraged potential competition by disincentives, such as
quantity discounts to finns using the whole Fahrweg network. Apparently, the only
operators using the whole network were the DBAG's transport divisions. Regional market
entry could have been promoted by a differentiation of the Fahrweg in regional networks
or routes, but apparently the Fahrweg's business goals were subordinated to the goals of
the holding DBAG. The access price discounts were dearly designed for the Bahn's own
passenger and freight operations, as they were the only operators who could benefit from
the most rewarding discounts. Thus, it was virtually impossible for small operators and
potential market entrants to come even dose to the most attractive discounts. The
incumbent DBAG's Fahrweg division erected market bathers against outsiders in order to
give the DBAG a competitive advantage over potential entrants.
Though the pricing differentiated between different categories of trains, such as
InterCityExpress (ICE), InterCity (IC) and InterRegio (IR), the categories were designed
according to the Deutsche Balm AG's own train categories and requirements. Though the
standards were possibly a natural occurrence based on the DBAG's past railway
experiences, they impeded innovations of new models by potential competitors, as they
had to comply with DBAG's standards. Nonetheless, the inflexibility of the pricing
scheme did not only apply to the train categories, but also to the capacity of the network.
The Deutsche Balm simply neglected traffic externalities, though congestion pricing could
have alleviated congestion on the network. Instead of rewarding flexible train operators
for switching from peak to off-peak operations and charging mark-ups for the use of
capacity bottlenecks in the railway system, the Deutsche Bahn AG lacked a rational
incentive price mechanism. In the 1997 railway infrastructure directive, the
Eühninfrasmktur-Benutzunsttrordnung (EIBV), the Ministry of Transport provided
169criteria for access prices, also comprising components for congestion and pollution
costs. 5 Above others as a reaction to the mounting criticism, the DBAG relaxed its
pricing regime in time for the start of the second stage of the railway reform in 1999.
The 1998 access price system, the Trassenpreis.ystem (JTPS98) was essentially
designed to attract more traffic to the railway system and to recover the full costs of the
infrastructure, setting a stark contrast to most access price systems in the European Union.
The majority of European railway track managers solely recover a small margin of the
entire infrastructure costs through their revenues from access charges, while government
subsidies make up for the resulting shortfall in revenues. Due to the technical
characteristics of railway infrastructure, the proportion of short term fixed costs usually
adds up to 90% or more of the total network costs. In turn, marginal cost pricing cannot
recover the full costs of the network, requiring either additional government subsidies or
other second best pricing regimes, such as the TPS'98 two-tier system set up by the DB
Netz AG. Knieps argued that a split into a fixed and variable price component is
beneficial to society, whenever high fixed costs are present. In such a scenario, the variable
price component promotes an increase in the total volume of traffic as a result of the
degressive cost structure of a two-tier system. The average access costs of train operators
decrease the more kilometres they operate their train services. Thus, a two-tier system
could recover the full costs of the infrastructure with minor deviations from the economic
optimal allocation principle of marginal cost pricing.TM6
The TPS'98 provided for open access to all national and international existing or
potential train companies. The pricing structure accommodated both operators with only
occasional traffic and operators with regular operations or a high quantity of services that
require a great amount of slots on the network, such as the DBAG train operators. While
occasional customers were likely to pay the so-called VarioPreis, a special two-tier pricing
system had been created for the high volume customers to attract more traffic to the
railway infrastructure supposedly without discriminating quantity discounts as in the
initial access pricing mechanism. In the two-tier system, the access price had been
composed of a fixed and a variable price component. The fixed component of the access
price was purchased with an InfraCard, whereas the price of the InfraCard was
independent of the final volume of traffic. The card entttled the customer to use the
Knieps (1996), p. 65; also see Aberle and Brenner (1996, pp. 41-57 for a detailed criticism of the initial
access price system.
6 EIBV
170network in exchange for the payment of an additional variable price component
However, the variable component was considerably smaller than the VarioPreis access
charge, because the VarioPreis already contained a fixed plus a variable price element,
whereas the fixed element had already been covered with the purchase of the InfraCard in
the two-tier system.
The pricing of the InfraCard was based on the long run network related costs, such
as capital costs in the form of depreciation, interest payments and basic maintenance costs.
Thus, the cost components of the InfraCard did not vary in the short term with the
number of train journeys. The final purchase price of the InfraCard for an individual train
operator depended upon three parameters, those being (71) the contract length, (2) the
scope of the chosen railway network and fmally, (73) the quality of the network.
The duration of the InfraCard subscription (71), which embraced a period of one to
ten years, reduced the InfraCard's price by a maximum of 10% for a ten-year contract. As
customers with long-term contracts shared the DB Netz AG's investment risks and
thereby promoted new infrastructure investments, they were rewarded with a reduction in
the InfraCard's price. An additional discount was tied to the scope and the quality of the
chosen network for which the InfraCard was valid. The bigger the network (/2) that
individual train operators selected from the entire track infrastructure of nearly 40,000
kilometres owned by DB Netz AG, the more expensive was the InfraCard. In order to
address the network character of the railway system, the DB Netz required its customers
to select lines that were linked together as small, quasi-autarchic networks of a minimum
100 kilometres for low-distance, 1,000 kilometres for long-distance passenger traffic or
500 kilometres for freight services. The cost of the InfraCard finally reflected the quality
of the selected network (/3). The DB Netz AG divided the entire network into six track
categories that represented various speed limits, ranging from category KI with a speed
allowance between 200 and 300 kiloinetres per hour to category K6 with a speed limit of
80 km/h.
The prices of the InfraCard reflected specific requirements for the operation of
long- and short-distance passenger, as well as freight traffic on a mixed-use infrastructure,
such as differences in equipment and quality of tracks. Thus, the access prices for
' Aberie (1998), p. 472, Knieps (1998), pp. 466-470 and Schwalbach 1998), pp.476-479
The information on the TPS'98 is taken from the official brochure of the Deutsche Bahn AG (1998),
which descnbes the new system and from Haase (1998 , pp.460-465
171passenger traffic were generally higher than for  freight traffic due to the comparatively
simple standards required for freight services. Long-distance passenger traffic needs more
expensive infrastructure equipment on high-speed lines, while short-distance regional
trains call for extensive and highly expensive interface facilities, such as tracks along
platforms and special signalling for trains pulling out of or into stations. Whereas the
DBAG owns a total of 6,500 railway stations and stops, the regional traffic exclusively
uses about 600 o of the stations, obviously increasing the fixed quality-price component of
the InfraCard. The InfraCard also considered the relevant market structure, such as
intermodal competition with other transport operators along the diosen network.
Every train operator who had purchased the InfraCard was charged an additional
variable price component per train kilometre. The variable component depended upon
three further paramenters, those being (vi) the capacity of the line, (v2) the timetabling
flexibility of the service and (v3) possible premiums or discounts.
Contrasting the initial access price mechanism's inflexibility in peak pricing (vi),
the TPS'98 designated three capacity classifications (BI - Bill), with highly frequented
capacity bottlenecks being more expensive than the remaining categories, thereby
acknowledging the criticism that the former charging principles neglected congestion costs.
The Deutsche Balm assumed the TPS'98 would encourage a more balanced use of the
whole system and increase the overall performance and capacity of the network.
Also, the variable cost element was correlated with the timetable flexibility of the
train companies applying for slots (v2). As co-ordinated train operations put rigid demands
on arrival and departure times of different services as well as train connections, the
expenses of the DB Netz AG are higher the tighter the restraints, such as connecting
services. Correspondingly, more flexible train operators received price reductions. Still, the
cheapest option was the purchase of specially offered slots from DB Netz, the so-called
Angebotstra.csen or slots on offer, as they require the highest flexibility from train companies
rather than the track operator. The DB Netz constructed the Angebotsirassen between
major junctions and specified the required speed for the offered train paths. However,
priority was given to the Rege1trassen, the regular slots for which the companies applied
and were charged according to the standards they require. The cheaper Angebotstrassen
were by far more restricted, as they were offered according to the requirements of DB
Netz whenever slots were not purchased in the process of allocating the Regeltrassen.
172Train companies wishing to offer services at particular times on a particular line usually
applied for Regeltrassen.
Potential discounts or premium payments (v3) were linked to the variable costs of
the access price, adding to the capacity and flexibility elements. The DB Netz had some
tom for manoeuvre in determining the final variable access price with regard to special
arrangements or conditions that had not been covered by the individual pricing elements.
Thus, innovative train systems, environmentally friendly or noise-subdued trains might be
eligible for discounts and vice versa for premium payments.
In addition to the InfraCard system, the VarioPreis offered an alternative to
customers who did not meet the basic requirements of the InfraCard, such as the
minimum scope of an individual railway network or who generated only occasional traffic.
The VarioPreis was explicitly tied to the total distance of train kilometres covered. The
price depended mainly on the three capacity classifications (BI-Blil) and six different
categories of line (K1-K6) that were defined according to the technical equipment of the
chosen track and its performance and speed potential. While the combination KI/BI led
to the most expensive, the track category K6/BIII offered the cheapest basic price. The
DB Netz guaranteed a non-discrimination of the VarioPreis customer regarding to price
alterations due to discounts, his flexibility in respect to the timetable and the use of
Angebotstrassen.
If more than one operator applied for the sanie slot, the DB Netz AG had to
follow the regulations of the EIBV. The directive regulates the access price system and
potentially arising conflicts between different players. According to §4(5) EIBV, the slot
must in such circumstances be granted to the operator who is willing to pay the highest
mark-up on top of the access price of the TPS'98. Even the initial stage of separating
railway tracks and transport systems in different subsidiaries created an emerging market
for train slots.
In summary, the TPS'98 had two main objectives under the official condition to
provide non-discriminatory access to the network. First, the pricing system was designed
to recover the full costs of maint2ining the railway infrastructure. Second, it targeted an
increase in total traffic volume and productivity by managing more train slots through an
incentive price mechanism. The variable price component represented an incentive to run
173more services, because the average access price decreases in proportion to the train
kilometres operated.
Overall, the reformed access price system eliminated many of the initial access
pricing system's disincentives that discouraged small or regional operators, innovative train
systems and flexibility of operators. The TPS'98 abolished bulk discounts that exclusively
benefited the DBAG's transport subsidiaries. Furthermore, it revoked the former system's
orientation to the DBAG's own train categories in favour of a more open system. Most
importantly, the TPS'98 actively encouraged the flexibility of train companies regarding
congestion on the track system. This provided for a more efficient allocation of slots and
increased the railway system's productivity due to fewer capacity bottlenecks and a higher
network capacity. While the VarioPreis set an incentive for small or regional operators,
the InfraCard access price structure provided incentives for operators to use the network
more intensely. Accordingly, their final average access price decreased in proportion with
rising traffic. Thus, the TPS'98 made a step towards the twofold aim of recovering the
costs of maintaining the infrastructure while at the same time attracting more traffic to
the railway system.
Notwithstanding the achievements of TPS'98 compared to the former system,
non-discriminatory open access was not guaranteed. As a result, the German competition
authority considered an investigation into the access price system. Disregarding the
potential arising from an institutional integration in the DBAG holdin& possibilities
remained to discriminate against open access operators. Bulk discounts for operators using
the whole network were abolished, but the TPS'98 still offered quantity discounts
according to the network size. Indeed, cost differentials of DB Netz partly justified the
InfraCard's price components of contract length and scope of the network. However, the
fixed costs of the InfraCard hold a potential to deter newcomers from entering the rail
market. The capacity of the network did not allow for immediate large-scale market entry,
even if a newcomer would be able to find sufficient resourcesY The discounts of the
fixed cost component and the separation in a the VarioPreis and InfraCard regime
favoured the Deutsche Balm AG to the detriment of smaller competitors, as they could
hardly get hold of the most favourable discounts.
•' After the DBAG announced to cease all !nterRegio services, Conner suested to acquire the entire
InterRegio rolling stock of the DBAG to replace the services with new IRte,Connex trains. Naturally, the
DBAG was rarely enthusiastically in favour of the proposals. Conner argued that public funds part-financed
the purchase of the InterReglo's and Conner would be unable to order new trains on such a large scale in
the short-term, Frankfurter Aligemeine Zeitung (2001
174Under the influence of the KartelLamt's investigation, the DB Netz revised the
TPS'98 and implemented new access prices in April 2001. The competition watchdog
ceased its investigation, because the new system abolished the competitive distortions of
TPS'98. Quantity discounts of any kind are now absent - the access price is the same for
each track kilometre, independent of the total amount of kilometres travelled with an
average price of DM 6.40 per track kilometre as before. As an inevitable side effect of the
abolition of a two-tier system of fixed and variable costs, the incentive price mechanism
to run additional trains ceased, which was subsequently criticised by environmental
groups.349
The new arrangement consists of three modules, the basic price, the product
specifications and special specification.r.35°
1. The basic price accounts for different track categories and capacity of the track.
The module is subdivided into nine categories, ranging in price between DM 2.9
per track kilometre for S-Bahn tracks to DM 6.6 per track kilometre for
operations with minimum speeds of 200 km/h. The capacity charge of a uniform
mark-up of 20% applies to highly frequented train paths.35'
2. This price component is added to the basic price and differentiates three price
categories for both passenger and freight traffic. In passenger operations, prices
range between DM I per track kilometre for an economy train path, DM 1.65 for
at least three regular services each day to DM 1.8 for express paths with highest
priority. Prices in freight traffic range between DM 0.5 and DM 1.65 per
kilometre for feeder, standard and express freight operations.
3. Finally, discounts or premiums may be added on top of both elements. Thus,
tilting trains have to pay an additional charge of DM I per kilometre and freight
trains exceeding 1,200 tons are charged an extra DM 1 to DM 2.6 depending upon
the weight due to higher wear and tear costs imposed on the network. Innovative
train technologies may obtain discounts.
' Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung (2001b), p. 17
350 DB Netz AG (2001), pp. 4-9
There are six long-distance paths Fl-F6, two feeder paths Zi & Z2 and one category for S-Bahn traffic
SI with the following speed restrictions: Fl > 200 km/h, F2 161-200 km/h, F3 101-160 km/h for mixed
traffic use, F4 101-160 km/h for fast interregional traffic, P5 101-120 km/h for slow interregional traffic, F6
101-160 km/h, though generally used by regional traffic, ZI < 100 km/h, Z2 < 50 km/h and SI
exclusively for S-Bahn trains.
175Though the revised pricing regime abolished the incentives for additional train
services inherent under the former system, it eliminated the discrtcninations arising from
quantity discounts that were in favour of the DBAG's subsidiaries. Still, there are more
subtle ways of discriminating against competitors other than price discrimination. 352 The
DBAG could simply refuse to do business with its competitors or to co-operate in the
provision of train connections and timetabling. The DBAG might block supply channels
and long-term DB loyalists might use their lobbying connections in the EBA, which is run
by former Bundesbahn employees.353 Also, DB Netz and the other DBAG subsidiaries
have a variety of informal links between each other. There are various ways of
discrimination against unwelcome competitors in a vertically integrated DBAG. If the
government indeed intends to curb the discriminatory potential inherent in the DBAG
holding, an institutional separation of the Deutsche Bahn AG offers the only credible
alternative.3M
And eventually, in March 2001 the German minister for transport announced that
the DB Netz AG would be separated from the holding, but immediately compromised his
announcement due to strong opposition from the chairman of the DBAG.355 The ministry
commissioned a task force to investigate options for the DB Netz AG to guarantee the
independence of the track network.356 The task force suggested stronger independence of
the Netz AG, though intertwined connections of the board members of each subsidiary
are still allowed. In addition to greater autonomy in the holding, the task force
recommended to establish a track agency at the EBA to supervise the non-discriminatory
open access to the network.357
352 Basedow (1996), p. 27
Aberle and Brenner (1996), p. 9
"4 Vertical and horizontal separations are discussed in section IV below.
FrankfiirterAllgemeine Zeitung (2001a), p. 17 and Schwenn (2001a), p. 1
"' BMVBW (2001), www.bmvbw.de
Wirtschaftswoche (2001), www.wiwo.de and Frankfurter Allgemcine zeltung 2001g), p. 13
1763.4 Regionalisation of social service responsibilities
One of the most fundamental prerequisites of the structural reform of the railway
system was to free the newly created Deutsche Balm AG from the Bundesbahn's pressing
burden to meet the contradictory goals of social service provision and commercial
viability. Though accepting the basic propositions of a supposedly social market economy,
post-war politicians had burdened the Bundesbahn with social service obligations instead
of solving the issues with a proper social policy. Eventually, the structural reform of the
Deutsche Bundesbahn dealt with the problems that originated from a concept of dual
objectives. The Bahnreform relieved the railway system of its social service obligations
that kept unprofitable traffic going for political reasons, despite the devastating effect of
cross-sub sidises on the intermodal competitiveness of the railway system as a whole.
The regionalisation commenced in January 1996 and was essentially a
decentralisation concept for social service responsibilities from the federal down to the
German Lander level. The Deutsche Bundesbahn and Reichsbahn, respectively the DBAG
received direct federal compensation payments for social service provisions until 1995.
Though the Regierungskommission Bundesbahn recommended implementation of the
regionalisation concept right from the beginning in 1994, the Lander authorities claimed
they were inexperienced and unable to take over planning, management and financial
responsibilities from the national government to tender regional train services to the
DBAG or other public transport operators.358 Since the regionalisation has been
implemented in 1996, the federal government compensates the Under for their additional
financial burden in contracting regional train services.359 The financial transfers from the
national budget to the regional Lander governments amounted to DM 8.7 billion in 1996
and DM 12 billion annually from 1997 with variations depending on value added tax
revenues.360 No changes to the adjustments were envisaged prior to 2002 and would have
been subject to the approval of the Lander representatives in the Bundesrat. The total
annual amount is allocated to the states of the federal republic in relation to an allocation
kg according to article 4, §8 ENeuOG.
Aberle and Brenner (1996, pp. 17-22 present a detailed account of the regionalisation and its
consequences; see also Girnau (1995 , p. 19
'Whde the direct transfers from the Bund to the DBAG have been replaced, the compensation funds are
allocated via the Landerfinanzzisgeich arrangement between the Bund and the Lander since 1996. Regarding
the Linderfinanzausgleich see footnote in chapter 1.2 above.
'° Artide 4, 5 ENeuOG committed the funds provided from federal fuel taxes.
177Thus, the Deutsche Bahn AG was no longer responsible for social service
obligations. 1-lowever, the regional states may commission the DBAG to provide local
passenger train services. In that case, the Deutsche Balm is acting on behalf of the Lander
governments and cannot blame possible deficits on unprofitable local or regional
connections, a blame-culture-tactic that was very fashionable with the old Bundesbahn.
The regionalisation did not oblige the Lander to use the funds to commission public rail or
other specified public services, though article 4, §7 ENeuOG suggested that the public
funds should preferably support regional rail services. Still, the Lander may order local and
regional passenger services from either the Deutsche Bahn AG's DB Regio subsidiary, from
any other train operator or public bus provider. Notwithstanding potential competitors,
the DB Regio is still the dominant regional operator of train services and was the
monopolistic supplier until the regionalisation in 1996. Aberle and Brenner argued that the
Deutsche Balm AG's market dominance, especially prior to 1996, might have induced the
company to declare higher than actual costs in order to skim off the cream of short-
distance train traffic, as the costs were reimbursed by the regional states from the federal
transfers. The Lander did not have any benchmarks in costs of the services until the
regionalisation ended the monopolistic role of the Deutsche Bahn AG. Apparently, a
declaration of inflated costs equals an obscured subsidy from the taxpayers to the then
monopolistic supplier of regional passenger rail services. Nonetheless, there is no further
evidence of a potential dedaration of higher costs, owing to the lack of transparency in
short-distance operations and an unclear dividing line between short and long distance
traffic. However, Aberle and Brenner suggest that the former champion in loss making,
the short-distance traffic division of the Deutsche Bundesbahn, had received a sudden
promotion to an outstanding subsidiary of the Deutsche Bahn AG.'
Since the liberalisation of regional passenger traffic took effect with the
regionalisation, other modes of transportation may be offered the opportunity to provide
subsidised public service traffic subject to the Lander governments' consideration.
However, the legislation, which instituted the regionalisation highlighted that the funds
provided by the federal government to the regional states should focus on railway traffic.
As the DB Regio is still the major player in the market for regional railway traffic,
potential competitors could be deterred from entry. This potential danger is further
aggravated due to DB Regio's backing from the powerful Deutsche Balm AG holding. The
deterrent effect can lead to a further strengthening of DB Regio's market power, whilst
3" Aberle and Brenner (1996), p. 21
178artificially cementing inefficient and unprofitable railway services. Lander authorities
might then ignore more rewarding options from a social and economic point of view.362
The Lander could either directly commission a train company to operate regional
train services or invite competitive tenders for subsidised public services. 3 Since the
regionalisation took effect in 1996, all German states with the exception of the city states
of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg made use of the competitive element offered by the
regionalisation and initiated a bidding process. The invitations for bids are usually
published in either an official journal of the EU, the German federal government or in
major German newspapers. The Lander have a further possibility to pre-select a few train
companies and ask them to provide their bids, thus excluding outside bidders. 3" In order
to cope with the regionalisation, the 16 German Lander founded 32 regional authorities
that are responsible for the planning and operation of the subsidised regional services. Of
those, only 20 chose the competitive approach until the end of the year 2000, equalling
45.9 million or 7.9% of the total train kilometres in the regional rail passenger market,
whilst most of the remaining services are operated by the DBAG.365
The service contracts of the competitive process average 8.7 years, though the
range is very wide, from one to fifteen year contracts. Schnell claims that the lack of
competition in regional rail transport was caused by several reasons. First, the regional
authorities lack experience and have high co-ordinating efforts, which delayed the
introduction of competitive tendering. Second, resources were not readily available for
small competitors of the dominant DB Regio, as supply channels were blocked by large
orders of the DBAG, such as train staff and rolling stock.366 Third, short-term selection
processes for a regional service naturally favour the DB Regio, as newcomers are often
unable to commit the required resources within that period as they generally do not own a
large stock of rolling stock which they can flexibly adjust to demand. Fourth, the DB
Netz, DBAG's subsidiary infrastructure operator was behind schedule in upgrading tracks
for new service, resulting in further delays. Furthermore, a horizontal and vertical
362 Abere and Brenner (1996), pp.21-22
363 Artide 5, 15(2) ENeuOG stated that the Under may place tenders without further specification.
364 Schnell (2001), p.3
Schnell (2001) studied the extent of competition emerging in the German passenger market for regional
uansport since the regionalisanon took effect in 1996. His comprehensive study is drawn upon in the
following.
" Blocking of supply channel is usually seen as a stnitegic market barner consciously erected by incumbents
- in contrast to the shwctural market barrier. Gabel (1994) traces the emergence of AT&Ts monopoly in
telecommunication m 1894-1910 to AT&T's ability to lock off competitors' access to capital markets and
other strategic means to discourage entry.
179integration in one company offers the possibility of hidden cross-subsidies to deter
competitors and win the bid. Fifth, the Lander apply a counterproductive policy of direct
subsidies for rolling stock, which again favoured the DBAG considerably in the past. This
might impair the Under's willingness to introduce competitive tendering for regional
services, as their invested rolling stock capital might then move to different parts of the
country with the train operator.
Though the competition in regional transport is still stow, Schnell quotes cost
reductions amounting up to 2000 in European wide bids, up to 1500 for bids published on
a national scale and up to 10% for pre-selected tenders. In effect, 107 mostly small public
or private companies were offering passenger train services on the German network at the
beginning of the year 2000 and the demand on some lines increased to such an extent that
additional rolling stock had to be ordered. Due to the growing competition from smaller
operators, the DB entered into industry associations with some smaller competitors to win
bids co-operatively. However, the Kartellamt asserted that joint operations were
incompatible with German competition law, if either of the associated firms could run the
business alone. As this clearly applied to DB Regio, the competition watchdog assumed
that the DB Regio intended to stifle potential competition and prevented the DB Regio's
participation in the bidding associations.7
Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung (2001d) and Schwenn (2001b), p. 13
180Stuttgart and Leipzig railway terminal buildings. The infrastructure investment in the
tracks peaked in 1995 and experienced a 63° o increase in 1999 due to prestige
infrastructure projects in building new railway lines for InterCityExpress trains that
consist of various tunnels and required expensive drilling through mountain areas to allow
for straight high-speed operations.
Chart 32 proves that the organisational reform to a state-owned joint stock
company resulted in considerable cost burdens to German taxpayers, excluding any
additional allowance individual Lander provide in state aid to the railways. The figures
comprise total federal government expenditure to the Deutsche Bundesbahn and
Reichsbahn until 1993 and their successors DBAG and BEV from 1994-2000. This
includes the federal government's direct compensation payments to the DB and DR for
the provision of local and regional traffic until 1994 and to the DBAG for the years 1994-
1995. In addition, the data covers the costs of interest-free loans to the DBAG, non-
commercially viable infrastructure investments and the annual deficit of the BEV. As the
DB's and DR's debt was transferred from the BEV to the federal debt administration, the
BEV deficit excludes corresponding interest payments from 1999. Also, the federal funds
committed to regional railway operations since the regionalisation in 1996 are excluded
from the data. These amounted to DM 12 billion in 1997 and roughly DM 16 billion in
2001, substantially increasing the total subsidy bill to the taxpayers. The exclusion of the
regionalisation fund and the interest on the Bundesbahn debt from 1996, respectively
1999 accounts for the deceiving fall in expenditure levels in chart 32. Apparently, the
reform was an expensive but inevitable undertaking for the German government, but
stopped half-way through. The reform required the government's commitment to relieve
the Deutsche Bahn of the burdens of the past, such as the massive railway debt, an
inflated workforce to relieve the German job market and the Bundesbeamte who
amounted to 65,001 in 1999 and still 55,850 in 2000. The BEV and thus the taxpayers
covered the wage differentials and the costs of Bundesbeamte who were not anymore
required by the DBAG.9
DBAG (2000a), p. 13
1834. Conclusion
The organisational reform of the Deutsche Bundesbahn to the state-owned
Deutsche Bahn AG did not lead to the expected turning point in the transport market, so
far. The railways lost market in passenger and freight rail traffic since privatisation, though
it might have been worse without the changes. Notwithstanding the efforts of the past
years, several elements of a fully-fledged reform were either ignored or repeatedly
postponed. The full privatisation and the separation of the Deutsche Bahn holding were at
the very heart of the Regierungskommission's proposal for a structural reform.
Nevertheless, the DBAG's chairman is opposed to the transport minister's advocacy of a
separation of his holding company and succeeded, whereas the government does not
appear to be excited about a sale of its share capital of the Deutsche Balm AG. Though
the formal privatisation of the Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn resulted in
a merged company with re-organised structures, the federal German government is still the
sole shareholder of the joint stock company Deutsche Balm AG and carries the entailed
entrepreneurial risks. Despite the transfer of the Deutsche Bundesbahn's debt to the
federal government's account, the German government remains responsible for potential
deficits of the DBAG, as long as it owns the company and transfers considerable subsidies
to the railway system. What is more, the government has not yet committed itself to a
final sale, thereby stopping midway in the process of privatising the Bundesbahn and
shifting control to private investors.
The government has not taken the decision to concede its controlling powers over
the railway system to the capital market, in effect crippling the railway systems' potential
and holding one of the most effective checks at distance. Even if the full privatisation
materialises at some future day, an emergency brake for the government is already in place,
as less than 500 o of the DB Netz AG would be sold to private individuals or
companies.37° Ewers had strong reservations about a potential sale of the shares of the DB
Netz, as long as the government remains the majority owner, as it casts doubts on the
proposition that the DB Nets will operate profitably. Rather, it paves the way for a DB
Nets as a self-service shop for political pressure groups, similar to the situation of the
Deutsche Bundesbahn in the post-war period until the 1994 reform.37' Under such
arrangements it is highly unlikely that a sale of shares from DB Nets will attract the
investors needed for an efficient and modern infrastructure.
370 Artide 2, S2 3) ENeuOG and also artick 87e of the German constitution.
185Indeed, the government has reserved a controlling stake to interfere with the
DBAG's internal business decisions. It impedes the potential the railway system could
have had acquired if organised as an independent industry, subject solely to its own
decisions. Until today the reform was at best half-hearted and has shown that the attitude
of post-war railway protectionism still prevails instead of relieving the railways of its past
burden into an industry run like every other industry. The transport ministry's plan to
establish the EBA as a new regulatory body, somehow in competition to the Kartellamt,
indicates a trend to more interference, even though the Kartellamt has proved its ability to
oversee the railway market on a number of recent occasions. It induced the DBAG to
revise its discriminating TPS'98 and prevented that associations of bidders for regional
competitive tenders were dominated by the DB Regio's participation in corresponding
associations.372 Also, the new regulatory body would be directly accountable to the
ministry of transport, raising questions about the EBA's independence from the political
process, comparing unfavourably to the Kartellamt's independence from the ministry of
transport.
The institutional integration of the passenger and freight subsidiaries along with
the DB Netz AG under the holding company Deutsche Bahn AG poses a threat to
exploiting the full potential of the structural reform. The current virtual separation of the
train operations and the infrastructure manager does not guarantee the absence of price or
non-price discrimination against competitors of DBAG's subsidiaries. Ewers argued
consistently that the DBAG's board was stuck in a dilemma. On the one hand, the
company must not discriminate, but competitors may in effect compete with the Bahn's
own subsidiaries and capture profitable business. On the other hand, the board of the
company has to maximise the entire holding company's profit as a vertically integrated
industry.373 Notwithstanding the latest revision of the access price system, the DBAG
holds the capability to deter competitors or to discriminate against other train operating
companies by means of price discrimination of the DB Netz in the limited terms of the
access pricing regime and by more subtle ways of discrimination. Therefore, a vertical
separation of the DBAG is the only assurance to promote greater independence and focus
the DB Netz' objectives on the track system and all train operators, instead of vested
interests of the DBAG holding.
371 Ewers (1995), p. 122-123
372 Schwenn (2001b), p. 13
" Ewers (1995), p. 122
186The regionalisation in 1996 was of paramount importance to the reform project It
separated the issues that had been muddled over in the Deutsche Bundesbahn for decades,
as the government required the public company to run both a profitable business and
work as a socially oriented caretaker. The structural reform resolved the conflicting goals
of the railway system and transferred responsibility for social service provisions to the
regional Lander. However, one flaw of the regionalisation still remains, due to the
dominance of the DB Regio AG and thus again, the DBAG. The DB Regio's market
power may deter potential entrants from competing for regional train services, though its
market dominance is increasingly underminecL Also, the instant decision of some Lander
governments to spend federal transfers for regionalisation explicitly for train services ruled
intermodal competition, possible efficiency and environmental gains out from the very
beginning. If DB Regio were forced to react to intermodal and intra-modal competition
from the outset of the reform, the competitive pressure for innovations and superior
transportation quality would have been stronger. Accordingly, the Lander governments
should be encouraged to invite tenders for public transport provisions from a choice as
wide as possible to get the best value from taxpayers' funds.
Initially, government subsidies were required to free the railways of the burdens of
the past But the transfer of the entire railway debt of DM 67 billion to the government
distorted the transport market, privileging the DBAG. Article 2, §22(2) ENeuOG
provided for a further transfer of public funds amounting to DM 33 billion between 1994
and 2002 to invest and modernise the DBAG's assets. The Deutsche Bahn receives
additional generosities of DM 26.4 billion between 2001 and 2003 for the track network
and spent roughly DM 16 billion in compensation to the Lander in 2001, up from the
1997 level of DM 12 million. In addition, the government finances new infrastructure
projects directly or subsidises commercially viable projects with interest free loans. The
provision of interest free loans for commercially viable investments is paradoxical if the
government wanted to create a self-sustaining, profitable train operator. The massive
subsidies considerably distort the investment decisions of the Deutsche Bahn, because the
DBAG carries less risk for their decisions, encouraging too much investment, e.g. in
prestige projects such as expensive terminal modernizations and route extensions for high-
speed services. The discrimination in favour of the railways prevents a level playing field in
the transport market. However, the German railway system has potential for growth,
especially with congestion on the roads increasing and also due to Germany's central role
187for East-West transit freight traffic. Germany has embraced the European Community's
conditions in an early stage and exceeded the directive 91/440/EEC's requirements. The
European legislation provided the German legislators with a justification to go ahead with
the structural reform, as the government required agreement in the parliament from the
opposition Social Democrats and also consensus in the Bun desrat.374
Knill and Lehmkuhl (1998), p. 9
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189C. Railway reform in the United Kingdom
1. The nationalised British railway system on the path to reform
Both the 1947 Act to nationalise Britain's inland transport system and the 1993 Act
for the privatisation of the railway system represent the markedly opposing ideologies of
their political masters. Prior to analysing the pnvatisation in the 1990s, it is necessary to
provide a brief overview of the events in the preceding decades, which resulted in the
government's duty to present radical reform proposals in order to rescue the deteriorating
public railway system.
The 1947 Transport Act had established the British Transport Commission and its
subsidiary Executives as the agencies to control and run a centralised and unified national
transport system. The new Labour government, which was elected in 1945 with a majority
of 146 seats in the House of Commons, claimed that only a single public agency could co-
ordinate the country's transport system efficiently. Labour's party manifesto for the general
election strongly advocated in favour of a unified system: "Co-ordination of tranport service.c by
rai4 pva4 air and canal cannot be achiaed without unification. And unfication without public ownership
means a steady stnggk with sectional interests or the enthronement ofajrnvate mon po/y, which ,muhi be a
menace to the rest of industiy."377 Accordingly, the overriding aims of the Act to nationalise
Britain's transport system may be summarised with the terms of integration and centralized tv-
ordination of transport services, which would soon again become fashionable in the 1968
Transport Act and towards the dose of the millennium under New Labour's run-up to the
1997 general election and beyond. However, the apparent consequences of the centralized
co-ordination and the Costs of a nationalised transport serviced had been overlooked by
the advocates of nationalisation in Britain and elsewhere:  'But for there to be gainers from
transpon co-ordination there must also be losers. Co-ordmation can on'y mean the rest,iction  of choice to
reduce costs; siblic seriice'imp lies the widest possible cboce'7'
Throughout the 
19th, but especially the 
20th century it is interesting to note that the
railway system in Britain was always a highly delicate matter of affairs. The various Labour
governments were consistently preoccupied to pass legislation either to nationalise or
heavily regulate both the private and later the nationalised railways. The results of their
317 Bonavia (1987), p. 3
'8 Joy (1973), p. 144
190legislative efforts are highly visible with the 1947, 1968 and 2000 Transport Acts.
Whenever Conservative governments were elected, they took countermeasures, aiming to
destroy Labour's integrationist efforts of regulation. Immediately after nationalisation, the
Conservatives passed the 1953 and 1962 Transport Acts, separating the modes of transport
and cutting the railway network's size. In 1985 followed a further Transport Act, which was
chiefly concerned with the privatisation of the public National Bus Company, already
hinting at the 1993 Railways Act to privatise railway services. At first glance, it is therefore
obvious that the railways in Britain and the transport sector as a whole were muddling
through a zigzaing route without the option to consider a clear strater, as its
determinants might change after the next general election. British Rail "i.  .has become a
political football with the number of post-war Tran.pon Acts now in double figureL The Bntisb Rail
management has had to take into account political constraints as mu as market constraints in the
nrnning of its business.'57' The British railway system provides a nearly perfect example for
everyone interested in the side effects of political interferences with private or public
companies serving a somehow mystically defined public interesL A first recommendation to
political decision-makers must therefore be to guarantee the - private or public -
companies complete independence from day-to-day political decisions, in order to avoid
the companies' exploitation for short-term political desires and power games. However, it
is admittedly doubtful whether politicians will readily agree to restrict their own leeway.
The British Transport Commission was granted a legislative public monopoly with
nationalisation of transport, in order " . . to carrj goods and passengers bj nzi4 road and inland
wateniitrj, within Great B,itain... '° in addition to ancillary services, such as hotels, hostels,
places for refreshment and services " . . as it rnaJ appear to them requisite or expedient to
pevtrde... '' Apparently, the Act afforded the BTC extensive autonomous powers to
develop various kinds of business under public ownership, which would necessarily result
in crowding out of private business activities in the same fields. In addition the
Commission was granted a limited degree of political power in §9 of the 1947 Transport
Act, as the " . . Commirsion mqy, with the consent of the Mthister promote BilLc in Par&iment and maj
oppose anj Bill in ParliamenL ,i52 Again it may be assumed that the Commission naturally
favoured its rising influence, but the entire structure of the relationship between the
government and the British Transport Commission implied the potential danger that
Irvine (1987), p. 32
°Pu	 General Acts (1947), 2
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191British Railways first went into an operating deficit in 1956 with £16.5 million and
no recovery in sight. The situation was rather aggravated within the following years as
displayed in chart 33. The figures, however, do not indude any central charges from the
British Transport Commission, such as interest on capital, administration and redemption
costs, which were in a range of £31.9 to £511 million per year in the period 1948 to 1962
as suggested by Aldcroft. Taking the central charges into account, the overall deficit would
have looked quite bleak with £156.1 million in 1962 and only a single year of a minor profit
of £3.6 million in 1952.' Still, he concludes that the real problem was the rapid
deterioration of the operating account, as the central charges were fairly stable after 1955.
Charts 34-37 offer some insight behind the operating returns. Chart 34 clearly
points to 1956 as the year in which the total working expenses of the railways exceeded
their revenue from passenger, freight and miscellaneous receipts with the gap markedly
widening over the next few years as reflected in the operating returns. Whereas passenger
receipts were slowly increasing in absolute terms between 1948 and 1962, freight receipts
experienced a turning point in 1957 and went into a decline, which explains the growing
relative importance of passenger in relation to freight receipts as portrayed in chart 35 from
the mid-i 950s. The ton-mileage of British Railways' freight business was already on the
downturn after 1956, whereas the estimated passenger miles increased from 20,308 to
22,591 million between 1955 and 1957 (chati 36). Chart 37 illustrates the post-war situation
in the freight market, where coal and mineral reached their post-war peak in 1953 and
merchandise traffic in 1951 before entering the path of dedine in the freight business. Due
to the general decline of the rail freight business in the 1950s the mineral traffic gained
relative importance as it increased proportionately to the total volume of railway freight
Aldcroft (1968), pp. 120
1931.1 Reasons for the structural change in the transport market
The situation in the British transport market resembled the German case. The
reasons for the structural change were both endogenous and exogenous to the railways.
British Railways were organised as a public monopoly in the non-existent market for railway
transport Throughout its nationalized history, government backing and debt-relief
cushioned competitive and financial pressures. The supply of railway services was limited
to the quality and quantity British Railways had to offer under the reign of the BTC at
politically regulated prices. The British Transport Commission was supposed to co-
ordinate and integrate the different modes of transportation until its abolition with the
1962 Transport Act Under the BTC competition was restricted to a marginal degree to
achieve the goals of an integrated system of public inland transportation. In the 1947
Transport Act, S obliges the Commission "i. .to exenise theirpoweic under thisAct as toptvzide,
or secure or promote the pi'vdsion ojç an f/Icient, adequate economical and propery integrated system  of
public inland fran4pon andporlfacilities within Great Britain forpassengers and goods...
The steady deterioration of the financial situation of British Railways with
increasing deficits after 1955 and the government's financial priorities for other policies
had a negative impact on British Railways' investment policy. Investment proved to be a
major problem to the railways in the aftermath of WWIL This naturally hampered
innovation that was urgently needed to respond to challenges posed by intermodal
competition. While the physical assets were still suffering from wartime under-investment,
the shortage of resources in addition to claims of other nationalized industries led to an
aravation of the problem. "Restrictions on the allocations of investment to nationalized industries, in
which the railways were accorded a low pnoriy, severe shoiages of labour and mate,ialc, e.pedally of steel
and timber, and steadily rising prices, meant that the railways coui do littk nxre than fry to catch sp with
their arars of maintenance. Given these severe conditions it was practically impossbk to embark ipon any
major new technical developments."
However, adding to the lack of capital, the BTC realised very late that
transportation innovations, such as diesel trains would result in considerable savings,
especially in suburban services. Neither did the Commission discontinue the mass
production of steam locomotives after WWII, nor did it start substituting steam by diesel
Nash and Preston (1994), pp. 19-20
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200power within their common replacements early in the post-war period. Finally, the
Commission acknowledged these shortcomings in paragraph 34 of their 1956 Proposalc for
the Railwqys, as technical developments of twenty years would have to be gathered in.
Thus, even if the financial constraint upon the Commission's investment policy would have
been relaxed, it is at least doubtful, whether the Commission would have invested in
modernisation of the system. Alternatively, additional resources might even have induced
the BTC to further resist market pressures, as they would have cushioned the BTC's
desperate situation.
Lack of investment and the handling of the BTC contributed to the structural
change. Due to lack of capital it was difficult to get the best and innovative products. Still,
the management was neither inclined to opt for diesel trains as replacements for steam
locomotives, nor did the BTC cut unprofitable lines and the consequent cross-subsidies or
charge discriminating prices to reflect the cost differentials of operation. As a result, British
Railways' competitiveness with other modes of transport declined in relative terms, partly
due to the British Transport Commission's and the British government's own fault or
reluctance.
Though the passenger miles actually travelled between 1950 and 1960 did not
change markedly in railway transport, they went up 2.6 times in private motor transport
during the same period of time (chart 40). Chart 43 shows a similar picture for the inland
transport market, divided between private and public transport. Whereas private traffic
occupied no more than a tiny fraction of the inland transport market in 1950, it
outperformed public transport handsomely by the end of the decade. Apparently, the
overall demand for transportation grew rapidly, but the railways proved unable to benefit
from the massive growth. Instead, the increased demand favoured private means, such as
cars, taxis and motorcycles. Previously, it has been argued that endogenous factors
contributed to this trend by slowing down innovation and change, but the developments
were partly out of the control of the Transport Commission.
3 Pathamentary Papers (1956)
201and in any case convenience rather than price was the determining factor in road competition during this
period The realty momentous growth in motor traijic occumd in the prisite sector whiZit the public sector
tended to decline, e.peciahj the passenger side Moreover though the milwajs' share of inland transporl
decine4 thrj were in the 1960s still carrjing a similar tlume of traffic to the pre-war period Thus it
cannot be argued that the railwqys lost much traffic to the road in absolute terms, though it is possible that
they could have done more to capture some of the new traffic created in the 1950s y motor transpon!'°"
° Aldcroft (1%), p. 173
2031.2 Early railway reforms
Following a Conservative election victory in 1951 the emphasis in transport policy
shifted from integration to competition with the 1953 Transport Act Whereas 3 of the
1947 Transport Act called upon the Commission to provide an integrated public inland
transport system, the new legislation restricted the Commission's power mainly to the
provision of rail transport in Britain and to passenger services in London. In addition, the
Act fundamentally relaxed the railway's charging system to grant the railways the possibility
to react to the increasing competition. Concerning the organisational structure, the Railway
Executive was replaced with six Area Boards to decentralise the management of the
railways." In effect, the restrictive charging principles prior to the 1953 Act meant that the
railways were unable to price its services along with operating costs. Similar to the German
train system, train operations were subject to public service obligations, resulting in the
railways' duty to maintain a number of uneconomic services without a considerable degree
of price discrimination between low- and high-density traffic. Therefore, cross-subsidies
from profitable to unprofitable lines were essential to keep the unviable operations. In the
consequence, low-density, high-cost services to remote places were priced too low, whereas
the high-density, low-cost services were priced excessively to cross-subsidise the former. As
the road haulage business was not affected by restrictive charging principles, they could
effectively reduce their prices down to marginal costs, attracting business from the more
expensive railways, thereby easily undermining the profitable railway traffic and the
complex system of cross-subsidies in the railway network. However, Aldcroft suests that
the Transport Commission was too conscious about the social service obligations to use its
charging freedom granted by the 1953 Act to price discriminate across the network, which
would have led to a more rapid closure of uneconomic lines. In the long run, closures
were the only way to eliminate cross-subsidies across the network in order to regain the
competitiveness compared to other modes of transport. But instead, the programme of
massive closures was delayed until the Beeching Report and in the meantime the financial
situation of the railway system deteriorated with the trains losing market share to private
modes of transport
It was not before 1955 that the British Transport Commission realised the necessity
for an overhaul of the railway system, when they published their Modernisation Plan,
' 1 Pubhc Generai Acts (1953): Transport Act
Aldcroft (l%8), pp.129-130
204outlining the BTC's rather general suggestions to modernise tracks and locomotives.
Implicitly, the Commission acknowledged its former neglect of investments in diesel and
electric traction. The Commission and Railways Executive were still too preoccupied with
steam traction, which accounted for up to 97 per cent of track miles operated in I 955•33
However, due to large anticipated government commitments to the Modernisation Plan,
the government demanded a further investigation in the railways' needs and published a
more detailed analysis in 1956 with the Proposalc for the Raibvays. In paragraph 34 the
report noted a possible outcome of the modemisation measures: 'The financial results of all
these measures in connection with passenger traffic will be deciswe. The investment in diesel multp/e unit
trainsfor stopping services is expected to mu/tin immediate and very great sazing Economies villa/so be
made on the suburban services, and the profitability of the long distance services will be enhanced All in all,
a total improvement of some £3O,. aJ'ear may be predicted with confidence as the eventual outcome. This
is hardb surprising when it is remembered that there are the technical developments of twentyjears to gather
in."
Notably, the report was rather vague. Paragraph 75 underlines the Commission's
uncertainty about the report's final outcome, as "i. . the changes in charging arrangements will have
to stasi at a time when road competition is keener and greater than ever befrre and when the service afforded
y the railways is below the efficiency and reliability needed A/so, it vAil take some time to  ct the
complete re-orientation of selling poliy and selling methods, which is required Though the benefits ni/i
emerge slow'y, in the end they will be substantial How substantia4 will depend in large degree on the price
polig to be pursued y the Commission in the nearfuture. '
After the BTC re-expmined its modernisation plans, it presented the British
government with its Ri-appraisal of the Plan for the Modei'wisation and Ri-equment of British
Railways in 1959 and estimated that its suggestions would produce a substantial working
surplus between £50 and £100 million by 1963.' Contemporary critics might argue that
the British Transport Commission was steadily losing contact with reality, as the
accelerating deterioration of the financial and market position of British Railways was even
more evident in 1959 than four years earlier (e.g. see cban!s 34,38, 39, 42). There was at best a
scarcity of economic arguments supporting the Commission's unrealistic assumption that
gross receipts would more than cover working expenses by 1963. By the publication of the
1959 Re-appraisal, the gap between gross receipts and working expenses had widened to an
British Transport Commission (1955)
1 Parhamenlmy Papers (1956)
Parliamentary Papers (1956), paragraph 75
396 Parliamentary Papers (1959), paragraph 111
205impressive £42 million from the first year of deficit in 1956. Despite the Commission's
insistence that everything was under control, the government was no longer prepared to
accept the Commissions propositions. 'No one would deny that in 1955 the ruibvays were badly in
need of modernization and intestment. But the p/an was realty a last-minute reswe t'rpemtion, hastily
conceited and ill-thought out, and it was accepted by the Ministry and the Gotemment Iarey on the
,grvunds that anything was better than nothing. Later, in e,idence to the Se/ed Commi#ee, the Treasury
expressed the view that it was 'mereLy a hotch-potch  of the things that the Commission was sayng it was
desirable to try to achiete by 1970, ill-qualified and not really exp/ainableY'7
Foster finds three possible explanations to "the obscurities and deficiencies" of the
Modemisation Plan and its successor documents in 1956 and 1959: '?irst, the Commission
may hate had something to bide. Second, it genuinely did not know how to set  out its cahwlations
unambgously and arn'e4. Tbir4 it nr so pukd by the lack of data on which to steppon' its
calculations that it fill into well-intentioned conflusion. The thini of these is the most plausible. '
Apparently, the Commission was over-optimistic, in stark contrast to the government,
which was not quite inclined to believe the Transport Commission's over-enthusiastic
conclusions and arbitrary estimates, as the Commission had not undertaken a detailed
analysis so far. And indeed, it is surprising that the Transport Commission was actually
founding its estimated predictions in their 1956 and 1959 proposals on nothing but
guesswork, which is rarely adequate to produce reliable data for urgent strategic decisions
upon investments and reorganisations. In addition, the Commission missed out to cut
uneconomic and cross-subsidised parts of the network in order to enhance the overall
long-term viability of the railway system and partly justify its rather enthusiastic predictions.
Aldcroft concludes that the Commission ' . . simply assumed that traffic would increase when diesel
multple units were introduced and that immediate satings would be terygreat. "
Aldcroft (1968), pp. 155-156. He quotes from the Report from the Select Committee on nationahsed
Industnes-Brrnsh Railways, }LC. 254(1960), paragtaph 164
Foster (1975), p. 103. Foster (1975), pp. 97-111 provides a detailed account of the Modernisanon Plan and
its immediate successor documents and analyses their severe shortcomings. Comparing the 1959 Re-4)mr  al
with the 1955 and 1956 Plans, Foster (1975 'p.102 noted that  it ..zentfuitherthan the othert m a,nfusrng the
profitabsky frnmstmentite modenti.cauois isth the pivfi(abz4y of the rwlwqys ar a whole."
_ Aldcroft (196ff), pp. 157-158
2061.3 The Reshaping of British Railways
Notwithstanding the optimistic predictions of the British Transport Commission,
the optimism was, however, incapable of averting disastrous figures for the railways. The
government appointed Richard Beeching as new chairman of the British Transport
Commission in June 1961, prior to his successive appointment as the first chairman of the
British Railways Board, which came into being in early 1963 after the 1962 Transport Act.
'7n almost all but de-nationaliation the intentions of 1947 vre now final'y reverceL Trtrncport co-
ordination, a dead-kiter, was ffldal/y buried, and above all the railwqys nre no longer to be a utility.
Comme,vial viability, not sence was now their prime duty. To this end they  re given almost tvmpkte
freedom to wy rates and afro passengerfares outside the London Tran.poi1 Area. At the same time they
were relieved of common-carrier liability. '
The Reshaping of B,itish Railways, populsrly known as the Beeching Plan, was published
in 1963 and constituted the first detailed analysis into the shortcomings of the British
railway system, thereby contrasting the rather unfounded and vague modernisation
proposals of the 1950s. The underlying assumption of the Report was to make the railways
pay their wij. As a result, the "...prvposalc are directed towards developing to the full those parts of the
ystem and those seriices wbkh can be made to meet traffic requirements more flicient1v and sati.factori/y
than any atiilabk alternative fonn of tran oil, and towards eliminating on'y those senias which, y their
very narn railways are ill-suited to prvside "° The Report emphasises its conservative proposals
with regard to closures of railway services and lines, as assessments of future developments
usually involve risks of destroying valuable assets.
'°° White (1982), p.205
1 Brrnsh Railways Board (1%3), p.2
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MAP 4: Deasiy of Passenger Traffic
Source: British Railways Board 1963), Aldcroft (1%8)
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MAP 5: Deosiy of Freigbt Traffic
Source: British Railways Board (1%3), Aldcroft  (1965)
The conclusions of the Reshaping Report are based on traffic surveys that were
conducted in the week ending 23d April 1961.402 The size of British Railways' network
consisted of a total 17,830 route miles and a track mileage of 34,150 for both, passenger
and freight services. The results of the survey concerning traffic densities are displayed in
maps 4 and 5 above. The fixed costs for maintaining the network induding the signalling
system, but exduding interest on capital, stations, depots and marshalling yards amounted
to £1 10 million per year, which was about a quarter of the railways' total revenue. This
share of fixed costs highlights the necessity to achieve high traffic densities in order to
recover not only the variable, but as well the fixed costs. Contrasting this essential
condition, about one third of the route miles carried only one per cent of the total
The following data are taken from British Railways Board (1963), pp. 9-11
209
Image removed due to third party copyrightpassenger and freight traffic, measured in passenger, respectively ton-miles. Whereas these
traffics produced approximate revenues of £4.5 million, the corresponding costs for the
provision of the route was in the range of £20 million. The situation is not much more
encouraging when considering an entire half of the route mileage. Whilst it carried four per
cent of the passenger miles and five per cent of freight ton-miles, the corresponding
revenue was only half of the £40 million costs for providing these tracks. Accordingly, the
railway traffic on one half of the system was by no account able to recover its costs of
providing the tracks and signalling, irrespective of movement and other costs. However,
the earnings of the other half of the system covered their own route costs more than six
times. The revenue-cost ratio of British Railways' 7,000 stations in 1961 was similarly
disastrous. Whereas one third accounted for less than one percent of passenger receipts,
one half of the stations produced no more than two percent However, less than one per
cent of the total 7,000, namely 34 stations, produced 26 per cent of total passenger receipts.
Again, the discrepancy on the freight side was similar, with one third producing less than
one and half of the freight terminals producing no more than three per cent. Therefore, it
was concluded that station and line closures would result in massive savings, even if it
would involve a loss of traffic.
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	
	
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	 	 	 	
TABLE 1: Repepue a*d Aisessed C.stsf.r British Rai1jqys, 1961
Sousce: British Railways Board (1963)
The results of the Report's analysis of revenues and costs of British Railways'
services in 1961 are displayed in table I above. The Report admits that the method to
allocate indirect costs may be disputable, but it was necessary to allocate the costs, which
210
Image removed due to third party copyrightwere not identifiably associated with particular traffics in the most appropriate manner in
order to produce results as a sound basis for general condusions.403 Accordingly, the
league-table of the most unprofitable services was headed by stopping-trains with an
overall loss of £5• million in 1961 after indirect costs were allocated to the business.
However, stopping services were not even able to cover their direct costs by their own
revenues, with a gap of £26.1 million waiting to be catered for by cross-subsidies. Though
suburban trains covered its direct costs by a marginal surplus of  £O•5 million, they were
nevertheless unable to pay their full share of system costs by £25 million. Only the fast and
semi-fast passenger services, provided by through trains on routes with a comparatively
high traffic density easily covered their direct costs by £18.5 million, but still ended up with
a substantial deficit of £21.8 million due to indirect costs of the system. On the freight side,
only coal traffic and freight by coaching trains, meaning mostly parcel and mail freight,
were still profitable after indirect costs had been allocated. While mineral freight produced
a comparatively small deficit of £.7 million, wagon load and sundries traffic generated
deficits of £53.8 and £21.3 million respectively and proved unable to cover their direct
costs by a massive degree.
The problem of the railways was found to be a legacy of the past. When the horse
and cart served as feeders to the railway network in the 1 9th century, an extensive network
of branch lines induding a multiplicity of stations and depots had been developed to
minimise journeys on the poor road network. Thus, the railways were engaged in a
complex nationwide system of collection and delivery, often in single wagon consignments.
With the extension of the national rail network, the wagon rather than the train was
established as the unit of movement. While fast through freight services were mostly
suppressed, the wagons moved extremely slowly from one to the other marshalling yard,
involving often unpredictable overall journey times and delays. 'Thus, in order to provide for a
lorge measure of rail partidpation in countrywide collection and &lizy of small conszgnments, which the
railwqys were neverparticuhvfr well suited to do, and which they ony thd because the horse-drawn cai was
worse, the railways threw away their main adwntages. They saddled themseks v4th the cost±5i mottment  of
wagons in small numbers otr a multtiliciy of branch lines, where there *re too few wagons moving to
make good trains. At the same t&ne, they saaificed the .pee4 reliability, and low cost  of through-train
operations etn on the main artei'ies."°4
403 British Railways Board 1963), p.7
4 British Railways Board (1963), p. 25. For the full details of the Rtthapn report on freight services see pp.
24-48. The following data concerning the passenger services is taken from pp. 1223 of the report.
211The fast and semi-fast passenger services generally provided inter-city services.
Predominantly, they can be located on map 4 as full lines, carrying a high proportion of the
total passenger numbers. Owing to the past competitive structure of railway services,
duplicate facilities and tracks had been constructed between some of the main cities. The
Report targeted a concentration on selected routes and stations to achieve substantial
savings for British Railways. Peak traffic for summer and public holiday seasons on those
routes further inflated the costs of the fast and semi-fast lines due to under-utilization of
rolling stock. Less than a third of the total 18,500 gangwayed coaches allocated for fast and
semi-fast services were used for the year-round service. The majority of the coaches were
either stored in order to cater for high peak services (8,900 coaches) or were used in the
regular summer service (2,000 coaches), with an additional 2,100 coaches being under
repair.
Though suburban services came close to cover their direct costs, they fell far short
to pay for indirect costs allocated to them. The main reasons for them being unprofitable
are due to the peak nature of their traffic and the low fares charged to commuters into the
focal cities. Stopping-trains predominantly served the rural community and are almost
without exception represented by the dotted lines in map 4. The Report goes into great
detail about the stopping-trains' unprofitable operations, ' . . to dispose of anj idea that stopping-
train seriices couW be preserve4 as an economic alternatite to buses or pritte traniport, 7 on5, some
ingenuity were shown lij ilwqy operators. This rea4'y is not so, and it is olnious that a high proportion of
stopjing passenger train seriices ought to be discontinued as soon as possible... So far as the senices
themseltes are coneerne4 closure proposals base been deten'nined the inability of the senias to pnubea
retenue sufficient to cvter the dired costs of operating them.  "° The suggested closures would
amount to a route mileage for passenger traffic of about 5,000, leading to expected savings
in the range of £33 million per year against a loss of £15 million in revenues. Further
savings were expected after complete closure of some of those lines, which would still carry
desirable freight traffic. Due to parallel bus services in most of the areas affected by line
closures, special hardships were expected to be very rare. The final proposals of the
Reshaping Report concerning dosures of passenger services are illustrated in map 6.
4° British Railways Board (1963), p.18
212Image removed due to third party copyrightroad and rail transport. The liner Trains were conceived to provide a fast, containerised
shuttle service between depots, located in the main centres. Road vehicles would then
distribute the cargo from the special depots to their final customers. Accordingly, British
Railways was no longer prepared to give up the potentially good traffic to road haulage
companies, but was inclined to capture its share of the freight market, signalling a
remarkable shift in attitude towards its customers. Map 4 positively illustrates that there
was huge potential for profitable freight business, estimated optimistically to be in the
range of 54 million tons, which British Railways had, however, neglected so far. Map 8
shows a very simikr basic pattern to map 7 and displays the suested routes for the
proposed Liner Trains, which were anticipated to gain a share of 16 million tons of the
total 54 million tons potentially favourable to railways. British Railways' lethargic
approach of the past towards its customers and intermodal competitors was apparently
inappropriate and outdated by Richard Beeching's proposals. However, White notes, that
"...the detailed reasoning of the report was disappointing. Technological detdopments were :gnore4
paniciilart the potentialities of electnjication, so important to the Southern. Also, no account was taken  of
wy regional differences, the whole mihvaj ystem being assumed to be bomogenouL The unique place of the
Southern was unrecognised The approach to a period of rapid economic change ntis also inflexible. The
plan failed also to recogniy the consequences of the imminent 'container revohtion' on the ports; or the
rapid growth of continental traffic.
British Railways Board (1%3), p. 59: The report argues that there was a considerable tonnage of
potentially good rail traffic, which was, however, not carried by the railways. Accordmgly, an additional 8
million tons could be carried in train load quantities, 30 million tons were considered to be favourable to rail
by virtue of their consignment sizes and a further 16 milhon tons might be gained due to the proposed Liner
Trains.
White (198Z), p. 206
215MAP 7: Flows .f Freight Traffic
Souzce: Bntish Railways Board (1963), Aldcroft (1968)
The Reshaping Report anticipated that its full implementation would lead to
eventual savings in the range of £1 15 to £147 million, thereof savings arising directly from
closures ranging from £34 to £41 million. However, the full potential of the plan would
only unfold, if the whole plan was implemented with vigour, as the proposals were strongly
interdependent In that case, however, the Report predicted that the railways' deficit might
be eliminated by 1970.410
410 Bnth Railways Board (1963), p.60
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Soutce: British Railways Board (1963), Aldcroft (1968)
Richard Beeching prepared a detailed scientific analysis concerning costs and
benefits of train services and general operations. The Report resulted in conclusions about
the railway system's future viability and necessity of certain operations, notwithstanding the
criticism that calculations and projections were based on tentative estimates and
insufficient data - in fact, past figures were quite rare and future figures not available.411
Though the Report favoured a drastic shift to a railway system with a new role and reduced
network, it was the only path to proceed if the railways were expected to improve their
financial viability in the long term. Towards its end, the Report highlighted one of its main
assumptions " . . that the niilwajs should be used to meet that jxvi of the total tranpon requüTment of
the country for which thej €fr the best awl/able means, and that they should cease to do things for which
they are ill suitei To thic en4 studies... concluded that in may rnp&4, thy are being used in way which
411 Foster (1975), p. 83 criticised the lack of knowledge of railway cosis. While the report's estimates were still
based on considerable averaging,, Foster (1975), p. 75 asserted that the railways attempted to maximise
revenue rather than profits due to lack of knowledge. Thus, they kept uneconomic lines and the railways also
"...bad a hazy idea fhow thy mght t vstc and a hazier one the	 proJtabthy stroduang :nonsfrneni'"
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Image removed due to third party copyrightemphasise their disadwntges and fail to exploit their ngeL"12 Finally, British Railways had
recognised that they must focus on its core business, if its purpose was to run a profitable
business. Prior to the Reshaping Report, the railways neither had a consistent strategy based
on their competitive advantages, nor more than a rough idea what to do. 413 An obsession to
satisfy social ideals by serving remote areas with low traffic densities and to charge
universal prices across the network despite a variance in the cost structure contradicts the
goal of a competitive or even profitable railway system. It is impossible to achieve both sets
of objectives. British Railways faced the choice between a social service or a profitable
business. If the government desired to mntain unprofitable services due to social
considerations, it was clearly the government's and not British Railways' obligation to pay
for socially desirable services.
Beeching's report was soon supplemented by a further report of the British
Railways Board in 1965, in order to examine the development of the major trunk routes
over the next twenty years.414 However, the report on the trunk routes emphasised that it
was aiming to select routes for future intensive use and not to pick lines for closures in the
first place, essentially by comparing 1964 traffic volumes with the projections for 1984.
While the report admitted uncertainties involved in those estimates, the 20-year time
horizon was considered to mark the limit of a realistic appraisaL
Route selection was found to be a prerequisite to a viable railway system. Unit
railway costs fall corresponding to increases in traffic density due to the high fixed costs
inherent in railway transport. According to the 1965 report, British Railways' costs were
inflated as a direct result of excess capacity on the network, due to duplication of lines and
modernisatiosi investments, which were further increasing the total route capacity. Thus,
only about a third of the total through route capacity was used in 1964. "Therfire, unless
future traffic ktic osr the thvugh routes are hkebs to be manj times higher than at present, the
expenditure of the ty hvge sums of monrj necessarj for maintenance, renewa and improment of all
existing tinvugh routes cannot bejustfie4 and the concentration of traffic and of delopment expenditure
upon selected routes is clear!, desirabk"5
412 British Railways Board (1963), p. 57
413 Classic discussions of core competencies and strategies to achieve and maintain competitive advantages
are provided by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), Kim and Mauborgne (1997), Porter (1997) and Prahalad
and Hamel (1990) on whom the authors' comments are based.
414 British Railways Board (1965)
415 British Railways Board (1965), p.9. The report analyses the traffic flows ui 1964 and 1984 with a variety of
27 different maps, which are displayed in the report's chapter fl
218The 1962 Transport Act marked a considerable shift in railway policy from an
integrationist to a cnpetitive approach of railway organisation and co-ordination, thereby
reversing much of the 1947 Act. The main aim of the 1962 Act was  "i. .to proridefor the re-
organi.cation of the nationalised traniport undertakings now canied on under the Transport Ac4 1947,
and for that purpose to protde for the establishment of public authorities as succescors to the British
Transport Commission, andfor the tranler to them of undertakings, parts of undertakings, property nghts,
ob4gations and liabilities...'416 The 1962 Transport Act dissolved the British Transport
Commission and transferred its functions and property to four separate public authorities,
the British Railwqys Boai4 the London Transport Board the British Transport Docks Board and the
British Waterways Board as set out in the first section of the Act Section two subdivided the
British Railways Board into six regional boards, the Eastern London Midland, North Eastern,
Scottish, Southern and JVestern Railway Boards, which were thenceforth responsible for the
operation of train services in Great Britain. The regional boards had a greater degree of
commercial freedom than the former Area Boards, which were replaced by the six
subsidiaries of the British Railways Board, though strategic decisions, such as the eventual
size of the network, remained with the Minister of Transport and the British Railways
Board.
Beeching departed from the Railways Board in 1965 following a change in
government in the previous year, hinting at a general change in railway policy. The change
of government terminated his project '. . before they bad time to work themselves thrvugh, so we
shall never know whether tby would have worked W"bat is undoubted/y true is that the subsidy bilifor the
railway would have been unmanageable had Beeching Part 1 not been implemented"7 The evidence
for a shift in railway policy was soon provided in the 1966 White Paper on Transport. The
White Paper criticised the lack of interinodal transport co-ordination in the 1962 Transport
Act and rejected its priority for commercial viability of the railways, emphasising their
wider role for society. Contrasting previous railway policy, the paper announced a
considerab4' larger ystem than seemed likeLY with the preuous polity of widepread closure.'41'
Whereas the government required the Railways Board to conduct its operations with
efficieny and enterprise according to paragraph 28 of the paper, the government also accepted
responsibility to subsidise uneconomic services for the first time, as long as the services
were to be retained for reasons of social policy "The Government will assume responsibilityfor the
losses on servwes retained for social reasons, or on wider cost/benefit  gnimdc, though the loss on such
416 Pubhc General Acts (1962)
417 Welsby (1998), p. 234
418 Parliamentary Papers (1966), paragraph 20
219services which meet mainl, local needs may ultimate?, be assumed by the local ivmmuniy. The Railways
Board will then be given realistic financial objectives to twist them to move as soon as possible to aful/y
economic basis of operation.'4t9 Though the government made a step into the right direction by
accepting its and the communities' responsibility for social policy instead of transferring
the burden to finance social services to the railways, the new government missed the point
highlighted in the original Reshaping Report. Some services were simply not economically
viable - even if the railway operators had shown some ingenuity.
The White Paper's recommendations founded the basis of the 1968 Transport Act.
The Act established six public transport industries - British Railways, B,itich W/atetwqys, British
Tran.po Doc€r, National Frezgbt Co,poration, National Bus Company  and Scottish Bus Group. Its
underlying principle was a return to the pre-1953 integrationist' policies of the 1947 Act,
though the government did not repeat the mistake to group all modes of public transport
under a single organisation, such as the former British Transport Commission. Clearly, the
then Labour government had learned one lesson. Nevertheless, the government was
tempted to venture another - though smaller than in 1947 - grouping experiment in freight
transportation. The first section of the 1968 Act established the National Freight
Corporation to provide ". . .pmper?, integrated seriices for the caniage ofgoods within Great Britain
by road and raii and.. . to secure that, in the proticion of those senices, goods are camed by rail whenever
such carriage is ffhcient and economic...'4 Obviously, the government's intent was the
discrimination in favour of rail freight, but it is more than doubtful whether they knew
what they were doing. The condition of efficient and economic carriage lacks a closer
definition by the legislation, which comfortably offered room for manoeuvre from the
government's point of view. However, taking the Act's conditions literally, the government
could easily agree with Beeching's proposals, if it was in favour of rail freight on?, if both
conditions hold, which is dearly implied by the conjunction aniL Now, supposing the
government had a maximisation of society's welfare in mind, when it rightly called upon
the railways to provide flit*nt freight operations, it demanded at the same time profitable rail
freight services. So far, there is nothing wrong with that. If this was the government's
understanding of efficient and economic rail carriage, the government's discrimination in
favour of rail freight in the 1968 Transport Act is at best redundant The wording of the
Act set a condition, which is the basic concept of private enterprise. As long as rail freight
is both a profitable and an efficient means of transportation, anything dose to the term
4t9 Parhamentary Papers (1966), paragraph 141
Pubhc General Acts (1968)
220market failure is certainly non-existent. In that case, nationalised rail freight operations lacks
justification and may well be left to private entrepreneurs, who are likely to invest in
profitable and efficient services.
Other important implications of the 1968 Act were a specification to relieve the
railways of most of its capital debt and the government's assurance to issue grants to the
British Railways Board for the provision of unremunerative services, as long as the Minister
of Transport considered the service to be desirable for social or economic reasons. In
order to grant the railways some financial freedom and ease the pressing interest payments,
the Act envisaged a reduction of the interest-bearing capital debt of the British Railways
Board to L300 million to take effect by January 1969. Section 20 made provision for grants
to Passenger Transjotl Executives (PiEs) to secure passenger rail services in their respective
metropolitan areas.4
As a result of the 1968 Transport Act and the preceding change in railway policy
towards more centrally co-ordinated integration rather than competition, many of the
original proposals of the Reshaping Report were weakened, reversed or abolished. Still,
considerable progress had been achieved in the first years after Beeching's Reshaping
Report. Within four years of the report, total route mileage had been cut from more than
17,000 to 13,000 miles by the end of 1966 with 2,000 passenger stations shut and
impressive developments in freight, where the total number of freight depots and stations
came down from 5,200 in 1962 to only 1,500 in 1966. Staff levels were also on the decline
from a total labour force of 475,222 to 338,951 in the same period, thus raising hopes for
productivity improvements. Diesel and electric traction increased markedly, affecting the
journey times on many main lines, while passenger accommodation and quality of service
improved at the same time. In freight the focus had shifted on concentration upon major
terminals, replacing the costly multiplicity of terminals. In addition, every effort was made
to encourage through-train movements or large consignments and the carriage of
containerised merchandises with Liner Trains, as suggested in the Report. The first
Freightliner service between Glasgow and London was introduced in 1965 with new routes
following. Finally, the government recognised its duty to subsidise the Railways Board,
when asking British Rail to serve social policy considerations. Contrasting these positive
developments, Aldcroft concluded that the Board was financially much less successfuL
'' Pubhc General Acts (1968), section 39 Is concerned with grants for unrernuneralive services and section
42 with debt relief.
422 Pubhc General Acts (1968), section 20
221Despite annual savings of £115 million in the penod 1962 to 1966 due to the progress
made, rising costs of operations owing to price and wage increases in the range of £95
million consumed a large share of the savings.4
423 Aldcmft (1968), pp. 200-209
2222. New Opportunities for the Railways - the Conservatives' policy
2.1 Reforming British Railways
Notwithstanding the previous approaches to reform, the financial difficulties
continued. Adding to the 1968 Act, the 1974 Railways Act further reduced the capital debt
of the British Railways Board to £250 million and increased the British Railways Board's
borrowing powers.424 Also, the act implemented a clear distinction between freight and
passenger traffic, with priority for passenger traffic. As the legislation obliged the British
Railways Board to sustain the 1974 level of passenger services, subsidies in form of  Public
Seriice Ob4gations (PSOs) were granted to the British Railways Board.4is The Board also
operated local services for the PTEs and obtained further subsidies through their contracts
with the PTEs.42' Though the Railways Act stabilised the situation in the railway industry,
British Rail was hit by the recession after 1978. The financial constraints on BR's budget
led to cuts in infrastructure maintenance. When the government realised that British Rail
was unable to guarantee the 1974 standards without further subsidies, it opted for an
organisational reform of British Railways. The traditional structure of functional and
regional managers was replaced with a management of clearly defined business sectors. The
prominent objectives were a reduction in state subsidy and a more commercial operation of
Bit427
The sector management was launched in 1982, when five business sectors were
established, compnsing InterCify services, Network SouthEast, Provrnciaj Fmght and Parcth.4
Assets and staff were ascribed to the sectors, while they were defined to be homogeneous
in types of traffic and in their material equipment to increase the transparency and lines of
responsibility in British RaiL This was one of the two main advantages of sector
management. In addition to the more transparent managerial control with identifiable and
responsible sector managers, they also had a tight control over the assets specific to their
sector. Eventually, the business sectors acquired full control over their train operations.
However, the organisational structure played host to potential conflicts of interest and
thus, required various complicated internal contracts. Nash and Preston exemplify this case
'Pubhc General Acts (1974)
Finally, the PSOs were estabhshed as an instrument to exphcitly distinguish between viable railway
operations and those deemed worthy of social subsidy.
4 Irvine (1987), p. 6 and Schmitz (1997), p.38
'Nash and Preston (1994), p.22 and Schmitz (1997), p.40
Note that Ne!,,,rk SouthE att was formedy Londoa &SouthEacL
429 Nash and Preston (1994), p.21
223with the East Coast Main Line. Though the prime user might well be InterCity services,
Provincial, Freight and Network SouthEast traffic depend upon access to the line.430
The reform established accountability for costs and revenues of BR's new sectors.
This resulted in an unambiguous distinction between commercial sectors, such as InterCity,
Freight and Parcels, and subsidised sectors, embracing Provincial and the Network
SouthEast services. The government introduced financial targets for the commercial
sectors to earn a commercial rate of return on their assets, set at 8°  o in real terms.43'
Though the government acknowledged that Provincial Railways would depend upon
ongoing state and PTE support, the inter-urban and commuter train services on the
Network SouthEast were envisaged to operate without subsidies after 1992/93. The
government announced that Network SouthEast's subsidies would cease, because it was
inequitable to support the prosperous metropolitan area of London with funds provided by
the general taxpayers.432 Public subsidy to InterCity services was eliminated by 1988 and
total subsidy paid to British Rail had been cut by a quarter between 1983 and I  987. Real
fare increases and a rise in labour productivity led to an enhanced performance of British
Rail in the 1980s. However, BR was strongly affected by the recession in the early 1990s
(cha,'rs 48-52, chapter 4. 1),' again requiring rising subsidies and destroying the prospect of
Network SouthEast breaking even.435 In 1991 a further management reorganisation was on
the agenda with full responsibility of the business sectors for all aspects of their services in
the Organisingfor Qua/iy approach.4
This was to result in seven divisions, basically comprising the former with some
changes and the establishment of internal profit centres either along specific routes and
regions or according to the type of traffic carried. InterCify operated the national high-speed
passenger network, Regional Raihvqys was running urban and rural services outside the South
East as the successor body of Provincial Railways. The Network SouthEast managed
commuter and other services throughout the London and South East region, whereas
430 as and Preston (1994), pp. 21-22
43' Nash and Preston (1994), pp.22
432 Allemeyer (1993), p. 16
National Audit Office (1996), p. 14
l The economic situation is mirrored for passenger traffic in charts 48-50 and regarding freight traffic in
charts 51 and 52. The charts are displayed and discussed below in chapter 4.1.
Nash and Preston (1994), p.22
National Audit Office (1996), p. 14, White (1998), p. 110 and Charlton (2000), pp. 31-32. Charlton (2000),
p. 32 emphasises that the Organising for Quality approach was an important forerunner to pnvatisation, as
BR's manageis acquired knowledge of the cost structures and requirements of their oistomers due to a higher
degree of autonomy and more transparent operations
224Eurvpean Passenger Senes LM was set up to plan and operate the new Channel Tunnel
passenger services. On the freight side, Trainload Fight carried bulk freight in whole
trainloads, mostly serving coal, metal, petroleum and construction industries. Raireght
Distyibution had been established as a separate freight operator in charge of the
containerised Freightliner operations, linking the then 25 freight terminals to Britain's deep
sea ports. As a counterpart to European Passenger Services, Railfreight Distribution was
also supposed to run international freight services through the Channel Tunnel, while the
Post Office made use of the passenger trains for transportation of parcel freight.437
Throughout the 1980s, the British government aimed at cutting the subsidies to
British Rail and to allocate the full infrastructure costs to the corresponding business
sectors in order to avoid cross-subsidies and strengthen sector management responsibility.
The infrastructure costs were allocated according to three pricing principles. The Prime-user-
costing had been employed between 1983 and 1985. In this framework, it was most
important to find the prime user of the system, as the prime user would obtain
management responsibility and priority on the line. The next step was to inquire which
facilities would be redundant if freight trains were no more running their trains on the line.
Those costs were then allocated to the freight sector, while the same method was then
applied to regional and other train services. The remaining costs had to be covered by the
prime user of the line, e.g. in the above East Coast Main Line example by InterCity. The
prime-user-costing was seen as unfair to the prime user, as he would also have to recover
the entire costs for excess capacity and eventually cross-subsidised other business sectors.
In the British case, costs for various parts of the network that were more or less redundant
were allocated to the prime user, generally InterCity sewices.4
Sole-user-costing replaced the former in 1985 and begins with the prime user's track
costs, down to the least important user of the line. Contrasting the prime-user-costing, the
sole-user system does not focus on the currently existing infrastructure, but is based on
railway infrastructure as it should have been if modern technology was employed. The
prime user is substantially relieved under the sole-user system, compared to the prime-user-
costing principle. The cost differential between both systems reflects the excess capacity of
the infrastructure.43' The third pricing principle, the Location-costing allocates maintenance
costs and investments to the business sectors responsible within the sole-user-costing. This
Welsby (1991), P. 218
Aberle and Brookshire (1990), p. 111-42 and Irvine (1987), p. 21
43 'Abexle and Brookshire (1990), pp. 111-42-45
225principle is unambiguous as long as a single business sector uses the corresponding
infrastructure exclusively, whereas an arbitrary allocation key must be used if the line is
used by more than one sector.
The reform programme that was introduced in the aftermath of the Beeching plans
was quite remarkable. Some British Rail subsidiaries without natural monopoly features
were privatised during the 1980s, such as ferry services operated by Sea/ink UK and
Howrciufi, the catering subsidiary TradAers Fanç the Bntish Tranpot Hotth and Bntish Rail
Engineering Led, which produced locomotives and rolling stock, but was also involved in
maintenance business.'° The non-transparent national railway monopoly had been
transformed into a more efficient public undertaking with clear lines of responsibility and
control, approaching private business models. Still, Schmitz argues rightly that public limits
on borrowing powers reduced the entrepreneurial freedom of the business sectors, as the
limits equalled a check on BR's investment policy."' But government as the taxpayers'
elected principal naturally must have a control over its agent, though it might be
disappointing from BR's point of view. As the final entrepreneurial risk of BR rests with
the government, unrestrained borrowing powers would set wrong incentives for BR's
managers, who might find an expansionary business policy appealing, especially as they
would not have to consider its economic viability. Though Schmitz' view is theoretically
right, a relaxation of borrowing power without individual responsibility could lead to
disastrous consequences and virtual over-spending. However, a politically dependent
system is bound to be short-term oriented, neglecting strategic long-term investments, as
BR's funds are commonly in competition with other government priorities.
While British Rail's total passenger revenues went up by 22% in real terms between
1983 and 1990/91, demand for passenger services rose by 100 o and the level of investment
into the railways had doubled when investment levels peaked in 1992-93 over 1983 (chant
53, chapter 4.1). Subsidies reached an unprecedented low point in 1988-89 with £446
million, though they started rising steadily to £2,171 million in 1992-93, largely due to the
recession (chan 45, chapter 3.1). InterCity services reached profitability from 1989 and did
not any longer depend on public subsidies. The trend of British Rail was contrary to most
"° The 1981 Transport Act created the preconditions for disposal of subsidiaries of the British Railways
Board m Pubhc General Acts (1981 . See also National Audit Office (1996),  p. 14 and Irvine (1987), p. 13
with regard to the subsidiaries that were sold.
441 Schmitz (1997), p. 48
226European countries, where the deficits reached new records nearly every year.'2 In 1991,
the deficit of British Rail amounted to 0.12° 0 of the British GDP, compared to an average
of 0.70 o in the remaining members states of the then European Community. 3 Though
British Rail exceeded most European railway undertakings in economic terms, Nash and
Preston argue that the re-emergence of increasing deficits, the slow-down in labour
productivity improvements and concerns with regard to future investments may have led
the government to look for new solutions during the recession in the early I 990s.'" In July
1992, the government proposed the most drastic measures so far. The Conservatives'
White Paper on New Opportunitiesfor the Railways in July 1992 argued for privatisation and a
new structure of the rail industry, forming the basis of the 1993 Railways Act.
Allemeyer (1993), pp.15-16 and Schrnrz (1997), p.48
Allemeyer (1993), p. 11
111 Nash and Preston (1994), p.23
2272.2 Digression: Deregulation in the UK bus industry
Prior to 1985, UK bus operations were undertaken by the National Bus Company
and Scottish Bus Group, via PTE subsidiaries and their contracted operators. Still, many
small and a few larger private bus operators, such as Barton Transport, had upheld their
independence outside of PTE areas in addition to municipal bus companies, whilst the
coaching business remained primarily in the private sector. The then situation in the bus
industry may be characterised by " . .grvsc ineffideny, resource waste, and minimal attention to the
customer (The idea of seeking to attract new customers was nvy mentioned). Rewnue si4pon which
stood at £10 million in 1972, rose to £520 million tenyars kiter, while passenger kilometresfellfivm 60
billion to 48 billion otr the same period At the same time, costs rose y 15 to 30 per cent otr the rat€ of
inflation, and fares were immised 4y more than 30 per cent. So much for the supposed adantages of an
integrated and co-onlinated industrj, almost all of it in public ownerthtil"45 Hibbs and Bradley
further argue that this drastic state of affairs was the direct result of the antiquated licensing
system dating back to the 1 93Os.' Under the road service licences, the exact route,
timetable and tariffs had to be specified. Subsequently, the major reform of the industry
was undertaken in the 1985 Transport Act, which made provision for a transfer of
operations of the National Bus Company to the private sector and abolished all remaining
road service licenses. 4'7 The Act also recognised the necessity of social services, such as
concessionary fares for some groups of passengers and granted subsidies for discounted
tariffs and bus routes on unviable routes. The National Bus Company was wound up and
divided into 72 undertakings, a third of which was sold to private companies, whereas the
remaining two thirds were management-buy-outs with employee participation with a total
sale price of £325 million. While the sales of the National Bus Company and the Scottish
Bus Group were completed in 1988 and 1991, the majority of the PTE subsidiaries
followed on the course to privatisation. Only London seemed to be exempt from the
developments. Though the London buses were sold between 1993 and 1995, they are
operated through franchises and the ' . .London neavrk. . . offers an example of a
planne4 regulated ystem run entirety bjpriwtety-owned operators on a contract basâ
Hibbs and Bradley (1997), p.S
'' I-hbbs and Bradley (1997), pp. 2-3
Pubhc General Acts (1985, 1, 47. The 1980 Transport Act had already removed quantity and price
controls from the industry, see White (1997), p.2
' Schmitz (1997), p. 35
449 White (1997), pp. 2-3
228The conversion of the bus, coach and rail industries into something closer to true
transport markets exhibits some interdependency and was backed by a similar overall
economic philosophy.450 When the bus and coach deregulation took place, British Rail was
already undergoing major reforms, but it was another seven years to the White Paper New
Opporntnities for the Raihvajs. Though bus deregulation may provide some lessons, they must
not be overstated, as the final outcome of the reforms differed to some extent, most
noticeably in on-street-competition versus franchised train operations, access rights to the
infrastructure and the scope of regulation.
The bus and coach industry clearly dominates the railway industry, as various bus
operators acquired railway franchises (table 2, chapter 3.1). Here, National E.press Group is
undoubtedly outstanding, controlling a total of 9 out of 25 passenger rail franchises in
2001. The operator obtained four franchises from Prism Rail in July 2000, a consortium
made up of bus industry executives. In the financial year 2000-01 National Express Group
received more than 38% of the total rail franchise payments (tables 3 and 4, thapter 3.1).
Though the linkage might give rise to fears that the operators could exploit their dominant
market position, the argument is somehow startling.451 Over the previous decades, it was
generally a great concern of politicians to integrate the transport market. Their approach to
integration was limited to legislative efforts and created public monopolies, the reform of
the bus and rail industries in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in integration by private
endeavour. Though some operators like National Express acquired a considerable share of
the bus and railway markets with the consent of the industry regulator, National Express
does not possess a monopoly in the wider transport market and meets harsh competition
by private car travel and also rail or air traffic. However, a dominant company might have a
considerable competitive advantage over other operators, not least beause it can offer a
superior product, such as connecting integrated services.452 Whereas the bus companies
operate in a contestable bus market, the British Transport Commission did possess an
incontestable monopoly, granted by the government.
°White (1997), p.11
451 According to Preston et a!. (2000), p. 104 the Monopolies and Mergers Commission ruled on National
Express Group's acquisition of Midland Main Line. Though it approved the case, the Commission imposed
Certain restrictions " . .to eaiw thct Mr senits n not rwn down to *jr mc to nal"
452 Greenspan (1967), p. 66 discusses the harmful effecis of antitrust policy and the restriction of
entrepreneurial freedom and draws the following conclusion of supposedly harmful monopolists. "It takes
exuotthnary skill to hold move than fglj penant if a hve indiubj's market in afree nony. It reqiares unusualprodumtc
abthçy, uuhn,g bwusessjudgmen4 umthnftnS oi at the wnlrnwnis unplvvemmt ifonApsvdaet and tethaique. The nve
companj which is able to rettan itt share if the mar*etjear ifteryear and deeade ?e dede does bj means
q7iaeng - and desenespi'?ise, not arndenmatzon."
229The operation of coaches and buses is characterised by low bathers to entry and
neither implies strong economies of scope, nor of scale and accordingly no natural
monopoly situation.453 The vertical separation of railway operations and infrastructure
management led to a more comparable cost structure of the bus and rail industries. Still,
the competitive structure of the industries shows considerable differences. The bus and
coach market may be characterised by light regulation, whereas the railway market is tightly
regulated. "Stricter controls on serilce standards, quality and pricing have been introduce4 notabty in the
regulation of certain major fare categories (Saverc, and season tickets) initialty so that average annual
increases should not exceed RPI, and from 1999, RPI-1% Co,rciderabk q1 ir1 bar been directed toward
protecting existing senice levels enjqyed y userc, prvtision of through ticketing... and publication of a
national timetable. ' According to White, the regulation in the railway market contrasted
markedly with the regulatory efforts in the coach industry after the 1985 Transport Act,
which neither promoted co-operation in timetabling, nor through ticketing. The timetable
information was rather erratic and no checks on fare increases were provided. 455 This was
also one of the major criticisms of the bus deregulation. I-[ibbs and Bradley, however, point
out that considerable regulatory and bureaucratic efforts restrict the bus industry, as local
authorities exercise their remaining powers. There were also examples that councils did not
allow bus operators to advertise their timetables at bus stops, naturally contributing to the
lack of timetabling information.4
The deregulated bus market resulted in increased competition in the transport
market, predominantly constraining InterCity and Provincial railway services. 457 Intra-
modal competition in the bus and railway markets  in the aftermath of the reforms differed
strikingly. While the train industry was supposedly pnwced by franchised train operations,
buses and coaches were involved in strong on-the-road competition.  "And, as the theory of
contestable markets would expect, the potential  of new competition bar proved itsefapowerful incentive to
maintaining and improring standards of sence. ' Hibbs and Bradley note an influx of
competitors in some areas, such as Greater Manchester and Merseyside. Though they agree
that it led to confusion due to the absence of reliable timetabling information, the
competition resulted in greater orientation towards the customer preferences and an
4 Burchell (1997), paragraph 4 and Schmitz (1997), pp. 34-35
White (1997), p. II
455 White (1997), p. 11 and Schmitz (1997), p. 37
Hibbs and Bradley (1997), p. 17
Irvine (1987), p. 7
1 Hibbs and Bradley (1997), p. 23. Emphasis in the original.
230enhanced performance.459 Marketing and service innovations were introduced, such as the
minibus after 1984, more frequent serves and new direct routes, reducing uncomfortable
changes and waiting times.46° Despite a drop in passengers travelling outside London along
the long-run annual trend of 300, White observed an overall growth in bus kilometres of
25-30% and of total distance travelled since deregulation. 46' Government support for
tendered socially necessary services dropped from £974 to £281 million between 1984-85
and 1993-94, while operating costs of local bus services outside of London went down
from 140 to 121 pence per mile.462 Adding to the overall improvements, the government
gained financially by reducing public subsidy to the bus industry, the sale price of the
companies and the annual corporation taxes that had to be levied after deregulation.463
4 9-libbs and Bradley (1997),	 11, 15-17
° Hibbs and Bradley (1997), pp. 18,21
White (1997), p.3
Hibbs and Bradley (1997), pp. 15-16. The data provided is at 1994/95 prices.
White (1997), p.9 and Hibbs and Bradley (1997), pp.27
2312.3 The 1992 White Paper
The story of the Conservative government's bold move into railway privatisation
has been told many times. During the 1980s the Conservatives' privatisation programme
gained momentum with obvious attractions to apply it to BR. 465 First, government believed
that private sector management would bring about more innovation than public sector
management, as government would always back up state-owned undertakings. 46' Weisby
highlights his advocacy of private ownership of the British railways due to conflicting aims
of railway policy versus public policy priorities, while the government had further
obligations towards the general economy. 'The result s.c continuous and inconss. tent inteiference in
the management of the wnpanJ. These cosfiicts were presentfor all the old nationalised indumies but the
temptation to intervene always seemed stronger on the railways than in other sectors. Phying trains has
always been seductite for poktiians.'"7 As a state-owned undertaking prior to 1982, BR was
largely exempt from the pressures of private entrepreneurs to operate profitably and
according to their customers' preferences. However it must be said that British Rail had
taken a dear lead role under European railways since the implementation of sector
management in 1982. Now, the Conservatives intended " . . to enable the railways to respond to
the increasing demands of customers and to provide the quali of service those customers want."4 ° Second,
the opening up of the railway industry would promote the innovative potential injected
with the new management. Third, government would be relieved of their straitjacket-
relationship with the railways that tied the Exchequer to fund the industry and its risk if BR
remained in the public sector.47°
In 1992 the Conservatives suested a highly complex, but far-reaching reform of
British Rail to encourage innowtion, minimsepsiblic spending and align BR with the preferences
of customers. 
471 The Conservative government's expectations reflect a textbook case and
strong belief in the benefits of private entrepreneurship. The 1992 White Paper  New
4 "The following selection of recent works provides differing accounts of the pnvatisatlon movement in the
UK: Br2dShaW (2000), Bradshaw and Lawton Smith (2000), Freeman and Shaw (2000), Grantham (1998),
Shaw (2000) and Wolmar 2001).
465 Rees (1994), p. 45
'' Welsby (1998), P. 235 and Welsby and Nichols 1999). p. 58
'WeIsby(1998,p.236
4 "Welsby and Nichols (1999), p. 57
Freeman (1992), p.82 excluding the original bold print)
'T0 Welsby (1998), pp.235-236
' Gerondean (1997), p. 145
232Opporninities for the Raihvajs officially listed the benefits anticipated from private sector
involvement in railway operations, as cited below:472
1. Orientation towards the customer's preferences: 'M nagement and emplojyees in the private .cector have
greater incentives topvtide the .ceriices which the customer wants. The projitabilify of their companj -
and at the end of the day theirjobs - depend onprotiding a senwe which attncts custom. Nationalised
industries do notface such acwtepresmrei"7'
2 Competition and end to monopo/y power in railway tranpo7t 'New openitors will be allowed to
protide senices, giiing customers a choice and stimulating improved se,,ices and value. '
3. Freedom of management The government was concerned about political interference with
the BR management and was aiming at a reform "i.. . with less scope and jus4fication for
Government inwltement in managerial issues.'75
4. Qualify standards: The franchising contracts with the several train operating companies
would include enforceable quality standards. Franchisees in breach of the standards,
such as punctuality, reliability and overcrowding are liable for penalties.
5. Motivation and ffIcieny: By deregulating railway operations, the government expected
that the companies would reflect local and regional identities with a better
understanding and service of the demands of the locals.
The government considered,first, a sale of British Railways as a single entity, which
was often claimed to be the preference of the British Railways Board.476 The then Prime
Minister John Major favoured the second option to split BR into private regional companies.
The third model contemplated was a privatisation along the existing business sectors, while
the founh concept was a vertical separation between the infrastructure and operation of
services. The first two schemes were rejected on grounds that British Rail's losses were too
great and the single national undertaking or the regional entities would have to rely on
continued large subsidies from the taxpayers for the foreseeable future. The government
assumed some scope to privatise British Rail along its business sectors. Though private
InterCity and freight services were feasible, the freight business was by no means
homogeneous with performance varying markedly across the freight business sectors. In
regional passenger traffic, a future of Regional Railways was unthinkable without large
amounts of public subsidy and Network SouthEast services would require rapid and
Parliamentary Papers (1992), pp.4-5
Parliamentary Papers (1992), pp.4
'74ibid.
'75ibid.
4Thçj Reid (1992), pp.9-10 stated that the British Railways Board had never expressed a desire have
BR sold as a who1e Reid rather preferred something like a creeping pnvatisatlon with progressively mcreasing
opportunities for private sector involvement.
233substantial price increases, if they were supposed to operate profitably. In addition, the
government envisaged competition as the major source to enhance the railway system's
efficiency. Therefore, the opening up of markets was seen to be more important than the
gains from simply transferring ownership from government to private entrepreneurs. Also
the first and second options were discarded, as they would offer less scope for competing
train services.' European legislation placed an additional constraint upon the
government's choice due to Directive 91 /440/EEC.
Eventually, the government opted for a vertical separation between a state-owned
national infrastructure company, Raithuck, various Train Qteratrng Companies (10Cc) and
Freight Operating Companies (FOCs). However, the passenger train companies would only
own a few of the necessary assets for their operations. Passenger services were to be
organised in 25 temporary franchises, simil2r to the then profit centres of British Rail.478
The TOGs would lease their rolling stock from Rolling Stock Leasing Companies (ROSCOs), to
which BR's rolling stock was to be transferred prior to privatisation. The vertical separation
into the railway tracks and associated infrastructure, such as electricity supply, the
management of depots, stations and the signalling system on the one hand and the
provision of railway transportation on the other hand, was found to be most appropriate to
accommodate the government's objectives to promote competition and inject the benefits
of private sector management into the railway system. The new structure for British Rail
would go far beyond the European requirements of the Directive 91/440/EEC. The
European legislation played an important role in legitimising the British government's
efforts to implement a radical reform agenda for the railways.479
Subsidies to the proposed franchisees of passenger services were to be provided
where subsidy was required to maintain socially necessary services. And the National Audit
Office noted later that the "...Government considered that the process of regular re-letting offiwichises
would create competition in the market, ensuñng that senAtes are ran bj the most ident operator,
resulting in time, in reductions in the amount of public iwbsidj required Iy the Train Operating
mpanies" If the authority responsible for the franchise arrangements should decide that
a service was no longer socially necessary, the subsidies would cease and the same closure
procedures as prior to the privatisation of BR would apply.
'7 Parhamentaiy Papers (1992), p.3 and National Audit Office (1996), pp. 15-16
' Nash and Preston (1994), p. 24. Initially, the Treasury suested to create more TOCs, as it anticipated
increased competition among the bidders in the franchising process, Shaw (2001), p. 9.
Knill and Lehmkuhl (1998), pp.4-S
°Nationa3 Audit Office (1996), p. 18
234The government foresaw a clear role for a future Office of Passeger Rail Franchising
(OPRAF) in its White Paper, as the remit of the Office was the franchising of passenger
train services on the government's behalf. "The uthotity, after consultatmns with the piitzt.
sector and BR, will agree with the Secretay of State a programme for franchising train  senices. The
Gotrmment will decide a budgetforgrantsfor these senices, and set broad objectitsfor sen'ice letth, service
quality andfares. Taking account of these broad objectives, the Authoi'iy will .pe*j' the minimum services
a franchisee will provide and the minimum quality standamc. Open competitions will be held for pñvate
sector companies to ran services. Individual services will continue  to be provided 4y BR onv f no satifactoy
private sector bid is receiveiL
OPRAF was to be in charge of the tendering process, but had no regulatory
functions towards the industry. The Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) would become the sole
economic railway regulator and had to assure fair arrangements for track access and
charging. Also, the ORR would promote competition and prevent abuses of monopoly
power. Potential for abuse of monopoly power was exclusively suspected in London
commuter services and in the operation of railway tracks and associated infrastructure. No
special regulation was envisaged for privatised freight and parcel services, as they were
operating in a highly competitive environment.
The White Paper emphasised the paramount importance of safety for the travellers
and the workforce of the privatised companies in a fail-danger industry. The government
expected the new safety framework to place the primary responsibility for safety with
Railtrack and the train operating companies, while the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
would supervise the railway companies' compliance with the strict safety requirements as
the sole safety regulator of the industry.
The 1992 White Paper proposed to set up Railtrack as a monopolistic state owned
track authority and to pnvatise the freight and parcel operations. Temporarily, BR's
passenger services would become operating companies under BR's organisation until the
entire passenger business had been transferred to private sector franchises. At this early
stage the government envisaged a right of access to the rail network for private passenger
or freight operators, so long as they would meet strict safety and environmental standards,
481 Parliamentary Papers (1997), p.7
Parliamentary Papers (1997), p.17
235to be overseen by a new regulator. The franchised passenger services would then
compete with open access train operators on a publicly owned infrastructure. Similarly
important is the government's long-term objective " . . to see the pmwte sector owning as much as
possible of the railwqy. Powerc will therefore be taken to allow the uturep'ittisation of all BR track and
operations.' 5 Also, the White Paper visualised light regulation for the railways, leaving a
high degree of managerial freedom to the actors in the new railway market. The ROSCOs
and freight operators were left almost without regulation and the market was assumed to
restrain even the TOGs, except for London commuter services. Except for the London
area fares policy were to be left to the operators and franchisees would have wide
discretion over their output levels, checked solely by minimum service levels that were
substantially below BR benchmarks. Thus, monopoly regulation could largely be restncted
to the public sector monopoly in the infrastructure. The further political process
considerably watered down the White Paper's proposals of open access, the sale of all BR
track and operations and light-handed regulation.
Substantial amendments were made during the passage of the Bill through
Parliament, as the proclaimed benefits of the reform were less than self-evident at the
time. 7 The minimum service requirements were upgraded to more restrictive Passenger
Senice Requirements (PSR) and some fares would be subject to regulation. The amendments
and also the open access provision would have an adverse effect on the franchise bids, as
open access operators could openly challenge the franchisees on their most profitable
routes. This naturally reduced the attraction to operate a franchised passenger service and
simultaneously increased the subsidy requested. As a result, open access provision was
postponed to sweeten the franchises in a package deal of tighter regulation compensated by
a temporarily protected market. The change of mind was responsible for far-reaching
implications of the reform. The incentives of the private rail companies' and their actions
would have differed markedly, if they had the perspective of full ownership of the
temporary franchises at a future date in addition to harsh competition in the railway market
by new entrants from the very outset of privatisation. Weisby notes that the ' . . effects of these
changes on the smooth operation of the priwtised railwaj were given scant consideration and  in some cases it
is doubtful f the implications were even ,inderctood —for example, thefran chisedpassenger railwqyfinished
. Parliamentary Papers (1992), pp.4,13-14
' Weisby and Nich Is (1999), p.60
*SPhry Papers (1992), p.4
'WeIsby (199g), pp.236-237
Welsby (1998), p. 237
236U) vith fewer managerial degrees offreedom than were preuous/y enjyed y BR under stale ouersht.'
Towards the end of 2001, neither the opening up of railway markets by means of open
access rights, nor the material privatisation of the franchise companies is in sight. In
contrast, the private TOCs generally enjoy temporary monopoly rights, Railtrack is on the
verge of effective re-nationalisation, whereas the regulatory authorities gained a tighter grip
on the passenger franchises over the last year.
1 WeIsby (1998), p. 237
2373. The vertical separation of the British railway system
The Railways Act of November 1993 provided for a vertical separation of track
infrastructure and train operations, as well as a horizontal separation of the train operations
itself into 25 passenger train companies. Main objectives of the legislation were the
injection of competition into the supply of a declining railway industry and the
minimisation of public spending. The Act was based upon the propositions as set forth
in the 1992 White Paper, with the various exceptions emphasised above. Sections 15 and
17 of the Railways Act provided for the theoretical obligation of facility owners to permit
the use of railway facilities by other persons, where the facility may either be a track, station
or a light maintenance depot. However, on-track-competition was constrained by the
franchise agreements and potential entrants were required to obtain a licence for their
operation from the ORR. In response to the Secretary of State, the Office of the Rail
Regulator had implemented moderation of competition arrangements until March 2002,
effectively protecting the franchised operators from competition-on-the-track. 49° The terms
of access agreed upon by the facility owner and another person require approval from the
Regulator, who may modify the proposed terms of access after consultation with both
parties. Also, an eventual sale of the franchises was not within the immediate remit of the
Act.
In the first section, the Act provided for the appointment of the Rail Regulator and
an officer to be known as the Director of Passenger Rail Franchising by the Secretary of State.
Their duties were codified in sections 4 and 5, similar to the initial suggestions  in the 1992
White Paper. According to the Act, the Franchising Director's main functions broadly
embraced the franchising of passenger services on the basis of competitive tendering and
the monitoring of the franchise operations. The tendering process for the carriage of
passengers by railway explicitly excluded the participation of public government bodies or
ministers. Franchising agreements were required to include the duration of the franchise,
while they may include provisions concerning an extension of the period or fares and any
provisions the Franchising Director may think fit. Grants made available by the
Franchising Director in consequence of the franchise agreements were to be provided by
Parliament Originally, the Rail Regulator's principal duties included the promotion of
489 The objectives coincide with the Conservatives general privatisation agenda, Richardson 1994), pp. 62-63
° ORR (2001), www.sra.gov.uk. Swift (1995), pp. 73-74 considered the Regulator's position on imposing
moderation of competition arrangements and the resultant trade-off between promoting competition and
attiactive investment opportunities. As Wolmar (2001), p. 243 put it, Swift dumped "...  the ry concept qf on-rod
competition.. .:n the bottom drawer..."
238Image removed due to third party copyrightRegions (DETR) and in 2001 by the Depatiment of Trancpotl Local Gottnent and the Regions
(DTLR). The Transport Act 2000 established the Strategic Rail Autboiçy (SRA) as successor
body to OPRAF, adjusted the role of the ORR and abolished the British Railways Board.
The industry was shaken by a number of tragic railway accidents. In the consequence of the
Hatfield crash in October 2000, Railtrack imposed over 1000 Emergency Speed
Restrictions and the system went into a prolonged crisis, culminating in Railtrack being
placed in public administration in October 2001. Now, the structure of the whole British
train system was increasingly called into question.
Chapters 3.1 to 3.5 explain the functions of the various players in the British railway
industry according to their original design, in addition to the brief outline of the functions
given above. Chapter 3.6 draws upon the changes that followed Labour's 1998 White
Paper and chapter 3.7 discusses the outcome of the tragic train accidents, including the
winding up of Railtrack. Chapter 4 assesses the British experiment in four parts. First,
chapter 4.1 illustrates the developments of the sector since the mid-1980s with empirical
data. Chapter 4.2 comments upon the absence of competition in the infrastructure and
train operations, while chapter 4.3 looks at the regulation in the industry. Finally, chapter
4.4 deals with the safety issues and the fear of consumers, before chapter 5 draws a
conclusion.
2403.1 The Train Operating Companies
The Railways Act reorganized British Rail's passenger transport businesses,
InterCity, Network SouthEast and Regional Railways into 25 TOCs, basically in line with
BR's former profit centres (table 2). Though the TOCs were initially part of British Rail, the
Act made provision to franchise them to private bidders, who would tender for the right to
run a passenger railway for a specified period of time as set out in the detailed franchise
agreements. Under the original arrangements, the franchises were awarded to the bidder
who offered the highest amount of franchise royalty to the government or rather,
requested the smallest subsidy payment to operate the service. Accordingly, the amount
of the fee to OPRAF or subsidy from the office of the Franchising Director was
determined in a competitive tender process for each train franchise, as illustrated for all 25
TOGs in tables 3 and 4. Though the level of subsidy required by the applicants was the
prime factor in awarding the franchise treaty, the National Audit Office underlined that the
bids had to be acceptable in terms of the level of service proposed. The right to operate a
franchise might be revoked if the franchisee failed to meet the terms agreed upon  in the
franchise treaty.
Table 3 and 4 show past, respectively future payments as negotiated in the franchise
contracts and portray that only Gatwick Express was operating without subsidy from the
beginning, in effect paying the government for the franchise contract. However, a number
of franchise agreements are on the agenda for re-franchising in the next couple of years
according to Table 2, with negotiations already under way. The successor body to OPRAF,
the Strategic Rail Authority, is expected to push for higher returns for the public, both  in
financial terms and in service quality provided by the passenger rail operators.
492 Gerondeau (1997), p. 145
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TABLE 2: The Fraichued Traiire Operatnig C.wpasses
Souize: SRA (2001d), p.45 and www.ara..gov.uk
Note: During 2001 negotiations were undertaken with the respective franchisees to implement 20-year franchises on
Chiltern Railways, Connex South Central and South West Trains GoVia assumed operations on t1 South Central
franchise after an early changeover agreement with Connex. National Express Group acquired Prism Rail plc in July 2000
The SRA approved the resultant change of control of West Anglia Great Northern, Wales and West, Cardiff and c2c
franchises under some conditions, SR.A 2001a), p 20.
242Image removed due to third party copyrightImage removed due to third party copyrightImage removed due to third party copyrightoperators held a dominant position in the intermodal transport market Fare increases were
then restricted to increases in the retail price index. OPRAF's successor body, the SRA,
declared in its 2000-01 Annual Report that approximately 390 o of the TOCs revenue
comes from fares regulated by the SRA. Fare increases were limited to RPI minus 1% from
January 1999, equalling real fare reductions.'5
A major achievement of the British approach to privatisation was a greater
transparency in the actual costs of operating certain passenger services. The funding
structure of the British railway system changed from a system of government grants and
loans to a system based on direct franchise payments to train operators. In addition, some
of the train operators receive other means of support, such as grants paid by seven
metropolitan PTEs for the provision of passenger railway services in their respective areas,
amounting to a total of £283 million in 2000-01 The total government transfers between
1985-86 and 2000-01 are summarised in chart 45, including government receipts from the
railways, such as Railtrack's debt repayments and the sale of the ROSCOs. The chart dearly
shows the success of the sector management introduced in 1982 and the effects of the
glooming recession on subsidy payments rising to their peak in 1992-93. Chart 46 illustrates
the total amount of franchise payments to and from the operators. Accordingly, the
operators were anticipated to start repaying the government's subsidies from the financial
year 2005-06 (see also table 4), when payments from the operators would exceed overall
franchise subsidies.
SRA (2001a), p. 19
'Arriva Trains Northern, Central Trains and ScotRail benefited from part finding from the PTEs, SRA
2001d), p. 18
2463.2 The Freight Operating Companies
The structure of the freight industry substantially differs from the passenger rail
industry. Freight Operating Companies offer the carriage of goods by railways.  "The FOCs
are notfranchisees in the same waj as passenger Train OpeniIitg Companies (FOCi,), but are commeraal
companies with no public obbgation to pivvide a given level of serilce. The jh'ght business operates in an
'open access' entironment wherebj airy operator can tun fiight trains su/?ject to obtaining a sqfèy case,
licence and acce.cs to the rail network Access to the rail network isptvtrded  4y Raiftrack. The FOCi have
Track Access Agreements with Railtrack, paying afixed amountfor access to the network and a vatiable
amount depending on how maty trains they tim. ' The access price regime for the FOCs was
altered in April 2001 to promote rail freight. Now, the SRA covers the fixed component of
the access charge, whereas the operators solely pay the variable cost element.
The rail freight industry has seen considerable improvements since privatisation.
Charts 51 and 52 in chapter 4.1 support the SRA's allegation that the declining trend in rail
freight has been reversed following privatisation of the freight operators. The
government was disinclined to impose regulative forces to rail freight, as it realised the
amount of intermodal competition in the entire transport market. Accordingly, regulation
similar to the passenger rail industry has been absent from the national rail freight market.
The Regulator exdusively oversees licence arrangements and access prices. The
FOCs do not automatically receive public sector grants, though individual businesses may
apply for freight grants awarded by the Department of Transport, respectively its successor
department DETR The 2000 Transport Act, however, transferred the responsibility for
freight grants to the new Strategic Rail Authority. 499 Two options of grant are available to
encourage rail freight transport, either the Track Access Grant (L4G) or the F'rezght Facilities
Grant (FFG). While the TAG provides financial assistance to meet the access charges
payable to Raikrack, the FFG may be granted to support one-off capital investment costs,
e.g. for special loading requirements, storage facilities, sidings or connections to the rail
network According to the Strategic Rail Authority, the freight grants totalled £23 million
in the financial year 1999-2000 and increased to £36 million in the following year.50° In May
2001, the SRA unveiled its Freight Strategy. The strategy targets 800 o growth in rail freight
t.www.sra.gov.uk: Rail Freight Industry
SRA (2001a), p. 39
SRA (2001a), p. 40
500 SRA 2001c), p. 20. Nash (2001) points out to the Regulator's limited role in control over FOCs. For
general information on freight grants see also: DETR (1997) and www.ews railway.co uk
248over ten years from the 1998-99 level at an estimated costs of £4 billion, as set out in the
government's 10 Year Plan.501 The SRA's phased investment programme will focus on four
sets of strategies on the network, interchanges, funding and service delivery.5°2 The Freight
Strategy reserved £1.5 billion for network improvements, such as diversionary routes,
additional capacity, electrification and an enhanced quality of the infrastructure. As the
SRA noted substantial investment in freight rolling stock since privatisation the SRA
requested that Railtrack's speed restrictions of 45mph to 110mph for bulk to mail trains
should be relaxed to make allowance for the new rolling stock. In addition, the network
should be cleared to allow for axle loads of 25.5 tons, while train lengths on key corridors
should accommodate freight trains as long as 775m.503
The freight market is dominated by three major FOCs.50' English JVthh and Scottish
Railwqy (EWS) is the largest nationwide freight rail operator in the UK, moving over 1,000
trains per day and over 100 million tonnes of freight every year. Right after Wisconsin
Central Transportation purchased British Rail's bulk freight services, the operator was
reborn as EWS and invested in 280 new locomotives to replace parts of the antique fleet
inherited from British Railways. EWS realised that wagonloads would constitute their
highest growth potential. Though consignments may be  as small as a single wagonload,
they may also range up to full trainloads of 500 up to 3,000 tonnes. Whereas a major part
of EWS' business comprises traditional goods such as coal, minerals, steel, petroleum,
chemicals, mail and parcels, EWS is also extending its business into comparatively new
markets for the railways, including food, retail, cars and timber products. In 1997 EWS
purchased Railfreight Distribution, the operator of freight services through the Channel
tunneL Railfreight Distribution became EWS' international division, now called EWS
International with responsibility for European services. The company claims to offer its
customers flexible solutions in the UK and on the European continent with intermodal
operations to combine the advantages of rail, road and sea transport, thereby  alming at a
market-led, integrated transport solution.
Freghtliner Ltd is the successor to British Rail's former Freightliner service as
subsidiary of Railfreight Distribution, which was purchased by a management buyout in
SRA (2001b), p. 7 and DEER (2000c)
SRA (2001b), pp. 14-34
SRA(2001b),pp. 18-19
504 Clarke (2000) provides a detailed account on the pnvatlsation of freight services and also the pohtical
efforts of the government to involve the Wisconsin Central President Ed Burkhardt. Burkhardt rejected eariy
approaches of the UK government as he disapproved of the vertical structure of the British system, the
sphtting of Trainload Freight and the stiong emphasis on passenger services, Clarke (2000), p. 194.
249May 1996. The company is specialising on the carriage of containers between Britain's deep
sea container ports and its inland terminals in industrial centres. Freightliner moves over
one million containers a year with roughly one hundred trains each day. In addition to rail
services, it also offers direct road delivery to the customers' premises, arranging for next
day delivery to all destinations in the UK. In 1999 Freightliner diversified in bulk rail
freight and launched Autoliner, its automotive division.505 The third major company, Direct
Rail Semces (DRS), is mostly engaged with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. on the carriage of
nuclear materials. The Office of the Rail Regulator received further applications for rail
freight operating licences from Mend Rail L&ixited and from GB Rail Fmght Limited in 2000
that have both received approvaL
505 www.freighthner.co.uk
ORR (2000a), p.19 and www.sra.gov.uk
2503.3 Railtrack
Notwithstanding arguments for a horizontal separation of the infrastructure
provision, the Conservative government took the view that a single infrastructure operating
company was preferable to a variety of network operators. 507 The then Department of
Transport assumed that a single national track company would preserve the integrity of the
entire railway system and could enforce uniform safety standards. Moreover, the
Department held the view that a single track operator would serve strategic investment
needs of the railway network and the future company was believed to be fair to the various
train operating companies seeking access to the infrastructure, while guaranteeing efficient
timetabling administration.
The Act created the state-owned company Railtrack by 1' April 1994 after
establishing Railtrack as a separate British Rail division in February of the same year.
Railtrack assumed ownership of virtually all track and associated infrastructure, such as
signalling, stations and depots, formerly owned by the British Railways Board. The assets
of Railtrack are summarised in figure 3 below, including 16,652 route kilometres of track
infrastructure in the fInancial year 2000-01, of which 5,167 were electrified, around 40,000
bridges, viaducts and tunnels, 9,000 level crossings, 2,508 passenger stations, 90 light
maintenance depots, 1,000 signal boxes and control centres. 509 While most of the passenger
stations were leased to the respective TOGs operating the route, Railtrack manages 14
major stations on its own. The company's responsibility embraces the general maintenance
and development of the railway infrastructure, the timetabling administration, train
planning, the signalling system, the safety of vehicles accessing the network, the co-
ordination and safety of daily operations. This was accomplished with a total workforce of
11,200 in 2001, slightly down from 11,500 at the time of flotation.
Raikrack sets up and enforces safety standards applicable to the entire network and
its users, the train operating companies and station operators. Railtrack also formulates a
railway safety case that has to obtain approval from the Health and Safety Executive.
Railtrack's safety case . .a& all signjfwant health and safqy implications of its actis.vties and their
507 Below, a competitive model of network operators shall be discussed. The single private railway network
manager Railtrack was subject to hght regulation, while the franchised train operating companies were
carrying a substantial share of Railtrack's risk of market demand due to guaranteed income arrangements.
Though Railtrack was indirectly affected by intermodal competition, proper quality regulation would have
been the second best option to a competitive model as put forward in this thesis.
National Audit Office (1996), pp. 19.20
509 DETR (1998), p. 24 and SRA (2001c), p. 32
251Image removed due to third party copyrightquestioned whether Railtrack was sold at a bargain price on the stock market.51' The
flotation price did not fully reflect Railtrack's assets and endowments and Railtrack's
income from access charges was largely guaranteed up to March 2001, until new
arrangements were approved by the Regulator's review." The flotation was taking place
after the sale of the rolling stock operating companies and 54 of British Rail's over hundred
divisions, while the franchising process of passenger rail was right on track. The
Department of Transport deemed the successful flotation of Railtrack of paramount
importance to the further success of the privatisation and, in particular, the franchising
process.su
The government's pnme oF?jective with regard to Railtrack was its flotation as soon as
reasonably practicable. Three further goals were, however, closely tied to Railtrack's
flotation. First, the government aimed to obtain a good deal for the taxpayer by maximising
total equity and debt proceeds. Second, the government intended to widen and deepen
share ownership. The government's third target was the wider implication from the railway
privatisation for their entire reform programme. It was in the government's interest to
convince the electorate that the privatisations across the British economy were the only
way forward and, indeed, a splendid success for Conservative  policy.51'
Proceeds from Railtrack's sale amounted to £1.9 billion. Still, the company's
massive public sector borrowing of nearly £1.5 billion, mainly to the National Loans Fund,
had to be taken into account. As the National Loans Fund had to be discontinued after the
sale, the Department of Transport decided to cancel Railtrack's debt, while at the same
time introducing new debt of £586 million. The arrangement equals a net debt write-off of
£869 million by the government. The total revenue from the sale, though, adds up to
nearly £2.5 billion from the actual sale plus the debt repayment.
The DETR report on the flotation of Railtrack admits that the early sale may have
had an adverse impact on the sale price, as the market was only beginning to comprehend
the working of the previously highly protective railway industry, its various players and the
regulative forces involved. The report emphasises that both the Department of Transport
and their financial advisers SBC Warburg " . . wetr concerned not to lose the confidence of iinstors
511 White (2000)
512 WeIsby (1998), p.243
"3 DR (1998), pp.2-19 present the arguments of the Department surrounding the privatisation and the
Government's aims in more detail.
'14 DETR (1998), pp. 15-19, 61-68
253which they had made effois to build up. '' Initially, the Department considered a sale in the
autumn of 1996, but decided against this option due to the prospects of the forthcoming
general election. The government contemplated that a sale closer to the election might curb
market demand, driving down the eventual market value and the government proceeds of
Railtrack's sale. Whereas the then Department of Transport argued that a delayed sale
might have produced negative side effects for the upcoming franchising negotiations and
the railway privatisation as a whole, the DETR report clearly favoured a later sale of
Railtrack, as institutional investors would have gained a better knowledge of the structures
of the rail industry. However, the Conservative government disagreed that a delay to the
autumn of 1996 would provide investors with much further insight than was already
available.
The then Department openly favoured a full privatisation of 100% of Railtrack's
share capital rather than a partial sale of the company. Again, this was partly due to the
uncertainty surrounding the upcoming general election and New Labour's election pledges
to re-nationalise the railways.516 In addition, the Department feared that investors could
lose confidence in the government's knowledge of the railway industry and its commitment
to the privatisation process as a whole. "The Depariment's marketing adise,for the offer to the
genenilpublic.. . considered that retaining a residual equity stake in Railtrack mzght create apercption in
the market that this spelt a lack of confidence in the Goven'tment's abiliçy to achieve sufficient demandfor a
full sale. That percption woul4 in their tiew, have been sufficient to ensure that the pritisation was a
failure.'617 In addition, a partial sale was believed to imply to investors a greater incentive for
government to interfere with business and shareholder interests. Naturally, a partial sale
would have affected the eventual sale price and thereby, the proceeds to the government.
While the Department took the view that a full privatisation would lead to higher proceeds,
proponents of a partial or phased privatisation underlined that investors would be able to
assemble more information about the privatisation of the rail industry. Besides, they
regularly pointed towards the sharp rise of Railtrack's shares, interpreting that a phased sale
would have yielded much higher returns for the government. Chart 47 displays the stock
market performance of the company between 1996 and 2001. Trade in Railtrack shares was
suspended on 8th October 2001 at £2.80, when Railtrack went into public administration.
The share price would have developed in a different way, if the government had retained a
515 DETR (1998), p. 4
516 The former Minister Steve Norris attacked Labour's role in the pnvatlsatlon process: 'Labour thirats to t
natzonaBe the time te w selbng the rlwqys dpove the pnce dow . . .It war a iiaz4 dekbenzte ai q'pthtzail and
ecwwnsic sabotage ,*recfrd atfiutnztrng the last Garernm fsprn sationphvrL Itfled", Norris (1998 , p.11
DETR (1998), p. 5
254Image removed due to third party copyrighton deepening share ownership. The government maintained the momentum of their
privatisation programme by venturing into one of the most widely debated industries.
Raikrack's shares were issued at £3.90 in May 1996, with the share prices
skyrocketing thereafter, until they reached a maximum price of £17.68 on 23 November
1998, giving Railtrack a market value of some £9 billion, up from £1.9 billion at the time of
the sale in 1996. This marked rise in Railtrack's market value gave support to the argument
that the company was sold at a bargain price to the detriment of the taxpayers and the
benefits of Raikrack's shareholders. Whereas this viewpoint might have had some
foundation at the writing of the DETR report in 1998, the drastic fall in Railtrack's market
value gives support to the theory that the share value of Railtrack was massively inflated.
Some industry observers alleged that the appointment of Tom Winsor as Rail Regulator in
1999 had adverse effects on Railtrack's stock market performance, as he was considered to
be tough on regulation.519 Though the news about a tough new Rail Regulator logically had
some effect on the stock market, it would be grossly unfair to put the entire blame on the
Rail Regulator. Up to the final winding up of Railtrack on 7th October 2001, the tight
regulatory environment that had already been implemented by the 1993 Railways Act, the
political uncertainty surrounding the Hatfield crash, Raikrack's handling of the crisis,
Railtrack's management competence or incompetence and the anticipated consequences
after Hatfield possibly had a greater effect on the plummeting share price. The number of
accidents and the subsequent investigations into railway safety increasingly questioned the
logic of the 1993 Railways Act and the vertical separation of the British railway system.. At
the time of writing, the future structure of Railtrack was still unclear, as highlighted below
in chapter 3.7.
Raikrack's main expenditure is its investment in maintaining the infrastructure. In
1997-98 alone, maintenance costs for the upkeep of the network amounted to V02
million. Most of the maintenance works were subcontracted to various track renewal and
infrastructure maintenance companies as illustrated in figure 1. For the next decade,
Railtrack had planned investments into its network in the range of £27 billion, including
planned upgrades to the East and West Coast Main Line services.5
519 Financial Times (2000a)
5www.comdirectcp.uk
256Railtrack's income in 2000 was made up to the extent of 85° o from access charges
paid by passenger rail franchisees, while receipts from freight access amounted to 6% of
Railtrack's revenue. The remaining 9° o were provided by rental income from Railtrack's
property (5%), other income (30 o) and sales of commercial and development property
(10 o).521 The access charges are paid to Railtrack under contracts agreed upon with the rail
operators and approved by the Office of the Rail Regulator. The access contracts specify
performance regimes between the individual transport operator and Railtrack with either
bonus or penalty payments for punctuality, as well as train slots granted to the passenger or
freight operators. Railtrack's revenue from access charges totalled £2.3 billion from
passenger rail franchises (93%) and freight companies ç7%) in 1997-98. The Secretary of
State implemented the level of charges for access to Railtrack's network in 1994-95 when
Railtrack was still in public ownership. The charges were to cover operating expenses, asset
maintenance costs and eight per cent return on capital. The Rail Regulator's 1995 review of
the charging principles came to the conclusion that Railtrack's charges to passenger
operators should fall by eight per cent in real terms for the fiscal year 1995-96 in relation to
1994-95. As the Regulator envisaged annual real term decreases in Railtrack's operating
costs of three per cent in addition to a potential for lower maintenance costs, the Office of
the Rail Regulator demanded further real term reductions of two per cent annually until the
implementation of new access charges in 2001 in order to reflect Railtrack's estimated cost
reductions in the access regime. The Regulator ". . . beliewd that this letel of chatRes would enable
Railtrack to maintain and renew the netv,vrk efflctiy and q7icienty in modern equiwdent form, and to
sustain the national timetable of servicei "
The initial access price regime for Railtrack's network involved a two-tier structure
of fixed and marginal costs plus an element of either penalty or bonus payments for
punctuality.5 The fixed charge was based on avoidable costs and a share of joint costs,
which was inevitably arbitrary and does not reflect the profitability of the respective train
services. Due to the small share of the marginal cost element in total access charges, train
companies had an incentive to run additional services even with lightly loaded trains on a
network that was already close to full capacity. "The twiabk charges include no element either to
allow for congestion or the oppoiiuniy cost of slots orfor externalities such as air)ol/ution. Moreotr, it
gives no incentive to Raifrrack to enhance capacity to pviedefor 'dia sevdce.ç in fact Railtrack argues that
the wnable element does not even cover wear and tear  cost, so it is c/ear'y in their interest to discourage
52t www.corporateinforrnation corn
522 DETR (1998), p. 28. For the data see p. 27.
5 Nash (1997), p.4 and Nash (2001)
257epansion of sertices. From the point of tiew of fflcieny, the result  ic that the ystem has no mechanism to
ensure efficient use scaive capacify. Adjustments in capacity or quality  maj be made bj negotiation between
Railtrack and the operators beyond the access rights held 4y operators, but these negotiations are complex,
inwiving ften sett'ral opemtorc as well the Strategic Rail Autboñfy and the Regulator, and there  is an
obuous incentite for operators other than the main one affected to seek  to free tide '' Such complex
and time-consuming negotiations obviously involve high transaction costs, which had to be
taken into account when companies were taking their initial investment decisions.
Following the Regulator's 1995 review, the ORR published his draft review of
Railtrack's access charges in July 2000 for the second control period commencing in April
2001 until 31 March 2006. After responses from relevant industry parties, the Rail
Regulator published his Final Conclusions on The Periodic Rem'ew q[Railtrack's Access Chai'Res in
October 2000. Due to disincentives imposed upon the TOCs as a result of the high fixed
cost element of around 91% and low variable cost components, Railtrack suggested to the
Regulator to increase the variable element of the access prices.525 While the variable
component was subsequently increased to roughly 20% of the total access price, marginal
wear and tear costs and a capacity charge were induded in the ORR's final conclusions.
However, the capacity charge equalled only 50% of the estimated congestion costs arising
from the train operations.SV With regard to the FOCs, the SRA pays the fixed element, so
that the operators themselves are priced on a variable cost basis for their access to the
infrastructure. This arrangement replaced the former system of negotiated access charges
between the freight operators and Railtrack. Non-franchised newcomers to the passenger
rail market are solely required to pay the variable component of the access price. Though
the new regime discriminates in the favour of entrants to the passenger services, the
majority of the TOCs still received major franchise payments from the SRA in 2001. Not
least is the opportunity of open access to the railway market very limited due to current
franchise contracts and the protection from competition until March 2002. The pricing
system for the second control period substantially distorts the railway and transport
markets and is static over the control period of five years, where flexibility is needed to
adjust for investment needs. 'F,vm the y of prmitisation its retenues ur more or less fixe4
according to a formula laid	 !y its regulator. But noboy, not least Railtrack 's management, knew
524 Nh (2001)
525 ORR (2000b)
526 WeIsby (1998), p.244
ORR (2000b), p.12. The ORIt suested to compensate Railtrack for the remaming congestion costs m
the next control period.
52 ORR (2001), www.sra.gov.uk
258what its costs would be. There was nofroper inventory of the stale of the track and sgnaLc, and therefore no
idea of bow much investment would be needed to fix them.
Raikrack could have challenged the proposed access arrangements with an appeal
to the Competition Commission, as provided in the 2000 Transport Act Despite Railtrack
ended up with roughly £1 billion less than requested in their ORR approved expenditure
level, Railtrack accepted the charging regime in January 2001, which was subsequently
implemented in ApriL530 Railtrack's overall revenue reqarirement from access charges for the
TOCs for the second control period is built upon three components. First, Railtrack had to
recover its expenditure from the access charges levied to operate, maintain, renew and
enhance the network. Second, Railtrack must be allowed to achieve a return on its assets
that is then added to the required level of expenditure. The third component comprises
Railtrack's projected income from other sources than rail infrastructure, such as stations,
property, open access and freight revenues. The projected revenue from other sources is
subtracted from the sum of the level of expenditure and the return to determine the overall
revenue requirement that has to be recovered via access charges.531 The final ORR
arrangements set Railtrack's expenditure level for 2001 to 2006 at £14.9 billion and granted
Railtrack a real pre-tax rate of return of 80 p.532
The Conservative government's Railways Act tried to implement a radical U-turn
after decades of railways' dependence upon public sector financial support and the
goodwill of politicians. Though the private sector rail franchises are still subsidised by the
Strategic Rail Authority, the absolute figures are on the decline, as has been shown  in tables
3 and 4, as well as chart 46. Initially, Raikrack obtained most of its income from access
charges from passenger and freight rail operators. As a result of the access price regime for
the second control period, Railtrack received £47 billion in government grant, mainly to
make up for the spiralling costs of the West Coast Main Line modernisation, improved
signalling and safety measures. Previously, public grants to Railtrack were strictly limited.
But the Conservatives' intention to create political independence for the railway industry
5 Economist (2001b), www.economist.com
ORR (2000b), p.8
531 ORR (2000b), p.6
ORR (2000b), p.9
Economist (2000b), p. 36. Ford (2001b) compared infrastructure investments under the private regime to
the costs under BR and found that costs per mile more than doubled. The cost inflation of the West Coast
modernisation is especially startling as it had been agreed upon in 1996 between OPRAF and the pee-
pnvatised BR at £2.4 billion and is expected to more than triple, if it will ever be completed. Apparently,
Railtrack's accountants must have had dropped a few figures.
259was left in shambles in the aftermath of the rail accidents of Southall, Ladbroke Grove and
Hatfield. Following disputes between the DTLR and Railtrack about further government
funding of Railtrack plc, the network operator went into public administration on 8th
October 2001. The current railway crisis has made concrete anticipations about further
subsidies highly speculative. But even prior to the crisis the railway market was subject to
various regulations and rigid obligations from contracts. Increasingly, Railtrack's and the
franchisee's future is subject to political bargaining.
2603.4 Suppliers
While British Rail owned, maintained and operated all of its rolling stock, the
rolling stock was seen as a major burden to the TOCs due to their short franchise periods,
relative to the economic life cycle of rolling stock, averaging 30 years. Accordingly, the
Conservative government opted for leasing arrangements of British Rail's passenger rolling
stock to the new train operators to save them the high initial investment costs in new or
refurbished trains and lower entry barriers to the new railway market. The Secretary of
State ordered the British Railways Board to create three British Rail subsidiaries by April
1994 and transfer BR's passenger rolling stock of 11,000 vehicles. Accordingly, Angel Train
Contracts, Eversholt and Ponerb,vok were established. The leasing arrangements between the
newly created ROSCOs with the 25 Train Operating Companies were already in place in
December of the same year, prior to the commencement of the franchising process.
Subsequently, the government sold the ROSCOs for about £2.6 billion in early 1996 to a
private sector consortium, a management buyout and an employee buyout team.53'
The ROSCOs are subject to the general competition law, with further regulation
being absent.535 The majority of the leases tied the TOCs to the ROSCO until 2004, though
a few leases expired in 1998.' Effectively, the leasing contracts provided the ROSCOs
with a guaranteed income over the leasing period, minimised competition between
ROSCOs and transferred the risk of demand vanations in the final consumer market to the
TOCs. Though they rarely owned any assets themselves, the passenger rail franchises had
to meet their franchise agreements with OPRAF, their leasing contracts with the ROSCOs
and high fixed access charges with Railtrack.
Six heavy maintenance depots serve the rolling stock companies, carrying out heavy
maintenance work for passenger and freight rail companies. The depots were sold to three
private bidders between April and June 1995. Railtrack's infrastructure maintenance and
renewal services are undertaken by seven infrastructure maintenance firms and six track
renewal companies, which were sold untilJuly 1996 (seefigure 1).
'1 Natona1 Audit Office (1996), p. 19
5 WeIsby (1998 , p. 245 and White (1998), p. 117
Schabas (1997), p.2
DETR (1998 , p. 22
DETR (1998), p.22
2613.5 Government authorities involved
In order to supervise the new industry structure the Conservative government
created the Office of the Rail Regulator as the sole economic regulator of the railways and the
Office of Passenger Rail Franchising as apublicfunding bo4y for passenger rail services. Their
separate roles are best understood from figure 1. The head of OPRAF, the Franchising
Director, awarded the franchises and paid subsidies to passenger franchisees, whereas the
Rail Regulator is concerned with licensing and access arrangements of the TOCs to the
railway infrastructure. The 1993 Railways Act empowered the Secretary of State to appoint
both the Rail Regulator and Franchising Director, who appointed their own staff, subject
to Treasury approvaL5
In their New Opportunities White Paper, the Conservatives proclaimed they would
introduce competition and open up the railway industry, moving away from central
government planning to control by the market However, by no account did they go full
cirde by dismissing the state owned railways into a free market environment when it came
to the compromising Railways Act. Nash argues that the design of the system '. . left the
gotrnment with extensive powerc over the rail -ysten '° Welsby and Nichols add that even though
the rhetoric ofptivatisation had been concerned with liberating management, the Raihvqys  Act of 1993
bad the effict of ensuring that in manj wqys the privatised industrj was suIject to more regulation than its
nationalised predecessor had ever been.'' OPRAF and the ORR dominated the regulatory
framework, complemented by the Secretary of State, the Health and Safety Exeetive and the
Office of Fair Trading. Though the Rail Regulator was legally independent from  political
control, as the then Conservative government was concerned about the private sectors'
willingness to invest in the rail industry " . . OPRAF was clear/y an instrument of government
poli taking its 4/eciives directfrom the Secretarj of State...7M2 OPRAF was responsible for the
terms and conditions of the individual franchise agreement, with regard to quality of
service, price controls, duration of the franchise contract, levels of subsidy and finally, the
terms upon which the franchises are awarded to bidders.
After the 1997 general election of the new Labour government, changes  in
transport policy towards more integration were announced in a White Paper, also affecting
•' House of Commons (1993a) and Pubhc General Acts (1993), clauses 1-5
° Nash (2001)
Weisby and Nichols (1999), p. 61
542 Nash (2001)
262the Franchising Director's and Rail Regulator's roles. Labour's 1998 White Paper  A New
Deal for Transpoil and the resultant replacement of OPRAF with the Strategic Rail
Authority, as well as changes to the safety structure of the UK railway system, are
examined further below.
2633.5.1 The Rail Regulator
The Rail Regulator is the sole economic regulator specific to the rail industry. His
principal remit is the promotion of competition in the railway market and, logically derived
from this objective, the prevention of anti-competitive behaviour, such as the abuse of
monopoly power. The Rail Regulator's responsibilities regarding competition are shared
with the Director General of Fair Trading. Closely connected to the aim of encouraging
competition on the railways is the Regulator's obligation to promote and protect the
passengers' interests and maintain network benefits of the railway industry.3
To achieve those goals, the Rail Regulator regulates the access to tracks and
associated infrastructure, such as stations, depots, electricity supply and signalling. The train
operators are required to obtain a licence from the Regulator prior to operating trains on
the railway network. In addition, the access agreements between the individual train
operators and Railtrack need to be approved by the Regulator.
As the Regulator's role is mainly concerned with competition and the prevention of
the abuse of monopoly power it is hard to see what extra benefits the Regulator adds to
society's welfare, as the Office of Fair Trading and the Regulator's functions are at least
overlapping. In Germany it is currently discussed whether the railways should have their
own regulatory body. The German equivalent to the Office of Fair Trading, the
Bundeskane1/amt strongly argued against a special regulator for the railways, as its functions
are within the remit of the Bundeskartellamt and a further authority with similar tasks
would double the inputs and obscure the competencies and responsibilities of the
corresponding government agencies.'
DETR (1998), pp.22 23, House of Commons (1993b), p. xn, National Audit Office (1996), pp. 16-20
Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung (2001d), p.l7
2643.5.2 The Franchising Director
Originally, the Secretary of State issued the Franchising Director's prime objectives
in March 1994: "1. to sere the railway passenger senrces in Great B,itain are proiided underfiiinchise
agreements as soon as reasonab'y practicable; 2. to swar an overall saprovement in the qualify of railwqy
passenger and station servwes."45 In addition, the Secretary stated subsidiary objectives,
including the promotion of efficient and economic railway services, the cost effective
development of the railway system and the award of franchises to companies that have
substantial involvement of former British Rail employees.
Therefore, the Franchising Director " . . negotiates, awards and monitor:cfranchises granted
topiiwte sector biddersfor the train operating companies and sets the mtz'dmum level of rrgulatedfares that
thy can charge. The Franchising Director also stpulates the minimum seriice requirements that the train
operating companies are required toprozide and .cpedfrs targetsforpunctualify, tvliabilify andprevention of
overcrowding. ' The Franchising Director's duties embrace the regulation of key fares and
the monitoring of fare increases. Fare increases, however, are restricted by the RPI-X
formula, i.e. fares might only rise by the Retail Price Index minus X per cent, where X1
for the period 1999 to 2003, equalling a fall in real terms. However, a number of popular
fares such as advance purchase tickets are set explicitly at the discretion of the train
operating companies.'7 Only exceptional circumstances would permit OPRAF the
temporary operation of franchises, such as rejected closure applications or delays in the
award of franchises.
The Franchising Director's powers were widened in November 1997, when he was
equipped with re-defined objectives by the Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions. The Secretary of State intended to strengthen the train
companies' orientation towards passenger preferences, when he asked the Franchising
Director to increase the number of rail passengers, work towards better quality of services
and administer the current franchises in the interests of the passengers.
Though the Franchising Director had considerable decision-making flexibility
under the terms of the 1993 Act, the Director was required to consult the Secretary of State
on a number of occasions, such as the duration of the individual franchise agreements and
National Audit Office (1996), p. 21
' DETR (1998), p. 23
Parliamentary Papers (1998), p.95
265major commitments in infrastructure investments. Also, the Franchising Director had to
consult the Rail Regulator with regard to the companies involved in the tendering process
and fare regulations the Franchising Director intended to imp1ement. The New Labour
government replaced OPRAF with the SRA in the 2000 Transport Act The SRA formally
assumed operations in February 2001.
'1'Nationai Audit Office 1996), pp.6,20
2663.53 Rail safety bodies
The Health and Safety Executive's primary goal is to ensure "..that eisk.c to people's
health and safetjfivm work actitities are p,vper/y controlki ' Complementing the ORR as the
economic regulator, the HSE is the sole safety regulator for the railway industry and is
responsible for both the enforcement of legislation and the examination of the railway
safety cases. The Health and Safety Commission (HSC) is the government's statutory adviser
on railway safety to whom the HSE reports. The Commission is directly accountable to the
Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions and to other
Secretaries of State for the administration of the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act
throughout Great Britain. Whereas the HSE is the statutory regulator of railway safety, the
most important role in the guarantee of safe operations, however, rests with the individual
players in the railway market 'Railtnzck has primary re.ponsibility for ensuring the safe operation of
the rail neTh'ork and each pan of the railwaj inductrj has a legal trsponsibiliy to ensure that it operates
saf4y, but ths Gottnunent looks to the HSC/E to use their wide-ranging powers to ecure that sajèy
standards are maintainea and imp roted where necessarj. '°
The Health and Safety Commission's advice contributed to the system of safety
regulation that commenced in 1994. According to the safety regime for the railways, the
train operators submit their individual railway safety cases to Railtrack for approval. The
train operators' safety cases are risk assessments of their operations, including proposed
risk management strategies. Railtrack has to prepare its own safety case and submit it to the
HSE.
The Safety and Standards Directorate (SSD) was Railtrack's main internal body for its
own safety management procedures, while its final responsibility rested with Railtrack Line,
the operational side of Railtrack. In a DETR review of the Safety and Standards
Directorate in February 2000, the Department issued concerns about SSD's dual role as it
has internal and external safety responsibilities without a dear dividing line. 55' Additionally,
the report expressed disapproval regarding the interdependency  of Railtrack's commercial
interests and the safety interests of SSD. Thus, the Department suggested the re-
organisation of Railtrack's safety management procedures with the SSD as an independent
subsidiary of Railtrack. The restructured SSD which was temporarily renamed  Railwaj Safefy
549www.hse.gov.uk
° DETR (1999b), paragraph 25
DETR (2000a), paragraph 3
267Limited (RSL) for the report's sake, would become the independent focus for safety in the
rail industry. While RSL would inherit most of SSD's functions, the report recommended
that the Health and Safety Executive should take over the responsibility to approve the
TOCs individual safety cases from Railtrack.
DETR's initiative followed repeatedly expressed unease on the part of the
Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. The Committee had argued for
the removal of SSD from Railtrack on a number of occasions with the main purpose to
remove Railtrack's responsibility for safety regulation.552 In October 2000 the Rail
Regulator announced the creation of a new wholly owned subsidiary of Railtrack, the
lndejendent Ri1wy Safqy Adätj (IRSA) that acquired the responsibilities formerly carried
out by the SSD from 1 January 2001. Railtrack's modified network licence codifies
IRSA's responsibilities and rules Out any commercial functions of IRSA. 554 This latest
development is especially interesting in the light of the discussion in section IV about an
entirely independent safety operator.
552 In us report of 17th December 1999, the Committee argued for the SSD's removal from Railtrack for the
third time, DETR (1999b)
DETR (2000e)
Department of Transport (2001), pp. 6-9
2683.6 A New Deal for Transport New Labour's transport policy
The New Labour government published their White Paper  A New Dealfor Transpon
Better for Ettrjone in July 1998 with an emphasis on an integrated transport policy. The
Paper foresaw the creation of a non-departmental public body, the Strategic Rail Authority,
to work towards proper intermodal integration of the railway system and increase railway
traffic as a share of total passenger and freight transport. Labour's principal aim was to
initiate a renaissance for the railways. But the government saw the fragmentation of the
system as a major burden towards achieving this aim. The Paper demanded a coherent
network rather than a collection of franchises. 555 Therefore, the 1998 White Paper pledged
to establish a national Strategic Rail Authority " . . to protide a clear, coherent and strategic
programme for the dewiopment of our railways. '' The 2000 Transport Act formally established
the SRA as successor body of OPRAF by February 2001.
Though the government claimed that the respective roles of the Franchising
Director and the Rail Regulator created confusion even within the industry, it suested to
replace OPRAF with the SRA. Main tools for the SRA's policy were accordingly the re-
franchising process, management of current franchises, as well as the administration of
subsidies to the TOCs. The SRA acquired a key role to strategically develop the railway
network. 7 It is, however, hard to see why the government assumed it would be easier to
differentiate between the SRA and the ORR than between the ORR and OPRAF.
The White Paper revealed the underlying principle of the change in railway policy.
While the Conservatives originally proclaimed that they were aiming to separate politics
from business, New Labour's purpose rather resembles a guidance of private sector
business. When " . . oppomnities arise for negotiating franchises, the new Strategic Rail Authoriy,
guided 4y Ministers, still ensure that anangements are made so that train operators stncture and market
theirfares to offer tishe for money for their ai1omerc, and to reflect the fact that the raibvqy is a national
network which needs to be marketed accordinth and in a way which encourages people to switch from car  to
train. ' The philosophy behind the approach is dominated by central planning. Assuming
rational consumers, they know better than politicians or anyone else whether products,
555 Parharnentary Papers (1998), p.94
5 Pht Papers (1998), p.43
Winsor 2001), p. 33
5 Parhamentwy Papers (1998), p.96
269such as the train services they enter, offer value for money according to  their own
preferences.
The government intended to have a bigger say in the railway market, or rather, in
railway poliej. New Labour had a stronger belief than the past Conservative government in
the beneficial effects and superiority of ministerial guidance over a competitive market
place, even though it would limit the benefits of competition. The government regarded
the British railway system as a single national system and it was not the private sector's task
to integrate the railway network, but the government's. Also, Labour assumed they had to
convince people to leave the cars at home and travel by public transport, instead of leaving
the decision to the citizens' preferences. The potential train customers will prefer their
private car use until their utility of using a train service exceeds their utility from using cars.
Now, it is the TOCs' job to attract customers to their services. They have to run the
railway under strict franchise constraints and earn money from the operations - however
they achieve their objective. The White Paper's suggestions distort individual preferences
and the market by interfering and guiding according to politicians' preferences and ideals.
Naturally, they claim that they - and not the train companies - are creating the railway
system ' . for the benefit of the people that it exists to sane. The Strategic Rail Authony will be our
prime thicle for this... Passengers must in future haw a greater wice in train sewwes which are paidjor
with their fares and their taxes. ' Now, what greater voice could the passengers have other
than voting by feet against the services which do not match their preferences?
Admittedly, it is justified to expect efficient products from the taxes paid. In a free
market, however, the customers would pay for the services they demand directly. The
underlying assumptions of the 1998 White Paper fundamentally contrast with the 1992
White Paper's assumptions. While the 1992 Paper planned to curb politicians' involvement
in the railway industry, more scope for regulation was on the agenda in the 1998 Paper.
And indeed, the New Deal for Transport assumed that the government was creating the
railway system, whereas the New Opportunities f r the Railways suggested to shed as
much responsibility from politics to an independent railway system, at least envisaging
open entry to the transport market and an eventual sale of the train operating companies.56°
If the political process prior to the 1993 Railways Act had followed the suggestions of the
1992 White Paper, Britain would have established afrll-scalepthxitisation in railway transport.
9 Parhamentary Papers (1998), p.97
360 Parliamentary Papers (1998), p. 97: "We wntpassenge7r to hate a real sqy iz the nnLwqy ystw va we are
tlea/vtS."
270The Conservative's 1992 White Paper aimed at a deregulation from a centralised railway
administration towards a decentralised and competitive railway matet. The role of the pace
setters was transferred to private sector companies in limited passenger rail franchises. New
Labour's 1998 White Paper contrasts the 1992 White Paper by re-regulation and a demand
for a more integrated industry. Labour considered the government's and the SRA's
guidance as principal forces in shaping the railway system, whereas the views expressed in
the 1992 Paper envisaged private companies as innovators.
Labour assigned a number of key tasks to the independent Rail Regulator. Those
included the setting of access charges to tracks and stations as well as an assessment of
Railtrack's performance and investment levels in accordance with the access charges paid
by the transport operators. Despite proclaiming the necessity for an indpendent Rail
Regulator, the government announced that the Regulator's duties were amended ' . .  to ha
regard to stat.ut.oy guidance frvm the Setarj of State on his brvadpoIiy oi?jectits for the passe nger and
freight mi/way. '' The newly introduced statutory guidance to broad policy objectives
supports the above arguments about the substantially different underlying principles of
railway policy. Labour wanted to be an active player in the railway game, while the
Conservatives' goal in their 1992 White Paper was to get a good seat in the front row to
exercise some supervision over the market.
The White Paper's proposals were at the very basis of the Transport Bill, presented
to the Commons in December 1999. The Bill received royal assent in the following year. It
provided for the establishment of the Strategic Rail Authority as set out above. The
Franchising Director's functions, his property, rights and liabilities were transferred to the
SRA in Schedule 15 of the 2000 Transport Act. The Office of Passenger Rail Franchising
was abolished, while the Rail Regulator's role was adjusted to the new environment and
other duties. Finally, the Transport Act abolished the British Railways Board and
transferred its property, rights and liabilities to the Secretary of State.562
In May 2001 the SRA unveiled its Freight Strategy to complement the
government's 10 Year Plan published in the previous year to ' . .  tackle congestion Fy improiing
all pes of tran2)ort - rail and raad, public and ptiwte - in ways that inase choice. ' The Plan
561 Parliamentary Papers (1998), p.97
562 HMjse of Commons (1999) and Public General Acts (2000), especially Schedules 15-18
SRA (2001b)
Financial Times (2000b)
271comprised financial commitments amounting to £180 billion over a decade, a third of
which was reserved to improve the national railways network with new track, signalling,
stations and rolling stock. John Prescott, the then Secretary of State, made assurance that
• . a/most three-quarters - £132 billion - .uill come fivm the public purce... We will secure that
irnstment through long-term partnersh with the pitzte sectop new railfrascbises lasting 4' to 2Qyearc,
30-yar contracts for ,vadc and a 30 .year publie pü'ate partnersh fir London Unde,round"'5
Nevertheless, it is now more than doubtful whether the investment will meet the
government's targets of 50% growth in passenger rail and 80% growth in freight rail
transport.
Connex South Central was the first franchise operatof to lose out in the  re-
franchising game. Their South Central franchise comprises commuter services between
London, Surrey and Sussex with 100,000 passengers per day. The Strategic Rail Authority
awarded the network to GoVia, a subsidiary of Go-Ahead. After agreements with Connex
on an early changeover of the old seven year franchise, GoVia assumed operation on the
commuter network in August 2001. Further negotiations between GoVia and the SRA
were under way towards a new 20 year franchise with planned investments of £1.5 billion
in new rolling stock, stations and major track upgrades to increase capacity. GoVia aims at
doubling passenger numbers in the next 20 years, while the UK network is expected to
grow by 52 per cent. As the sacking of Connex' followed prolonged complaints about their
late, dirty and overcrowded trains, the SRA's decision to end Connex' South Central
franchise was seen as a warning to other franchise operators who were also criticised for
poor performance.
Changes to the industry's overall structure were on the agenda after the SRA's
official launch in February 2001. The chairman of the recently established Commission for
Integrated Transport made a case for a merger of the ORR and the SRA? 9 Further, he
argued for a vertical re-integration of TOCs and the lines they use on a leasing basis from
Railtrack. At the same time, talks were under way between FirstGroup, Stagecoach and
5 DETR (2000b)
Grant (2001), p. 26. Ford (2001a), p. 17 suggests that the railway part of the 10 Year Plan is possibly
nothing more but a meaningless concept smce the latest events in the railway market.
567 SRA (20010
'' Fmancial Times (2000d), p. 1, Financial Times (2000e), p. 4, Financial Times (2000f), p. 21, Financial
Times (2000c), p.26 discuss the SRA's decision to sack Connex' from operating the South Central franchise
due to poor performance.
'- The 1998 White Paper announced to establish the Commission to " ..pn,tük independent adince to Goveniment
on the implementation ofmt ted	 po'rpoy...", PP(1998), p.92
272National Express with the Strategic Rail Authority and Railtrack to explore possibilities for
re-integration of track and operations. John Prescott, the deputy prime minister, was trying
hard to think the unthinkable in the aftermath of Hatfield, considering that the number of
train operators could be as few as four or five. Still, the Finandal Times claimed that radical
change was not on the SRA's agenda as the SRA's chairman Sir Alastair Morton found that
• . a number of rail industrj chiefi know tby have had quite enough resmctutig.' 7° In March 2001
The Economist predicted that the process of re-franchising and re-structuring might well
produce a rail industry of four or five regional operators in sole charge of railway transport
in their areas, with Railtrack being 'tn essence a h#e prvpe?1J cvmpanj vith minor operational
responsibilities.'571
The reduction to four or five franchises is not currently on top of the agenda, but
the SRA established longer franchises for periods of  20 years. Also, the SRA created three
new franchises comprising several old franchises, the TraiuPennine Express, the W"ales &
Borders and the W"essex franchise. Planning is under way to form an OrbiRail franchise for
round-London services, which is unlikely to come into being before 20O304.572
°Fmancia1 Times (2000e), p.4
Economist (2001a), p. 39
572 SP (2001a), pp. 27-29 and Abbott (2001) on over- and underground rail developments in London
2733.7 The railway crisis
Every action in life involves risk and thus, a trade-off between the expected costs
and benefits of each action. The railway tragedies at Clapham Junction (1988), Southall
(1997), Ladbroke Grove (1999) and Hatfield (2000) had shaken the railway industry. In the
aftermath of the accidents, it was sometimes claimed that they were a natural outcome of
the privatisation that starved the railways off funds. However, total investment figures on
the railways more than doubled since privatisation. Though the argument might then
proceed that British Railways were already on a dietary investment programme prior to
privatisation, the current private rail industry does obviously not deserve the blame for iow
spending prior to their involvement. Either the former governments are to blame for
under-investment of BR, the private sector for the current quality of investment schemes
or, more likely both.573
In a report to the Rail Regulator, Boot Allen & Hamilton underline that Railtrack
• . has to work, for the mostpart, with the infrastructure inheritedfrom BR, e.pecial/y with what seems to
be rather poor ba//act osr much of the network; what Railtrack can be held re.poncible for ic it is
tlacing poor-qua/iy ballast with the same... JVhat is more relevant is the extent to which Railtrack is
current/y adopting maintenance philosophies whicb are inefficient, gicen the infrastructure that exists. There
were clear(y a number of policies durzng the JIrt control period that were sub-optimal - not least the
structure of contractual arrangements which seems to have protided almost no information about what was
happening. . .In summary, we are sure that Railtrack is stilipursuing sub-optima/policies, and these will be
increasing costs above what could be achietwd..." 4 Arguably, the doubling of investment figures
since privatisation solely makes a point about the amount of money spent on the railways,
abstracting from quality for money. And indeed, Ford wondered about the productivity of
investment schemes under BR compared to the private regime. Following a detailed
analysis of major projects over the last decades Ford concludes, as a rule of thumb
current schemes are costing two to three times what BR u.vuhi hate paidfor the seprojecI'5
Under the state run system, BR was in competition with other state-owned
industries and public projects for scarce public funding. The decision on spending more for
' Bagwell (1984), p. 25 confirms that government financial support to BR was generally on a small scale
compared to other European railways. He cites a Leeds study revealing that revenues covered 71° o of BR's
total costs, while only Swedish railways were more self-supporting at 83° o in 1977.
Booz, Allen & Hamilton(2000), ch. 4, p. 5. The Economist (2001b) confirms the assumption about the
state of the infrastructure, though there is no inventory of its condition.
Ford (2001b), p. 21
274safety on railways may be politically desirable. Naturally, it results in a trade-off between
investment in rail safety and other public or private projects that would receive lesser
funds. The trade-off is a constraint on excessive spending for individual projects.
Notwithstanding the amount of safety investment, a totally safe railway system is an
illusion. It would logically imply an immediate cancellation of all train services on
Railtrack's network. There is no guarantee that rail accidents will never occur again, unless
the railway is brought to a complete standstilL Political promises of a safe railway system
may serve short-term political purposes but whatever investment or initiatives are pursued,
railways are a fail-danger technology where chance plays a major role. Nevertheless, there
are ways to make the railways even safer than they are today. In their Southall and Ladbroke
Grove Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems, Cullen and Uff comment upon the following
protection systems:57'
The Automatic Warning System (AIVS) provides a warning and braking system at red or
yellow signals. Though the AWS is fitted to the UK network, the driver may cancel it
and the technology is outdated.
• The BR-Automatic Train Protection System (BR-ATP) has been installed in the early 1990s
on the Great Western and Chiltern lines, but the Cullen and Uff Inquiry judged the
BR-ATP as an antique technology.
• BR and Railtrack had developed the Train Protection Waning System (TPIVS) jointly from
1994. Its fitting will be made mandatory from 2003. However, the main shortcoming of
TPWS is its limited effectiveness to maximum speeds up to 74mph.
• TPWS+ is an enhanced version, which would be capable of stopping trains with speeds
exceeding 74mph at red signals, whereas TPWS-E would offer a possibility to upgrade
to the Eurojean Train Control System (ET(S).
• The ETCS is currently undergoing tests in Europe. It has the advantage to increase
overall track capacity, accommodating for the expected rise in UK rail traveL The
ETCS may evolve into a European Standard, as its fitting is required by European law.
Following the Ladbroke Grove disaster, the Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott
requested a report on Sgnafr Passed At Danger (SPADs) from Sir David Davies, the
President of the Royal Academy of Engineering which was then taken account of in the
Joint Inquiry report of Cullen and Uff.5 The Joint Inquiry report recommends the
576 In their USC (2001) report, the Cullen and Uff Joint Inquiry eitensive1y commented on the different
options of Train Protection Systems. Though the systems are briefly outhned, they are not the focus of this
thesis.
Davies (2000), www.raeng.org.uk
275installation of the TPWS+ system, whereas further decisions concerning TPWS-E should
be left to the railway industry, as it could not be installed before late 2003 and the costs
would substantially exceed the costs of the simpler versions of TPWS. European legislation
requires that high-speed lines be fitted with the ETCS system when signalling systems are
renewed or upgraded.
In addition to the technical measures, other means to make the railways safer than
they are today may result in a further re-organisation of the railways or simply in internal
re-structuring of Railtrack's and the operator's safety management procedures. In the case
of a SPAD like in the Ladbroke Grove/Paddmgton rail crash there must be an immediate
and clear line of communication to other train drivers approaching the potentially perilous
location. SPADs are a major source of accidents when compared to broken rails, the cause
of the Hatfield crash, despite broken rails averaging two per week in Britain. However,
Hatfield's four victims, the disruptions of the British rail network for half a year including
major loss of confidence in the railways and the political uncertainties surrounding
Railtrack's future might have been avoided. Railtrack's maintenance contractors Balfour
Beatty already detected cracks in the broken rail at Hatfield several months before the
accident. Whereas a new rail was stored at the site for five months waiting to be fitted,
Railtrack had difficulties in arranging for a temporary suspension of services on the busy
line in order to carry out the replacement works as delays would result in fines for
Raikrack. A different set of priorities in Railtrack's penalty scheme, its internal procedures
and unambiguous management responsibilities might have avoided Hatfield and the
entailed loss of life and confidence in the railways that also resulted in millions of forlorn
revenues and penalties.
In the months following the board's acceptance of the Regulator's  Final Conchisions
on the Pe,'iodic Reuew of Track Access Chaes, Railtrack's financial crisis unfolded, partly as a
consequence of Hatfield and the massive cost overrun in the West Coast Main Line
upgrade.578 Although Railtrack's then Chief Executive Steven Marshall designated the
review as disastrous, his board refrained from challenging the Regulator and accepted his
verdict that made allowance for £14.9 billion for operations, maintenance, renewal and
enhancement of the network during the second control period 2001 to 2005. The figure
was up from £12.9 billion during the first control period between 1996 and 2000 but £1
Economist (2001b), www.econoinist.com and Ford (2001a , pp. 17-20
ORR (2000b), p. 7 and Ford (2001a), p. 17
276billion less than demanded by Railtrack. Ford judges that " . . Railtrack did not understand the
basics of its businesi '° Though Railtrack's income was inadequate to cover rising
maintenance and renewal costs, the track operator was bought off by the government's
early release of £1.5 billion grants and £500 million for unachieved freight revenue with a
potential for further subsidies. Railtrack could have appealed to the Competition
Commission under the arrangements under the 2000 Transport Act to adjust and delay the
implementation of the charging regime but refrained from according measures.
Suddenly in June 2001 Railtrack claimed it would have to invest an extra £3.8
billion over the next five years just to keep the rail network in a reasonable condition.
Raikrack scaled back spending by 30° o on investments that were not yet committed, but
the commitments alone " . . were assuming n:ghtmarepropoilionr the W'est Coast main line iqpgnide,
ongina4'yp,iced at £2.3 billion, was passing £7 billion and still climbing. 'i" Apparently, Railtrack's
unfolding financial crisis could not have been a surprise to its board. However, the board
accepted ORR's review in January. Railtrack demanded an additional £2.6 billion as well as
a suspension of the regulatory regime. Railtrack's £138 million dividend to shareholders at
the same time didn't go well with ministers. The Secretary of State forced Railtrack into
insolvency, because he did not consider it reasonable to support Railtrack with further
public subsidy. Following Byers' action to place Railtrack under public administration, it
was openly debated whether the Secretary blackmailed the supposedly independent
Regulator prior to the events, as the Regulator could have bailed Railtrack out with
additional subsidies. In a letter to the High Court on the administration proceedings, the
government's advisers stated that the Secretary had informed Railtrack's chairman that he
would ". . introduce a bill at the earliest oppon'uniy giung him the direct power to direct the rail
regulator. "'
The DTLR planned to turn Railtrack into a not-for-proft trust, independent of
government and on a fully commercial basis. However this supposedly commercial
structure may look like, it seems for sure that the new undertaking requires large injections
of taxpayers' money, while the Secretary of State " . . has to prove that whatever takes tharge of the
° Ford (2001a , p. 17
Ford (2001a), p. 17 and Grant (2001 'p.26
ORR (2000b), p. 17
Grant (2001), p. 26. This inflation in protected costs fits well into Ford's rule of thumb above.
Grant (2001), p. 26
Financial Times (200lcf), p. 3 and Ford (2001a), p. 19
586 Ford (2001a), p. 19
277railwajs will work better than the old Raiherack did. ' And he may encounter increasing
difficulties in encouraging private investors to part-fund the bilL Though Byers constantly
claimed that his move was no renationalisation of the infrastructure operator, the
confidence of capital markets in the government's commitment to public-private
partnerships has been thwarted. This might also have implications for further public-
private projects of the government, such as the part-privatisation of London Underground
that is on Minister's desks. Still, engineering firms that undertake maintenance and
renewal for Railtrack were discussing a scheme to run the infrastructure provider as a not-
for-profit organisation as proposed by the government. The original idea of the DTLR,
however, seemed to suggest that the members of the new organisation would be industry
stakeholders appointed by the SRA.8
Economist (2001 b), www.econornist.com
588 Financial Times (2001b), www.ftcotn and Fmancial Times (2001cr), p. 3 for Stephen Byers' attempts to
give industry leaders reassurance.
'- Grant (2001), p.27 and Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung (2001h)
2784. An assessment of the reform process
4.1 Performance
The years following privatisation have seen a rise in both passenger and freight rail
transport (see charts 48-52). In 2000-01 passenger rail travel was at its highest level since the
late 1940s and was anticipated to increase by a further 50 per cent by 201 Freight lifted
rapidly went down until 1994-95, stabilising in the range of 100 million tons per year
thereafter, whereas freight moved shows a steady increase up to 18.1 billion ton kilometres
in 2000-01, pointing towards increased average journey lengths.' The government's 10
Year Plan and the SRA's Freight Strategy anticipated a further 80° o growth of rail freight.5
Total passenger kilometres went up by 37% and freight moved by 39% over the 1994-95
figures. However, the increase led to capacity bottlenecks on Railtrack's network, as the
company could hardly accommodate such drastic growth. Chart 52 shows a slower rise of
coal in proportion to other freight moved, hinting at the private FOCs attempts to
diversify into a wider freight market, as mentioned above. The charts also illustrate the
success of the implementation of sector management to British Rail in 1982. But the
upturn of the passenger figures was soon curtailed by the recession in the early 1990s and
started to recover only at the time of privatisation.
Apparently, the rail figures are highly sensitive to the overall economic
performance, which seemed to support the growth of the rail industry after the 1993
Railways Act. The freight business shows a serious decline in 1984-85 as a consequence of
the miners' strike. The major disruptions following the accident near Hatfield on 17
October 2000 had a further temporary impact on the rail industry, when Railtrack imposed
over 1000 Emergency Speed Restrictions across the network. Severe flooding and weather
conditions during the autumn of 2000 aggravated the disruptions to the industry and led to
temporary closures on several routes. Despite these negative influences on the rail industry,
passenger numbers increased slightly by 2° o during 2000-01. Nevertheless, their effect is
visible in the small reduction of passenger revenues in 2000-01 as a consequence of
compensation payments to travellers and the minor setback of the growth trend  in freight
traffic (charts 50 & 52). Still, it is likely that the expected downturn of the economy in 2001-
° Economist (2000a, p. 36 and DETR 2000b). Detailed performance assessments on every operator are
provided in sSRA (2000c).
591 sSRA (2000b), p. 17
DETR (2000c) and SRA (2001b), p. 7
SRA (2001e). The weather in the autumn of 2000 was the wettest in England and Wales since 1872
2794.2 Infrastructure and train operations
Apparently, competition in the market for rail track access is almost absent. The
TOCs depend upon Railtrack for the application of their safety cases and access contracts,
regulated by the ORR. As the only supplier of infrastructure access, Railtrack exercises
considerable market power in the railway industry.594 However, regarding the wider
transport and communication market, Railtrack's railway market power is considerably
curbed. 5 Assuming an efficient access price system, Railtrack has a rational interest in
granting access to every operator who pays the way and thus, creates revenues for Railtrack
by means of track access charges, though some discrimination may pay off for Railtrack.
Lost traffic to train companies means lost revenue for Railtrack. If the incumbent TOGs or
newcomers, in co-operation with Railtrack, attract further traffic volumes to the railways
from other modes of transport or create new markets, both the train operator's and
Railtrack's receipts will rise, creating a win-win situation for both parties. Should Railtrack
exercise its dominant position in the railway industry and charge excessively high access
prices, it behaves irrationally by eliminating its own foundations and income in the long
run. Even in the unlikely case that Railtrack may behave irrational, thereby eradicating the
basis of other businesses in the railway industry, a complaint to the Office of Fair Trading
on account of abuses of monopoly powers should be sufficient
Indeed, the previous argument is only true for an efficient access price regime. In
contrast, the charging scheme in operation during the first control period until March 2001
led to inefficiencies and distortions in the transport industry. The high fixed element of the
access price set an incentive for train operators to run additional trains, even if they were
only lightly loaded. Railtrack claimed that the variable component did not even cover wear
and tear costs. Accordingly, Railtrack would rather have an incentive to  discourage additional
services, as they would equal a cross-subsidy from Railtrack to the operator. Following
Railtrack's comment to the Rail Regulator, the variable component of the access charge
was increased for the second control period and a capacity charge was implemented to
promote more efficient allocation of scarce slots on the network. The pricing policy
discriminates in favour of newcomers and freight operators, as both are solely charged for
1 Tom Winsor, the Rail Regulator issued a warning to Railtrack, that they must not behave like a dictator in
the industry, Financial Times (2000h).
5 Bradshaw (2000), p. 234 argues that R.ailtrack's ",rnnwpo/y stas"was one of the least satisfactory outcomes
of rail privatisation, as the relationship between the regulator and Railtrack is characterised by asymmetric
information. Above others to obtain yardsticks for Railtrack's cost structure, Bradshaw suggests a break-up of
Railtrack, "...although anj break-up of the aYmpanj mtgbt herald the irvuprng of the nuLwy :nto veiz%i intgrated
nec "Section IV shall analyse a railway structure with competing track operating companies.
284the variable costs. The charging schemes for the first two control periods until March 2006
more or less guaranteed Railtrack's revenue allowance, further discouraging Railtrack from
expanding the network or run it more efficiently. The Regulator's approved revenue
allowance for Railtrack is based on track access revenues from train operators. The
franchised services, however, have franchise conditions to meet that guarantee Railtrack's
mcome.
Also, competition between train operators is still limited to a few major
connections, mainly out of London up to the north of England and Scotland, where
competition between different routes developed, e.g. between Virgin on the West Coast
Main Line and Great North Eastern Railways along the East Coast, or passenger services
by Silverlink up to Birmingham. Still, neither the open access to new entrants, nor a full
privatisation, i.e. an eventual sale of the franchises have so far materialised on the
government's agenda. Though the 1992 White Paper suggested open access and a final sale
of train operations, it is doubtful whether the Conservatives would have met their own
original proposals, which were watered down in the policy process leading up to the 1993
Railways Act and compromised in the first franchising process due to anticipated adverse
effects on the amount of subsidy to the TOCs and the prospects of the upcoming general
election.
Following guidance from the Secretary of State, the Rail Regulator decided in 1994
that competition on the track should be restricted for the period of the initial franchises
through moderation of competition arrangements of the ORR. The government was
concerned that the threat of open access might have an adverse effect on the prices of the
initial franchising process and also on the overall success of the ptivaflsation. 5 During the
first stage of the moderation of competition arrangements, competitive entry generally
required the approval of the incumbent franchise operator, if traffic flows generated more
than 0.2° o of the franchisee's revenue on a specified flow. The franchise operator
nominated all such flows to the Rail Regulator for approval. The TOC might also request
nomination of flows not currently served by an existing train operator, if a potential
newcomer could endanger the franchisees core market on that alternative route. Thus,
potential entrants were restricted to operate services on flows that generated less than 0.2°
of the franchisee's revenue. Alternatively, only flows on which no through service was
Bolt 1997), p. 10
285provided were subject to open access competition. 7 In September 1999 the second stage
relaxed the protectionist access arrangement to a threshold of 2000 of the incumbent
franchisee's revenue on nominated routes. Non-nominated services are open to potential
competitors. This stage is expected to expire in March 2002 and " . . the Regulator does not
be/iet that it would be appropriate to introduce new moderation  of competition amingements from 1 April
2002. Instead he intends to consult on the appmpiate long terni approach, in the context of the Strategic
Rail Aiirthoriy's. . .franchise replacement programme.'t9' Since privatisation, competition in the
privatised market has been strictly restricted to overlapping or parallel franchises and to
emerging open access providers, such as Hull Trains' non-franchised passenger operations
between Hull and King's Cross. The moderation of competition was implemented to
facilitate the successful franchising process.5
Before the passing of the Railways Bill in 1993 Glaister and Travers commented on
the government's proposals to implement open access rights at some future date. They
suggested, ". . . the outcome could be that passenger seriices on profitable routes would beprouded entire!,
Li3 'open access' operators in competition with one another. Servwes on unprofitable routes would be çperated
underfranchises, jf the Franchising Director decided thy were worth running at all ' Notwithstanding
its advantages, Glaister and Travers highlight likely complications, as the open access
competition would eliminate profits that were used to cross-subsidise loss-making
operations. In the end, the general taxpayers would lose, as they would have to fund the
unviable services that are preserved.60' But this exactly is the point of so-called public
services, which are to a lesser - or often greater - extent paid for by the general taxpayers,
whether or not they ever use the specified public service. Over the past, cross-subsidies
from profitable to uneconomic services resulted in the profitable sector losing
competitiveness with other modes of transport that did not have to comply with
comparable obligations and could skim the cream on the most promising routes. Open
access providers would indeed opt for profitable routes and they might also fmd former
unprofitable routes or links that were already out of service to offer some economic
potential. These services are not a public, but a pthtite seriice in an industry like any other
industry. Public services should be in the realm of the government and accordingly the
government and in the event the taxpayers must be ready to fund the unviable services for
Jones (2000), p. 376
ORR (2001), www.sra.gov.uk
Preston, Whelan and Wardrnan (1999), pp. 86-89, 92 studied the scope of open access competition and
concluded that competition-on-the-track would generally result in a transfer of rents from producers to
consumers and from incumbents to newcomers, rather than an increase m overall welfare.
Glaister and Travers (1993 ,p.4l
601 Glaister and Travers (1993), p.41
286the advancement of public welfare. In that case, public subsidies would be transparent and
easily accounted for by the taxpayers.
It may well be that the Regulator will move into this direction after the expiration
of the moderation of competition arrangements in 2002, when he considers his further
approach to open access operators in conjunction with the SRA's re-franchising process.
According arrangements would still require the SRA to tender unviable routes of regional
or social importance if government so desires, while the Rail Regulator's functions might
move to the marketplace and the Office of Fair Trading. The train operators could then
compete in a railway market instead of an administered regime of price and output
controls.
The duration of the first franchise agreements between OPRAF and the TOCs was
designed to be in the range of 7 to 15 years, depending upon the investment needs of the
franchise. Preston, Nash and Wardman estimated that an extension of the franchises by
five years would have reduced annual subsidies by £415 million, equalling a 21° o reduction
of the total subsidy bilL602 Also, short franchise periods may very well discourage
investment in the system, though proponents of the short franchises stressed that shorter
periods would promote the competition for franchises.'°3 Further, it might be expected that
incumbent franchise owners try to run ahead and invest in their franchise in order to be
rewarded in the re-franchising process, but this strategy is highly sensitive to political
decisions. Labour's initial claims of a re-nationalisation of the railway system should have
served as a reminder to the then Conservative government that the re-franchising process
and the performance of the TOCs depend upon public policy, contrasting the aim of the
Conservatives to create a railway system independent of politics. It is inherent to franchise
systems that rules of the game may be altered in the next round of franchises, and this is
indeed what happened with Labour's New Deal and tighter rules in the re-franchising
process. The uncertain future of railway policy under either a Conservative or Labour
government, the prospects of re-nationalisation, tougher regulation and the possibility of
different rules after a general election or whenever it suited political bargaining are
disincentives to the franchisees' investment policies. The SRA extended franchise periods
to 20 years in a more strategic approach. Admittedly, the longer franchise duration erects
legally protected market bathers for the specified service. Thus, open access provisions to
602 Preston, Nash, Wardman et aL (1997), ch. 4
Preston et aL (2000), p. 103
287the entire railway network are needed more urgently than before to challenge the
franchised operators to provide high-quality services to the consumers.
It is often claimed that one of the major drawbacks of the British railway reform is
its institutional complexity, involving high transaction costs. This shall be discussed in
section IV, which argues that transaction costs also occur within a single national railway
company, such as British Rail or Deutsche Bahn AG. Negotiating costs or costs of
enforcement may even be lower in a decentralized railway market between a number of
companies and regulators than in a centralised single railway company. Nevertheless, the
diversity of public regulatory bodies has been called into question further above. A network
of obligations imposed upon the rail operators markedly increases negotiation and
compliance costs. Also, the amount of 25 TOCs may not be optimaL The number of 25
companies is as arbitrary as the number of four companies after Britain's 1921 merger. It
may well be that the railway market works more efficiently with fewer train operating
companies and suppliers. As mergers are quite common to every market economy, a
further concentration in the railway market might be expected to align closer to the market
optimum.'°4
Passenger rail transport in the UK is undertaken by 25 different franchisees. But
only 11 different companies own the 25 TOGs as depicted in Table 2 above. A prominent
concern was that four of the 11 franchise owners are also major bus and coach operators,
giving rise for potential market dominance or a drain of resources from the rail franchise
towards the bus operator or vice versa.605 However, the combination between bus and train
operators also offers considerable benefits in form of transport integration, which is so
often demanded by advocates of re-nationalisation, re-regulation and alike. Integration of
the entire transport industry was the major goal of the proponents of the 1947 Transport
Act, which established the British Transport Commission and also the 1998 New Dealfor
Transport. Though public sector monopolies for the entire transport market were expected
to produce massive benefits to society, a strong position of private firms leads to fears of
monopolistic behaviour. Puliment was the sole regulator of the monopolistic British
Transport Commission. In contrast, the ORR, the SRA, the USE, the Secretary of State,
the Office of Fair Trading, European competition laws and direct competitors check
private companies in the transport market
604 Interviewees in a study by Preston et al. 2000), p. 103 expected a consohdation in the industry to a final 4
to 6 operators in ten years.
Preston et aL (2000 , p. 104
2884.3 Regulatory interference
The Conservatives' 1992 White Paper envisaged broad objectives for the
franchisees, no regulation of fares, except for London commuters, a combination of
franchised and open access operations to the passenger rail industry and an eventual
privatisation of francbises. The 1993 Railways Act, however, implemented tight regulation
that was not foreseen in the White Paper. The result was a contradiction of the
government's original objectives and an unsound privatisation process. Weisby and Nichols
indicate that the privatised industry structure was more tightly regulated than the state
owned BR and Nash confirms that the 1993 design granted the government extensive
regulatory powers over the industry.606
The postponement of open access made the creation of the ROSCOs at best
redundant. Instead, the BR's rolling stock could have been allocated to the franchises,
similar to Statens Jarnvagar's transfer of rolling stock to the CPTA.'°7 While the idea of
leasing companies for rolling stock would facilitate competition  in an open railway market
due to a reduction of entry barriers for newcomers, the necessity of ROSCOs is doubtful in
an incontestable railway market. The ROSCOs received an invaluable income guarantee
due to the design of the British approach to reforming the railways, as the TOCs were tied
to the ROSCOs until 2004, though a few leases expired  in 1998. Thereby the TOCs
relieved the ROSCOs of the risk of demand variations in the final product market. The
regulatory regime applied to Raikrack had a similar effect upon the TOCs, as the ORR
more or less fixed Railtrack's income from access prices in his quinquennial reviews of the
pricing regime in 1995 and 2000. The TOCs, however, had contractual obligations
regarding their output leveL In short, the TOCs had to carry a substantial risk of the assets
they did not even own, guaranteed a long-term income to the ROSCOs and Railtrack and
shielded both against an economic downtum. The contractual structure discriminated in
favour of Railtrack and the ROSCOs, though they rather than the TOCs exhibited market
power and were already safeguarded from competition due to the regulatory design.
'06 Welsby and Nichols (1999), p. 61 and Nash (2001)
'°See section Ill.A4
'°8 Bradshaw (1998), p. 182 explains the governmenfs reasonmg behind this design: '7n onierto sell the tious
component parts qtthe r€th'qy gadusby a maconable price, the ,gotment's advisercfelt it necessal3 to se/i the new companees
ithguamnteed vnftizr in p/ace."
609 This observation was largely shared by Welsby (1998), pp. 9-10. Welsby criticises that the TOCs that
". . . iom intended to be the .pearbead qfx weniabim €(the nzlwqys and the figurrbeads thepnzirthsed :ndusty" were
most beaujy riaIated... "Welsby recommends a reduction of the ROSCOs' market power, a reform of the
charging principle towards a higher share of variable charges and a reform of the Incentive structure in the
institutionally separate railway system.
289Railtrack's access charges were subject to the Rail Regulator's control, but
regulation of ROSCOs was absent, though the leasing companies were subject to the
general competition law. Competition between ROSCOs was also almost absent due to
long-term contracts that had been agreed upon prior to franchising passenger operations.
And competition from rolling stock producers would only emerge if TOGs required rolling
stock in addition to the leasing contracts or when the contracts were running out.
The reformed British railway structure was tied together through a net of
supervisory and regulatory bodies, such as the SRA, the ORR, the HSE, the Secretary of
State and the Office of Fair Trading. The regulatory variety is indeed surprising, especially
before the background of the 1992 White Paper, which suested that government
involvement would be curbed. Also, it dearly highlighted perceived monopoly power in
London commuter services and the operation of the infrastructure. The regulation,
however, focussed on the TOCs. Currently, 39% of the TOCs' income comes from fares
regulated by the SRA. Passenger Service Requirements restrict adaptations of franchisees
output levels according to market demand. They have to meet comprehensive franchise
obligations set by OPRAF (and then the SRA) that limit their flexibility and entrepreneurial
freedom. Licenses and access agreements are in the realm of the ORR and safety cases
require Railtrack's approval. In addition, the Rail Regulator was supposed to promote
competition and the passengers' interests. The latter are most certainly diverse and one
might wonder whether there was a model customer whose interests the Regulator was
promoting. Competition is the only objective, non-discriminatory regulator, taking the
interests of all passengers in account.
Adding to competitive market forces, the obvious regulator for abuses of market
dominance is the Office of Fair Trading. Also, European competition rules laid down in
articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Amsterdam may be affected if trade between member
states is affected: "A,y abuse bj one or more undertakings of a d4minant position within the common
market or in a substantialpart of it shall bepvhibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as
it maj affict trade between Member States."1° Accordingly, the rules of the competitive game are
already set at both the national and international level in order to protect the players from
potential abuses of other players. The added benefits of a further economic regulator are
therefore at best questionable, if not absent and distorting.
610 pii Union (1997), arucle 82
290If the 1992 Paper had materialised, the British approach could have been
characterised by light-handed regulation. Regulatory forces would have checked the market
power assumed in the infrastructure and London commuter operations. Franchised
passenger services would have seen minimum service requirements instead of PSR's with
an inherent flexibility and standards developing in competitive services. The franchised
services would have taken care of social services and received subsidies in return. Open
access operators could have checked the TOCs price/output combination. They might also
have challenged claims on subsidised services, similar to Sydvästen's challenge to the
incumbent Statens Jarnvagar.611 The 1992 White Paper advocated choice, but the
subsequent reform restricted choice. Efforts to deregulate the industry to create a market
for railway services were sacrificed to regulatory interference and ministerial wisdom.
611 See section III.A.4
2914.4 Safety
Safety issues were one of the prime concerns about the British Rail network after
the dangers had been highlighted by the disruptive Southall, Ladbroke Grove and Hatfield
accidents in 1997, 1999 and 2000 with a high number of casualties. In the wake of each
crash followed an understandable public outcry, which was immediately echoed by
politicians who were taken over by the something-must-be-done mood and were promising
immediate action of some kind.
However, Railtrack moved first and brought Britain's train system close to a
standstill. Railtrack's action was literally remarkable and indeed, quite preposterous. The
track operator imposed over 1200 Emergency Speed Restrictions across the rail network,
often as low as 20 miles per hour and replaced hundreds of miles of rails. One might argue
that the public outcry in the aftermath of Hatfield left Railtrack not much of a choice other
than reducing the risk to a minimum with extensive speed restrictions. Jenkins noted in  The
Times ". . . byteiia has now grabbed bold of sanity. Ac everj passenger will attest, .peed and comfoti are
being sacnjIced to the ,rnz,cim, better safe than blamed As a resub milbons ofpassengers are being d,iten
off the trains on the roads, where maiy more will die or suffer senous iyu7y. The railwqy is now a classic of
brainless regulation. Who wild blame Railtrack jf it left its 'emeencj timetable' in place for ever, until
ministers agree to 'take the blame'for changing it?"512 Wolmar highlighted the role of Cox who
took office as Railtrack's director of operations just seven weeks prior to the crash as a
newcomer to the rail industry.6u Instead of running the railways, Railtrack's executives
made it their priority to avoid another broken rail at all cost. 614 Wolmar maintained that
Railtrack's overall reaction to the crash and the imposition of crawling speed restrictions
against the advice of senior engineers was the result of lacking engineering expertise.615
Though the actions taken in the aftermath of the accident might improve long-term
rail safety, it resulted in double journey times or worse in the short-term, forcing several rail
users back on the road. The Economist questioned the rationale behind the measures taken,
arguing that the " . . chaos is like±5r to cause more deaths than it saves and the money that is supposed to
'12Jenkins (2000 , p.22
613 Wolnm (2001 , pp. 1-10
614 It is alarming to observe that not even the executives of Railtrack trusted the quality of their network
themselves and resorted to such drastic measures. And the costs were excessive, indeed. Wolmar (2001), p. 7
stated that the disruptions in train operations amounted to "...ull otter 1/rn, paiJy in ampensation dams and
pa1ty in much unnessarj ençneenng nu*."
615 Wolmar (2001), pp. 10-14
292satt Litts is being misspent.' 16 The Economist's continued that the measures produced a rail crisis
that drove about a third of the railways' passengers back to the roads in the month
following the fatal Hatfield accident.617 However, the accident rate per kilometre is 12 times
higher on the roads than on the railways. Calling upon road-safety experts, The Economist
estimated that the extra traffic on the roads could result in five additional deaths. Over the
last thirty years a total number of six people have died due to broken rails, including the
four victims of Hatfield.
As a matter of fact, fatalities on the roads easily outnumber deaths on the railways.
Whereas 3,423 people died on the roads in 1999, 33 people were victims of rail accidents in
the same year, 31 of the latter figure actually died in the fatal Ladbroke Grove crash.
Though the number of kilometres travelled on the roads is higher than on the railways, the
accident rate in proportion to the kilometres travelled on the roads is substantially higher.
Still, railway accidents with a comparatively large number of victims naturally attract more
public attention and press coverage than the 1999 average of nine daily deaths on Britain's
roads. Considering the higher level of fatalities on the roads, the Cullen & Uff Southall and
Ladbroke Grove Joint Inquiry specifically pointed towards the '. .  disproporlionate reaction of
the media to rail mishaps of ay kineL 1S In their view, one of the main reasons of the public's
concern is that they do not have any control over the events in case of an accident The
passengers are solely left at the driver's discretion. The report also notes that the public
attitude in Britain changed over the years. Even major rail crashes did not produce a
reaction comparable to the most recent accidents. According to the report this may be due
to legislative changes, such as the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act and the misleading
perception of parts of the public that the privatised railways would give a higher priority to
profits than to safety.619
The Economist calculated the costs of a single life attributed to the different train
protection systems, resulting in £15 million per life saved with the enhanced and £5 million
per life saved with the common TPWS. As local authority spending on road safety rarely
exceeds £100,000 investment in accident prevention measures, The Economist questioned
whether the priorities on spending would be right.  'From socieyc point of uew, though, it is far
fivm rational to 4pend 150 times as much on sathg a life on the railwqys as on sathg a on the tvadc.
616 Econoyit (2000b), p. 35; see also The Economist's leader on p. 23 of the same issue.
617 Wo y (2001), p 16 cites that congestion went up by 40°. m the two weeks after Hatfield and was 2000
above pre-Hatfield levels five weeks after the crash.
618 HSC (2001), p. 11
619 HSC (2001), pp. 2 and 4
293A bereaved mother cares little how her child was killed May more lives could be saved the monry
cumnt/y being poured into awiding spectaadar but rare railway crashes were .pent instead on awiding the
tragedies that happen ten times every iky on the nrndr.
The blame culture following each accident and even minor derailments was neither
good for the victims, nor the railway industry. The Economist's figures illustrate the massive
amount needed to make the railways safer than they are today. But in addition to the train
protection systems, further investment is required in Railtrack's infrastructure that has to
be carried out over several years.'2' The transport minister Lord Macdonald acknowledged
negative effects of investment under previous state-ownership and observed that we ' . .  are
dealing with a very large mechanical railway and things break. W'è must comp ensate for decades  of under-
investment as quick/y as possible. " Society and its political agents have to make a decision
about the trade-off of public investments in safety on the railways. The opportunity costs
of attributing more public funds to railway safety are lesser public funds in other policy
areas, whether it is road safety, health care or environmental policy." 3 As the Joint Inquiry
report noted that ' . . sums which can be detvted to sajèy issues are necessari/y limited and other
demands on public funds mean that questions ofpriori!y must be addressed."4 The priority, however,
seems to be clear. In June 2001 the DETR confirmed that more resources could be
diverted from roads and local transport investment to the railways - with the entailed
consequences for victims in road acthdents.'
In a fail-danger industry like the railways it is vital to be aware of the potential
dangers and provide for clear competencies in emergencies. SPADs as in the Ladbroke
Grove disaster require a straight line of communication to other decision makers, such as
the driver of the approaching train and the operator of the signalling system. In case of a
63 Econonist (2000c), p. 23 and also Wolmar (2001), pp. 186 187
621 Jones (1999), p. 17 cites Colin Robinson of the lEA: '7 do think people are expecting results in the radindiistrj too
qtacky. Improvement ne//undoubtedly happen, but  it ugcung to take 5-lQyecm before there is a noticeable dferene"
' Marston (2000), p. 1. Bartholomew (2000 , p. 28, quotes average investment levels of £850 million a year
in the two decades prior privatisatlon, comparing to increased investment of roughly £2.4 billion in 2000. He
argues that nationahsation and not privatisation was to blame for the recent railway catastrophes:  "The decades
ef neglect Ig? the nzilnery with out qf date sgnafr, old s ystems and antique ro/.kng stock. It is the nabonabsation ef the
rvelways, ruther than pavatisatson, that kes bebend the number f deaths and serious injuries that have taken phue in recent
ynon It war under najionabsation, too, that the  unions became sopoa'eeful in the rail indusky. That added substantially to the
cost of ripthr and improvements that we dqunztely needed"
"Using the governmenfs official guideline figure of £3.2 million per life saved on the railways compared to
the £100,000 available for equivalent figures on the roads, leads Wolmar (2001), p. 186 to a drastic
conclusion: "In other words, over therty times more is ipentper  bft saved on the railnays than on the roads, wketh, snadentah5,
kill 3,500 people peryear. Equimilent sums 4pent ox road safiy, ortudeed kidney machenes or even other  pes of railwqy safety
themes, would save manjt more
'4HSC(200l),p.3
" Financial Times (2001a), front page
294railway accident, responsibilities must be transparent, without the possibility to pass the
buck. Section IV suests according safety operations.
2955. Conclusion
Initially, the British railway privatisation was judged to be a success. This at least
was a widespread notion until the recent railway accidents, when the reputation of the
British approach to privatisation lost ground. In the early 1 990s, the necessity of change in
the industry was obvious for both Labour and the Conservatives. The approach the
Conservatives were pursuing was more radical than any of the reforms in Europe. The
EEC Directive 91/440 as discussed in section III.A. was a welcome legitimisation to justify
the rather radical reform programme before the British public, though privatisation in the
UK exceeded the modest European requirements.626 But a radical approach was needed to
save the ailing railway network that depended on political bargaining between a variety of
interest groups to decide upon investment levels, prices and other key figures during much
of the post-war period.
From a statistical point of view, the figures suest that the reform was a success.
Investment data as well as passenger and freight rail transport went up by impressive
degrees after privatisation, whereas franchise subsidies went in the opposite direction.
However, Railtrack's financial crisis in the aftermath of Hatfield, a massive inflation in
route construction and upgrading costs spoil this rather encouraging picture, as the
government had to take financial responsibility from the bankrupt track operator. Though
it would be over-optimistic to ascribe the industry's growth entirely to the reform initiated
by the 1992 White Paper and its watered-down version in the 1993 Railway Act, the U-turn
in the railways' performance coincides significantly with the privatisation of the industry.
Still, exogenous factors, such as the boom of the UK economy also benefited the
railways.6V
Notwithstanding the performance figures, an overriding concern for the British
passengers and the public is safety on the railways, again highlighted by the tragic accidents
in Southall, Ladbroke Grove and Hatfield. However, the disproportionate actions due to
'26 Kmll and Lehmkuhl (1997), p.4
627 see Shaw (2001), p. 7. Studies for the U.S. draw similar conclusions. The 1980 Staers Act deregulated the
U.S. railroad industry. Ellig (2001) conchides: "Qfcourre, the fact that rate reducboiu fo2towed deregulation ikes nt
necessa4 mean that dereguhition onird all of the rate redudio,u. .. .Some or most of these thaiges ivuld afro baz been
enous; in that case some or most of the reductions in revenue per ton-mile cansed /y thesefactors should n be attributed to
deregulation." Domergue and Qumet (2001) condude in their brief overview over the European railway
reforms and improving traffic statistics that "..it u too soon to credit thufawurable ewliction solelj to the rail torens.
The ,general upturn in economic actitlEy must have plqyed a hve ,vle, but the rail reforms mqy bepa#jy responsible as suppoiled
by thefact that the thange has been greatest in UKfrght zere the reforms nre most dramatic."
296political panicking were neither beneficial to the victims and their families, nor to the
railway operators and their customers. Further investments in safety measures may be
essential to regain the reputation of the railways, but there is no guarantee for safety in a
fail-danger industry. The suggestions made in the Joint Inquiry report on the European
Train Control System may well pave the way for a single European railway safety agency.
However, section IV suggests a system with an independent safety operator in an open
access environment, also in charge of daily traffic management and the allocation of slots
without removing the rail firms' individual responsibility for safe operations. The structure
would ensure competition in a true railway market and would remove the necessity of
excessive public regulation.
If the railways exploit their competitive advantages over other modes of transport,
a shift of the modal split in favour of railways may be expected. Though legislative efforts
might contribute to the shift, the railways' reaction to intermodal challenges and increasing
congestion is most important. The protection of the incumbents in the railway market
might have had some justification at the beginning of the railway reform. But the time has
come to open up the market for entrants and to go full circle in privatisation, including a
sale of the franchises to the private sector and entailing open access competition with
unregulated fares. Private train operators have proved that they are able to run the railways.
The SRA, PTEs or local government bodies may continue to pay subsidies, wherever
railway services are considered beneficial to the region or individuals, but do not pay their
way. The Office of Fair Trading would monitor the companies' competitive practices and a
national or European railway safety body could be in charge of the overall safety
procedures, while the companies would be responsible for their actions, just like every
other private business. The future of the single national track owner is still undecided and
Railtrack may well be separated horizontally or may be forced to lease their tracks to major
regional operators. The TOCs are already franchised to a relatively small number of
franchise owners and a further trend towards concentration may be expected, if political
concerns of market power are left aside. Section N also takes the implications of a
horizontal separation of tracks and a concentration of train operating companies into
consideration.
The New Oppommities for the Railwqys White Paper provided valuable ideas for a
reform of the railways in the dynamic transport market. Unfortunately, the 1993 Railways
Act was substantially flawed, as the most important provisions of the White Paper had
297been watered down or removed during the Bill's passage in Parliament. The creation of
ROSCOs to lower entry bathers is essentially useless, if insurmountable entry barriers are
erected by franchised passenger operations that exclude competitive entry to the market.
Without open access, there is no reason why the rolling stock could not have been included
in the original franchising contracts. Adding to this, the ROSCOs were sold when medium-
term leases for virtually the entire fleet of rolling stock had been signed, virtually
guaranteeing an income to the leasing companies.' Also, the Rail Regulator fixed
Railtrack's income from access charges that carried only a small amount of variable costs.
The guaranteed revenue removed incentives from Railtrack and the ROSCOs to enhance
the efficiency of their respective products. As a consequence, the risks of the final market
have been lifted from the asset owners, while the franchised passenger operators are left to
fulfil their contractual obligations, subject to substantial uncertainties of the final market
and the overall economic development. While Railtrack, the ROSCOs and infrastructure
suppliers were privatised, the private franchise operators own very few assets. The
franchise may be revoked if the government so decided under the current framework,
deterring further investment. Though the then Conservative government acknowledged
market power exclusively in the infrastructure and in London commuter services, it went
for a re-regulated railway market predominantly where no considerable market power was
assumed, that is in train operations. Glaister noted this trend already in 1994, as
"i.. 'administeredpricing', 'moderation of competition' are being dedopedaspolicies which, in the short iwn
at least, are &sgned to defeat market sjgnalc y rendering them irrelevant. 29 In this light it is difficult
to judge the bodged British privatisation as a success and also to award the British model
the term privatisation.63° This is still a long way to go. The latest crisis on the British
railways must be used wisely. The next section offers a design for privatisation that could
be based on the approaches to reform undertaken in Britain and other European countries,
but requires some re-thinking of the basic structure of railway systems.
6i s Welsby (1998), p. 246 and Weisby and Nichols (1999), p. 70
629 Glant (1994), p. 133
3° Cynics might rather choose British Rail mstead.
298Section IV
Privatisation - An Alternative Model
299A. General assumptions
After the period of relatively free railway entrepreneurship in the 9 century had
been overthrown by regulation and eventually nationalisation, the railways in Germany
and later in Britain were organised as monopolistic public companies which were sole
rulers over railway transportation in protectionist transport markets. This monolithic
structure is portrayed in figure 4 below, in which one company generally owned and
operated layers I, H and III. The discussion in the preceding sections has shown the
following, generally for the United Kingdom, Germany and also partly for other EU
countries:
1. The railwqys were ongina4y set tip asprwate companies due to dffering motives.
2. Government regulation of the raiiwaj industry was alreadj on the agenda in the 1840s,
gaining pace in the latter ha(f of the 1 9th centuy.
3. The railwqys were nationalisedfor a number of reasons, outlined in sections 1 and II.
4. The reasons for nationalisation based on market im)e/èctions were unjust'fied from an
economic point of tew, as discussed in section II.
5. Rsgulation or outnght nationalisation of the private sector involved political and social
pol4y considerations.
6. P,ivatisations in the last decade of the 20th century followed drent perceptions about the
role ofprivate enterprise and railwqys in society.
In the aftermath of WWII, the Deutsche Bundesbahn and British Railways
operated passenger and freight services on their own infrastructure networks until they
were affected by the railway reforms in the I 990s. This section investigates the three
layers of railway networks in horizontal and vertical combinations, ranging from the
vertical and horizontal integration in one company to a number of companies emerging
from horizontal and vertical separation at the other end of the scale. The latter case could
produce a variety of different passenger and freight train operating companies and railway
track operators. The passenger and freight rail finns in layer III will be termed POCs and
FOCs, while the term TOCs is used for addressing both as train operating companies. The
railway infrastructure network could be run by several safety operating companies (SOCs)
in layer H and rail track operating companies (ROCs) in layer L This is the starting point
for a fully fledged reform, decentralizing vertically and horizontally integrated railway
300firms, potentially into a variety of new, independent firms, while simultaneously opening
the market for newcomers by providing open access to train operations.
LqyerHl	 Train Operating Companies
(P0 Cs and FOCs)
LIyer 11	 Network of Traffic and Safetj Controls
(SO Cs)
Layr I	 Phjisical Connection of Railwaj Tracks
(ROCs)
FIGURE 4: Vertiall, Iiterated Railwaj S511e4w
Some assumptions were already implied. The theoretical analysis of the railway
industry is founded on the following assumptions:
1. Methodological individualism: This principle means that economic behaviour and
action originates from individual behaviour and action. It is always individuals
who take decisions and make moves. So called government decisions are
resulting from individual action. Thus, it is solely individuals, never the
government, the society or other nebulous collectives taking decisions or
action."°
2. Rational utility maximisation: The individual players involved in the market act
rationally in their self-interest, aiming to maximise their own utility function.
Thus, the owner of the infrastructure network will maximise the revenue
from access charges paid by POCs and FOCs, as long as his decisions are based
on his profit function. Still, the owner's utility function might comprise other
goals next to the pure profit motive. This assumption simply states that
individuals guided by reason will not contradict their self-interest The owners
of the train operating companies, however, are likely to lure passengers and
freight cargoes on their trains, instead of leaving them stranded on the
platforms and driving past or leaving them to other railway companies or
'° Blankart (1994), p. 10 and Schumpeter (1995), pp. 333-340. Schumpeter (1995), pp. 334-335 clearly
distmguishes between thepoli&ul and ,wethodoIowa1 individualism. The political individualism issues a vanety
of assertions, e.g. that individual freedom benefits the welfare of the entire society. However, methodolocal
301intermodal competitors. Nevertheless, it does not mean that railway
companies have to accept every customer. It is very well possible that the
firms dodge some low-paying customers in order to keep a certain reputation.
Utility maxiinisation does not necessarily mean maximisation of passengers or
trains on the network.
3. Non-discriminatorj o)en access to the networks: Every train company which
complies with minimum safety standards may run freight or passenger trains,
provided they have been allocated a slot on the network of tracks and traffic
controls and pay an access charge to the network providers, such as ROCs and
SOCs. No train company may be discriminated against if they conform with
the minimum standards provided for in the initial privatisation arrangements,
that is entrants must not suffer access charging differentials relative to existing
firms."1 The assumption of free access rights is essential in seeking a rational
alternative to the models of privatisation employed in Europe, as Sharkey has
• shown that free and unrestricted entry can in tbeoy be a viable sHbstitute for direct
regulation in a natural monopoty or natural obgopo/y market."'32 This assumption of
non-discriminatory open access shall be relaxed further below.
4. Distribution of propertj nghts: The government owned and operated the railway
system. Accordingly, contractual arrangements between the government and
the private sector railway industry may be negotiated at the time of
privatisation, such as a non-discriminatory open access provision or
obligations to run (un-)subsidised trains to remote villages with virtually no
traffic volume but high costs. As long as these or any other contractual
arrangements are agreed upon prior to the actual privatisation with full
information to the bidders for the services, they are not infringing upon the
railways' property rights, as they were simply derived from the previous state
ownership and in the end from the ambiguous processes which led to
nationalisation in the first place. Nonetheless, it must be clear that any kind of
contractual arrangement will have an effect on the sale price of the industry's
divisions. The governmental requirements might even be such that no private
company applies to run the infrastructure. Alternatively, applicants may ask
the government for subsidies to fulfil the demands or the government could
individualism has nothing in common with its political countetpart. It is a simple statement that economic
behaviour is based on individual behaviour and actions.
631 Sligler (1968), p. 70
632 Sharkey (1982), Pp. 152 and 164
302opt to run the infrastructure as a public company, while only the train
companies would be sold off. It is a utopian task to dream up a railway
structure from a state of nature environment, where the railways would be
left to themselves might be easier, as no predictions about the final outcome
or structure could be made by definition. Still, the variables in the real world
scenario were set by government regulation and nationalisation. Therefore,
the possibility to start from scratch is ruled out. Now, it's the governments'
responsibility to release the industry, so that the railways may flourish, if the
market so demands.
5. Transaction costs exist: Thereby it is acknowledged that transaction costs are
usually greater than zero. The concept embraces both ex ante and ex post
costs of contracting.'" Accordingly, search for information, contracts,
monitoring, enforcement arrangements and other exchange transactions are
not freely available. If transaction costs were equal to zero, there would be no
reason to have a firm at all. Instead of intra-firm activities, all transactions
could then be carried out on the market via the price system.
Even though the railways' future in the early 1 990s looked bleak in both Britain
and Germany, the governments had the opportunity to shape the future path of the
railways. Governments must use their scope wisely in order to design a railway system
without the fallacies of the past monolithic railway bureaucracies. Governments have the
chance to design a system with a variety of freedoms which would then allow the
companies to operate profitably in a competitive transport market and to regain market
shares which they lost due to their past inefficient organisation. However, exact scientific
predictions cannot and must not be made.6M These should be left to the magical women
with crystal balls. The following analysis will investigate how to maximise the railways'
potential in a privatised industry from the outset. Final decisions must be left to the
individual firms and their owners subject to the restraints of the above assumptions. The
synthesis will then compare the suggested model with European reform models outlined
in section III, focussing on the British and German railway privatisations. Though one
model of railway privatisation will be most favourable from an economic point of view,
some governments may favour other models presented due to political considerations.
'"Mahoney (1992), p. 566
'' Hayek (1996), p. 14 argues that scientific predictions in market processes are impossible because
knowledge is spread over all individuals in society.
303B. Network economies and the railway industry
Railway services are charactensed by the network character of their production.
A network may be defined '..as a large technical ystem consisting of dfferent hjerr of niw
services interconnected with each other through which the final consumer service is generateiL"635 With
regard to the final product mihvt) tranportation ofpassengers, it would be useless to offer
passengers a seat in a train without the train having the right of way on any track at all.
And a railway infrastructure is similarly useless without train operations on its network
and a network of traffic signals and safety measures protecting the trains from collisions.
The services involved in the end product ni/way services require a smooth co-operation
between all parties involved iii the production. The raw services are interconnected with
each other and the capacity of each layer involved determines the capacity of the whole
system. In the following, three layers of a railway system will be analysed more closely,
although most debates on railway systems traditionally assumed the possibility of vertical
separation into two layers only, namely the infrastructure networks (see figure 5, lqyers I &
II) and the operation of railways (see figure 5, lajer III)•636
' 33 Blankart (1998), p. 1 [without original emphasisj
'' Krueps (1996) made a strong case for a vertical separation of tbrmer railway monopolists into three
different layers instead of the traditional two, which will serve as a basis for the discussion. The Open
Systems Interconnection' model of the International Standard Organisation (ISO) consists of seven layers.
Blankart (1998), p. 2 uses a model with four layers in his discussion (1. Physical connection; 2. Means of
transport; 3. Dispatching; 4. Delivery to final user. For the purposes of the following model the restriction
upon three layers is sufficient, as the model will not discuss Blankarfs layers three and four, but will be
restricted to layers one and two of his model, the main activity of former national railway companies. It is
nevertheless useful to keep the other layers in mind, as the companies might find it beneficial to offer their
customers a 'door-to-door' service for freight, luggage and passenger transport
304Lqyer III	 Train Operating Companies
(P0 Cs and FOCs)
Lqyerll	 Network of Traffic and Safety Controls
(SO Cs)
Layer I	 Physical Connection of Railway Tracks
(ROCs)
FAGUKE 5: The Ltyers ef Railwaj Sjsleas
In this analysis, the first layer of railway systems is the physical connection, i.e. the
railway track infrastructure. The second layer is the network of traffic control systems,
while the train operations comprise the third layer of a railway system. Because each layer
puts a restraint on the other layers, as the operation of trains (layer III) is limited by the
maximum capacity the track and the traffic control networks  (layers I & H) can carry, co-
ordination and adjustments between the players in the railway market is essential to
produce an efficient railway system. The exact means of co-operation are controversial
and may be summarised by the markets versus planning debate. The possibilities for
interconnection of the layers will be a focus of this section. Blankart briefly summarises
the views of the conventional planning wisdom in noting that the interconnection of the
layers can be dealt with '..through either planning or markets, i.e. by hierarchical flat or by
decentralized agreement. According to the conventional wisdom on4 j planning is efficient in a large
technical .ystem. Markets would lead to incomplete adjustment in particular in regard to standards.
Whereas capacities on each layer may be adjusted to the demand coming from a neghboring layer
(promded that there are no problems of market power...), standards are said to be unlike/y  to adjust
under the intisible band of the market. In railroads e.g. decentralized action is said  to lead to rail
ystems with vaying rail width, ekffirent s:gnahng techniques, ekiferent brakes and different buffer
heights so that network islands, each with differing sets of standards, would emerge. The reason is that
individuals when deciding on standards onb consider their onos utik y and not that generated to other
particpants of a large technical ystem. Thrj disregard the externalities generated  to others and
therefore prevent that the full potential of the cystem will be exploited in decentralized markets... In
order to azuid such externalities, adjustment on each layer should be made centralv. One single
organization would work more q7Itienty according to the conventional wisdom than many competing
305otRanilations. Centralization woul4 however, inevitab/y lead to market power. The large technical
.ystem would become a natural monop ov Ath the power and the incentive to reduce  supp±5,, to set p rices
above costs and to generate excessive profits. Such market beharirnr should be prevented  4'y government
regulation. Politicalfower should neutralize market power so that peiformance can be achieved which
is similar to that oJ'competitiwfirms though no competition takes place. ...Note that markets have no
ivIe in the conventional wisdom of late technical .cystems."637
Though this analysis is tailored to the railway industry, it is applicable to other
network industries with minor alterations, broadly encompassing utility industries, such
as transportation, communication and energy supply.638 An incomplete list of network
industries would include systems as diverse as railways, roads, airports, waterways, ports,
telecommunications, broadcasting, postal services, electricity, water, gas supply, sewage
etc, but may also be extended to non-utility services such as financial, internet or
interpersonal networks. In Europe, a considerable number of the mentioned utilities were
for long supplied by public companies for various reasons. This has been discussed for the
case of railways in section II and it was highlighted that the economic arguments for the
operation of public railways are at best very weak. Furthermore, it has been stated that
politicians might have other reasons to favour a nationalised railway network, mostly
arising from a perceived social policy background. The final decision is for the politicians
and their agents, the electorate to determine and cannot be the focus of this analysis.
Nevertheless, in the past those non-market activities led to distortions of the
marketplace, mostly with inefficient utility finns, resulting in costly and low quality end
products. Therefore, it is for the advocates of state interference to prove that their
actions are worth pursuing, not for the protagonists of the unhampered market. Many
countries have already privatised a number of network industries or had them short-listed
as potential candidates, whether for economic, budgetary or social policy reasons.
' Blankart (1998), pp. 2-3 (emphasis in originar)
' Geddes (2000) mainly focuses on the US. electricity industry but also surveys other utilities, such as
telephone, gas and water supply on pp. 1187-1191 with a brief excursion to the deregulation debate that
gained pace in Europe on pp. 1191-1192. His study provides a vast overview over almost the entire utility
hterature. Cave and Mills (199 focus on the U.K. utilities industry. See also Littlechild (1995) and
Moorhouse (1995) on electricity deregulation, Cave (1994) on the introduction f competition in the UK
telecommumcation sector, McTigue (1998) on telecommunications  in New Zealand and Rodriguez (1998)
on pnvatisation of postal services in Guatemala. Byatt (1995), Scheele (1991) and Scheele (1997) illustrate
the successful prrvatisation of the UK water industry that was criticised on environmental grounds.
306Kay emphasises the importance of product homogeneity in network
economies.639 Though the amount of passengers travelling between two points on the rail
network is often very similar, it is quite impossible to transfer only the net balance of
passengers over the network. In contrast, electricity supply is a rather homogenous
product where only the net balance is shipped over the electricity grid, resulting in
considerable savings. Nevertheless, certain similarities typically remain in utility networks,
such as high initial capital investments to provide the railway or grid infrastructure, or in
case of other network utilities gas or water pipelines, telecommunication lines or
antennas, airports and roads infrastructure to name but a few. The investments in the
network infrastructure represent high sunk costs as described earlier in the debate on
contestability, making it difficult to move operations, but also to enter the market with a
competing service provider.
It was to a large extent due to the sunk costs, the barriers to mobility and the
perceived natural monopoly character of network utilities, that governments refrained
from private sector involvement, as it was feared that private network monopolies would
be the natural outcome and they would exercise their dominant market power to charge
monopolistic mark-ups on the price, supply inferior quality or even both. However, the
previous analysis of state-owned railway industries should have proved that the same
applies to government controlled or owned monopolies. As customers of inefficient and
protected state-owned rail undertakings commonly had to realise, the quality was at best
poor, if not appalling. Passenger and freight charges were generally very high, despite the
government's heavy subsidies to public companies - which, however, did not impress
their high-cost structures very much. Though subsidies may usually result in lower direct
fares, they are not available for free. Abstracting from their distorting effects on the
market, the general taxpayers have to step in, paying for the subsidies and lower railway
fares - whether they ever use the train system or not. Though the fear-of-monopoly-
argument was a welcome justification for nationalised companies, the argument was
simply applied to the private sector, the public sector apparently being exempt from
similai temptations. This issue was addressed in the brief public policy discussion in the
broader context of the nationalisation debate. In summary, however, it can be said that
public choice economists would not readily agree with the perceived sacred role of
national governments and its politicians. Furthermore, it were governments who actually
created mobility barriers and a protected transport administnition, which at that time had
Kay (1994), p.77
307nothing whatsoever in common with a transport  market, with free exchange transactions
between individuals. Despite the sunk costs in the railway infrastructure, there were ways
of opening up the administration towards creating a more open market. Measures to do
so in network utilities, specifically in the railway industry, are the aim of this section.
3081. The mystified meaning of integration"'
In the case study on the British privatisation, it has been pointed out that the
British Labour Party's transport policy was dominated by the belief that the railways had
to be integrated into a broader transportation system. This was especially obvious in the
1947 Transport Act, but similprly in New Labour's  New Dealfor Transport. Those kinds of
legislative integration attempts stem from a central planning attitude. What is often
termed vertical or horizontal separation therefore poses a seemingly obvious threat to the
conventional integrationist's viewpoint. However, it need not necessarily do so. Whereas
a monolithic railway or transport organisation, such as the British Transport Commission,
is one way of integrating the transport sector by planning, an integration over the market
is another possibility, which shall be called market-based integration hereafter. Williamson
considers a vertical integration in the conventional usage of the term as "...the  organization
form not offirst but of last resort - to be adopted when all else fails. Ty markets, ty long-term
contracts and other iybrid modes, and revert to hierarchj on/y for compelling reasons. Absent pre-
existing monopo/y power, in the event of which strategic considerations can arise, the logic of transaction
cost economizjng reserves integration for those transactions for which the condition of bilateral
dependeny is substantiaL' 1 Shelanski and Klein et al. also consider the conventional logic
of vertical integration as a rather extreme form of internal governance that could also be
substituted by intermediate forms, such as long-term contracts and other contractual
arrangements."2
Neither a vertical, nor a horizontal separation aim at a disintegration of the railway
industry as a whole, solely at institutionallj separated companies, that is a different
oathation in a number of businesses, instead of a single and, indeed, monopolistic firm.
This monopoly situation is a direct consequence of government intervention,
nationalisation and the blind, but possibly even well-meant pursuit of  an integration in
one public company. This section designs a railway market without major bathers to
entry or exit and provides a basis for competition between different private sector
companies. Competition is however only possible if non-discnminatory open access to the
infrastructure networks is guaranteed and if the complications of the sunk cost element
are addressed properly.
"'This title was msptred by Hibbs(2000): Traiupon Poafy The M jitb of Iatgrated PlanranS
641 Williamson (1991), p.83 assumed strong ptperty tights regimes.
309Integration is inherent to network industries due to network externalities to other
users. An individual's utility deriving from a network is a function of the network's
technology and the number of customers using the network facility.'43 This leads to the
problem of the critical mass of a network required to operate it beneficially and the
problem of network islands. Network islands reduce the benefits of positive externalities
when networks exist with similar though not identical technologies next to each other,
thereby making it impossible to interconnect the networks with each other. Thus, in the
early days of railroading the narrow and broad gauge and further varieties of gauge widths
made it necessary for passengers and freight to be transferred to another rail car. In
England, the broad gauge connecting London with the West Country lost out towards
the already extensive narrow gauge network, while the problem never occurred in
Germany due to the import of English locomotives requiring a standard gauge from the
very beginning. Today, interconnection between different gauges can be observed at each
railway crossing between Europe and former Soviet Union countries, but also within the
EU when entering Spain. Either passengers have to change trains or the entire carriages
are lifted up and fitted with suitable wheel equipments. While varying gauge widths and
technology differences reduce positive network externalities, they may also be used on
purpose in order to deter entry and erect market barriers. This was one reason for the
huge variety of gauges in the 1 9th century United States. Today, it is still impossible for
German high-speed trains to access the French railway network due to technological
differences. The critical mass of a network is especially obvious in the
telecommunications industry, where the individual's utility increases the more users the
network incorporates or for the railway industry, the more potential customers can be
reached via the existing stations and lines. Therefore, it pays for the players in the railway
market to participate and co-operate ttoluntanb' in the railway game.
Now, in a horizontally and vertically separated railway system without
government cushions to protect the railways' share of the tasty transport market pie, the
players need to co-operate to score in the game and survive. Other train companies in
either of the three layers are not only competitors, but principally complementors, which
Nalebuff and Brandenburger define as follows: 'Aplqyer isjlour complementor f customers
valuejiourpnduct more when they have the other phiyr's jnvduct than when tby have your product
642 Shelanski and Klein et al. (1995), pp. 344-345
" Blankart and Knieps (1991), p. 8-13 give a detailed account of networks' utility.
310alone. '" Most obviously, it's again a train passenger valuing the product even more,  if he
would actually receive a passage over the network, that is the end product railway
transport, instead of being left in a carriage in a parking lot. And local customers living
close to a city will value a high speed connection between urban conurbations more, if
the service is complemented by local train or bus services so that they could get home
instead of being stranded at a station at night The essential role of complementors is even
more apparent when looking at the three vertical layers rather than horizontal services,
because train operating companies are pretty useless without the railway track and vice
versa.
'"Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996), p. 18 (emphasis in ongin4. The authors' book "Co-opettion" is an
impressive game-theoretical approach to mtroduce a new mindset in strategic thinking, aiming at the
individual players to change not simply the way they play the game of business, but to actively shaping the
game.
3112. Transaction costs
In his 1937 article on the nature of the firm, Ronald Coase analysed the reasons
for the emergence of firms.'45 He clarifies two alternative means of co-ordinatmg
production - either by an entrepreneur as the central planner in a firm or alternatively by
co-ordinating production by means of the price mechanism, thereby mirroring Blankart's
argument upon co-ordination of networks to produce a final good by central planning or
market organisation. "Within afirm these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the
complicated market structure with exchange transaction is substituted the entrepreneur-.co-ordinator,
who directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of tv-ordinating production. Yet,
bating regard to the fact that, ffptvduction is regulated lij price movements, production could be
carried on without anJ organization at a14 wel4 mgbt we ask, JVbj is there anj organiation?"L'4'
Though the co-ordinating entrepreneur traditionally very much resembles the central
planner, there are also market-based approaches to business organisation and
governance.'47
The question on the existence of organisations is central to Coase's article and
leads back to the concept of market-based integration as suggested above or the concepts
of horizontal and vertical separation, as they were traditionally named. It had been
assumed further above that transaction costs are greater than zero. Were that not the
case, firms would have no reason to exist, indeed, and we would not have to bother
about institutional integration or separation at all. But "i. . the operation of a market costs
something and. . . /yforming an orgamration and allowing some authority (an 'entrreneur') to direct
the resources, certain marketing costs are savei The entrepreneur has to carrj out his function at less
cost, taking into account thefact that be majgetfactors  ofproduction at a lower price than the market
transactions which be supersedes, because it is alwqys possible to revert to the open market jfbefaiLc to
do this.' The co-ordination via the price system is not for free, because transaction costs
'45 AreprintofRonaldl-LCoase's 1937 groundbreakmgarticlewas pubhshed in the 1988 editionof"The
Firm, the Market and the Law".
'4' Coase (1988), pp. 35-36
" 7 Gable arid Ellig (1993) present an alternative to the central planning attitude, wh*ch is usually
predominant in private firms. Their market-based approach to management was appbed to Koch Industries,
an immensely successful and rapidly growing company. Koch Industries' CEO Charles G. Koch stated in the
foreword to the study: 'We a,v cousinced that Koch Industries' success stems fiimany fivm our managemeJrt
pbdosopb j, which u call 'market-based mana&ement'" In addition, Gebert and Boerner (1995) provide a detailed
account on the traditional, centrally planned business orgamsation. They offer their solutions for a more open
system, based on philosophical arguments from Karl IL Popper's pubkoation on the open and closed
societies in Sparta and Athens.
"Coase (1988), p. 40 and Vaubd (1991), p. 264
312in the real world are greater than zero. Those mainly include costs of collecting
information about prices and quality in the market, negotiating, contract and control
costs. Though these transaction costs might be miniinised by developing certain
techniques or a rule based approach for the players in the (railway) game, they cannot
fully be eliminated - not even by internalising transaction costs of the price system by
intra-firm organisation. Still, the costs might be reduced compared to a co-ordination via
the price mechanism, as a series of contracts with a number of suppliers could be
substituted by one intra-firm contract Taking the path of cost reductions by intra-flrm
organisation to its logical conclusion, it might seem surprising that production of the
various goods in the global economy is carried out by a multiplicity of firms instead of a
single big firm, or even one world firm.
However, the intra-firm co-ordination has a number of costs entailed.69
Especially heterogeneity of transactions may result in the market becoming the lower cost
institution. 'This would seem t impy that the costs of carying out exchange transactions through the
price mechanism will taiy considerabfy, as will the costs of organizing these transactions within the
firm. It seems therefore j,ossible that, quite aparifross the question of diminishing return, the costs of
organizjng certain transactions within the firm mq'y be greater than the costs of cariying out the
exchange transactions in the open market."5° If a new product is developed on the free
market, switching from the former to the new input factor for the final output may not
be too cost-intensive, if co-ordination is carried out by the market, anyhow. However, it
might involve high transaction costs if the production of an intra-firin factor input
becomes outdated. The production of a more innovative input factor may be entailed to
major disinvestments plus further investment costs. Naturally, this spells a disincentive
for innovative capacity within the firm itself. Imagine a single national, vertically
integrated railway company, which also produces its own locomotives. Assume that
another company in the same country or abroad comes up with an innovative new
locomotive. If the national railway company were to buy the new engine, it might very
well be the death-knell to their own locomotive engine division. Still, they might keep up
pace with intermodal competition in the transport market. Should the railway company
decide to stick to its own locomotive producing division to protect jobs and avoid
disinvestment costs, it might very well result in an overall loss of the railway's market
share due to antique engines or other techniques. Though the railway company's
" 9 Mahoney (1998), p. 569 focuses on three categories, that are, bureaucratic, sirategic and production costs.
'5° Coase (1988 , p. 45
313transaction costs might initially have been lower compared to an organisation via the
price mechanism, a dynamic market might lead to radically different outcomes within a
brief time span.
The example presented is not even far from the real post-privatisation world.
After Wisconsin Central Transjonation had acquired English, lVthh and Scottish Railwqys
(EJVS) to undertake UK freight services, they decided to purchase engines from a
Canadian company, which were both cheaper and better in quality than their British
counterparts. As often, British unions protested - unsuccessfully - as they anticipated job
losses in the British locomotive production business. But EWS had a choice and opted
accordingly to invest its resources in the use, which produced the greater value, serving its
own and its customers' interests. It would be interesting to measure the impact of that
single investment decision on external effects, more specifically upon the trend on the
British railway network to attract more freight traffic from the roads to the railways - an
often proclaimed aim of transport politics.
So long as a possibility for active or potential competition exists against the  b:g
firm, it will emerge at some point, as long as the government does not opt to protect the
market by erecting legal and, thus insurmountable, market barriers. If there is potential
for innovation, finns will get kicked out of the market, if they cannot keep pace with
innovation, or in Schurnpeter's words they will die a natural death. This is the core to
evolution, to the disturbance of existing structures, which is " . .  more like a series of
exjlosions than a gentle, though incessant, tranformation."' Also, there may be decreasing
returns to scale in the big firm. At some point, the costs of an additional intra-firin
transaction will equal the costs of a transaction on the market. The advantages of the
least-cost institution are also undermined if the intra-organisational efforts increase in an
expanding firm to such a point, that the entrepreneur fails to invest the resources in the
profit-maximising factors of production. At another level, these diminishing returns of
monolithic orgamsations became obvious in centrally planned economies, such as the
Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic. Simply, there was no scientific way
to route the factors of production to their uses where they promise the greatest return on
investment. No central planner can ever oversee all individual preferences and investment
opportunities, even if he so wanted. In line with the assumption on methodological
individualism, the decisions must be taken by the individuals who know best about their
314preferences, whether in a social setting like a socialist society or simply in a marketplace
where the factors of production shall be invested in the most profitable uses. Planners
should work towards "i. . creating conditions under which the knowledge and initiative of individuals
are given the best scope so that th ej can plan most successful/y...
This gets us back to the integrationist' question on how to organise a formerly
monolithic railway industry. Again, there is no fail-proof way of so doing according to
any kind of scientific method. The approach pursued here is based upon the above
assumptions, leaving as many decisions as possible to the judgements of the individuals,
such as customers and owners of railway enterprises. If they want an increased integration
under the new structure proposed, they may enter into contractual agreements of any
kind, whether co-operations, joint ventures or mergers.6ia Mahoney demonstrated that
vertical contracting could act as a viable alternative to vertical financial ownership, while
it is a substitute if transaction costs are absent." After the government has taken the first
steps to dismantle the former state-owned monopolist, the further path of action must be
their choice. According to Coase, ". . . a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an
extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of catrjing out the same transaction 1ij
means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizfng in anotherfirm."5
651 Schumpeter (1939 , p. 102
652 Hayek (1946), p. 26. Hayek (1946), pp. 26-31 discusses two opposing definitions of planning. namely
planning a blueprint for society versus planning for conditions under which individuals may flourish.
'53 Blankart and Knieps (1991), p.2 suest that the individuals should decide, whether or not networks are
created at all rather than calculating costs and benefits of networks scientifically. They claim that markets are
generally swtable to reveal the individuals' cost-benefit considerations, but they moderate their viewpoint due
to potential special characteristics of network econonues. Those are investigated in greater detail in their
work.
' Mahoney (1998), p. 564
655 Coase (1988), p. 44
3153. Regulating agencies and bottleneck regulation
The overriding question is: Who sets the rulesfor the ailwaypiwtisation and thereafter?
This question has already been addressed, when making the initial assumption that
property rights were fully allocated to the government prior to the reform, as it owns and
runs the entire system. After the privatisation, the rules will be according to the
contractual arrangements between the government and the individual players in the
emerging railway market. The government may shed its entire control over the railways
or, more likely, it may try to keep some controlling stake in the privatised industry, in
form of a regulatory agency or even by means of direct interference through the transport
minister and the government. Blankart favoured an approach of minimalistic regulation of
bottlenecks for the regulation of netwot economies. However, with regard to the railway
industry, there is no reason to stop half-way through at bottleneck regulation. Therefore,
Blankart's approach shall be considered briefly, before considering a free market without
a specific public railway regulator at all.
Applying the arguments to other utilities would requires only a slightly different
course of argument, especially with regard to the proposed vertical and horizontal
structure of the railway industry further below. Most prominent is still the open access
arrangement. Moorhouse makes a strong case against government regulation in electricity
generation and concludes in favour of competition: 'The technical and economic knowledge
exist to permit the substitution of market competition for state ownership or government regulation in
the electricity generation indust. The chief advantages of making that substitution include a reduction
of costs and lowerJmnal user prices, closer al:gnment between the anaJ  of services offered and consumer
preferences, and greater incentives for ongoing discoverj and innos.wtion '' McTigue suests that
privatised industries can only flourish with the absence of government regulation.
Potential competition in unprotected markets is the overriding regulator in networks. He
exemplifies his arguments with the deregulation and privatisation of New Zealand's
telecommunication market, which he was overseeing as a Cabinet Minister.' Geddes'
survey of utility literature concludes that the past reforms of utility regulation were very
successful, resulting in large net welfare gains to society.' 5 ' Caplan and Stringham offer a
more radical approach, showing that markets are a superior co-ordinator in network
'' Moorhouse (1995)
' McTigue (1998)
658 Geddes (2000), p. 1192
316economies than central planning.' Lal underlines their view by drawing on Mises' and
Hayek's insights who ' . .pointed out tha4 though such a form of planning might be theoreticalfy
feasible in a world where information about resources, technology, and the nyriad actual and possible
production processes and tastes of consumers could be costles4y acquired /iji the central phinning
authorify, in the real woncl it would be impossible. The market-based price mechanism is essential
because it makes use of the dñision of knowledge which is unai9idable in €vy real world economjl. ''°
Blankart uses a similar approach, arguing that markets are superior to central
planning as they promote a wide variety of demand and search for new technologies.
Accordingly, the management of a single large technical system is unlikely to place much
emphasis on offering a variety of different services to their customers because it would
harm the network operators' standardisation efforts. Thus, the firm would rather rely on
standardisation of services, even if customers would be prepared to pay a higher price for
a greater choice.661 Apparently, Blankart uses the Hayekian"2 argument, aiming at the
innovative potential both approaches offer and condudes that the market is the superior
search engine: '?lanning relies on organized search according to the hierarchical rules of the large
technical ystem. Collective decisions within the organization are needed before an old technology or
product can be replaced !.yo new one. Those interested in the status quo have an opportunify  to oppose
against those who want togo aheaiL Therefore collective decision making on innovations will alwqys end
in some compromise. In the market, in contrast, innovations are decided lij the demanders outside the
organiation Innovation depends on their and not on the members' approvaL Moreover manj ideas are
in continuous contest. Search on the marketplace takes place on a broader basis than in hierarchical
organizations. Therefore markets seem to be superior, when search is invoàd' 3 Nevertheless, he
concludes that markets may not work in some segments of large technical systems, that is,
wherever bottlenecks exist. His proposed concept of minimalistic regulation therefore
aims to promote competition wherever feasible and regulate only those segments of the
network where markets are imperfect Potential market imperfections have already been
considered in section II. However, the possibility of monopolistic bottlenecks in the
'CapIan and Strmgham (2001) exemplify their arguments with the delicate production of a free market in
defense services.
'° La! (1997), p. 213. See also Hayek (1946), Hayek (1996), Mises (1952a) and Mises (1952b).
661 Standardisation, rather than innovation prevailed on the British railway network, as mentioned in the
historical study. Freight cars were often half empty, because standard sizes of freight cars were mostly used,
rather than new smaller sizes at lower costs.
662 See Hayek's 1974 Nobel Prize Memorial Lecture in Stockholm The AiimaJi'un, von lVtssen. in Hayek
(1996) and his 1944 critique of planning in The Road to Serfdom, Hayek (1946), pp. 35-37 and Hayek (1999),
p.17
Blankart (1998), pp. 5-6
317railway market must be taken into account, that is a combination of natural monopolistic
elements with sunk costs.
For the sake of the argument, a monopolistic bottleneck shall be assumed on the
line between London and Glasgow, as illustrated in figure 6 below. Usually, only a few
sections of the network will constitute a monopolistic bottleneck, instead of the entire
railway service from London to Glasgow. Now imagine the following situation in the
passenger market between London and Scotland. Let the fictitious	 T
Co be the sole provider of passenger travel between London and Glasgow, owning
the train operations, the infrastructure and the terminal stations. H hhutd Ex)ress Tra ni,
a company specialising in high-speed light freight and parcel services all over Britain, also
owns a track connecting the same cities, which Highland Express uses exclusively for its
high-speed freight operations.
Due to unused capacity on its railway infrastructure and Highland's observation
of highly profitable passenger traffic on the England-Scotland route, Highland Express
considers to enter the passenger business and compete with the incumbent firm Scotland
Express. However, Highland Express does not have access to a passenger terminus in
either of the cities, as its freight trains were aiming at freight depots in the outer suburbs
of both London and Glasgow, instead of arriving close to the city centres. The company
now faces the choice either to invest in new terminal buildings and connecting tracks or
to use the existing facilities of the incumbent. This situation is displayed in the figure
below, where the incumbent Scotland Express owns the entire connection from the city
centre of London to the centre of Glasgow sa a d ), while the entrant owns
the long-distance railway infrastructure between both its freight depots Fi in outer
London and F2 (øa line c) in the Glasgow suburbs.
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Entrant Hi land E4s: F - c F2
FIG URB 6: M.aopalistic Bottleneckj ii a Railwaj Sjstci,
The newcomer to the passenger market, Highland Express Trains, would face
sunk investment costs in the local connection from the freight depots (F, and F2) to
potentially new terminal buildings in the town centres. However, this option might be
legally restricted in an urban area, which is already heavily congested. In that case,
Highland Express would need access to the incumbent's tracks and station facilities from
the outer suburbs into the town centre, if it wanted to compete for a fraction of the
passenger market. Now, there's scope for the concept of minimalistic regulation, which
would exclusively target the monopolistic bottlenecks and only if joint use of the tracks
and stations is technically feasible. In the given example, the links from the freight depots
to the train stations are the only facilities which inhibit a monopolistic leeway for the
incumbent, e.g. in charging the newcomer monopolistic access prices or applying
discriminatory standards, by which the incumbent might place a discriminatory burden on
his competitor.
The concept of minimalistic regulation may be generalised as illustrated  in figure 7
below. A firm that doubles all its inputs and produces double the amount of output,
exhibits constant returns to scale. More generally, constant returns to scale are present, if a
firm increases all inputs by the factor t and produces t times as much output. If, however,
the output grows by less than t, the production technology creates decreasing returns to
scale. The third case of increasing returns to scale is given, whenever the output expands by
more than t.
"'Formally, returns to scale can be summarised as follows, given only two input factors x, and x, for
simphcity, t> 1:
constant returns to scale:	 f tic1, tx2) = tf(x1, x2)
detieasing returns to scale:	 f tx, tx2) < tf(x1, X)
:ncreasing returns to scale:	 f(txj, tx2) > tf x1, x2)
Varian (1995), pp. 302-303 for the formal description of returns to scale.
319Flexible investment costs	 Sunk investment costs
Constant or decreasing	 Competitive markets
returns to scale	 (many suppliers)
Increasing returns	 Contestable markets	 Monopolistic bottleneck
to scale	 (one supplier)	 (one supplier)
1IGUKb 7: The LiMits of Markets ii LarSe Techoical Jjste.ws
Source: Blankart (199g), ,. 7
Constant returns are the most natural or plausible case as it is relatively easy for a
firm to copy its own activities. Accordingly, a firm's owners will not be delighted to learn
that their production technology is characterised by decreasing returns, as it should at
least be able to copy its own production activity. However, would railway systems be
characterised by either constant or decreasing returns to scale, no necessity for the
government to interfere with the market process would arise ure 7, up)er box). Many
suppliers would compete with each other, notwithstanding whether sunk investments
would be involved. Small sized companies may easily enter the market with equal costs in
case of constant returns or lower costs than large firms in case of decreasing returns.
Whenever one finn should be tempted to charge a mark-up over competitive prices, the
firm immediately attracts newcomers and endangers its position in losing customers to
entrants or other firms already in the market.
However, large technical systems may exhibit increasing returns to scale (figure 7,
lower boxes). Therefore, it will be cheaper for one firm to serve the entire market demand
than to share the market with a selection of other suppliers. Imagine there is only one
railway track operator providing a line in each direction between London and Glasgow.
As long as the capacity of his track is not fully utilised, the construction of any number of
new railway tracks by other companies would be a waste of resources, as long as the new
lines do not involve radical changes in comparison to the production technology of the
former, such as innovations, thereby creating new demand for the entrant's services or
attracting customers away from other modes of transport Should the track operator
decide for any reason to offer the use of his tracks exclusively to firms A and B, but
320refuse firm C having access to his tracks, the latter is obviously in a position where it
cannot offer any railway services on the line London-Glasgow. No alternative route being
available, he can either invest in an own railway track or leave it. Whenever increasing
returns occur in combination with sunk investment costs, the firm is said to have a
monopolistic bottleneck (figure 7, tight lower box). The access to the bottleneck is the
prerequisite to run the service and government regulation is usually seen as safeguarding
competing train operating companies from being discriminated against or exploited by the
owner of the monopolistic bottleneck, whether by outright exclusion of certain TOCs  or
by monopolistic access charges."5 Assuming, the London-Glasgow line is extremely busy,
a further track operator might enter the market and construct new railway tracks
between the two terminal cities in order to gain his share of the market demand. Despite
increasing returns to scale and sunk investment costs, the size of the market could allow
further track operators to work profitably. While the example of the track between
London and Glasgow involves entry barriers in the form of sunk investment costs,
regulation is not required if sunk costs are absent and the market is contestable. Even
though it is cheaper for one company to supply the entice market with the service 7gun
7, left lower box), the firm will refrain from charging monopoly prices, as it is subject to
potential competition.
Therefore, Blankart would only agree to regulation of incontestable monopolistic
bottlenecks in large technical systems. As a result, the problem of network regulation
would be strictly limited, indeed. Still, the question remains whether the railway market
is characterised by major bottlenecks which could give rise to monopoly power in the
first place. Considering monopolistic bottlenecks for the railway industry, two
determinants must be taken into account,first, other forms of competition, recognising
the existence of other markets and second, the future structure of a privatised railway
industry. When Blankart reached the conclusion that markets are imperfect in dealing
" The monopolistic bottleneck as said to be an essential fadify as discussed extensively in Lipsky and Sidak
(1999). The essential facility doctrine is ". .parehnzsed in terms coiwpeLlthg in their smpkay A monopolist en
control qf afaaky essential to other co.wpetetors must ptvtrede reasonable access to that fathy it isfeacible to do so.",
Lipsky and Sidak (1999), pp. 1190-1191. While the phrase itself did not appear in any reported judicial
decision until 1977, the doctrine dates back to cases such as the Terminal Railroad Association, culminating
in the Supreme Court's 1912 decision in favour of the Terminal Railroad's concentration efforts against the
govemments advocacy of dissolution. In their rather critical approach with regard to essential facilities,
Lipsky and Sadak argue that essential facilities produce the familiar problems of monopoly. 'Vnder those
circumstances, no quant:y qfant:trust enforcement sllcban,ge the structural characte,istics that ,gu rise to the eiseiwal
faaJyprvblem...sode(y is faced uith the same unappeWing altereatwes ,zwhzbfr in any pub/ic utzky cvntext pub/ic
ownersbp, rgulation in the clasdc 'rate-base! rate-of-reture' ,m,la inceniwe reulaZeon, and eariouc en beten
solutions... ' Lipsky and Sidak (1999), p. 1220.
321with large technical systems he disregarded other forms of competition, which could
restrict the bottleneck operator's market dominance, namely interr#oda substitutive,
locational and geograJ,hical competition. Notwithstanding the special characteristics of other
network economies, it is insufficient to observe the railway market on its own as if it
existed independently in the economy. The railway system itself is interlinked with other
industries in the transport and in other product markets."6 Thus, the arguments of
increasing returns to scale plus sunk investment costs are not sufficient to justify
regulation of the railways. Accordingly, Kessides and Willig (1995) suest that
• railroad services are far more contestable than these imJediments to rail enty would suggest,
because there are often strong competitive pressures from other modes of transportation - such as
trucking or water cariiage - on the rates chatedfor shipment of a wide variqy  of commodtt:es.
Intermodal competition and other forms of competition do and did constrain the
railways, which were losing considerable market shares across their passenger and freight
divisions in both Germany and Britain in the past, as shown in the case studies above.
Intermodal competition in the wider transport market stems from other modes of
transport, such as road, air, canal and sea traffic but also from pipelines in the carriage of
products such as gas or petroleum. It is hard to imagine any place  in Europe, let alone
Germany or Britain, which is served by a railway but cannot be reached by an alternative
mode of transport, neglecting price, quality or the effort entailed to the alternative. In
freight transport, however, the situation might be different, esp. in countries with wide
open lands such as Russia or the United States. But even if there are bottlenecks in
freight haulage to certain places, must the government interfere with an otherwise
functioning market economy?
In addition, products which are currently carried by rail freight could be
substituted by other products, thereby wiping out both, the product's and similarly the
railways' market by substitutive competition. Assume a lonely coal mine in the middle of
nowhere, being served by one railroad, without any other affordable transport links in the
vicinity. Apparently, the mine is tied to the ground and cannot move operations. In this
case, the coal mine is obviously trapped and the railway company might be expected to
charge monopoly prices. So, this clearly appeals to the concept of mininialistic regulation.
Does it? At the outset of this section, the actors were assumed to be rational utility
' 6' Foster (1992), p. 123 also noted the disaplirung influence of the stock market and the prospects of
hostile takeovers that constrain management
322maximisers. Accordingly, it does not make sense for the railway to price the coal mine out
of the market, as it is itself in competition to other coal mines and other energy resources,
such as nuclear power, oil, gas, solar power and others. The coal mine and the railway
firm are operating in a bilateral monopoly. Eventually, both actors must play together, as
they can either flourish together or ring each other's death bells. In Brandenburger and
Nalebuff's terms from further above, the coal mine and the railway firm are
complementors. And the game is called co-opetition.
While the example of the coal mine illustrated the case for substitutive
competition for so-called captive shippers, a railway firm serving industries or people in
remote places is also subject to locational competition, as the railway's customers could also
re-locate their business, as long as their disinvestment costs are not prohibitive as in the
case of the coal mine. And again, they will have to offer their end product at a
competitive price, if they are not themselves enjoying monopoly rights. It's also
substitutive competition, once again.
Grimm and Winston modelled different means of competition in the deregulated
U.S. railroad industry. They found huge benefits of geographic competition, which occurs if a
number of railroads could potential/y serve a firm, even if the shipper is located 50 miles
from that potential service provider, reminding the actual freight operator that it must
not charge a mark-up on competitive prices exceeding the discounted value to build a
new competing line over time. "Geographic competition... has a thrge impact on rates. Receivers
who can be served y or more railroads from different origins enjy a 25 percent rate reduction
from average charges. Final'y, intermodal comp etition from truck and water modes strongjy disctt lines
rail rates. Shppe.rs' rail charges fell dramatical/y f thy use water transportation for some of their
traffic. '
Further, they investigated whether so-called captive shippers in the U.S., that is
shippers who do not have reasonable alternatives for moving their produce," have to
cope with inferior quality of service than non-captive shippers. They found that the
captive services are neither more unreliable nor slower than non-captive freight services.
They discover only a small deadweight loss associated with inflated freight rates for
captive shippers, which " . . indicates there is b#frjustjIcat:on on economic efficienfy grounds for
" Kessides and Willig (1995), p. 5
668 Grimm and Wmston (2000), p. 59
323proposaLc to address the captive shzpper issue. Derigulation 's annual benefits to shippers, in general,
are LatRefy intact because the loss  to captive sb:ppers amounts to rougbfy 10 percent of these benefits.
.Infrarticular, alternative sources of competition in freight markets limit the share of traffic that is
tnlfy captive, and even shippers who are captive in a particular market maj have some leverage in rate
negotiations through plant location competition andproduct competition. '*70
Obviously, the rationale for minimalistic or even greater regulation of
monopolistic bottlenecks is not as self-evident as it seemed at the outset. Diverse forms
of competition restrict the bottleneck owner's perceived market power. Still, the second
determinant remains in deciding whether bottleneck regulation is required. The future
structure of the pnvatised railway industry may restrict any remaining monopoly power
considerably. As scrutiny towards the restructuring shall be given below, the following
remarks may only be regarded as a first guideline.
So far, the railway industry was usually a vertically and often also horizontally
integrated industry, owning and operating tracks, passenger and freight transportation.
Thus, the end product railwqy tran.portation services was produced by one company in its
entirety. Re-thinking the industry based on the layers of railways, opens up further
characteristics for regulation of perceived bottlenecks. Accepting the existence of
monopolistic bottlenecks implies that the railway market is a closed economic system. In
that case bridges, stations and urban railway tracks into stations might constitute what is
generally deemed a monopolistic bottleneck. This construct, however, lacks contact with
reality, as the railways are acting in a highly competitive transport market with further
interactions with other markets as shown. Nevertheless, the government has a far-
reaching authority to shape a privatised and competitive railway industry with almost no
monopolistic elements.'71
"Ellig(2001)
'° Grimm and Winston (2000), p. 66. The concepts of competition have been discussed as locational and
substitutive competition.
' At this point it is necessary to remind the reader of the actual meaning of monopoly as clarified by
Schumpeter (1943), pp. 98-99: "Monopolist means Sin d Seller. Lctenil±y thersfore anyone is a monopolist who se/Ic
anything that is not in etey inspect, wnzppng and location and senice ,nc/.vdea exactlj like what other people se uey
or eceiy babeniasher, or eiy seller of ood Humors' on a road that is srot sm lined srth sellers  of the same
brand of:ce iiwn. This however ii not what mean when talking about monopolists. We mean onlj those single sellers
whose man€ets ain not open to the intrusion of would be producers  of the svue comniodiy and of actual producers of
sinnh2r ones or, speaking thghty mom technically, only tho e single sehrr who face a gtven demand schedule that is sevemnlj
independent of their own action as unllas of anj inactions to their action bj other concerns."
324Below, it will be argued that considerable sunk costs are indeed characteristic for
the railway industry. However, they are restricted to the infrastructure networks,
comprising railway tracks, signalling networks and stations at most. Still, investment costs
of station terminals could be partly recovered by selling them to other users, independent
of railways, even after a potential end of railway operations, especially as major terminals
are often located in high-value inner city districts. If governments opt for a full-scale
vertical and horizontal separation of the railway industry, train operations would be
offered by numerous passenger and freight train operators (I'OCs, comprising both POCs
and FOCs), running over tracks of several rail track providers (ROCs), controlled by one
or more safety and signalling firms (SOCs).
Now, if the TOCs have a choice to operate services over tracks of competing
providers, the dominance of track providers is eroded and their dependence turned upside
down. In order to maximise profits, ROCs compete with each other to attract FOCs and
POCs to their lines or networks. Failure to do so results in loss of access revenues. Now,
it is rather the track firms who depend on the train operators' traffic. Should they charge
monopolistic access prices, the train operators could either withdraw from their network
or even from the entire railway business. Train companies can  vote nth theirfeet, or wheels,
as they own capital on wheels, which they may employ virtually everywhere. The ROCs
in contrast own capital that is literally tied to the ground. The tracks leading into stations
could be owned individually or jointly by several ROCs, or they might also be owned by a
single rail track provider. The same constellations are possible concerning the ownership
of railway terminals. And even if only one company owns the entire lines into a busy
urban railway terminus, including the station, it does not confer dangerous monopoly
power to that company, as its revenues depend on train operating companies actually
accessing the tracks and stations. A prerequisite for competition is, however, the
assumption of non-discriminatory open access to the railway network, without pre-
determined slots for the next 7 to 15 years as in the British reform, which in effect tied
the franchisees to their lines without having the chance to compete on the track with
other operators or to escape from Railtrack's access pricing regime, as Railtrack is the
only UK operator of the track and signalling infrastructure, induding the major stations.
If there were competing ROCs, the Office of Fair Trading could supervise anti-
competitive behaviour in the railway industry. The remaining function for other
regulatory bodies, such as the Office of the Rail Regulator or the Strategic Rail Authority
as outlined in the UK study, are at least questionable. However, regulating functions
325could be performed by the SOCs. Responsibility for the handling of safe day-to-day
operations lies with the second layer, the network of traffic and safety controls. The tasks
of the SOCs could comprise signalling systems, supervision and approval of minimum
technical and safety standards for train and track operators, allocations of slots and the
co-ordination of other activities, such as through-ticketing and the provision of neutral
train information and reservation systems. Before turning to a more detailed analysis of
the individual layers and its players, the results may be summarised as follows:
1. The government sets the rules for the game at the outset of the privatisation
process in contractual arrangements.
2. The rationale for monopolistic bottleneck regulation and therefore for the
concept of minimalistic regulation is weak. It depends first, on the extent of
intermodal, substitutive and locational competition and second, on the future
structure of the railway market.
3. A full-scale vertical and horizontal separation of the railway industry could make
public railway regulation redundant.
4. The Office of Fair Trading could monitor anti-competitive practices, whilst the
SOCs could be responsible for further matters with regard to regulation, as set out
in the initial privatisation contracts and agreements between the government and
the SOCs.
326C. Horizontal integration versus separation
Chapter B.1 argued that the conventional terms of vertical and horizontal
separation could be misleading, as the objective of neither vertical nor horizontal
separation is to rip the railway system apart. Instead, the approach targets an institutional
separation of large technical systems in markets to facilitate non-discriminatiw and
competitive railway operations, thereby leading to a market-based integration of the railways.
Scale and scope economies are essential in the debate on horizontal and vertical
separation of the big firm, which was previously the dominant co-ordinator for railway
activities. Economies of scale and scope are decisive in determining the structure of the
reformed railway market and whether an institutional separation of the layers of the
railway industry is a viable option at all. If considerable economies of scale and scope
prevail in the railway industry, the best structure might well be a single public or private
company. However, there is no reason why public or private railway monopolies should
enjoy legal market protection, granted by the government, especially if economies favour a
monopolistic or dominant structure. Still, should railway transportation be characterised
by neither scale nor scope economies, an atomistic separation might serve the industry
and its customers best.
Investigating each of the horizontal layers separately, a smooth co-ordination of
the services on each layer is essential to reap the full network benefits of the railway
system. Thus, it is not all competition, but also co-operation, because the players involved
in railway transport are dependent on each other. Imagine the network providers if the
railway track in a country had been split into regional and high-speed networks which
were then sold to various companies: whilst the high-speed infrastructure owner  is
responsible for fast connections to the major centres, the regional network is needed to
bring the customer to his town in the vicinity of the city which is served by high-speed
rail links. And the regional provider of the network benefits from more travellers arriving
at the station who might then want to go on a journey on his network. These are dearly
positive network externalities of the regional and high-speed networks, rationally
favouring an interconnection. In a competitive third layer of train operations, the case for
co-operation is even more obvious: if the train companies refuse to co-ordinate their
timetables, such that the customers constantly miss their train connections, customers
might refrain from using rail travel at all, moving to another means of transport
eventually.
327All the players involved in the railway system can mutually benefit if they co-
ordinate some of their activities. "Business is cooperation when it comes to cnating a pie and
competition when it comes to dividing it it. In other words, business is War and Peace. But it's not
Tohty - endless cycles of war folkwed 4y peace followed bj war. It's simultaneou4y war and peace.
As Ray Noon/a, founder of the networking software company Novel4 explains: 'You have to compete
and cooperate at the same time.' The combination makes for a more dynamic relationship than the
words ompetition'and 'cooperation' suggest inditidually. ... You can compete without having to kill the
opposition. Iffighting to death destrrys the pie, there'll be nothing left to capture - that's lose-lose. By
the same token, you can cooperate without bating to ignoreyour seI-interest. After a14 it isn't smart to
create apieyou can't capture - that's lose-win.'72
In the railway game, the pie is the good railwqy transportation ofpassengers andfreight,
which is part of the bigger transport market pie. Whereas rapid growth of the railway pie
might entail a reduction in the other modes' share of the entire transport pie, an
innovative railway system could also contribute to the growth of the transport market as
a whole, branding the product transportation as a valuable experience. Again, even
intermodal co-operation can be beneficial to all players, thereby creating a win-win
situation. In the past, however, the powerful railways wanted to dominate the big game
of transportation. Having played for some time, they grew too confident of their
invincibility and became tired of observing other players' actions and strategies around
the game's board. While the railway system had captured a good share of the transport pie
in the mid-nineteenth century from waterways, turnpike and road operators, the share
grew smaller with innovations around the turn of the century and was largely absorbed by
other players in the transportation business, such as airlines, road traffic, communication
companies and others, who were determined to get a share of the pie. What was left for
the railways was a government-protected piece of cake or pie with the railways rather
watching the situation passively instead of actively facing the competitors by rapidly
innovating and reacting to customers' demands.
Chapters C and D of this section are concerned with the scope of horizontal and
vertical separation in a privatised railway system. First, chapter C will investigate for each
of the three layers separately, whether either of the following characteristics 1. to 4. is
involved and what the results mean for 5. and 6. Second, chapter D will then discuss the
328effects of a vertical separation of the layers. Finally, chapter E shall assess the reform
proposals in the light of issues which have been neglected so far, such as a restriction of
open access provision, access and congestion pricing, as well as public service obligations
or subsidies for socisi services of the railways.
1. Sunk investment costs are capital costs which cannot be recovered, even by total
cessation of production. Once invested, the investment is irreversible. Thus,
railway tracks, pipelines, roads or canals cannot easily be ripped out of the
ground and sold to another market.
2. Economies of scale may occur due to economies of density, firm size or length of
haul.'" Economies of density are present on a given railway line, if average
costs fall when the traffic volume of the line is increased. Economies of firm
size result from lower average production costs in big rather than in small
railway firms or network sizes, and economies of length of haul lead to lower
average costs on longer rather than shorter journeys.
3. Economies of scope are present in multi-product companies, if the costs of joint
production are lower than the production of the same good in separate
organisations, that is C(x1) < C(xj), where x1 are the individual goods
produced, e.g. representing freight and passenger transport or train and
infrastructure operations.
4. Network extealities occur when the actions of one actor in the marketplace
have positive or negative effects on other actors, which are not represented  in
the other's cost function. The sudden decision of a rail track operator to cease
operations immediately produces a negative externality and reduces the
network benefits to all users of the network. A new local operator who
adjusts his initial operations to the timetable of a long-distance operator in the
vicinity in order to act as a feeder, produces positive network externalities for
the long-distance operator and for local customers along his line, as they value
the end product rail service from A to B higher, if they can actually access A
in the first place. This definition of positive network externalities coincides
with Brandenburg and Nalebuff's earlier account on complementors: 'A player
is jour complementor jf customers value jour product more when thy have the other
plqyer's product than when thrj have jour product alone." Accordingly,
672 Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996), pp.4-5 (emphasis in original)
'"Rahmeyer (1996), p. 4. Braeutagam, Daughety and Turnquist  (1984), p. 4 point out that at least two
types of scale economies are prevailing in the railroad industry, namely economies of density and economies
of size.
329complementors have a built-in incentive to co-operate in order to mutually
attract customers.
5. Intra-layr comjetition is competition within the layer as if it would be a closed
economy, irrespective of external influences. Is competition between different
TOCs, feasible and efficient?
6. Government regulation - is there a scope left for government regulation or
intervention with regard to each layer discussed? Is potential market
dominance an issue within the layer?
3301. Layer I: the physical railway track infrastructure (ROCs)
The prime functions for the Rail Track Operating Companies (ROCs) of layer I are
the prothion and maintenance of a h:gb-qualiy track infrtzctructure network for passenger and
freight services in exchange for the payment of access prices to the ROCs. Train stations
and depots may be owned by the infrastructure companies, train operators or other
companies that would also receive an access charge  from train companies, just like access
charges paid by airlines to make use of airport facilities. The infrastructure providers'
activities involve mainly long-term decisions and negotiations with various players in the
transport market, such as other railway infrastructure operators if there is more than one
ROC, train operators, traffic safety and control firms, construction companies, train
station and facilities operators, politicians, local, regional and national administrations,
representatives of public consumer groups and so forth. Nevertheless, actual train
operations are likely to be dealt with on a more short-term basis, depending on the
process of allocating slot access rights to the TOCs.
The railway infrastructure is characterised by a high amount of fixed costs and
comparatively low variable cost elements.'74 In addition to being fixed, these costs are
sunk, i.e. they cannot be recovered, even by total cessation of production. It is simply
impossible to rip them off the ground and sell them somewhere else, as they are
geographically tied to their location. Apparently, entry barriers are present  in the railway
track network, as has been argued in the nationalisation debate. The track infrastructure
is clearly characterised by economies of scale, in particular in the form of economies of
density. The more trains use the network, the lower are the costs to be carried by
individual trains. If only a single train would use a certain line, it would have to recover
the entire trackage costs. So, if more trains are using the line, all of them have to share
the trackage costs between them, lowering average costs considerably up to the capacity
constraint of the track, in particular as the variable costs are low. The study on the British
privatisation already hinted at a possible expansion of the networks' capacity, either by
trading safety for a higher carrying capacity on the system or by actually improving safety
technology that would, however, also increase the system costs. When the railway track
infrastructure is operating close to the capacity constraint, it might make  sense to
duplicate the facility to accommodate for a potential growth in transportation demand.
331Economies of scope exist in interconnecting two previously separate
infrastructure networks, which had so far been completely isolated from each other. A
physical interconnection could attract further traffic, as more connections could be
offered to the users and potential users of both networks. Thus, the interconnection also
creates positive network externalities. Stackelberg argues that such economies favour a
single network provider.675 However, the network benefits and transaction costs are more
substantial to his argument Both ROCs would have an incentive to free ride, that is, to
wait for the other operator to invest in the interlinking track, facing high capital costs,
whilst the operator who refrained from investing could not be prevented from benefiting
from additional traffic and revenues, without having to face the investment costs.
Though both ROCs would be locked into a prisoner's dilemma situation, it is not a one-
shot, but a repeated game, even if not with the same but with other operators.676 Thus,
the companies will co-operate in a joint investment effort or with some profit-sharing
arrangements, assuming they are rational utility maximisers. However, what does indeed
favour a single operator are the transaction costs involved in negotiating and monitoring
these arrangements and possible disagreements concerning the allocation of the additional
revenues.
Scope economies based on interconnection of previously separate networks are,
however, limited. Clusters of regional economies are usually focused upon a core, which
means that a direct link to the outer regions of the separate clusters might not create
substantial additional trade, traffic and therefore revenues. Technical standards applied to
the networks might create some further negative effects. Interconnections usually require
the same standards for the whole network. Now, it might well be that the standards and
the entailed investment and maintenance costs for solely local or freight traffic lines are
kept on a level way too high for those traffics. This would then drive costs and might
even result in line closures though they could have operated profitably with lower
standardsP
Stackelberg (1990), pp. 194-198 for economies of scale and scope in the infrastructure.
' Stackelberg (1990), p. 196
676 Admittedly, the game cannot be repeated indefinitely due to scarcity of land resources. Thus, rational
players might be expected to defect in the last round and choose the free-riding instead of the co-operative
sokition. As rational players will anticipate the defection in the last round they will already defect in the
previous round, pre-empting the other's action. That would be the rational outcome in a finitely repeated
game, when the total number of rounds is announced prior to the start of the game. However, in this case,
there is no er-ante announcement as the amount of interconnections is simply uncertain and depends upon
the dynamic nature of progress of the industry and development of the network.
' Stackdberg (1990), p. 197
332Accordingly, the infrastructure network may be organised in a number of
interlinking regional operators'7' or specialised operators for high-speed, local, regional,
international or freight traffic, where feasible.'79 Still, the structure should ensure that
both economies of scale and scope are realised and it seems that especially the economies
of scope and transaction costs impose some constraints on a separation in a huge variety
of small networks. As long as horizontal mergers between ROCs are not prohibited, the
railway market is likely to observe a range of mergers until the network size reaches its
optimal scope. Open access has been assumed for TOCs and there is no reason why it
should not also apply to the railway infrastructure. Still due to high sunk costs it is less
likely in the market for the provision of track infrastructure that a whole bunch of new
entrants will venture into the market immediately. They might stand a chance of entry
where the incumbent's tracks are already close to the capacity constraint and entrants
might also opt to diversifr in overlapping markets. Instead of investing into traditional
railway infrastructure, they could also invest in new technologies, such as magnetic
traction, in order to capture a market share of both the traditional railway and short to
medium distance airline markets.
The major advantage of a horizontally separated infrastructure networks is the
reduction of monopolistic bottlenecks and as a result, government regulation of
bottlenecks. Regional infrastructure providers who are competing with each other for
increased traffic on their networks will then be restrained by the disciplining forces of
intra-layer competition in the market for track access rights and the entire market for
transportation.
'' The study on the Swedish railway reform mentioned that this was exactly the case in Sweden. The state
railways were aiming to interconnect the regional or local networks.
' Ewers (1993), p. 8 noted prior to the railway reform that a number of very small non-national railway
firms were operating quite successfully m comparison to the Deutsche Bundesbahn.. This indicated that
potential cost reductions due to large scale are no justification for a nationwide monopoly in the operations
of the track infrastructure Starkie (1989), p. 180 also suggested different track operators, but restricted his
argument mainly on parallel hnes, neglecting the potential offered through regional networks.
3332. Layer II: the network of traffic and safety operations (SOCs)
The second layer of traffic and safety operations, the Safqy Operating Companies
(SOCs) are based on their counterpart in air traffic, the air traffic control agencies, such as
EurocontroL The functions of the traffic and safety control companies are primarily the
ex-ante capaciçy management as a kind of clearing-house institution and the guarantee of safe
and efficient dy-toy trafficflows. In the case of accidents or SPADs, there must be a clear
line of communication and control which resides solely in the SOC. The train operators
involved immediately report the incident to the safety operator, who will then take the
necessary measures and precautions.
Most obvious potential tasks are the allocation of slots to the individual TOCs,
operation of signalling systems, supervision and approval of minimum  technical and safety
standards for train and track operators, strategic planning for the network and co-
ordination of network activities between the layers, such as through-ticketing, provision
of neutral train information and reservation systems and timetabling co-ordination during
the slot allocation process. The collection of access charges for both the ROCs and the
SOCs might also be carried out by the SOC. Nontheless, the list is not definite, it might
embrace less or more co-ordinatingfunctions, depending on the initial design preferred by the
government in charge. As the SOCs are responsible for the safe operations of daily train
services it would only be consequent to transfer regulatory responsibilities to them as the
unbiased private regulators for the entire railway industry.
Still, final responsibility for the safety of operations remains exclusively with the
individual TOCs and ROCs. They are by no means relieved of their liabilities and
responsibilities to operate safely. The SOCs are solely overseeing the general network
safety and have a contractual power to intervene, wherever they feel that safety is no
longer guaranteed. Those rules and regulations have to be set up and agreed upon in the
initial privatisation contracts between the government and all players in the railway
industry. These rules must not be static and allowance needs to be made for adjusting
thexnto technological progress.
Similar to the track infrastructure, the actual signalling system exhibits fixed costs
which are sunk. Still, the SOCs will have to make major investments in innovative
computer systems to run the daily operations and conduct the capacity management.
334Though these costs are also fixed, they are not sunk as in the physical infrastructure of
tracks or signalling networks. Much of the SOCs resources will have to be invested in
intelligent software solutions, rather than in physical materiaL Thus, their cost structure is
very different from that of the ROCs. And again, economies of density constitute the
major factor for economies of scale. The more trains use the network, the lower are the
costs imposed on the individual train operators.  Clearly, substantial economies of scope
are involved in the operation of the safety firms, as their software solutions require large
investments. Thus, it is cheaper for a single or a few finns to commit funds to research
and development of advanced technologies rather than forcing several firms to do so by
separating the second layer into various units.
An atomic separation of the second layer requires constant co-ordination between
the SOCs, as they need to agree on a set of minimum standards, the same traffic signals
and a flawless transfer of control over trains passing from a network controlled by one
SOC to another one, involving high transaction costs, hampering the exploitation of
network benefits, such as uniform signals, safety regulations and standards. In
emergencies it is especially important to have the sole responsibility for immediate actions
centrally controlled, as the time corridor for countermeasures is unlikely to allow for
communication to find the responsible control centre.
Competition between a few SOCs might be feasible, if their networks coincide
with the networks of regional or local infrastructure operators. But it would still lead to
higher transaction costs than the organisation in a single company, whenever trains are
passing the border points between two networks Furthermore, the SOCs would also
have to enter negotiations upon minimum standards and regulations. Most importantly,
the major co-ordinating and strategic planning organisation would have to concentrate on
intra-layer instead of inter-layer co-ordination functions, reducing the overall benefits the
introduction of a separate second layer could contribute to the railway industry. In the
end, a single interregional, national or even European safety company could be
advantageous.
However, that does not result in competition being absent from the second layer.
But competition between several SOCs could be replaced by competition for the field, a
335concept which was originally proposed by Edwin Chadwick in 1 859."° Accordingly, the
traffic and safety company could recurrently be auctioned off to a single firm under a
franchise agreement Thus, this concept allows competition to take place prior to the
production process, ' . .wzth would-be natural monopolists competing for the rzght to serve the
market in which each rival could serve the market at the lowest cost, adopting the best technology. '
After the franchise period has passed, the incumbent operator and potential rivals may
apply to run the safety operator in the next session.
The SOC can then take on the crucial and central role in the reformed railway
system, as its allocation of the slots and the resulting co-ordination of the passenger and
freight services is the key to reaping the benefits of the railway network as an integrated, but
market co-ordinated system. Assuming that the railway reforms will start off within the
borders of the nation states, national SOCs would be set up as clearing-house institutions
in allocating daily train slots and supervisors of railway safety. The respective SOCs might
then be auctioned off with invitations for tenders on a national and, later possibly an
international or at least European scale. The successful companies may also apply for
more than one SOC in the auction processes. Having invested in technological
innovations which contributed to winning the franchise of the SOC in one country, the
company's efforts to win further franchises would be based on previous experiences. By
means of that franchising process, one or a few companies with a superior technology and
organisation might run the entire European network of safety and control companies in
the end, thereby creating an integrated European network of railways, benefiting the
players in the market and enabling the railways to successfully compete with other modes
of transport.62
Competition for the field would make any government regulation of the SOCs
redundant Still, the government would have a considerable leeway of control in every
renewed franchise of the SOC. The auction process for temporary franchises also offers
'° Chadwick (1859), P. 385 proposed this concept whilst observing sanitary conditions in the English water
supply industries: '4...Ipi'vpose4 as an a #nistnztueprindple competition or the fiel4'that ir to sqy, that the whole
field of seruce sbo,dd be put up on btha4'oftbepublicfor competition, - on the oniy Condition on which ffideng, as
as the utmost cheapness, war pirnficable wueb, the possession, by one captal orby one establishment,  of the entiirfiela
which could be most q7iczentfr and economically administered by one, mith full seimties towanis the pub/it for the
pe?fotiwance of the requisite senia dwrng agunpetiod"
' Lal (1997), p. 221
Knieps (1996), P.32 explicitly suests that a harmonisation of national safety agencies for supervising
train operations could reap some of the potential benefits of horizontal Integration until a European agency
might finally emerge.
336the opportunity for a flexible design of the rules and regulations supervised by the SOCs
for the railway industry. Should train or track operators feel discriminated by the safety
franchisee, either the Office of Fair Trading or European Union competition authorities
might investigate the matter."3
This design also offers benefits for countries preferring a stronger state
involvement in railway policy, as the franchising process of the SOCs naturally offers
scope for government interference. The government could even decide to grant the entire
operation of the safety network to a public agency, which however eradicates the
competition for the best technology, as this is inherent to the auction process for the
most efficient and safe operations of the SOC. Whatever politicians should decide, they
must make that decision once and at the outset of the pnvatisation, in order to provide the
railway industry with guarantees for their own strategic plsnning.
" 3 The European competition rules laid down in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Amsterdam have
already been mentioned in section III.A.: "Anj abuse by one or ff01? unden'akings of a doimnant position wilhui
the common market or in a substantialpart ft shall beprobthvted at incompatible with the common market insoftr at
itmaj q7ct trade between Meusber States."
3373. Layer III: the train operations (lOCs)
The function of the third layer is simply the operation of passenger and freight train
services. One of the main features of the models of a privatised railway system below is
the non-discrintinatøy open access provision as assumed above, irrespective of the vertical
structure of the system. Open access means that access to the network is open to every
train company which complies with minimum safety standards as set out in initial
privatisation arrangements by the government and the SOCs in exchange for the payment
of an access charge to the network providers.
Even train services embody some economies of scale, as certain tasks benefit from
indivisibilities of services, such as mnmum lengths of trains. According to Ewers,
though, they are supposed to be fairly weak, ruling out a national monopoly for train
operations." Also, economies of scope can be discovered  in the train services, e.g. with
standardisation in locomotion technology. Stackelberg points to a German universal
locomotive, which may be used for high speed passenger transport and freight traffic."5
The standardisations would also result in cost reductions  in maintenance efforts and
would offer greater flexibility to employ the engine wherever capacity bottlenecks should
occur. Freight traffic, however, is characterised by an opposing trend, as freight
companies focus on the requirements of their customers, employing rather specialised cars
instead of standardised carriers, thereby accepting loss of scope economies. However,
natural monopoly theory does not apply to the train operations. Even though
locomotives and carriages represent fixed costs, they are not sunk, as they can easily be
moved to another location if market entry of a newcomer should fail. Due to the absence
of sunk costs, no market bathers exist. Thus, the incumbents in the market for railway
transport have to face potential competition. The market is not a natural monopoly, i.e. a
single seller cannot serve the market cheaper than several sellers. Market bathers being
absent, actual competition will prevail between train operating companies.
The pressure of both, actual and potential competition will lead to a supply of
railway transport which is geared to meet the varying preferences of the consumers. Some
companies might focus on high-speed passenger or freight traffic throughout Europe.
Others might specialise on regional passenger transport perhaps building an integrated
" 4 Ewers (1993 , p. 8
" Stackelberg 1990), pp. 198 199
338network with local bus and taxi companies instead of leaving passengers stranded at a
railway station in the middle of the night Some firms might specialise on low-quality but
cheap transport, while others will operate a high-quality, high-speed service aiming at
business travellers and a share of the short or medium distance airline market. Trains may
offer facilities to passengers, ranging from bars, restaurants, small conference, hotel, video
and cinema facilities to saunas, gyms, massage treatments, libraries, entertainment and
internet cafes. Whether passengers are travelling for a short or long time span, train
companies will be forced to offer the customers the deal they are demanding in order to
capture a share of the highly competitive transport market. Instead of neglecting market
gaps, niche markets and some classes of freight and passengers, firms may pick these gaps
deliberately if they can work profitably, using their competitive advantages  in price,
quality and speed over other modes of transport.
Nevertheless, it might well occur that a single train operator could operate train
services in an area cheaper than two or more operators. Imagine a short local railway line
between two towns or villages, connected with a single track. The operator runs one
train that departs from, e.g. Luzern on every full hour and arrives in the small village of
Engelberg after twenty-five minutes, only to depart for Luzern five minutes later, and so
on. Now, this train serves the demand quite well, leaving not much room for a
competitor. Furthermore, the single track makes it more difficult to compete, as there is
only an interval of five minutes, when another train could pull into the terminal right
behind the first one. But despite this seemingly monopolistic market power of the sole
incumbent, there is no need for regulation.
There is, indeed, potential competition and a newcomer might enter the market at
any time without having irreversible costs in his production. The monopolist on that line
has no credible threat at hand to keep potential competitors from entering the market if
he charges a monopolistic mark-up. The newcomer could either bid for the slots being
left over on that line and outperform the incumbent by offering cheaper or rail travel
with an all-exceeding service or target the incumbent's slot whenever the SOC allocates
the slots anew.
However, if open access to the network is prohibited, e.g. by franchising an entire
line for a number of years to one company or selling a vertically integrated service  without
allowing competition on the track, the incumbent could slow down in its efforts to
339innovate and stay ahead, exceeding any potential entrant, because there is none to
compete with, except for intermodal competitors. Market bathers of that kind could be
erected by government legislation or discrimination between the different layers. For
example, imagine that the infrastructure is owned by a single company that also runs a
TOG on its own tracks. Though the company must be obliged by a railway reform law to
grant other operators than its own TOC access rights to the infrastructure, it might
discriminate against competitors by overcharging others on the access price to the
network or by allocating the prime slots during peak hours to its own train company
instead of rivals if the SOC would also be vertically integrated. Therefore, non-
discriminatory open access to the entire network is essential.
Apparently, the open access is slightly limited due to the SOCs safety regulations.
Minimum standards are justified for two reasons. First, it was assumed that the
government owned and operated the railway system and would set the rules for its
privatisation. Second, considerable network externalities are involved in the safe
operation of the whole railway system. Even if a company's reputation would be entirely
lost after a rail accident, negative externalities would harm the railways' reputation as a
whole, because the public would link the accident to the general system and not to the
particular company. Absence of mnimum standards and regulations to the network
would invite freeriders to benefit from the general reputation of railway transport,
regardless of the safety measures the entrant has employed on its trains. Assuming poor
safety equipment and consequently lower short-term costs in one company, it might offer
cheaper transport than its competitors, while it is enjoying a free ride on their reputation
of the product safe rail traveL In case an accident should indeed occur due to the lack of
safety precautions the reputation of that company may be lost entirely, forcing it out of
business. However, neither the victims of the accident nor the other railway operators
who have to regain the reputation for railway transport's safety will benefit from the
firm's punishment by departing the railway market.
In a competitive marketplace for railway transport, competition between several
train companies is a likely outcome. Though competition is entailed with substantial
efficiency gains compared to a monopolistic supply of transport, the drawbacks may be
higher transaction costs for everyone involved. As an example, take the passenger who
intends to travel between Hamburg and Munich. Assume, that there are three high-speed
links, either via Cologne, Hanover or Berlin. While the direct connection via Hanover
340might be shorter, the connection via Berlin might be quicker due to a company offering
the most up-to-date technology. To make the choice for the pitiful customer even worse,
there are several different companies operating on each of the routes, some stopping more
often than others, some having different services aboard and so on.
But the solution is easy at hand, as entrepreneurs will take up the opportunities
and offer transaction-cost reductions for the confused individual. An Internet or
specialised travel agency may note the passenger's preferences and choose the according
service. Examples are plentiful on the Internet today, as a quick look into flight bookings
on the rapidly developing market for cheap, executive or whatever air travel will
instantly prove. Similar institutions are likely to emerge for safety and quality of railway
travel. Results of regular voluntary inspections could be published in magazines, such as
the German test Stftung JVarentest or easily on the Internet.
Therefore, a consequent reduction of transaction costs can be expected due to
emerging institutions, such as mtemet) travel agencies or publishers making use of the
otherwise high search and information costs for customers of the transport market. Some
of them might focus on the railway market, others on the entire transport market,
bringing the best deals to the consumers of transport.
In freight transport, resources are wasted when freight trains are doomed to wait
for hours at depots on account of outdated and slow transhipment facilities, in the event
losing business to road hauling or other modes. However, with open access on the
network, industry could hire their own trains or run their own freight operator on certain
routes, directly connecting their markets." For industries with small lots, specialised
freight companies may emerge in order to pick up the opportunities with innovative
computerised logistic solutions.
Due to the absence of market barriers, actual and potential competition prevails
in layer IlL Also considering the SOCs regulatory oversight, additional government
6l6 www.bahn.de (2001) and www.banverket.se (2001), press notices: IKEA Rail AB has taken a leading
role in European rail deregulation. On Friday, 29 June 2001, IKEA Rail AB, the newly founded rail
subsidiary of the Swedish furniture company IKEA has signed track access agreements with three
European track operators, the German DB Netz AG, the Danish Banestyrelsen and the Swedish Banverket
IKEA Rail will run daily freight trains between Alrnhult and Duisburg in eath direction every weekday from
September 2001, thus requiring ten slots per week.
341regulation is redundant and would lead to distortions in the efficient working of the
transport market.
342D. Vertical integration versus separation -
market-based integration
Before dealing with five main models of a privatised railway structure, it is
necessary to test the railways for economies of scope within their vertical structure.
Conventionally, it has been argued that economies of scope exist between both
infrastructure networks (lajters I & II) and the actual operation of trains (hyer HI) for the
following three reasons:7
1. Researcb and development activities require combined efforts between TOCs and
the infrastructure operator;
2. the latter might lose its contact to the market and the final customers as a
consquence of vertical separation; and
3. the management of trafficflows will be considerably burdened in an institutionally
separated system, e.g. with regard to timetabling and slot allocation, as well as
flexible day-to-day management of operations.
Ewers makes clear, that economies of scope are indeed existing, even though they
do not provide a rationale for a mutual monopoly of the infrastructure and train
operations. In contrast, the conventional argument claims that vertical separation would
eliminate the said economies of scope, which is why railway companies must remain
vertically integrated.
First, research and development efforts are said to be most effective, if the research
activities are simultaneously geared towards tracks and rolling stock. Therefore, separate
research departments in different train operating companies and network providers are
supposed to be inferior to research undertaken in an integrated company. Irrespective of
possible economies of scope in this area, research and development activities may,
however, be undertaken by companies, which are independent of either train operations
or infrastructure and traffic control networks. Apparently, those independent research
and development finns cannot neglect any of the complex activities in the railway
' Knieps (1996), pp. 38-42 and Ewers (1993), pp. 9-11 discuss the three reasons almost identically,
Investigating the conventional arguments. The Council of Academic Advisers of the Society for Public Policy
(Wissenschafthcher Beitt der Gesellschaft für offenthche 'Wirtschaft) represents a stronold of the
conventional view expressing the three concerns, Gesellschaft fur ofiii1iche Wirtschaft,  pp. 10-14. Still, cost
studies of economies of scope are not available to validate the arguments.
343industry, but must investigate their interrelations, e.g. between rolling stock and tracks.6M
With the liberalisation of global and European transport markets, a trend towards
international research and development companies is most likely, striving for innovations
which they can profitably sell to world wide transport markets rather than limiting their
efforts to a national scale in a nationally integrated company. Thus they might even
exploit potential economies of scale in research better than integrated railway firms.
The second argument, namely that the infrastructure provider may lose the contact
with the markep lace is simply irrational, when considering the initial assumptions.
Supposedly, the infrastructure company does not provide the track for altruistic reasons,
but is essentially motivated by making a profit, the train operators will be required to pay
an access price to the infrastructure provider, which they will then pass on to their
passengers or freight customers. Owing to intermodal competitive pressures and
substitutive railway connections of other infrastructure providers, the companies will aim
to meet the preferences of their direct customers, the train operating companies, as well
as taking the train operators' customers' demands into account
Third, the capad y management and organisation of daify traffic flows has been
mentioned above as a further point in favour of an integrated railway system due to
economies of scope. Though the traffic management is undoubtedly a complex task, its
complexity does neither depend on the separation or integration of the vertical layers, nor
on the amount of train operators on the track, but simply on the  number and speed of
trains. The need for a safe and co-ordinated traffic management is essential in both
separated and integrated railway systems. Above, it has been suested that these
operations could be undertaken by interregional, national or, later, even European SOC
in a vertically separated system, auctioned off to the aspiring operators of traffic and
safety management The SOCs would be in sole charge of the overall capacity
management and the supervision of traffic flows, they are bridging the supposed gap
which is feared to be left as a result of a vertical separation of the railway system.
'U Sweden has often been qu ted as a negative example of co-operation between the private train business
and the state-owned infrastructure operator. Ewers (1993), p. 10 however reasoned that the private train
company's complaints about the incompetence of the public infrastructure company must not be surprising.
He sees a possible solution to the infrastructure company's lack of incentives in a greater separation from
government and the obligation to run profitably.
344Dismissing the three generally quoted reasons in favour of economies of scope
between the combined layers I and II with TOCs does not mean that synergies are absent
in a vertically integrated railway systems. But their exploitation does not necessarily
require integration in a single enterprise. So far, the argument was made solely against the
conventional view, that synergies would exist for three reasons between the train
operations on the one hand and the combined layers of the infrastructure network on the
other hand. A vertical separation of the infrastructure networks into ROCs and SOCs
was simply unthinkable. It is interesting that it was not even considered, but a more
challenging debate was apparently halted for the three reasons mentioned afore.
Eventually, Knieps provoked the conventional thinking and suggested to separate the
physical track network from a safety agency similar to the ROCs. 6 Though their
foundations were not very challenging, vertical synergies might occur between TOCs and
the provision of small branch line stations. Alternatively, the ROCs or independent
companies with expertise in running stations could own the stations, collecting access
charges from the TOC operating the local branch.
As a vertical separation between TOCs (lqyer III) and the infrastructure (la jyers I &
II) was already seen as a radical step, an integrated infrastructure remained unchallenged.
But there is no reason that the status quo must uphold, if scope economies are absent
between layers I and H. Consequently, Knieps argues that the network of tracks and
safety contmls does not exhibit significant economies of scope, supporting the rationale
that a break-up of integrated railway systems into ROCs and SOCs plus the train
operations of layer Ill would at least be feasible without imposing major costs upon the
railway system.69°
Naturally, there is a strong demand for co-ordination between the ROCs and the
SOCs, involving transaction costs. The SOCs have already been referred to as something
like dearing-houses for train slots. As the ROCs are required to maintain and renew their
track infrastructure, certain slots have to be taken out of business to allow for
maintenance works. Quite obviously, the safety operator cannot allocate the slots, which
" Knieps (1996) suested to split railway transport into three layers similar to air transport, which he
investigated in the same study. Therefore, I am indebted to him in mitiating an argument that is mostly
neglected in the public debate and rejected as being impossible. This study however shows that an approach
to railway organisatlon in three layers offers several benefits to the industry and the transport market and
may serve as a solution to problems currently encountered in Britain, Germany and other European
countries.
° Knieps (1996), pp.41-42
345are used by the track operator to carry out repairs. Notwithstanding, whether layers I and
IT are integrated, the track department or ROC has to reserve the slots with the traffic
management department or the SOC, respectively. The transaction costs for the
reservation procedure are unlikely to differ much between internal or external co-
ordination. The process is essentially the same, whether in long-term track investment
planning or due to immediate incidents, when the SOC needs to block slots which were
already allocated to train services.
Most of the business operations of the SOCs and ROCs appear to be unrelated to
each other. The ROCs provide their track infrastructure and invest in new routes,
according to market demand. The SOCs deal with the ex-ante capacity management of
the railways and channel the daily traffic flows as requested by the TOGS, subject to
availability of slots. While the co-ordination between ROCs and SOCs seem to be limited
to more exceptional circumstances, the TOGS will have to deal with the safety operator
on an almost permanent basis. If there are vertical synergies, they could be expected
between layers II and HI rather than between I and IL Again, the market seems to be
appropriate for co-ordinating the actions of TOCs on the railway network with a
company unbiased between the TOGS allocating the slots and making sure that operations
run safely and smoothly.
346L Model A: Integration of layers I, II and III
The full vertical integration as illustrated in figure 4 is the traditional model of
railways, in itself representing two different structures in its horizontal dimension. State-
owned railway companies were usually vertically integrated, commonly as the sole or at
least the major provider of national railway transport. Also, the 9" century private
railway enterprises were generally vertically integrated companies.' The principal
differences rested first, with the ownership of the companies and second, the market
dominance of railway transport The state-owned railway firms had a virtual national
monopoly over railway transport as they were also horizontally integrated, whereas the
private railway companies were often massive enterprises, but never national monopolies.
Even the government-induced 1921 merger of British railway companies resulted in four
regional monopolies, but solely in the market for railway transportation with competition
in the market for transport and occasionally competition between lines.
The above assumption of non-discriminatory open access renders a full vertical
and horizontal integration invalid. The importance of the assumption has already been
dwelled upon, but its relevance for real-world railway reforms must also be noticed. The
European Union has issued a number of consultation documents and passed influential
legislation on access pricing and non-discriminatory access to the EU's railway and other
utilities' infrastructure networks, thereby pointing towards a trend favouring
liberalisation in network industries.692 A vertically integrated, but horizontally separated
railway system, as was most popular in the 9tf century, would meet certain difficulties in
the current situation, most importantly with regard to the safety network. From a
theoretical point of view, a vertical separation into a variety of SOCs as part of vertical
railway businesses is feasible, though naturally entailing transaction costs, which are likely
to rise in proportion to the number of SOCs and overlapping network operations. In
addition, especially the British real-world perspective sets narrow limits to the theoretical
feasibility due to the recent safety crisis mentioned in the case study on the UK in section
IILC. The British are unlikely to be prepared for any further experiments, as some of
them apparently felt like being actors in a test-case scenario for a textbook railway
691 The historical study has highhghted that open access to the tracks of those vertically integrated companies
was a legal requirement for hcensed train operators (see e.g. the Royal Prussian Railway Law of 1838),
though it was only used on one occasion by the Prussian government as a threat as described in detail
above
347privatisation. Thus, Model D will consider a railway industry structure with vertically
integrated train and track operations, while the safety provision is carried out by SOCs
embracing several or even all national or European integrated train companies.
' Non-discriminatory access to railway infrastructure was at the centre of the EU's directives as derailed in
section III.A.
3482. Model B: Integration of layers I and II
The integration of the track infrastructure and traffic control networks in a
monopolistic public or private enterprise with several competing train companies on the
network was among the first reform proposals of railways in Europe, as portrayed in
figures 5 and 6. In the proposals, the ROCs and SOCs were integrated in an
uncontestable, naturally monopolistic enterprise. Still, this is not to say that private
operators should be prohibited from operating or establishing its own infrastructure
networks. Solely, the government owned railway company is re-structured according to
the vertical structure in the illustrations provided.
The model in figure 8 is very similar to the current structure of the railway
industry in Germany. The vertically integrated Deutsche Bahn AG is the dominant
provider in layers I, II and III, while other train operators are competing with the DB's
passenger and freight transport subsidiaries. Other railway networks are strictly limited to
a few railway lines. The DB's dominant position in the German railway market was a
logical result of the German privatisation process, as the DB inherited the former state
monopolist Deutsche Bundesbahn.
Lqyer III	 Train Operating Companies
(P0 Cs and FOCs)
Layer II	 Netw,rk of Traffic and Safetj Controls
(SO Cs)
Lijer	 Piysical Connection of Railwa, Tracks
(ROCs)
FIG UKE 8: Verna1 Iitegrar:.i if Layers I & II - Netw.rk Pr.eider(s) za, rat itt TOCs
Figure 8 shows vertically integrated ROCs and SOCs with separate TOCs, though
the marked line indicates that the network provider may run his own trains on his
infrastructure if he so wishes. Now assume a dominant network provider like the DBAG
runs his own passenger and freight trains in a competitive layer IlL As long as the access
prices to the infrastructure are equal to every user of the infrastructure, presumably there
349is not much to worry about. However, notwithstanding open access to layer III, it cannot
be guaranteed that the access will also be non-discriminatory.
The German case study has exemplified that one of the main complaints of
smaller competitors for train operations in layer HI were indeed the access prices and the
conditions of the pricing regime. Both the reforms of the pricing schemes introduced in
1998 and 2001 have emerged as the DBAG's subsidiary track owner DB Netz' reaction
to the persistent criticism, that the pricing would discriminate in favour of major railway
companies with a large demand for slots and long-term contracts, essentially the other
subsidiaries of the vertically integrated Deutsche Balm holding. Also, the potential of
price distortions due to cross-subsidies within a company is inherent to vertically
integrated firms. Thus, the track operating division might overcharge all POCs and FOCs,
whilst cross-subsidising its own train operating division to undercut competitors' final
product prices.
True, the network operator has an incentive to get as much business on the
network as possible, as he is subject to intermodal competition. Nevertheless, it may pay
off to sacrifice some earnings in access prices and a part of the transport pie in exchange
for forcing other train operating companies out of the market, while his own train
company receives hidden cross-subsidies in order to offer cheaper tickets and better
quality than competitors. Also, the network provider might rationally discriminate in
favour of his train company in the allocation process of the most profitable slots, rather
than granting the best slots to competitors. In the case of congestion and delays the
network provider is likely to give priority to his own company, while the worst-case
scenario might involve open discrimination in the daily traffic management on purpose.
The development of the single market in the European Economic Community
area and concerns about market dominance prompted the European Community  in 1991
to issue the Council Directive 91/440/EEC, demanding at least accounting separation
between the train operating and railway track divisions of vertically integrated private or
public railway companies. Cross-subsidies were explicitly prohibited in article 6. The
following article 8 demands the introduction of non-discriminatory access prices for all
users of the infrastructure, payable to the provider of the railway tracks, whereas the
350mode of access is left for the member states to decide.693 This has been discussed above in
section III.A.
Thus, government regulation is an essential safeguard to monitor and guarantee
non-discriminatory and fair access to the track and signalling infrastructure in a vertically
integrated railway industry structure with a competitive supply in train operations. This
industry structure does not uphold a neutral role for a private company to act as a
mediator and co-ordinator of common interests, such as a private SOC. Whilst positive
network externalities exist, favouring horizontal co-ordination to some extent, owners of
major networks might do very well without their minor competitors, whereas the latter
could become dependent on the dominant operator's benevolent co-operation to run his
own services successfully. Cross-subsidies and other strategic market barriers adopted by
the incumbent could deter entrants from the incumbent's track network, even if they
offer a superior service to the incumbent As long as the incumbent is not operating dose
to the line's capacity, the sunk costs of the infrastructure can be expected to discourage
investment in a parallel network to challenge the incumbent.
Accordingly, a major restraint on misuse of market power cannot be expected
from intra-industry competition in this modeL Intermodal competition would be the
industry's main self-regulating force. Thus, a vertically integrated industry offers scope for
government regulation, to assure a fair and non-discrtminatory use of the railway
infrastructure, whether in a special railway regulatory agency or under the jurisdiction of
the Office of Fair Trading or its national counterparts.
'' European Economic Community (1991), Directive 91/440/EEC
3513. Model C: Integration of layers I and II with institutionally separate
TOCs
This model of railway reforms is very similar to the previous one, with a small,
however very significant, difference in design. The combined network provider is
prohibited from running own passenger or freight trains in layer IlL Roughly, this path
was pursued in Sweden in 1989. The network provider Banverket was established as a
public authority, whilst private sector competition was envisaged for sections of the
actual train operations as described in the European case study above.
Lqyer III I	 Train Operating Companies
(POCs and P0Cc)
Lqyerll Network of Traffic and Safetj Controls
(SO Cs)
Lqyerl	 Pbysical Connection of Railwaj Tracks
(ROCs)
FIGURE 9: Vertical Ititegrat:. af Layers I & II ,.'ztb :asntivr:.aal Iidefeideace .f Layer Ill
In an alternative setting, the government could sell off the network provider to a
private operator. Notwithstanding intermodal competition, the network company will -
whether public or private - exercise considerable monopoly power in the market for
railway transport, as other train operators depend on the provision of the infrastructure
for the production of the end product railway transport However, the relationship
between the operator of tracks and safety controls on the one hand and the competitive
supply of train transportation in layer III on the other hand is a mutual one. Again, all
train companies are competing with other modes of transport for the carriage of traffic.
Without passenger or freight revenue, there will be no revenue from access charges to the
network manager. And the sunk cost element of railway systems resides in the network
operator's outreach, not affecting the TOCs directly. Should either of the players in the
railway market defect from a mutually beneficial solution, both parties in layer III and the
combined layers I and IL would lose to the advantage of other modes of transportation.
Nevertheless, at least in the short term, it might pay off if the network provider defects
352from the co-operative outcome by raising access prices by a margin. Even if he loses some
customers, he might gain higher short term rents. His only task is to calculate the
reservation price that maximises his revenues. This is the simplest form of price
discrimination.
As the revenue maximising access price is likely to carry a monopolistic mark-up
over social marginal costs of providing the infrastructure, government regulation of a
dominant private network operator will be the common outcome in a railway reform in
line with this structure. While the institutional separation of the TOCs from layers I and
II in Model C allows the regulator to focus predominantly on the actual level of access
charges, Model B also requires the regulator to take hidden cross-subsidies, differential
treatments in the allocation of slots and further discriminations into account.
Accordingly, the regulator will need to collect more information in Model B, entailing
higher transaction costs and, due to imponderability in the information itself, regulation
in Model B is also tied to higher uncertainty with regard to the regulations' effectiveness.
3534. Model D: Integration of layers I and III with institutionally separate
SOCs
In its desperate search for alternatives as salvation to the present chaos on the
British railways and the helplessness of the surrounding politicians, the British
government and industry are currently emerging with ideas of re-integrating POCs and
the corresponding track infrastructure, presumably by means of a long-term lease of
tracks from Railtrack to major POCs. The case study on the United Kingdom has
revealed that the future structure of the British railway industry is once again open to
further debate.
	
er III	 Train O)erating Companies
(POCs and FOCs)
	
Layer II	 Network of Traffic and Safety Controls
(SO Cs)
	
\/Lqyer I	 Physical Connection of Railway Tracks
I(ROCs)
FIGURE 10: Vertical IntegratioN .1 Li.yers I & III a'itb institart:onallj separate
Saferj Operati.i:
Adopting a vertically integrated structure along the lines of the current franchise
operators in Britain would obviously require a comprehensive re-structuring of Railtrack,
either dissolving the company completely or reducing it to administering long-term leases.
However, proponents of the lease-option must explain why they would stop short of
going full circle, if they favour splitting Railtrack. It is hard to see any advantages arising
from a long-term lease over a sale of Raikrack networks to different franchise operators.
Instead it would inject further uncertainty into the system with regard to a major re-
shuffling of leases after the initial leases run out. The government might even reserve the
right to get involved in the re-leasing process. A further question anses with regard to
layer II as it might be too costly to split it up according to the new variety of separate
track networks. Alternatively, an independent safety operator or Railtrack might run the
354second layer, notwithstanding the choice between a sale or lease of Railtrack's layer I
business operation, whilst layer I and III are integrated.
The debate on nationalization of railway enterprises has shown that the basis for
the market imperfections doctrine is at best very weak. Thus, the proponents' arguments
were somehow supplemented by strong concerns about market dominance of private
companies. Accordingly, the concerns usually associated with vertically integrated
companies are fears of market dominance with an entailed discrimination against and an
eventual squeezing out of small competitors. Depending on the government's choice of
design, a vertically integrated railway market could still see major competition on the
main railway lines, e.g. in the UK running more or less parallel from the South to the
North, even if the train companies reserve exclusive access to the railway infrastructure.
This notion of competition would then take the form of competition between lines,
instead of competition on the track. The above assumption of non-discriminatory open
access to the infrastructure, however, excludes this option. Accordingly, every train
operator would be obliged to grant competitors access to its own vertically integrated
infrastructure network in exchange for the payment of an access charge. If the
competitors' access is indeed non-discriminatory, no one would have to worry about
unfair pricing strategies of the track owner or discrimination in allocating slots.
Nevertheless, the problem of co-ordinating safety operations between a number of
different integrated railway companies remains unresolved in this model of integration,
embracing all three layers in each train company.
This, however, is where the SOCs could take on an over-riding role. Now,
imagine a nationwide or inter-regional monopoly of a public or private company in sole
charge of the daily capacity management and overall safety operations as in figure 10
above. The competing vertically integrated train companies are running TOCs and ROCs,
while they are obliged to grant non-discriminatory access to their ROCs to any other
TOG The slot allocation process, the collection of access charges, the day-to-day traffic
management and co-ordination as well as the signalling operations are sourced out to the
independent SOC, which could be a demoted version of Railtrack in the case of Britain's
re-structuring example above, being a neutral and non-discriminatory mediator for all
industry players involved.
355While the government concerned needs to agree on a certain structure of access
charges to the SOC's network at the outset of the privatisation with a possible oversight
of the national or European competition authority, access charges to the ROCs' networks
would be set individually by the track operators. The fair and non-discriminatory access
for other TOCs could then be monitored by the industry's regulatory body, the safety
operating company.
3565. Model E: Full institutional separation of the three layers
Model E is apparently the most radical, and therefore probably the most
mistrusted reform proposal. It suests a full vertical separation of the railway systems
layers, completely transforming the former railway networks. However, it is simply the
next logical step from the proposals in Model D. The previous analysis of vertical
integration at the beginning of this chapter did not find that the business operations
between the three layers are strongly related to each other, though the lOCs have to co-
ordinate with the SOCs constantly during the operations of their trains. But no
substantial reasons were discovered, which could prevent or burden their co-ordination
over the market. The resulting independent operation of layers II and III, however,
promotes competition between passenger and freight train companies and the
opportunity to draw the safety operator's forces together in a single or few franchised
SOCs. Furthermore, a full vertical separation enhances the possibilities for internationally
operating companies, which are no more bound by national borders. Note that current
railway enterprises may run a few border crossing services into the vicinity, but many
railway companies are still oriented towards national markets, though the trend is
changing as visible with the operations of Eurostar, Thalys, but also certain freight
services, such as IKEA Rail AB's ten weekly slots between Almhult in Sweden and
Duisburg in Germany, involving three European track operators.'
In a railway reform in line with model E the layers would be separated from each
other at the outset of the reform. Thus, no company which actively operates in either of
the layers would run a subsidiary in another layer to avoid cross-subsidisation and
discriminatory behaviour. The railway system would be re-structured as shown in figure
11, with competing ROCs, franchised SOCs as well as active and potential competition
of POCs and FOCs.
'www.bahn.de (2001) and www.banverket.se 2001 , press notices: see previous footnote ui chapter C.3.
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Market liberalisation must acknowledge the dynamism of the railway market,
realising that neither the government, not economic wisdom can anticipate the future
developments of the market. Even if there are no economies today, economies could
emerge with the development of new techniques. The optimal market structure cannot
be designed in a government's back office or in an economics department. Instead, it has
to evolve by individual action, according to the individual preferences of the actors in the
transport market. The railway entrepreneurs have to determine the structure which serves
their customers' interests and thus, their own company. The governments' and academic
approaches can at best determine the basic structure for the market which maximises the
public benefit. After the basic design has been installed, government must let go to the
extent specified in the privatisation arrangements, so that the industry can flourish.
As long as horizontal or vertical mergers, joint ventures or other forms of
voluntary co-operation, that is market-based integration, do not harm the basic principle of
non-discriminatory open access provision, they must not be ruled out. Some
concentration in the industry is likely to occur over time in order to benefit from
economies or transaction cost reductions. Due to the absence of sunk costs, the market
for passenger and freight transport services is contestable. Even if there would be no
actual competition in the market, potential competition will prevail, eradicating
monopoly mark-up on the competitive market price.
This is, however, slightly more difficult in the market for track access, where sunk
costs imply natural monopolistic behaviour. After an initial break-up of the
358infrastructure, mergers in the ROC market could lead to regional or even interregional
track operator monopolies. As long as layer II's SOC is acting as the impartial clearing
house agency for the allocation of actual slots, monopolistic access prices are the main
danger arising from a monopolistic market structure. Potential government regulation
would only have to guard the access prices, though they are restrained by other than
direct competition. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether railway track operators would be
able to assemble a national or international track monopoly, notwithstanding whether it
would be in their self-interest at all.
The same applies to vertical integration between ROCs and TOCs, as long as it
does not impair the unrestricted access of potential entrants, or in other words, as long as
it does not erect mobility bathers to market entry or exit. Naturally, the market-based
integrationist' approach also includes intermodal integration, which might be favourable
to some railway businesses if they could internalise positive network externalities, such as
bus feeder services or superior knowledge in running transport businesses. Interestingly,
many railway franchises in Britain are currently operated by bus and coach companies.
The concept of integration has often been praised and Britain even attempted to integrate
water, road and rail transportation under the British Transport Commission in 1948,
resulting in a legally protected transport sector. While costs of failing public companies
have to be borne by society as a whole, private sector companies have internalised the
costs of failure, as they can put an enterprise out of business.
Nonetheless, the unbiased working of layer ii is crucial for the arguments above.
Relaxing its guarantee of impartial operation may result in discriminatory behaviour in
the slot allocation process or the capacity and traffic management, if the SOC is operated
by one of the companies in layer I or IlL There are two ways of prevention, either by
monitoring the processes by a regulatory agency or by prohibiting ROCs and TOCs from
running layer II. Tight control of the SOC's daily management could, however, prove to
be very costly or nearly impossible. As the amount of information required for the process
is very complex, the collection and analysis of the data is first cost-intensive and second
not likely to uncover minor discriminations, even though they might have a significant
long-term impact. Therefore, the prohibitive solution could be the most cost-effective
and transparent solution.
359E. Assessment of the reform proposals
L Scale and scope economies
Recapitulating the earlier analysis on horizontal and vertical integration versus
separation leads to the following results with regard to the five models presented above.
The choice between models A to E should be indifferent to scale and scope
economies involved in the infrastructure, such as economies of density and the physical
connection of previously separate infrastructure networks. Though the latter favours
fewer networks to an atoinistic separation of the railway infrastructure, a ROC monopoly
is not required. The economies of density may be exploited independently from the
number of railway track companies, so long as they exclusively provide the physical rail
infrastructure. Accordingly, the track infrastructure may be divided in interlinking
networks of high-speed, regional, local and freight traffic, with further differentiations if
necessary.
The situation in layer H is similar to layer I. The costs for individual train
companies falls with additional users. The costs of joint production of safety products,
such as the allocation of slots, signalling and the capacity management, will be lower if
performed in one company, rather than in a multiplicity of firms. Only the incumbent
Soc needs to invest in large specific research and development funds, whilst other
transportation or software companies will however attempt to keep pace if they envisage
themselves as potential future franchisees after the next auction procedure. While
national or European markets could offer scope for a few SOCs competing with each
other in the bidding for soc franchises, a large number of SOCs appears to be
counterproductive, especially if the networks are dealing with a large daily traffic volume
crossing the borders between one or more SO(2s. The constant co-ordination between
SOCs in passing responsibility for train operations to a neighbouring SOC involves
transaction costs. Most importantly, the transaction costs of finding the appropriate SOC
to avert disasters may be prohibitive in the handling of emergencies. The main benefit of
layer H as an inter-layer co-ordinating body and mediator between layers I and III would
be burdened with intra-layer co-ordination tasks, instead. And again, each of the above
models A to E offers similar potential to exploit economies and network externalities of
the second layer.
360The TOCs in layer III exhibit certain economies of scale and scope, which have
been discussed above, such as indivisibilities and standardisation benefits. Neither,
however, is an argument against vertical or horizontal separation. TOCs could run both
freight and regional passenger services, exploiting universal locomotion technologies.
High-speed passenger services might also commence high-speed express freight services if
there are economies of scope, favouring a joint production. Also, minimum train lengths
could be incorporated in a competitive supply of train operations, as competition does
not mean that train services must consist of one engine attached to a single passenger or
freight car. It is up to every company to decide upon its optimal train lengths or other
indivisibilities of service. It does not justify a monopolised suppiy of train services.
Furthermore it has been concluded that the conventional reasons for a vertical
integration of the three layers does not hold. Research and development production will
no longer be confined to a national railway company and to political desires. Instead,
railway enterprises will draw on a global pool of information and supply of innovative
railway products tailored to the individual firm's needs. Presumably, international, global
or specialised research centres can exploit economies in research far more effectively than
smaller national train companies who can only commit limited resources to research and
development activities. Also, the concern that the ROCs might lose the contact with the
final customer has been relieved. The ROCs must not lose the contact to the market of
passenger and freight transportation, otherwise it would drive them out of the market for
transportation. In a horizontally separated layer I, other ROCs will be deligthed to take
over either the assets of the losing track provider or its customers via their own
networks. The management of traffic flows will be carried out by the SOCs and is
independent of the actual number of existing railway firms, but soleLy dependent on the
actual number and speed of trains currently twining on the tracks. The pure tasks of
administering and maintaining the railway infrastructure are undertaken by the ROCs.
Their assignments are, however, mostly independent from the business operations of the
SOCs, though there is need for co-ordination, e.g. in blocking slots when repairs are due
to be carried out.
As a result, neither economies of scale, nor economies of scope pose major
burdens or concerns towards a market-based integration of railways, replacing former
361railway structures. Therefore, no specific model should be favoured on account of the
economies involved, alone.
3622. Open versus exclusive access rights
Model A had been ruled Out as a real reform model due to the impossibility of
incorporating non-discriminatory open access to its infrastructure. However, relaxing the
most prominent assumption made above has important consequences. Exclusive access
rights in Model B could mean that the operator of layers I and II does not grant access
rights to aspiring entrants toy III, as the network operator is running his own TOC. If
he accepts other train companies in competition to his own service provider, he might do
so to his own conditions. Potential entrants or already existing TOCs do not possess any
market power against the dominant network provider.
The situation is more positively leaning towards the TOCs in Model C. Now, the
relationship between the independent TOCs and the network provider in layers I and H is
inter-dependent Though the TOCs cannot provide railway transport without access to
the network, the network provider cannot exist without TOCs paying access charges. In
the end, the game between the TOCs and the network provider is all about distribution
of rents between them. To the detriment of the TOCs, the network provider might be
able to extract some additional rents by marginally raising access charges and vice versa.
Though the dominant infrastructure company appears to have considerable bargaining
power at first glance, it has to recover high capital costs, whereas the TOCs could sell
their assets fairly easily compared with the firm combining ROC and SOC services.
The trend towards higher bargaining power for layer Ill's train operators
continues with Model D and even more so with Model E, as long as a single TOC does
not purchase the entire ROCs in the marketplace. Though the train companies are
integrated in layers I and III in Model D, it is a rational choice for the ROC divisions of
integrated companies not to exclude other operators, if it provides additional revenues to
cover the network's costs and even more so if access is priced according to the efficient
component pricing rule. This charging principle developed by Baumol and Willig also
compensates the incumbent operator for the opportunity costs he  is foregoing by not
operating the service himselL695 Accordingly, the incumbent will be indifferent towards
the service provider and value another TOC in the same sense as his own's. In addition,
the train operator concerned may also wish to offer train services extending over the
borders of his own rail tracks. Therefore, he also depends on the benevolent co-operation
363of other ROCs. American railway history provides numerous examples for different
railway companies voluntarily granting access rights to each other.6
At the outset of privatisation the bargaining power in Model E will lean strongly
towards the TOCs for the same reason as in Model C. Following likely mergers and
acquisitions in the industry, the argument used in Model D applies. Thus, the necessity for
enforcement of the non-discnminatory open access provision is falling in line from Model
A to Model E, as it is partly self-enforcing for rational profit maximising companies. This
also hints at the limited scope regulation must take in non-discriminatory systems.
'95 The efficient component pricing rule shall be discussed in the next chapter below.
study of American railroad history is included in the appendnç section VIA.
3643. Pricing of infrastructure and congestion pricing
The theoretical pmblem how to price access to the infrastructure in large
technical systems emerged from a practical point of view with the deregulation of New
Zealand's telecommunication market and its consequent privatisation in 1989. The
former subsidiary of the post office was sold as a private unregulated monopoly in an
unprotected telecommunication market to a consortium of Bell and Ameritech. The sale
and purchase contract was based on the principle of non-discriminatory open access and
competition from Sprint arrived in the same year.697 For railroads, Levin points out that
the welfare maximising social optimum of marginal access pricing is unworkable due to
the existence of fixed costs in the infrastructure.698 As the literature on the subject is vast,
this can only present a brief overview and critique.699
Setting access prices to the railway network along with the approach of  fulfy
allocated costs means that the entrant has to compensate the owner of the infrastructure
for the direct costs attributable to the track network in addition to his share of the fixed
costs involved. The allocation of the fixed costs, however, leaves the entrant at an
arbitrary discretion of the incumbent in correctly calculating and attributing the fixed
cost element. In the UK case study the difficulties in allocating fixed costs to British
Rail's different divisions have been shown. This is even more difficult in an industry with
one dominant incumbent as in Model B, especially if the competitiveness of an entrant
depends upon an unbiased and fair allocation of fixed costs in an incumbent firm. Thus,
regulatory oversight over access prices seems to be more important in integrated railway
enterprises than in separated businesses, as the former offer a greater leeway in shifting
costs to the entrants. However, as the collection of information and the allocation of the
fixed costs to individual services are close to impossible for integrated companies, it is
'The former MP and Cabinet Minister from New Zealand Maurice McTigue (1998) descnbed the general
background of the prwatisation process in New Zealand and the imporiance of the absence of regulation.
Baumol and Sidak (1994), pp. 189-192 as well as Ergas and Ralph (1994, p. 3 discuss the access pnce
system, which was decided in court Though New Zealand's High Court decided in favour of the Baumol-
Wilhig or efficient component pricing rule as a general charging principle, the Court of Appeal finally ruled
against it on the grounds that the principle would not necessarily exclude monopoly profits.
698 Levitt (1981), p. 394
' For a more detailed analysis of access pricing rules see Cave and Doyle (1994), Economides and White
(1995), Laffont and Tiroie (1994), Locksley (1994) and Tye (1994).
365even more so for regulating agencies with asymmetric information about the firm's cost
function.
Laffont and Tirole proposed a marginal cost pning approach to realise allocative
efficiency and maximise welfare.70° However, the imposition of fixed costs of the
network obviously eradicates the first best world of marginal cost access pricing, leading
to a mark-up on marginal costs. They suggest covering the fixed cost element by subsidj
via taxation.70' The European case study illustrated a similar approach of marginal cost
access pricing with a government subsidy to cover fixed costs that had been adopted in
Sweden. Still, this concept distorts prices in the entire transport market in favour of
railways, if the same pricing regime does not apply to other modes of transport. If
governments aim at promoting railway transport, whilst discriminating against all other
transport modes, this option might be pursued. A policy of strict non-distortion of
market processes however assumes that evey mode of transportation pays its way and not
only the railways. In other words it requires access pricing schemes for roads and all other
means of transportation. On the basis of the entire costs involved, the individual
consumer would then have to make the choice of the mode of transport according to his
own set of preferences.702
Baumol and Willig developed the so-called efficient coponent pricing or simply,
Baumol-Willig rule.703 The access prices of the efficient component pricing rule are based
on the incrnnental costs of the service plus the o rt1niy costs, that is the revenue the
incumbent cannot realise due to the market entry. 704 As the opportunity costs in
Baumol's concept are deducted from the final product prices of the incumbent, the access
price to the incumbent's infrastructure would include a monopolistic mark-up, if the
700 Laffont and Tirole (1994)
701 Laffont and Tirole (1994), p. 1699-1670. Laffont and Tirole admit that their paper does not cover non-
linear access pricing regimes, such as two-part tariff which had been apphed with the German InfraCard.
On page 1670 they argue that '.it is an excellent tool to izse the mony needed to )qyfor the fixed cost of the
network. ..Swnlany we ban not discussed the :mporast pracucal issue  ofpeak load access pnang."
702 The author advocated the private supply, financing and pricing of roads in a paper presented in Cape
Town in 1999 on transport tdematics and road pricing, Krupping (1999).
703 Baumol and Sidak 1994)
Blankart (1998), p. 11. Incremental costs are the additional costs incurred. The incremental costs are
calculated by hypothetically comparing the total costs of the business with and without the service provided
by the entrant
366incumbents' final product price inhibits a monopoly price. 705 In addition, possible
inefficiencies in the incumbent's production are left unchallenged, but even worse, the
entrant has to pay for them by means of the access prices. According to Baurnol and
Sidak, the main problem does not reside with the efficient component pricing rule, but
solely with a lack of price regulation. The dominant company will be unable to realise
monopoly profits, if the stand-akne costs serve as an upper bound for price setting.706
However useful this concept is in vertically integrated markets as in models B and D, it
becomes worthless when applied to vertically separated systems, such as in models C and
E. The calculation of the opportunity costs is redundant in models C and E, as no
revenue of the incumbent is foregone due to new train operators, because the ROC does
not provide passenger or freight transport in the first place.
Though marginal cost pricing leads to allocative efficiency, marginal costs are
making up nothing but a small share of the total costs of the infrastructure. If tax-funded
subsidies are rejected by the government either due to the distorting effects mentioned
earlier, budgetary or any other reasons, Ramsey pricing offers an alternative option to
cover the full costs of railways, meaning that the fixed costs would be allocated to the
different parts of the network inversely related to their demand elasticity. 707 A relatively
simple means of price discrimination to cover the fixed costs is congestion pricing. That
means that peak hour services have to pay a higher charge than off-peak services.705 Also,
slow freight or regional services wanting to run over parts of a high-speed line would
have to compensate the track owner for their negative externalities caused, as they would
block the line for a considerable amount of time, which might have allowed two or more
high-speed trains to pass right after another. Thus, the slow train operator would simply
have to buy two or more consecutive train slots to allow his train to run on the high-
speed network. Ramsey-priced slots are likely to carry a relatively high mark-up over
marginal costs at peak times, while past-midnight services are unlikely to be charged way
above marginal costs. Also, higher access prices may be expected on lines where railway
Schwandt (1995), pp. 10-14 suggests to deduct the opportunity cost element not from the final product
prices of the incumbent, but to use the fully allocated cost concept Thus, he ps-dy retreats to the arbitrary
approach discussed earher, which makes his proposal highly vu1nerable
°' Baumol and Sidak (1994), p. 196. Blankart (1998) makes the same argument for mmimalistic pnce
regulation in bottlenecks. Stand alone costs are the entire costs for the production of the service  in a single
instead of a multi-product firm. A price in excess of the stand alone costs would attract market entry and is
therefore impossible in competitive markets.
Ellig (2001), Kessides and WIllig (1995), pp. 3, 9-10, Laffont and Tirolc 1994), p. 1670 and Stackdberg
(1990), p. 197
367transport or simply one ROC has a unique competitive advantage over intermodal or
other ROC competitors, so that customers are unwilling to switch modes or track
providers. This could be the case in heavily congested urban areas, when road transport
takes by far longer than catching the train right into the city centre. A state-of-the-art rail
track network could furthermore discourage high-speed train operating companies to
switch to a neighbouring track provider with a considerably worse quality, offering the
opportunity to charge a relatively high mark-up over marginal costs. The list is naturally
incomplete and only hints at the large potential for price discrimination in order to cover
the full costs of every ROC network.
The collection of access charges to both networks of ROCs and SOCs could be
facilitated, if the safety operator oversees and allocates the access charge revenues, as the
daily data flows on train operations and the process of allocating the slots are
administered in the SOC. Thus, the SOC could be the lowest-cost institution due to
economies of scale between the allocation of slots, the daily co-ordination of traffic flows
and the collection of the corresponding access charges.
70S Glaister (1981 , pp. 65-69
3684. Market power and regulation
The market power of the individual railway companies in models A to E differs
markedly. Whereas the fully integrated railway company with exclusive trackage rights
owns a regional or even national monopoly over railway transport, it is also a dominant
actor in the transport market. The firms in Model B are allowed to operate both an
integrated network company and their own train operations, thereby granting them a high
degree of market power and a considerable leeway in discriminating against competitors
on their own infrastructure networks. The leeway of monopolistic behaviour is dearly
weakened in Model C, as the integrated network provider is now prohibited from
running TOCs. Thus, the regulatory oversight necessary to guarantee non-discriminatory
and fair access to the infrastructure is fairly low in Model C compared to Model A and
also, Model B. It had been conduded earlier with regard to Model B, that a major
restraint on misuse of market power cannot be expected from intra-industry competition,
but only from intermodal competition.
Despite the strict separation in Model C, the network company will still exercise
considerable monopoly power, as the TOCs rely on its provision of slots for producing
transport services, even though it has been stated that their relationship is of mutual
dependency. Nevertheless, the network provider could have an incentive to raise prices
by a margin, sacrificing some lower paying TOCs in favour of TOCs who are willing to
pay more for the final provision of railway transportation. Still, Model C outperforms
Models A and B with regard to the extent of regulatory interference. The transaction
costs of collecting information and monitoring the railway companies are significantly
lower in Model C, as the regulator can focus on assessing publicly available access charges
of the network provider, whereas the regulator would also have to monitor internal
accounting and management procedures in Model B to exclude cross-subsidies, biased
allocation of slots, special privileges or other strategic market barriers towards
competitors.
Model D represents a further reduction of market power, and thus of the
regulation required to guarantee non-discriminatory behaviour. Under this proposal, the
capacity and safety management is franchised on a regular basis to an independent SOC,
while train companies may be integrated in layer I and ifi with further TOCs not
operating any infrastructure at all. In addition to the independent SOC, this model
369introduces competition to the provision of railway infrastructure, thereby reducing the
potential of monopolistic bottlenecks. While the Soc takes on a clearing-house role for
train slots, it could also monitor the fair and non-discriminatory access to the competing
railway networks as a kind of private intra-industry regulator, reducing a potential role of
a public regulatory body to overall supervision of the access pricing regime enforced and
controlled by the SOC. As the government's oversight over the SOC is already given with
the competition for the field, further public regulation is not required.
The market power of individual companies is even more reduced in Model E than
in Model D, representing a further step towards an unhampered railway market. The
initial privatisation process establishes vertically separated companies in Model E, with
competition in the field between TOCs and ROCs, as well as competition for the field in
layer II. This intra-modal competition is complemented by intermodal and other forms of
competition mentioned in the part on regulating agencies above. Thus, from the point of
ininirnising regulation, Models A to E may be ranked in reverse order.
3705. Cross-subsidies and social service subsidies
Cross-subsidies were a welcome method to complement government funding and
to provide train services on account of social considerations. This usually implied that
profitable services had to sacrify their profits to cross-subsidise unremunerative train
services, mostly in areas with a low population density. In turn, profitable services were
charging a mark-up over costs involved with running their service, in order to keep the
unprofitable lines in operation. But train services are not operating in a closed railway
economy. Thus, soon not only the unprofitable lines were dependent on subsidies from
profitable services and the government, but also the formerly profitable lines were losing
out to intermodal competition, often also becoming dependent on state funding. In the
end, the price distortions of cross-subsidies were harming the entire railway industry.
If governments intend to retain services for social policy reasons, they must
subsidise the required services directly, instead of relying on a policy of intransparent
cross-subsidies, as a result harming the entire railway sector, without serving the interests
of the railway, its customers or the government. Sweden was the first country
introducing a system of direct transfers for socially required services, as the country's
regions could order regional train services in exchange for subsidies, followed by
Germany's regionalisation attempt and the subsidies for TOC franchises in Britain.
Naturally, all of the models addressed above can easy accommodate additional
state funding. Targeting and monitoring subsidies to the exact service required could be
more effective in a separated than in an integrated system. If the national or regional
government considers further infrastructure enhancements on their local line necessary,
they may inject state funding into their local ROC. Should they prefer to save a local line
from being closed down, they could also subsidise a provider of railway transport directly.
The larger and more complex the company, however, the more difficult will it be to track
and monitor the subsidies. A separated system simply offers a greater transparency
compared to a single national railway enterprise.
The fear that governments will be unable to subsidise railway services in a
vertically and horizontally separated private industry is entirely unfounded. In contrast, it
could even be easier to subsidise Model E compared to Model A, as the transfers can be
371targeted directly and exclusively to services where they are needed most from
government's perception of social policy.
372F. Conclusion
Summarising the preceding models, Model E appears to be the most transparent
model, also nunimising regulatory efforts. Non-discriminatory open access, though
required by the privatisation arrangements, is almost self-enforcing in Model E, also
reducing the perceived dangers of market power under non-discnminatory conditions.
Subsidies can be made available by state governments, targeted directly to the part of the
railway system, where subsidies are required from government's point of view. And the
pricing of the infrastructure can also be tailored to political reasoning, though it should
rather be left to the individual ROCs to determine. As fixed costs render marginal cost
pricing impossible to recover the full infrastructure costs, congestion pricing offers an
excellent second-best solution, resulting in a second-best use of the scarce railway
capacity, which comes at least close to the optimal solution.
Models B to E each allow for limited government interference in the railway
market. Public or private sector companies might even run either of the three layers,
though at the immediate and indirect costs of losing the benefits of a competitive railway
system. In section lIon nationalisation above, a strong case has been made against state-
owned railway systems and in favour of full-scale pnvatisation. Accordingly, governments
must be aware of the trade-off of being actively involved in the railway industry.
Though the congestion pricing approach comes close to allocative efficiency, it
can only be assumed that the model with a high degree of competition best promotes
dynamic efficiency, that is the creation of a new demand curve by product innovation, a
shift in the old demand curve by quality improvements or a shift of the production
function by lowering costs.709 When discussing planning wisdom versus market potential
in a discovery processes in chapter B., markets were assumed to work as a superior search
engine in knowledge processes, as many different ideas are  in continous contest in
markets, while the central planners' ideas do not have to stand that test. In his 1974
Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture, Hayek highlighted the role of markets as the most
effective and superior mechanism to exploit knowledge. Scientific guidance is impossible
709 EIhg (2001): 'The concept of djna,nic aeng thus capturns a sunetj of àvene phenomena that scbolai'i have
descn bed with teiins like )ivductive çffiaeng' (...), X-jYdeny' (..), 'aatiin destruction' (Schumpeter), and
entmp,neurhp' (Kiiner 1973)."
373because information and knowledge are spread over all individuals in society. In contrast
to central planning, the market simply co-ordinates the knowledge of individuals.710
Model E allows for competition in the field for TOCs and ROCs, as well as
competition for the field in the Soc market. Thus, it seems that the degree of
competition in the individual models may be ranked, again, in reverse order. In addition
to the above, Model E has another important advantage over Model D, as the latter's
design will very much depend on the government's idea of separating the railway market
in competing, but vertically integrated, railway firms. Surely, the government is also
responsible for designing the pnvatisation according to Model E, but the immediate
outcomes are relatively small units of railway companies in layers I and III, which offer a
more flexible approach. Mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures may easily be pursued if
the companies involved consider it beneficial. As nobody can determine the perfect end
state of the railway market, Model E offers greater potential to leave the decisions to the
individual firms involved in the market, as they possess knowledge about their
companies' cost structures and customers no central agency can ever collect or assess.
Model E is also the most transparent system that should allow a comfortable
transition from the current system under question in the UK, especially as it
acknowledges that railways are an opaque technology with a great potential for danger of
failure in safety systems, while nobody knows the perfect end state. Thus, the market
solution for the SOCs assures that the firm with the superior ideas and technology to
guarantee safe operations wins the temporary license. The unimpaired safety firm has full
oversight over the daily operations and the railway system as a whole, while it does not
relieve the TOCs and ROCs of individual responsibility for safety.
1-Layek (1996), p. 14. Laaser (1989), p. 2 makes the same argument, as the main advantage of
competition is the co-ordination of knowledge spread over all individuals.
374Section V
4ynthesis
375A. Comparison of the privatisation processes in Europe
Interventionism prevailed throughout the railways' early history and the period of
nationalistic state railways, when train services were generally operating on a purely national
scale, disregarding the competitive adntages of the railways over long distances in freight
and passenger traffic. Despite deregulatory efforts in the 1990s, the European reforms were
often watered down and culminated in re-regulation rather than in deregulation, let alone
privatisation. Section I has shown the entrepreneurial potential of the early railroads until it
was stifled by regulation and eventually nationalisation due to reasons explained in section
II. The market share of European railways was down to 6.9° o in passenger and I 8.9% in
freight transportation by 1990, when the European Commission was prompted to halt the
shift in the modal split to road transport, as illustrated in charts 21 and 22. The
Commission's moderate directive 91 /440/EEC and subsequent directives considerably
promoted the European-wide move to railway reforms.
Considering the case studies' results in Germany and Britain with reference to other
European countries reveals that there is still much scope for liberalising the railways. With
regard to an eventual Libenilisation ojEui'opean Railwqy Markets, the reform projects may now
be judged in the light of four characteristics: non-discriminatory open access to
newcomers, the scope of the actual privatisation, the interventionist potential and the
extent of state subsidies. Having uncovered the flaws of the current reform programmes  in
Europe, chapter A.5 reflects upon the implementation of Model E before going full circle
with final conclusions drawn up in chapter B.
3761. Open access provision
In the German case, access to the infrastructure network is provided by the DB
Netz AG. Due to complaints of economists, competitors, the Kartellamt and others, DB
Netz revised the access pricing regime in 1998 and again in 2001 to create a non-
discriminatory system. But as long as DB Netz is a subsidiary of the DBAG holding, there
is a conflict of interest with DB Netz and the holding. As has been argued above, there are
various ways to discriminate against newcomers in an institutionally integrated DBAG,
including informal contacts between the holding, its subsidiaries and the EBA's former
Bundesbahn employees. In theory, however, open access to competitors had been granted
with the railway reform and the 2001 revision of the charging system does not discriminate
between train operators.
Originally, the British approach foresaw open access to Railtrack's infrastructure.
However, the proposals were watered down in the further political process. As a
consequence, open access provision was moderated until 2002 with a modest relaxation in
1999, but competition between parallel or overlapping franchise operators remains the
most important means of intra-modal competition. Still, an increase of open access
providers may be expected when the moderation of competition arrangement is finally
relaxed, as non-franchised newcomers are discriminated in favour, if they can enter the
market at alL This was due to the review of Railtrack's access charges as they are exclusively
charged the variable access price to the railway infrastructure.
While some European railway systems, most notoriously the French state railway,
still restrict open access to RFF's network, the Dutch and Swedish systems attracted
newcomers, though dependent from political reasoning and party politics. In the
Netherlands, open access was provided at zero prices until 2000, but the new coalition
government banned competition on the track after the Lovers Rail experiment The 1994
Deregulation Act passed by the Swedish conservative government would have
implemented complete open access to Banverket's network. However, the new Social
Democratic government immediately postponed the opening up of the market in the same
year. Competitive tendering for regional train services has been used widely in both Sweden
and the Netherlands. Also, freight traffic in both countries is subject to open access
competitors.
3772. Scope of privatisation
In section II, privatisation had been defined as the transfer of an economic activity
from state ownership to the control of the capital market 711 Accordingly, the structural
reform in Germany does not deserve the term privatisation. The DBAG is 100° o state
owned and a sale of the company has not yet been envisaged. The capital market's control
is marginal and the risk of bankruptcy remains exclusively with the sole shareholder, the
German government Even after a possible future sale of the holding's subsidiaries, it
remains doubtful whether the government will find investors willing to commit sufficient
funds to the DB Netz AG, if the state holds the majority of the share capital as codified in
artide 2, S2(3) ENeuOG.
The British government sold Railtrack, the ROSCOs and maintenance suppliers.
But train operations were franchised to 25 train operating companies. The franchises,
however, may be revoked or altered in the next re-franchising process. The franchisees
generally leased their rolling stock from the ROSCOs and paid access charges to Railtrack,
as the ROSCOs and Railtrack own the majority of the assets. Though the franchise owners
are subject to the control of the capital market, the train operators depend on government
policy. Raikrack's future is still undecided, oscillating between the poles of outright re-
nationalisation and the full control of the capital market without government bailouts. The
DTLR suggested a not-for-profit trust as successor to Railtrack, operating on a fully
commercial basis independent from government. Whatever organisational concept replaces
Raikrack, it has to prove that it works better than Railtrack. It remains to be seen how the
government intends to impose an incentive structure and the resultant investment
programme in a not-for-profit trust. Thus, the prodaimed commercial working and the
independence of government may soon prove to be an illusion without a profit incentive.
After the government has established the new structure, Labour will be reluctant to let
Railtrack's successor faiL7u Therefore, the new not-for-profit undertaking may be able to
hold the government hostage for public funds, while the government subsidies impose
conditions upon the trust.
711 Ewers (1995), p. 114
712 In a rather amusing column, the Financial Tunes (2001), p. 21 wondered about the name for the new
undertaking and had options from Nuuiruk to the more cynical BackT,mkor Bnbsb Rail on offer. The reader
may decide upon his favounte.
378Neither in Germany, Britain, nor the above European countries is the railway
industty a private business as usuaL The railway systems under closer investigation in section
III are owned by the corresponding states. However, Sweden and the Netherlands created
the scope for considerable involvement of private companies in the provision of train
services due to competitive tender procedures for regional traffic, but the state railways
were still exempt from the pressures of the capital market across the European Union.
3793. Interventionist potential
The entire Deutsche Bahn AG is operated as a state owned undertaking. The
regional Lander governments receive large amounts of federal funds each year to run
subsidised regional train services that are socially desirable. The Lander's choice of
competitive tendering or direct commission of regional train operations provides them
with a considerable amount of influence over private and state-owned train companies.
Also, the government has some influence on staffing decisions in the state-run DB and on
infrastructure investments. The transport minister announced the separation of the Netz
AG, but DB's chairman has strong links into the government that eventually supported his
stand against the minister. The EBA carries out direct supervision over the railway system,
whereas the Kartellamt promotes competition and checks discriminatory behaviour.
Notwithstanding the Kartellamt's opposition, the German government is determined to set
up a special railway regulator. The new agency would embrace regulatory tasks that have so
far been successfully undertaken by the competition authority.
The British railway system involves a complex network of supervisory and
regulatory agencies, ranging from the SRA, ORR, HSE to the Office of Fair Trading and
the Secretary of State. At first, the government's influence over the TOCs appeared to
inhibit most of the interventionist potential due to the regular re-franchising procedure.
However, Railtrack's collapse in October 2001 altered the picture, depending on the
government's final choice of Railtrack's successor body. Irrespective of the changes after
Labour took office in 1997, the Conservatives created an interventionist railway system,
that was at odds with their earlier propositions in the New Opportunities White Paper.
Weisby and Nichols suested that '..tbe Raiha'ay Act of 1993 had the effect of ensuring that in
ma?y wqys the ptwatised indsisty was suI?/ed to more regulation than its nationa/isedpredecessor bad eir
been.
The railways in France, the Netherlands and Sweden are still state owned and highly
intertwined with their governments. Especially RFF, NS Railinfrabeheer and Banverket
depend upon massive state support and resulting state guidance. The change of
government in both Sweden and the Netherlands further highlighted the sensitivity of the
re-structured railway systems to political interference and uncertainty. The alleged
independence from politics was also questioned with the Sydvästen and Lovers Rail
7 WeIsby and Nichols (1999), p. 61
380experience and the immediate reaction from politics. Adding to national regulations, the
national railway industries are subject to European directives and European competition
law. Drawing upon the successful working of the German Kartellamt and the European
competition law, excessive regulatory checks as in Britain or special railway regulators as
sug ested in Germany appear to be redundant.
Complex and duplicate regulatory bodies increase the bureaucracy and thus,
transaction costs, limit entrepreneurial and innovative potential and create the danger of
regulatory capture, favouring the incumbent operator. The incumbent state railway
generally possesses superior knowledge than the regulator and may exercise influence on
the regulatory framework that favours it over newcomers. In addition to direct means of
state interference, there are more subtle means to influence the railway industry or
favourable min.sterial decisions. Long-term informal links between civil servants  in the
ministry of transport and the DBAG may exercise their influence one way or the other.
The same danger is inherent in state agencies such as the German EBA, because the
employees were recruited from the former Bundesbahn. Thus, it is more than doubtful
whether the EBA can act as an impartial arbiter in the railway industry. The establishment
of a special railway regulator leads to blurred responsibilities, higher transaction costs for
the players and more distortions in a regulated industry. Regulatory nets leave the railways
no chance to become an industry like any other industry and to serve the customers
according to their own preferences. The guarantee of non-discriminatory competition in
the transport market may safely be left to national competition watchdogs, European
competition law, private regulation as suested in section IV.C.2, but above all to the most
effective form of regulation: the me7ilace.
3814. Extent of state subsidies
Subsidies to the national railway systems were paid out handsomely across the
European countries under investigation. The German government freed the Bundesbahn
and Reichsbahn of their accumulated debt, finances non-commercial infrastructure
investments and supports other infrastructure investments with interest free loans. The
Lander governments receive annual federal funds to support regional train services and the
BEV took the long-term liability towards the civil servants in the rail industry on board,
generously sponsored by the German taxpayers. The UK government intended to restrict
public spending on the railways to franchise payments, but the British railway crisis and the
final collapse of Railtrack contradicted the early intentions and required massive public
commitments to upgrade and modernise Railtrack's infrastructure. Also in France, the
Netherlands and Sweden, the railway infrastructure operators received large public funding.
The access prices varied from zero pricing in the Netherlands to marginal access pricing in
Sweden. In addition, the ministry of transport or regional governments tender socially
desirable services and the state carries the risk of bankruptcy of the state owned
undertakings.
Subsidies expose considerable interventionism, as the beneficiaries are cushioned
from the pressures of capital markets, while non-beneficiaries are discriminated against and
as a result market outcomes are distorted. Though subsidies may be understandable from a
social policy point of view, politicians must be aware of the consequences if they intend to
establish a level playing field for all modes of transport.
3825. Model E implementation
The flaws in the structural reforms in European railway systems may be replaced
with a full-scale pnvatisation according to Model E in section N. The past reforms across
Europe are an ideal foundation for the adaptation to Model E, the market-based
integration centred on an institutional separation. Due to European requirements, the
railway systems in Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden either
established infrastructure subsidiaries or even separate entities. Except for France,
passenger traffic is undertaken by separate divisions of the state railway and by private train
operators, mostly running regional services.
Admittedly, the track systems expose monopolistic characteristics in bottlenecks. A
horizontal separation of the infrastructure providers into various ROCs according to
section W.C.1 would substantially reduce government's necessity to oversee non-
discriminatory pricing policies of the ROCs. In addition to competition for passenger and
freight traffic, the ROCs are also exposed to constraints such as substitutive competition,
explained in section IV.B.3. Taking Railtrack as an example, the company under
administration could be split up into privately operated networks in the regions or along
lines, such as high-speed, regional, freight and mixed-use lines, with different companies
operating competing track systems into the terminal stations. While London offers some
alternative terminals that could provide trains to any direction, cities such as Frankfurt or
Leipzig do not offer alternative station facilities. This bottleneck problem could be resolved
if competing ROCs operate their lines into Frankfurt terminal station. Also, an according
arrangement for the infrastructure is unlikely to lead to management failures comparable to
Raikrack's panic and the resulting standstill after Hatfield.
Full-scale privatisation of the state owned train operators combined with non-
discriminatory open access provision would expose the railways to a  railwqy market
according to section W.C3. This structure would allow for intermodal mergers in the
transport market that could lead to market based integration between train operators and
coach firms, airlines, ferry services, taxi companies, road haulage and other companies. The
players in the transport market must use their talent and knowledge to offer innovative and
efficient logistics, tailor-made to consumers.
383The core of the railway reform is the intermediate layer of safety operating
companies as discussed in section IV.C.2. The SOCs are clearing-house institutions for
train slots and also supervise the safe operations on specified rail networks. Accounting for
national characteristics, the SOCs would acquire the signalling and associated infrastructure
and take control of the entire traffic management on the railway networks. Concerns about
the number of competing ROCs would be rendered irrelevant, as their networks and the
daily traffic flows of TOCs are co-ordinated by the safety operator. However, the SOCs
would have no power to exclude or discriminate against the TOCs or ROCs if they comply
with the safety arrangements. The safety operator simply co-ordinates enquires on an
inalmarkeqilace and guarantees for a safe traffic management. The SOC is in sole charge
of the traffic flows and handles all emergencies directly. If, however, the SOC should find
that a train or track operator offends the rules agreed upon in his safety licence, the SOC
may cease all operations on the track in question or of the train operator involved
immediately. Further proceedings may then be dealt with the competition authority or a
state authority such as the HSE.
Also, the SOC would have no power over access prices of the ROCs. The track
operators would announce their prices for individual slots to the impartial safety and traffic
management body that would then offer the available slots to the prices advertised by the
track operator. While there would be competition between train and track operators,
section IV.C.2 suggested to auction the entire national system initially to a single SOC
under a franchise agreement. In the re-franchising process, some national SOCs might win
auctions in two or more European countries, initiating a process of  Eurvpeanisatthn in
railway transport, irrespective of national borders. Though it had been conceded earlier that
governments might decide to run the SOC as a public agency, the benefit of competing for
the best technology on an international level would be lost.
This clearing-house and safety body would be the sole public or private safety
regulator on the railways with the consent of the ministry of transport or the HSE.
Complementary, the competition authority would comprise the role of the sole economic
regulator, except for the competitive marketplace. The Dutch system appears to possess
the system closest to the suggested SOC with Railned, in charge of traffic safety and
capacity management, and NS Verkeersleiding the agency in control of daily traffic
management.714 In Britain, the implementation of the new safety operator would embrace
714 van de Vdde (2000), p. 10
384the new IRSA and further functions currently undertaken by Railtrack. In Germany and
Sweden, the Soc would have to acquire functions and the signalling infrastructure from
DB Netz and Banverket, as well as responsibilities from the ministry of transport, the EBA
and Rikstrafiken. The German discussion about a special railway regulator could be
replaced by the new private clearing house with regulatory powers in safety operations.
Across all countries, open access to train operations is a basic prerequisite for a successful
implementation of Model E. The implementation also involves a re-structuring of the
railway infrastructure that is currently under way in Britain. Even prior to the British
railway crisis, it was discussed whether train operators should lease the infrastructure
themselves. Though this raised concerns of discrimination against competitors, the
structure suggested in Model E would come dose to the idea of separate infrastructure
networks, except for the discriminatory potential involved in the leasing modeL
385B. Concluding arguments
Regulation was present at all stages since the early days of the railroads. At first
regulation was prodaimed as a necessary safeguard to protect other modes and the
customers from the railways' market power, before the argument was slightly twisted. Now,
regulation was called for to protect the railways from increasing intermodal competition.
Notwithstanding the railway protectionism, the steady fall in market share was not halted.
Following successful reforms in the 1980s in Britain and Sweden, more restructuring was
on the agenda across the European Community.
The preceding prelude to the condusion in the synthesis has already drawn together
the analyses and recommendations made before. Svmming up, the privatisation and
deregulation attempts undertaken in Europe during the last decade have come far short of
their early expectations. Generally, the legislation enacting the reforms was a compromised
version of the original proposals of the same governments. This was especially true in
Britain and Germany. Also, Sweden and the Netherlands initiated far-reaching proposals to
complement their original reform projects, that were however reverted after a change of
government. None of the current railway reforms is close to a laissez-faire approach.
Instead, the railway systems are exposed to ongoing railway protectionism as they are
dependent on party politics and policy changes that contradicted some more liberal
proposals, such as the 1991 report of the Regierungskommission Bundesbahn, the Tories'
1992 White Paper on New Opportunities for the Railways and the Swedish 1994
Deregulation Act. Too many concerns and interests were compromised in the legislations
initiating the structural reforms.
In the introduction to this thesis it has been argued with Mises and Hayek that the
co-ordination mechanisms of a centrally-planned system and a market economy are
incompatible. Still, the politicians' and interest groups' wish lists contained a mix of both,
thereby eradicating the benefits of the market economy. Interventionism prevailed -
politics and the resultant interference are at the core of the transport problem. This thesis
advocates a concept of market based integration for the railways, scrapping the fatal balancing
act of a contradictory tgbt controlled market aprDach.
The core of this concept is a full privatisation of state-owned railway undertakings
with the freedom of inter- and intra-industry mergers thereafter, as the market has to find
386its optimal structure, which no well-meaning planning board or individual will ever be able
to predict or shape. Only while governments hold the property rights to the railways, they
must initiate strategic railway reforms before fully releasing the railways to their own fate or
fortune. In a privatised industry, the railway companies are subject to the control of the
capital market without any room for short-term political manoeuvring and muddling-
through. The structure proposed here is based on three levels of railway systems that would
be co-ordinated by market transactions instead of planning.
Private ROCs supply the entire track infrastructure of the railway network and
compete for traffic volumes with other ROCs. They announce - unregulated - prices for
individual train slots to the SOC, the combined clearing house institution for train slots, the
owner of the signalling network and the sole safety regulator of the railway system. Finally,
the TOCs compete for freight and passenger traffic and purchase the slots from the SOC
to the prices announced by the ROCs, including a mark-up for the services provided by the
SOC. A single national or possibly even European SOC at a later stage would economise
on transaction costs between various players, as it works as an internal marketplace, whilst
overseeing the safe operations of the railways and non-discriminatory open access as an
impartial arbiter. Accordingly, the SOC is at the heart of the railway privatisation proposed
here. Government involvement is curtailed to the provision of a license to the SOC and the
general oversight of the competition watchdog.
The European changes to the railway industry undertaken so far may be seen as a
first step to a full-scale privatisation as advocated in this thesis. Even the British railway
crisis appears in a better light than one might assume, as Railtrack's move into public
administration offers a new beginning according to the model set out above without
violating private property rights. An implementation of the model would require a
horizontal separation of Railtrack into competing ROCs, while the safety functions that
were undertaken by Railtrack and the signalling infrastructure would be taken over by the
SOC. A sale of the passenger rail franchises would complement the process as soon as
current franchise agreements come up for re-franchising.
Implementation of the model in Germany requires first and foremost the
continuation of the original reform by means of institutionally separating the infrastructure
from train operations and the sale of the state-owned Deutsche Bahn's passenger and
freight transport subsidiaries as envisaged, though supplemented by some alterations.
387Apparently, the original reform proposal came close to the model suested above but was
halted due to political lobbying of the Deutsche Bahn and further interest groups. The
reform process initiated in Germany needs to be modified to take account of competing
ROC networks, whereas the SOC would acquire signalling operations and functions
currently undertaken by the EBA, ending the political rope-pulling about a special railway
regulator.
Regarding the Dutch, French and Swedish railways, it has already been noted above
that the French have the longest road to travel before arriving at an industry structure that
does not differ from any other industry. While France was so far reluctant to liberalise the
railway industry, the Netherlands and Sweden opted in favour of reforms that got,
however, stuck half-way through. In order to establish a full scale reform in accordance
with the privatisation model above, Railned, NS Verkeersleiding and the Swedish
Rikstraflken would constitute the respective SOCs with additional functions in signalling
and capacity management, esp. in the Swedish case. The infrastructure operators
Nederlandse Spoorwegen and Banverket are the starting points for the establishment of
private, competing ROCs. Further, the passenger and freight operations are still state-
owned and should be sold in smaller units, though leaving the final say on the optimal size
to market processes rather than government re-structuring. Thus, even though the
government may offer several self-sustaining units for sale, it must not prohibit a single
bidder from acquiring a combination of TOCs.715
Notwithstanding the compromised and rather half-hearted approach to liberalising
the railway industry, some improvements have been gathered in and may serve as a
common starting point for a private railway market. Currently, the railways are still on hold,
awaiting their release from often well-meant government protectionism. If politicians aspire
a railway renaissance, they must refrain from distorting markets.
uS Earlier, the case of Ed Burkhardt of Wisconsin Central has been noted. Burkhardt made the British
government reverse her decision of selling off Trainload Freight in separate units to different bidders, before
agreeing to purchase the company and run freight services in the UK  under the heading of EWS.
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Appendix
389A. The United States of America
1. The early railway promotion and organisational innovation
The early nineteenth century saw the development of a system of turnpike roads
and canals as a result of the growing American economy. The steam-powered engine
commenced its journey with the first steamboat on the Hudson River in 1807. Still, the
longest canal measured less than 28 miles in total length in 1817, when permission was
granted to build the 364-mile Erie Canal between Buffalo and the Hudson River (me4 9).
The Erie was completed in 1825 and opened up the Midwest of the United States,
providing a transport link from New York and the Atlantic right to the Great Lakes and
further west. Even though canals were costly and required heavy state subsidies, 1,277
miles had been constructed by the end of the I 820s, thus reducing average costs when
compared to freight rates of road transport. However, neither system seemed appropriate
to accommodate the needs of the trading community and society in general. Freight and
passenger charges on turnpikes were expensive with rather uncomfortable coaches. Steam
or canal boats, though by far more comfortable at comparatively low rates as well as being
more appropriate for longer distances and heavy goods, had other drawbacks. Wrecks left
in rivers were a permanent nuisance and regular cause of accidents. Additionally, many
rivers and canal operating companies could only offer irregular or restricted transport
operations due to either too high or low water levels as well as frozen waterways  in
winter. 716
"' Stover (1961), pp. 3-10 and 34 reports on the development of roads and canals and on their drawback -
454 people died in accidents on western rivers, daiming 78 boats.
390Americans welcomed the railway age, quite often buying shares of the companies, there
was considerable political lobbying and opposition by the incumbent transportation rms
against the competitive threat.
Apparently, the incumbents' dissatisfaction is a logical consequence of their high
capital investments and the entrants' attack upon their dominant position in the transport
market. The canal operating companies had committed themselves with massive
investments in the canal networks. Suddenly, an unwelcome innovation arrived,
threatening their returns. Having successfully competed with the turnpikes, the canals had
a competitive advantage over road freight, especially in bulky or heavy goods travelling
over long distances. Their temporary monopoly in that market was indeed very short-lived
(chart 54). Already the very first railroad companies offered considerable cost reductions
compared to road freight and established a serious competitive challenge to the canals.717
Further major players in addition to the incumbent industries and the railroads
were state governments. The lobbying efforts of the incumbents produced legislative
discrimination against the innovative forces. 'Esn when completed, the railroad frequent'y bad
to overcome the opposition of state governments kjal to their canals. In New York railroads running
parallel to the Erie Canal bad topj tolls equal to those of the canab and in Ohio and Penniylvania
special taxes were levied against rail traffic which competed &rect±5i with canal business."718
717 Referring to the 1832 edition of the American Railroad Journal Stover (1961),  p. 34 mentions the case of
a mill owner thirteen miles our of Baltimore whose Iransportation costs with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
were only a fourth of his previous costs.
718 Stover 1961), p. 17 and Holbrook (1947), p. 231 report on the opposition the railways had to face.
392Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyrightNonetheless, a rapid railway expansion marked the next decades  (maps 10 and 11).
The railway companies gained substantial speed advantages over the canals. They were
able to offer a reliable service, not having to limit their operations in the winter, after
flooding or in dry periods. They were able to build short lines not being commercially
viable for canal operators and could directly deliver goods to the customers' doorways. As
the trains did not depend on an extensive supply of water, they offered a rather
inexpensive form of transport, as changes in altitude did not pose insurmountable
obstacles to them. The railways opened up markets where virtually no transport
infrastructure had previously existed, stimulated settlement and offered enhanced
opportunities for the people to move westwards.719 Maps 12 and 13 illustrate that
settlement was concentrated in areas where the railways were spreading out as
demonstrated in maps 10 and 11 between 1840 and 1860. Map 14 shows urban
settlements as they existed in 1860 with concentrations along the more industrial East
Coast and around the Great Lakes, mirroring map 11. As soon as the railway's
transportation potential had been recognised, local business communities, farmers and
other future beneficiaries along the proposed line started to promote railway construction
in order to gain a competitive advantage over other markets. In anticipation of personal
benefits in form of rising property values, expanding markets and quite  simply an increase
in the value of railway stock, they bought railway shares. 720 'The i7vtfi ictoy of the railwqy
over the wateroiqy resulted from organisational as well as technological innovation Technology made
Jossible fast, all-weather transportation; but safi, regular, reliable movement  of goods and passengers,
as well as the continuing maintenance and repair of locomotives, rolling stock, and track, roadbed,
stations, roundhouses, and other eqs4pment, required the creation of a sizable administrative
organisation. It meant the e ployment of a set of managers to supervise these functional activities over
an extensive geographical area; and the appointment  of an administrative command of middle and top
executives to monitor, evaluate, and coonlinate the work of managers responsible for the day-to-j
operations. ...Hence, the operational requirements of the railroads demanded the creation of the first
administrative hierarchies in American business. The men who managed these enterprises became the
719 Hawke (1970), p. 3 summarises a commonly held view about the impact of the railways on both
settlement and industriahsanon in the United States: "It was asserted that the rail.wqys opened the (Vest to
seulement, made atfr,bfr agncultunil lang and hence pry &sded an een&d ,nathet and supported the labourforce on
whith nineteenth century manufactunug depende'L Further, the nuiways were thought to have so stimulated the tryn and
steel and other industries as topnnde a base for in	 ali,aton. The reulwaj was seen as the kej element in nineteenth-
centu'growth."
°As to the reasons for the railways' success, Chandler (1997), pp. 83-86 considers the 'all-weather
transportation' the trains were offering as their most important competitive advantage over other modes of
transport. Taylor and Neu (1956), p. 5 and Stover (1961), p. 31 emphasise the importance of local or city
governments in railway promotion - they were often urged to invest in proposed railway schemes, buying
stock of the companies.
395divisions. Precise timetables were designed and handed to the conductors, who had to
adhere to the schedules and were granted full responsibility for their trains.
While the initial momentum for organisational innovation on the Western
Railroad stemmed from safety measures, the further growth of the transport market
required decentralised management and defined lines of responsibility, as pioneered on the
Western. When the Erie Railroad had to face both high operating costs and a serious
competitive threat from the newly created New York Central Railroad along the Erie
Canal in 1853, Daniel McCalluxn was appointed general superintendent. He improved the
organisational structure of his company that was already similar to the one of the Western,
stating that "..subordinates should be accountable to and be directed by their immedate superiors
on5'; as obedience cannot be enforced where the foreman in immediate chate is  inte!fered with by a
superior o ff icer giving orders dirrctb, to his subordinates."24
The growth of the railway companies forced changes upon their management. The
new structures from a rather centralised to a decentralised business enterprise were a
necessary reaction to the ever-expanding operations. Companies were not anymore
based at a single location, but had offices and employees scattered across huge areas.
However, adding to their geographical extension railway finns were massive enterprises
with regard to the workforce employed. Accordingly, new methods in management
techniques and communication were a pure necessity for the railway industry. The
invention of the telegraph in 1837 allowed McCalluni to improve the co-ordination of
train services and keep a constant flow of information between the offices. He developed
a system of regular reports from his employees and new methods of accounting in order to
collect and evaluate more statistical data that were required for an accurate calculation of
costs and tariffs as well as to optimise traffic flows. McCallum maximised the company's
revenue by improving traffic flows and reducing the waste of resources due to empty
freight trains. In 1855 the Erie Railroad operated 200 locomotives, 2770 freight and 170
passenger and post cars, thereby making it perfectly dear that the traditional management
of railways had passed away. The emerging modern enterprise simply had to adjust and
7is Stover 1861), p. 38. For details on the orgarusational Innovation which the Western pioneered m 1840
see Chandler (1997), pp. 96-107. Due to his comprehensive study, only a minor account can be given in this
thesis.
724 Chandler (1997), p. 102
However, Channon (2001), p. 6 notes a reversion towards functional structures at the end of the 19I
cenU
398start to think from scratch, in order to survive in an entirely different environment. 7 iy
the coming of the Chil JVar the modern American business enterprise had ajpeared among American
railroads. The needs of safety and then efflcieny had led to the creation  of a managerial hierarchj',
whose duties were carefully defined in organizational manuals and charts. Middle and t4' managers
supersise4 coordinated, and evaluated the work of lower level managers who were direaly re.ponsible for
the )i-to-ay ojerations."727
While the period preceding the Civil War was marked by the improvement of
internal affairs, such as the organisational structure of the company, external affairs
between the operators dominated the period in the aftermath of the war. Despite the
impressive pace of construction of new mileage there was still a lack of anything like a
network of railways, let alone an integrated transport network. The companies rather
existed next to each other as competitors than acknowledging any benefits from a more
co-operative approach to operation of railways. However, the physical separation of the
railways was not surmountable in the short term. Though many of the first companies in
the east of the United States were using the English gauge, as they purchased English
locomotives, the diversity in gauge differentials and the resulting interchanges of
passengers or freight to another operator still placed heavy cost burdens on the customers.
Together with several different time zones that became relevant with the railways'
expansion to the West and a lack of connecting railway bridges, through services were
often rendered virtually impossible. Connecting rail links between the different termini in
cities and other gaps had to be built, equipment and operation had to be standardised in
order to allow the handling of through-traffic. The settlement in the West and the
growing trade between the eastern and western states made producers on either side aware
of the potential benefits of an integrated transport network. They anticipated higher
profits as they could send their produce to more distant markets. However, the cost of
several freight interchanges was prohibitive. Because the physical separation of the
railways was an artificial bather to long-haul trade, demands for more conformity and  an
integrated network of railways were increasing.7 In order to improve the transport of
freight over long distances and open up new markets, interuirm co-operation was essential.
The railway companies needed to co-operate and work towards a railway network if they
and the public were to reap the full benefits out of the transport system.
Chandler (1997), p. 120
Chandler (1997), p. 107
7 According to Stover (1961), p. 51, a trip between Charleston and Philadelphia required eight changes of
carriages from the passenger due to different gauges. See Overbey (1982), pp.15-18 and Taylor and Neu
(1956) for more details on the trend towards the uniform gauge.
399The necessity of standardisation was further highlighted in the Civil War, when
massive troop movements and supplies had to be organised over long distances. The Civil
War in the 1 860s made a lasting impact on American railways. Co-operation between the
various operating companies became inevitable and strengthened the network economies.
The railways were providing the means for rapidly moving troops as well as the necessaq
supplies, which in turn increased their business. However, whilst the northern railxoads
prospered on account of the stimulation of demand, their southern counterparts had to
suffer under enormous railway destruction. The South faced considerable problems of
maintaining its tracks and transport operations due to shortages of rolling stock,
locomotives and new rails, as they were largely produced in the North.729
729 For a more detailed overview on the railway's role in the Civil War see Stover (1961),  pp. 54-63
4002. Land grants and the first transcontinental railway
Public opinion in the period from the first railway on the Baltimore & Ohio in
1830 up to the outbreak of the Civil War was mainly in favour of a rapid railway
development and expansion. The innovation of the railroad increased the potentials of
trade and led to improved communications in the country, while making long journeys
more comfortable and reducing the time of travel. Maps 15 to 17 demonstrate the
railways' impact on cutting journey times. Whereas a trip from New York City to Chicago
took up to six weeks in 1800, it was cut to two days by 1857. The political environment
of the railway companies was to a major extent supportive. Governments promoted
railway development by means of land grants and they refrained from regulatory
interference in general terms, leaving the companies to themselves. However, the era of
relatively unrestrained railway development was reversed after the war, with a public
growing increasingly hostile towards the railway companies, urging state governments to
regulate the operation of the railways. "Speculative building, vith manj cases of financial
maladministration, unfair discrimination in rates and service, and ruinous competition, caused a
reversal ofpublic opinion Open antagonism took the place offriendv cooperation."13° The corruption
scandals of the first transatlantic railway connection both illustrate the public's anger and
highlight the blame the government had to accept in the change in public opinion, due to
railroad promotion by means of land grants.
MAP 15 aid MAP 16: Rates .f Travel ii 1800 aid 1830
Source Chandler (1997), pp. 84-85
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Image removed due to third party copyrightMAP 17: Rates .f Travel s, 1857
Source: Chandler (1997), pp. 84-85
Though the American railways were built by private enterprise, the state granted
land to some companies for the construction of railway lines. As the low population
density in the western states did not promise immedi2te high returns to the operation of a
railway, both federal and state governments were willing to promote railway construction
in the West. Holbrook outlines the path American railway promoters were often pursuing
when applying for so-called land grants: 'The pical plan of a railroad promoter of the era was
first to oanize a companj whose title included tu or more of the princjbal towns of regions through
which it was alleged/y to pass, orpossib/y mere'y the tu teri,,inal cities...Next came a charter irnxili4'ng
land grants of alternate sections along the line of the proposed road Next the railroad bys would
incorporate a land conrpanJ, owned bjy the directors of the railroad, to develop and peddle the lands.
With the proceeds of the land sales, to which cash subsidies from federa4 state, or even city sources
often were added, plus the sale of mortgage bonds in Europe, actual construction of the railroad was
begun. Construction, however, was not done bj the railroad companj, but bj a separate concern, also
owned !ij the railroad's directors, which common/y paid off bandsome/y, although the grade was made
and the rails laid at stupendous cost to the holders of the railroad's stocks and bonds A considerable
number ofAmerican railroads were financed bj methods that cost the railroad's directors not a peny of
their own in actual cash."731
730 Cunningham (1922), p. 9-10
731 Holbrook (1947), p. 154. One sectioN consists of 640 acres.
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Image removed due to third party copyrightThe land grants were usually conditional upon rate reductions for government
traffic on the land-grant railways. Many companies mortgaged their land or sold it to
settlers in order to start construction of the lines. The companies even competed for newly
arriving immigrants in the large Eastern ports to settle along their lines, offering theni
cheap train tickets and land on a long-term loan basis. In addition, the companies and
states sent representatives to Europe and advertised in overseas newspapers for settlement
along their lines. The competition for settlers was so fierce that the representatives even
discouraged immigrants from choosing their competitor's land, as the land's quality was
purportedly poor.732 In the event, the railways had an enormous impact on settling the
wide western lands of the United States, where settlement would have been an impossible
exercise without the railway innovation. Even though contemporary politicians had to
face objections due to the huge quantity of land granted to the railways, the land value
would have been marginal without any sort of efficient transport links, literally paving the
way for settlement and cultivation. The companies received government grants, sold the
land to settlers and gained future passengers and freight in supporting the immigration and
their settlement along their own line. Still, public commitment was mostly seen as a
necessity. However, the state's choice in favour of land grants and loans resulted in a
transport infrastructure, not built to provide efficient communication links, but to
squeeze as much money from the government as possible. The most appalling case was the
American prestige project of a rail link across the entire United States.
732 1-Iolbrook (1947), pp. 155-161 and Stover (1961), pp. 91, 100-103
" Fleisig (1975), p. 563 indeed condudes that the subsidies might be termed eawqyI, as the railroad
companies would have constructed the railroads at a similar speed, independent of the land-grants. Thus, the
redisinbutions did not result in efficiency gains.
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MAP 18: Major Traiu-Mi:si::ip)i aid Pacific Railroad: ip to 1893
Source: Stover (1961), p. 85
Although Congress first considered the possibility of a route to the Pacific in the
early 1 850s, the American dream of a transcontinental railway caine to an abrupt end with
the economic depression towards the close of the decade. Soon again public and lobbying
demands arose to venture westwards and integrate California into the growing system of
railways. Due to its high risk and low anticipated traffic volumes outside the populous
eastern states, the project was not yet considered viable to private enterprise. In 1862
Congress passed the Pacific Railroad Act, thereby granting two companies rights to
construct and operate a transcontinental line linking the eastern to the western states and
the Pacific. Both the Union Pacific Railroad and the Central Pacific Railroad Company
were commissioned to engage in the project (map 18, NOL 1 and 2). The latter was allowed
to build eastward from Sacramento and the Union Pacific westward from the Missouri
River. Federal assistance was made available by means of land grants and government
bonds. 'Land grants often alternate sections per mile of)ublic domain on both sides of the  line over
the entire distance were made; and the Federal Government agreed to lend the companies, in five jer
cent bondc, amounts rangingfrom 116,000 to $48,000 per mile, depending on the terrain. "
7 'Holbrook (1947), p. 166. Stover (1961), pp. 67-73 presents further details on the first transatlantic link.
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Image removed due to third party copyrightIn effect both companies received a per-mile subsidy. Hence, a competitive race
for government money was the logical consequence. As might be expected, the companies'
principal concern was not the quality of the track, but the quantity built in the shortest
time possible. The negative side effects of the government's incentives and the absurdity
of that policy was highlighted in early 1869, when '..the advance grading crews of the Union
Pacific and the Central Pacific, in their eagerness to buihi as much subsidized road as possible, bad
passed each other with parallel lines. The con truction was often huied with fiimy beidges, narrow
embankments, and i.',,proper!y ballasted track... { The Union Pacific's chief engineer) admitted that
his company's greedy insistence on continued construction in the winter months often doubled or even
trijled building costs. The baste in construction was also caused by a public that wished to see the job
completei"735 The transcontinental railway was finally opened to traffic in May 1869,
presenting the first rail link between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans to the American
nation.
When the initial enthusiasm of the opening of the first rail connection between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans had slowed down, the glamorous success story grew rather
dark. Corruption scandals of the Union and Central Pacific, their construction subsidiaries,
suppliers and politicians were revealed. The corruption of the Central Pacific's owners, the
so-called Big Four - Hopkins, Huntington, Stanford and Crocker - was remarkable. The
former merchants from Sacramento were not lacking ideas '..in  making an extra, illicit profit
for themselves. Atfirst the road was builtfor the partners by a construction concern called Crocker and
Company. The transparent connections between the Central Pacific and Crocker's false-front
coi'poration were so obvious that in 1867 the partners shfted to dealing with a newfy created Contract
and Finance Company...Any successful investigation was rendered quite improbable by the 'accidental'
destruction of the company's book. perhaps byfire, in the earLy seventies."736 However, the Union
Pacific did not miss out on the variety of opportunities for enrichment at the taxpayers'
expenses. Though its chief engineer had calculated costs of $30,000 per mile of track
construction, the contract was given to a building firm called Credit Mobilier at $60,000
per mile with the difference being Credit Mobilier's additional profits. In 1867 the
building contractor itself revealed the scandal when declaring a dividend of nearly 10000
"...which, even in that era of robbery business ethics, was considered more than decent.  "7
7iS Stover (1961), p.70 and Holbrook (1947), p. 170 for the race and their parallel grading lines of the two
railway companies.
736 Stover (1961), pp. 75-76. Stover (1%1), pp. 68-76 presents more detailed information about the
corruption scandals and the companies, as well as the political careers being involved.
" Holbrook (1947), p. 171
405The construction of the line had to circumvent a number of problems. Apart from
high costs on account of the supply of water, timber, rails and other materials over long
distances, the construction met further difficulties in the form of a rather chilly welcome
by the native Indian population, as the railway was leading right through their territories
and they neither considered themselves as immediate beneficiaries of the new railway line
due to rising property prices, nor did they envisage themselves as customers.738 The large
amount of per-mile-subsidies for the project diverted the companies' attention from
efficient construction towards a race for every single mile of track. As the Union Pacific's
chief engineer admitted, costs were further inflated by insisting on winter construction.
The lines, not being properly built, soon required repairs and more investment
Additionally, costs were increased by both companies' lobbying efforts for the exclusive
contracts, granting the Union and Central Pacific Railways monopolies. The bill for the
appalling railway costs was at least shared between the taxpayers via the federal budget
and the passengers of the transatlantic line due to charges including a monopolistic mark-
up.
While the government's way of encouraging railway construction might have been
done with the best intentions in mind, its effects may be observed in the shortcomings of
inefficient and maintenance-cost-intensive railway connections. The climate of
entrepreneurial freedom considerably slowed down in the aftermath of the Civil War,
growing more hostile towards the turn of the century. Corruption scandals, political
lobbying and bribery became ever more appalling and evident.739 By 1884 the hostility
towards the railways was massive, tempting the Democratic Party to exploit the
atmosphere. The Democrats claimed the Republicans were dominated by railroad interests
and published a poster, supposedly portraying a map with the land grants given to railway
companies (map 19). Even though the poster exaggerated the land the railway companies
actually received (map 20) nearly fourfold, it had often since been reprinted in school
textbooks.74°
'Despite of the army's efforts to protect the railway workers, their task was a rather tricky one and might
best be summarised with General Crook's words, who stated that "it was not easy for one soldier to sumNnd
three IndIans". The Central Pacific met less resistance by the Indians than the Union Pacific. In order to keep
them calm, the owners of the Central Pacific even decided to hand the Indian chiefs a pass for the passenger
cars and let them play around with the freight cars; see Holbrook (1947), p. 169 and Stover (1961), pp. 70-
72
An extensive range of examples is provided by Stover (1%1), pp. 114-124.
4° 'This	 wbch...wrzr made for politicalpu?poses, has bad a rnmge and :nfl.ential hssto?J. It has been reproduted rn
many a school textbook s:nce 1884 and is laie!y reiponuibk, cha,es Mr. Hen,y of the Association ofAmerican
Railroads, for the envacous :deas most Americans bold toay :n re&ard to land gnvsts. The m4 in question really
406Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyrightThe federal land grants allocated to the companies supported 18738 miles of
railways in total length, amounting to 20% of the nation's 93,000 miles of track in 1880,
when the majority of grants had been claimed. Despite the exaggeration shown in the
misleading map (map 19), the lands granted to the railways were massive, totalling 6.8% of
the United States' territory (map 20) 741 'Thus, with the aid offederal government, a segment of
the railroad industrj was able to 'break free 'from the competitive boundc which bad prevailed in the
East. As might be expected, the subsidies attracted the kind of promoters who alwqys exist on the
fringe of the business community and who are constantly seeking an 'eacy deal'. Manj  of the new western
railroads were shabbify built: th!y were not constructed to carPy traffic, but to acquire land grants. The
western railroads were true monpolies in the textbook sense of the woreL Tby could, and did, behave
with an aura ofarbitray power. But that power was not denved from a free market. It stemmed from
governmental subsidies andgovernmental restrictions. "742
741 Stover 1961), pp. 89-90; Stover also presents different estimates on the total value of the land the
government granted to the industry. Holbrook (1947), pp. 157-162 discusses the government's direct
monetary benefits from loans and land grants. Gates (1954) discussed the government's costs from land-
grants and their effect on adjacent government property, whereas Rae (1955), p.113 stated that  "thet Li
ample gn,usdfor cIaimin that the rturwsfnris this polig outweghed its eost"
'42 Greenspan (1967), pp. 64-65; see also Rand (1967), p. 103
4083. The railroad cartels and the National Grange
Interfirm co-operation was necessary to move towards an integrated railway
network. Having accomplished the most basic physical integration of the different lines,
the companies were competing for through traffic in order to cover the high amount of
fixed capital costs. The railroad managers quicUy realised that they could gain more by co-
operating than simply competing for the lowest possible rates and finally established the
railroad cartels. Through traffic on the tracks often ".. .mads the dffirence between a road's
financial success andfailure. The need to assure a steadj flow of traffw created a constant pressure for
railroad managers to obtain through freghtftvni other roads on parallel routes. They did so cutting
rates and bj aggressive advertising and selling. To control such competition railroad managers turned to
cooperation. In order to obtain this constant jow of traffic across their lines, tby made informal
alliances with competing and connecting roads. When growing pressures to obtain through traffic
weakened these alliances, railroad managers set t) more forrnalfederations, creating some of the largest
and most sophisticated cartels ever attempted in American business. But these cartels rarejy
workd"743
The 1873 depression led to a collapse of the informal pooling alliatices that were
set up to stabilise rates and avoid expensive price wars. The companies' desperate need for
traffic led to free-rider behaviour, either secretly or even openly offering rebates and lower
rates than competitors in the industry, thus undermining the arrangements of the alliances.
The outcome was sometimes as absurd as the rate war between the Erie and the New York
Central Railroad. Eventually, their competition resulted in the New York Central offering
special rates for cattle carried between Buffalo and New York City. The Erie did not miss
out on this bargain, ordered vast amounts of cattle in Buffalo and sent them right through
to New York on their competitor's line with a comfortable profit.7"
The railroad cartels had comparable fortunes. Though they were created  in
response to the collapse of the informal associations, they had exactly the same flaws. As
neither of the associations was legally enforceable, the negotiated arrangements were only
relatively stable in the prosperous years, when everybody benefited from voluntary co-
operation. The destabilising effect entered the game, whenever a company had unutilised
excess capacity. A violation offered immediate extra revenues due to excess capacity,
-
Chandler (1997), p. 123. Chandler (1997), pp. 126-144 provides a detailed analysis on the co-operation
and competition between the railways, culminating in instable cartels.
7"Stover (1961 'p.115
409equalling the opportunity costs of its compliance, so long as the cartel could not provide
for credible threats when its arrangements were breached.745
However, it was not only the railways themselves, but also their customers who
were dissatisfied with the constant rate wars. The published tariffs were intransparent and
secret rates or rebates were offered exclusively to large customers. Western farmers felt
that they had to pay the bills, whilst they were losing out in the rate-war game: the
obvious outcome was a price discrimination with fairly low rates on competitive routes
and high rates on routes with less or no competition, often to levels where the marginal
benefits for their customers were just exceeding the marginal costs of sending their goods
to the market. Especially the farmers in the West were suffering from high costs of
transportation and the intransparent pricing policy of the railways.  7 They depended on
the railways, because their only alternative to send their produce to distant markets in the
Eastern states was the long way round Cape Horn, or through the Panama Canal from
1914. 'The ultimate anger of the western farmer with the railroads was the more bitter because his
need for them was so great and his onginal expectations bad been so b:gh. In the fifties and sixties,
when he hadfew railroads, thefarmer was so hopeful of achieving cheap traniportation that be was not
on/y willing to permit his own town and countrj governments  to he(p finance them, but be also frequent/y
mortgaged hisfarm to bitj railroad stock. ...Around JVatertown, lVisconsin, th!y mortgaged their farms
for stock in a railroad that never mate,ialied. Even when the lines were built the farmer often found
his land mortgaged, his railroad stock of little value because of excessive 'water' or a reo?anilation, his
taxes high because his township bad also be'ped the railroad, and his transportation costs still
excessive. "'
This was the environment in which the American railway companies were
operating in the aftermath of the Civil War. Many farmers simply considered themselves
having lost out in the game of American railtoadisation, in which they had placed their
hopes on more prosperity. They felt betrayed by the railways' practices of rebates, pooling
arrangements, rate wars, corruption scandals and their high transport tariffs in the western
regions compared to other modes of transport The farmers got the impression that they
745 Johnson and 1{uebner (1911), pp.288-315 present a detailed analysis of freight traffic associations,
arguing that they were benefitting both the railroad companies and the public. According to Chandler (1997),
p. 137 the cartels even developed their own executive, legislative and judicial bodies in an attempt to counter
the system's inherent temptation to undermine the agreements.
746 Stover (1961), p. 114 reports of shippers's complaints in the post-Civil War era that the rates between
NewYorkCttyandChicagooften changedup to sixtytimesin oneyear,withlevels often beingas highas
"iwt ivmpfrtey thoke off business.
747 Stover (1961), pp. 120-121
410rails, but would hamper operations of lines in use. And in Wisconsin, where a notorious act called the
Potter Law had gone into effict, the roads of that state cut service to one train a dry on ma1y lines, and
set to rolling all of the antiquated cars and locomotives thçy could assemble. 4 Potter Law,' said the
railroads, 'calls for Potter cars, Potter rails, Potter time.' Badgered and met at last I.'j the first
competent opposition thy had ever known the carriers closed ranks, forgot their internecine wars of
rates and nghts-of-wtrj, and fought bath. Thçy hired expensive counsel to hamstring the new laws.
IT/hen tby pretended to obey the laws, they managed /.'j ingenious and subtle methods to show that the
laws worked a greater hardship on the public than on the roads. And constantly thy increased their
efforts to conciliate the general public. ... Virtually all of the granger laws were soon repealed, or
othenvise became inoperative; and bj 1876 the Grange itself was on the decline. Comparative
prosperity had meanwhile come to the farmer, and be no  longer saw red when be looked at a train of
steam cars. "' Still, the National Grange left a constant impression oii the railway
companies and prepared the ground for railway legislation on a national scale.
° Holbrook (1947), p. 241; see also Cunningham (1922), p. 10 for the companies' reply to the granger laws.
4144. Federal legislation
The attempts to control competition through co-operation in pooling associations
or cartels had finally failed. Due to the impossibility of legally enforcing their
arrangements, both associations had crumbled whenever their participants were tempted
to attract further traffic to exploit their excess capacity. Instead of relying on unstable
interfirm co-operation to guarantee a profitable amount of traffic flows, the management
soon resorted to internalise the arrangements to obtain the necessary traffic. In the 1890s
the total workforce of the Pennylvania Rail,vad had risen to 110,000 employees,
outnumbering any public institution as one of the largest companies in the world.75'
Paradoxically, the trend of system building was supported by the national legislation in
1887 and 1890, with the Interstate Commerce and Sherman Acts, when pooling arrangements
were declared unlawful, leaving the companies not much of an alternative to
concentration in the industry! Hayek also supported the view that the highly
protectionist policy in the United States aided the growth of monopolies.
Following an earlier investigation of a Senate Committee on supposed railway
abuses, the Supreme Court ruled against state regulation of freight services leaving the
individual state's territory, as the federal government was responsible for interstate
commerce. In the event, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, to regulate
trade between the individual states. It established the Interstate Commerce Commission to
enforce what were supposedly reasonable and just transport charges. The Act also
intended to prevent unfair discrimination, therefore outlawing rebates and pooling
arrangements between the companies, though it had been a common practice in the early
751 According to Chandler (1997), pp. 204-205 the entire US armed services employed 39,492 and the Post
Office 95440 workers in 1891. A detailed analysts of the era of system buildmg is presented in Chandler
(1997), pp. 147-187, with the companies' strategy progressing from a territorial towards an interterritorial
one, creating enterprises on a massive scale. On p. 175 Chandler stresses the point, that enforceable pooling
arrangements - contrary to the federal legislation in 1887 and 1890 - might have averted the need to build the
massive systems: "It was the response to competition and not the needr or oppoilututies to reduce costs through
adm:mstrairzve coordination that led to the internalèjng f actzeetses and transathons qf the abva& lae, bureaucratic
enterpreses usthn a single giant megacoip. If thefederal gove?wment bad sanctionedpoobng the response rmgbt have been
qeinc
752 This was the era characterised by Chandler as system-budding, Channon (1996),  p. 154. Hadley (1890 , p.
171 already anticipated the trend in 1890. Also, he strongly advised against the prohibition of pooling
arrangements, as a direct prohibition would be highly unwise, Hadley (1890), p. 158. Baker (1940),  p. 145
supported his view and advocated consohdation in the railroad industry to reduce wasteful duplication.
Hayek (1999), p. 18
7 Sharkey (1982), p.27 claimed "..the infle,abtEy qf the ICC may hate inteirc9'ied rpesoder ofiastabrüly by
preventing a rational restructuring of rates and the consequentflow of capital into the most productive sectors of the
industij."
4151870s!5 However, it was difficult to police that no discrimination between customers in
the freight business was taking place. The Commission's power was limited and often
involved long court actions but amendments were passed in 1906 and 1910, granting the
Interstate Commerce Commission the powers to set maximum price levels and suspend
rate s.756 In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Act, prohibiting horizontal and vertical
restraints of trade in order to prevent firms to abuse a dominant position in the market.
The prodaimed motivation behind the act was the belief that unrestrained free enterprise
must lead to higher costs for society, infringing upon individual rights guaranteed by the
constitution.757
Despite the acts, the railway companies continued construction on lines to close
gaps in their integrated systems and amalgamated with other train operators. As a result,
seven companies were in charge of two-thirds of the entire American railway network of
225,000 miles in 1906.758 But investments in infrastructure and equipment slowed down
due to a rise in costs and the inflexibility of the companies to raise passenger and freight
tariffs without the Interstate Commerce Commission's consent! The first decade of the
20th century '..was marked unusual activi!y on the )an of state commissions and state
legislatures. Manj new laws were passed, neart, all of which either reduced revenues or increased
expenses. The dfficuly was aggravated !.'j a conflict of regulating laws as between the states themselves,
and as between the states and the Interstate Commission. Coupkd with these adverse influences on net
earnings came greater activily on the pant of the railroad labor organizations in their demands for higher
Hadley (1889), Pp. 183-184 that the prohibition of railroad pools enabled ". .  the most reckless among several
companies to set the .rtandardfor the whole competitive business...".
"6 Cunningham (1922), p. 10-20 discusses the federal legjslation in the decades right after the 1887
Interstate Commerce Act and its consequences on the efficiency of American railroads; see also Holbrook
(1947), p. 242 and Stover (1961 , pp. 131-134. Greenspan (1967), p. 65 holds government legislation
responsible for the evils the Interstate Commerce Act was supposed to relieve: 'That Act was not necessitated
by the 'ciels' ftbefree market. Like subsequent legsslaIion controlbng business, the Act was an attempt to remedy the
economic distortions wbithpnor,governrnent interventions bad create4 but which were blamed on thefree market. The
Interstate Commerce Act, in tun, produced new deston'io,u in the structure andfinances of the nubvadr"Judging upon
the railroads' post-war development Nelson (1960), pp. 502-503 supports Greenspan's general verdict on
the negative effects of regulation in the United States, as it postponed necessary adjustments.
7 Schmidt (1993), PP. 203-205 leaves no doubt that the Sherman Act's major intention was to protectfi
competition. Greenspan (1967), p.66 issues a clear verdict upon the early antitrust legislation in the United
States: 'It takes e rrxnIinay skill to hold more than fi/y percent qf a large industsj '.s market in afree economy. It
requires unusualfmductisn abil4y, unfailing buuness judgment, unrelenting e'ffort at the continuous imprv ttement of one's
product and technique. The rare company which is able to retain its share  of the ,narketjear afieryear and decade €fter
decade does so by means ofproductice 'fficieny - and do enespnnse, not condemnation. The Sherman Act may be
understandable when teewed as a projection of the nineteenth century 'ifear and economi ignorance. But it is utter
nonsense in the context of today's economic knowledge."
7 Stover (1961), p. 135
7 Pegrum (1957), p.424 suggested ". . . that the Com,mssion feels that it is a betterjudge of what i.rgoodfor the
nuiruads thai, they are." Similar notions seemed to prevail across the regulated railway industries in other
countries, most notably with regard to the British Transport Commission (see section Ill).
416C. Scope for research in transport economics - the pricing of roads
Implementation of Model E would establish a railway industry operating like any
other industry. However, it is not sufficient to create a market for railway traffic, if
considerable distortions remain in the overall transport market. An efficient transport
system requires a level playing field for all modes in a competitive transport market.762
Regarding the scarcity of capacity on the roads l-libbs noted, ' . . there must be serious
imperfections in the marketfor mobility so 4mg as there is no marketfor the use of road space, which at
certain times andplaces is an exceedingfy scarce commodity. 'p"
There has been a long experience with privately provided roads, from the early
turnpike trusts to modern toll roads.764 Some countries, notably Germany, were reluctant
to implement toll road schemes, but even where annual motorway tolls were introduced
the systems were inefficient if linked to a specific vehicle rather than actual road usage.
Instead of restricting road use, toll schemes with an annual fixed rate encourage excessive
use of the facility, as the charge is independent from the point of use. However, transport
telematics allows for exact charging of road use.765 While earlier proposals suggested the
use of smart cards or radio beacons, the wide use of the Global Positioning ystem (GPS) for
individual traffic routing offers simple methods in exact point-to-point road pricing and
congestion charging.
The technolor now available provides for a more radical approach to road user
charging, as it is not confined to special toll booths or beacons on motorways.7 Still, it
must be emphasised that road prices are a device szgnalling the true costs of scarce resources
and not a tax on road use.767 If road pricing comprises the exact costs of road use,
including congestion costs and environmental damages, a reform of financing roads must
abolish fuel and excise duties that are currently levied, as well as the environmental tax on
fuel consumption levied in Germany, as double charging distorts the price mechanism and
762 Kriieps (1991), p. 8
Hibbs (1993), pp. 70-71
" Hibbs and Roth (1992), pp. 17-20. Poole and Orski (2000, p. 17 discuss the conversion from high-
occupancy vehicle to high-occupancy toll lanes, investigating current projects in the United States, where a toll
varying with traffic congestion is automatically deducted from the driver's prepaid account, ranging from 50
cents to US$8.
Knipping (1999) advocates private supply and pricing of roads via telematic systems in a paper presited
to the 1999 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Conference. Ngkamp, Pepping and Banister
(1996), p. 20 comment upon the technological progress in telematics systems.
' Ewers and Rodi (1995) analysed the possibility to privatise Germany's federal motorways in a
comprehensive study and strongly advised an eventual pnvatisation.
435the efficient resource allocation. The road prices signal the true costs to road users to
confront them with transparent choices. If car owners do not use the road, they may not
be charged for the pure possession of the vehicle, as they do not impose any costs on the
road system. However, road operators may set up a two-tier system of fixed and variable
charges to recover the fixed costs of the infrastructure.76
Recently, the German government agreed on the introduction of tolls for road
haulage operators on motorways in accordance to distance travelled, based on telematics
systems. The exdusivity of the toll for road haulage results in new distortions, such as
discrimination in favour of rail freight, more traffic on county or municipal roads with
entailed pollution, longer journeys and higher final prices for consumers, as the new toll
does not replace vehicle, fuel or environmental taxes already in existence. In contrast, the
government imposed an additional burden to actively discourage road haulage and
promote rail freight with the revenues from the new charge.
Commenting on similar British phenomena Roth noted, ' . .  jf use4 as currently
envisaged, as a 'b:ghfy effective restraint measure ', congestion pricing coui1 become an instrument of
(yrannj enabling gowrnments to increase their powers l'j extracting rents from the use of monopolised
infrastructure. )V Rather than using road pricing to efficiently allocate scarce resources,
transport policy is still subject to the conventional wisdom of protectionism.77° The
obvious solution to this problem is the privatisation of existing roads and the private
provision of new infrastructure according to market demand in a model similar to the
competing ROCs. However, the implementation will be easier in road than in rail traffic,
due to the higher flexibility of individual drivers and a huge supply of alternative
connecting routes. Here, more research must be undertaken during the implementation
phase of the German pricing scheme for roads to allow for an upgrade to general road
pricing and the abolition of road-related taxes.
Hibbs (1993), pp. 73-74
761 Hibbs (1982), p.67 envisaged a two-part tariff of a licence fee and an additional thaxe releated to the
varying demands of road space.
Roth (1998), p. 13
'° Day (1998), p. 5
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